Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/115756
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Chance, determinism, and unsettledness |
Author: | Eagle, A. |
Citation: | Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition, 2019; 176(3):781-802 |
Publisher: | Springer Netherlands |
Issue Date: | 2019 |
ISSN: | 0031-8116 1573-0883 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Antony Eagle |
Abstract: | A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments. |
Keywords: | Chance; determinism; unsettledness; indeterminacy; laws; undermining; context-dependence |
Rights: | © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-018-1039-1 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1039-1 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Philosophy publications |
Files in This Item:
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hdl_115756.pdf | Accepted version | 486.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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