Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16104
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGamble, Denise D.en
dc.date.issued1997en
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997; 20:149-150en
dc.identifier.issn0140-525Xen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16104-
dc.descriptionCopyright © 1997 Cambridge University Pressen
dc.descriptionPlease see page 149 of PDF for this article.en
dc.description.abstractP-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityDenise Gambleen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.source.urihttp://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=29393&fulltextType=SC&fileId=S0140525X97250053en
dc.titleP-Consciousness Presentation/A-Consciousness Representationen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanities : Philosophyen
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat 
Gamble_16104.pdf180.55 kBPublisher's PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.