Institutions and values: climate change adaptation mainstreaming implementation in Kiribati

Abstract

Climate change adaptation mainstreaming (CCAM) is considered an effective way of integrating climate change adaptation and sustainable development agendas in policy and practice. Conventional approaches to CCAM emphasise either: a) a technological response that focuses on ensuring climate change projections influence decision-making; or b) the need for CCAM to incorporate an understanding of the underlying drivers of vulnerability that expose people to climate change impacts. However, both approaches give inadequate attention to political and social conflict in shaping CCAM implementation. This dissertation presents a case study from the Republic of Kiribati to explore the role of political and social conflict in shaping CCAM. It argues that the Government of Kiribati, in partnership with United Nations Development Program (UNDP), via the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), and the World Bank, via the Kiribati Adaptation Program (KAP), failed to effectively implement mainstreaming. Yet the KAP made more progress than the NAPA. Why was mainstreaming largely unsuccessful in Kiribati? Why did the KAP have more success compared with the NAPA? What does this case study tell us about the political and social pre-conditions for successful CCAM implementation? And what are the implications for CCAM policy and implementation in developing countries? In addressing these questions, I draw on normative neo-institutionalism and the notion of epistemic communities. Normative neo-institutionalism, and especially Olsen’s four pre-conditions for successful reform, provides a powerful framework for understanding the role of political and social factors in reform processes, while the notion of epistemic communities helps us to understand the nature of the values and actors that characterise these factors. According to this approach, successful CCAM implementation depends upon: a) a high degree of normative matching between the reform and implementing institution; b) a high degree of normative matching between the reform and the relevant society; c) a high degree of clarity about reformers’ intentions; and d) the capacity and resources of the institution implementing the reform. CCAM implementation in Kiribati was largely unsuccessful because: a) two competing coalitions became embroiled in political struggles over CCAM; and b) Olsen’s four pre- conditions for successful reform were not met. In regards to the first point, I show that the Ministry for Environment, Land and Agricultural Development formed a coalition with UNDP to support a vulnerability-based approach to CCAM, while the Office of the President formed a coalition with the World Bank to advocate for a technology-based approach. On the second point, I argue that the NAPA initially succeeded because performance against a majority of the pre-conditions was strong, but it ultimately failed because the government became disenchanted with the coalition’s vulnerability-based approach to CCAM. The KAP had more success long term because its coalition of support had greater resources and support from the government to push their technology-driven approach. However, tension within its supporting coalition led to reduced normative matching and capacity to support CCAM implementation. In policy terms, the implication is that CCAM strategies, and the step-by-step guides designed to inform implementation, should take politics and values into account.