Fisher's annotations from his review copy of -

A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY by J.M. KEYNES

p.5, para. 1	An argument is either conclusive or worthless. A conclusive argument may conclude that a certain proposition is probably true, i.e. that it is an unparticularised member of a class of which a known proportion are true.
p.10, para. 2 1.7	such a belief may none the less be true and certain
p.22, para. 2	The degree of belief is measurable and numerical but not the degree of rational belief?
p.28, para. 1	That a quantity is unknown is no argument that it is not numerical.
p.29, para. 1	The probability may be estimated from appropriate statistics or deduced from a known mechanism of causation, otherwise it is unknown.
p.31, para. 4 line 5	this assumes that we always can know the probability from the old evidence
p.32, para. 3 line 3	Unless it justifies certainty it justifies no knowledge at all.
p.33, para. 2 line 6 from bottom	where?
p.42, para. 3	if they *must* be known
p.44, para. 2	it *is* necessarily unknown

p.44, para. 4 line 3 from end	A parallel distinction is regarded as relevant evidence on p.57.
p.46, para. 1	has any objective quantity numerical quantitativeness in any other sense?
p.48, para. 1	(a) this to one circle only (b) this population of lines is equally related to all circles (c) this is equally related to all concentric circles.
p.49, para. 3	The invalidity of the principle is equally great with finite numbers.
p.50, para.1	both hypothesis as to the population of bags are self-consistent; the population is, however, unknown.
p.50, para. 2	In this case the population is known and the problem solvable, it has nothing to do with the "text book theory".
p.60, para. 2 line 4	but the form of a proposition may be changed without changing its meaning; disjunction of equivalent propositions is always possible.
p.62, para. 1 line 2	no *unique* units as in all other cases, see 25 below.
p.62, para 3	By projecting or inverting the points the case is evidently equivalent to that of the specific volume.
p.63, para. 1	The shape is immaterial and does not even depend on the solution adopted. The different populations of lines give different results in whatever limiting forms they are approached.

p.69, para. 4	pp.56-57 it is "proved" that on the constitution hypothesis is also legitimate and on this hypothesis h_1 does not strengthen a.
p.82, para. 1	in such a case the probability is unknown.
p.86, para. 3 line 4	this confuses knowledge of populations with knowledge of individuals.
p.99, para. 3	In this case the statistical mechanism is known and we do not require the principle of indifference.
p.102	We have no choice; what we seek in practice is the probability of success in a <u>given class</u> of actions. For any <u>particular</u> action the unknown probability is either 0 or 1.
p.105, para. 1	This seems sheer nonsense; the class of reference should be the same for all chances considered.
p.106, para. 1	This solution is certainly invalid; the problem is indeterminate.
p.106, bottom line	are there any legitimate instances?
p.339, para. 1	whose criticism??
p.339, footnote 1	h, however, is not usually an integer
p.381, para. 1	The opposite might equally be claimed; the distribution of statistical ratios in general is a meaningless conception.
p.382, para. 2	this criticism is childish.