

WILLIAM PENN'S PEACE PLAN

(By Professor Coleman Phillipson)

Some time ago I gave a brief account in these columns of a remarkable peace proposal set forth in 1306 by Pierre Dubois, a mediaeval publicist. I then thought that, in view of the present League of Nations and the agitation, controversies, and conflicts raging round it, it would be well to recall various pacifist schemes of the past, to see how they originated and what was their fate.

The only way to understand the peace idea is to study it on a comparative and historical basis. Failing this we cannot properly understand the League of Nations, with its covenants and protocols, or realise the extent of its originality on the one hand and its indebtedness to earlier schemes on the other. I am preparing a comprehensive work on the whole subject; but here I can say only a few words from time to time on the notable pioneers of permanent international peace. Last time I dealt briefly with the scheme of a Frenchman; today I propose to touch with equal briefness on the project of a great Englishman, William Penn. A French thinker may fascinate us by the breadth of his generalisations, but he tends to disregard practical difficulties. An English thinker is usually less daring in his imaginative flight, because he pays heed to actual conditions and is alive to difficulties. In this respect Penn is true to his race.

War and Cry for Peace

Penn's book, entitled "Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament, and Estates," was published in London and anonymously in December, 1693, and a second edition was issued in the early part of the following year. Like so many publications of the kind, it appeared amid the turmoil, devastation, and slaughter of war. The war of the League of Augsburg (1688-1698), waged by a number of European Allies against the threatened domination of Louis XIV. of France, was most exhausting to France and a wearisome burden to England; indeed, all parties were anxious for peace.

Penn was confronted with a situation similar in some respects to that of the Great War of 1914-1918. The European conflict with France was undertaken for the stabilisation of the "balance of power" between the leading rival States and for checking the overweening ambition of a sovereign who desired to become master of Europe. Penn was in advance of his time in realising first the tragic futility of waging wars for attaining international equilibrium; secondly, the absolute necessity of reconciling the freedom of national sovereignty and independence with the supreme exigencies of peace and order; and thirdly, that durable peace and order could be assured only by the establishment of a common central European authority.

A Central Organisation

After discussing peace and its benefits, the means of securing peace, the causes of war and disputes, he lays down the fundamental principles that "peace is maintained by justice, which is a fruit of government," so that the only way to attain European peace is by organising a league or confederacy of nations subject to a supreme assembly. This body, styled, say, "the Sovereign or Imperial Diet, Parliament, or State of Europe," would consist of deputies of all the European States.

The question of its composition, he admits, is a great difficulty, but is not "invincible;" the number of representatives might be fixed in proportion to national wealth. By way of illustration, which he says is based entirely on guesswork, he suggests the following numbers:—Germany (the Roman Empire), 12; France, 10; Spain, 10; Italy, 8; England, 6; Sweden ("Swed-

land), 4; Poland, 4; Holland, 4; Denmark, 3; Portugal, 3; Venice, 3; Switzerland, 2. "And if the Turks and Muscovites (Russia) are taken in, as seems but fit and just, they will make up a piece more;" and so the total number of deputies will be 90. With the characteristic modesty of the Englishman, he suggests a comparatively small representation for his own country. He adds that there need not be always so many persons present to represent the larger States, for the votes may be given by one man as well as by several; "though the fuller the assembly of States is the more solemn, effectual, and free the debates will be, and the resolutions must needs come with greater authority."

Disputes before the Assembly

Penn suggests that the Assembly should meet annually, the first meeting to be held at a central place and afterwards as agreed. Its main function was first to establish rules of justice for sovereign princes and States to observe toward each other; and secondly, to hear and adjudicate on such international differences as could not be settled by the ordinary channels of diplomacy before the sessions began.

If any of the constituent members of the League refused to submit their claims to the Assembly or to abide by and carry out its decision, and proceeded to take up arms against another member, then all the other members were bound to unite "as one strength" to compel submission to and performance of the decision, with damages to the suffering party and costs to the States that enforced the submission. As no single State would have the power to oppose successfully such a combination, "to be sure Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed peace to her harassed inhabitants."

William Penn concludes by expressing a wish that the honor of initiating such a design might fall to England; and he disclaims any great share in the proposal on the ground that such a scheme had already been put forward by Henry IV. of France.

(I hope to deal on another occasion with "Sully's Grand Design," ascribed to his sovereign Henry IV.)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE.

EXAMINATION RESULTS.
FACULTY OF LAW.
EXAMINATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF LL.B.
MARCH, 1925.
Law of Property (part 1).
Third Class.—Butler, Harold Dixie.
Law of Wrongs.
Third Class (in order of merit).—Mollison, Thomas; Gillespie, William Charles; Whimpress, Thomas Abraham (equal); Forgan, Frederick Robert.
Law of Evidence and Procedure.
Third Class.—Outlack, Peter Robert.
Constitutional Law.
Third Class (in order of merit).—Lyon, Hugh Pearson Dunlop; Goode, Evan Anderson.
Ordinary Examination for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Pass List.
Latin (2). First Course.—Passed (in alphabetical order).—Donnithorne, William; Goodhart, Mabel Flora.
Logic (21).—Passed.—Forgan, Frederick Robert.
Special Examinations for the Degree of B.A., B.Sc., and B.E. (Not Classified).
Modern History.—Third year (European history).—Bawden, Albert Victor.
Psychology.—Gerlach, Max Johann.
Pure Mathematics, Second Year.—Milne, Kenneth Harvey.
Inorganic Chemistry, I. (compulsory, 45).—Dixon, Lyall Douglas; McMahon, John Patrick; Ople, Arnold Mestyn; Rodley, Harold Boyce Ernest.

THE SPANISH WAR IN AFRICA.

IS IT A RELIGIOUS WAR?

By ARCHIBALD T. STRONG, Professor of English Literature in the University of Adelaide.

An interesting comment upon Spain's administration of her Moroccan zone, and incidentally, upon her conduct of her hitherto disastrous war, was made to me by an English army colonel whom I met at Gibraltar. The day was one of absolute peace; the great rock lay dreaming in the mild winter sunshine; and as we crossed over to exquisite Algeciras, the dead calm of the water was broken only by a brisk school of porpoises, who seemed to share our exultation in the beauty of the scene. On the African side, hardly a stone's throw away, so it seemed, lay Ceuta, the Spanish port of debarkation for the war, and for some miles to the right of this town ran a peaceful-looking strand.

The Roar of the Spanish Guns.

It was difficult to believe that a little inward from the coast, savage warfare was being waged, yet the trippers who crossed to Tangier that day heard the roar of the Spanish guns. The colonel, pointing to the quiet strand, remarked, "Even before this war, we fellows at Gibraltar could never go over there for an afternoon's shooting; we would have had our throats cut by the Riflians. The Spaniards had absolutely no control of the place. I would not trust them to administer a chicken farm."

At that time I thought that the colonel was exaggerating, and that the Spaniards might be able to administer a chicken

farm, and possibly even a war; but I may mention that within the three days succeeding our talk I myself was involved in one railway breakdown, one tram accident, and one wait of half an hour in a tram till the other tram reached the point of crossing. Also, I sat in a third tram at Granada while it made five spirited but unsuccessful little charges at the points in front of it.

The points, I may mention, had never been opened, but the driver was evidently in favor of Sir William Lyne's policy of "bullocking through." I could not help thinking that if the war were conducted on the same lines as the railway and tram services, it became at once possible to understand how that intrepid Moroccan chieftain, Abd El Krim, with a force of at most ten thousand, had inflicted numerous crushing defeats upon a Spanish army of over ten times that number, and how in 1921, in the crowning disaster of Annual, where the Moors cut Silvestre's communications and surrounded him, twelve thousand Spaniards remained dead upon the field, and the entire remainder, fifteen thousand in number, were captured by the rough Riflian tribesmen. That disaster remains unavenged to-day, and the Moroccans are not only undefeated, but consistently victorious.

Spanish Soldiers Brave as Lions.

Blasco Ibanez, in his savage pamphlet against King Alfonso XIII., says that Abd El Krim obtains all the guns and munitions he needs from his victories over the Spaniards; but M. Jacques Marsillac, the special correspondent of the Parisian daily, "Le Journal," who has recently visited Abd El Krim, states that this chieftain, for some reason or other, makes no use of these captures and has achieved all his victories by rifle fire alone; while the Spaniards are abundantly provided with big guns and aeroplanes.

The French are, of course, keenly interested in the present war, as it may easily spread into their own zone; but M. Marsillac assures them that they have nothing to fear, even if Abd El Krim should break his solemn promise and attack them, for he says that the genius of Marshal Lyautey, the great administrator of French Morocco, would settle in a few weeks what the Spaniards have been unable to accomplish in fourteen years. There could be no sterner comment upon the Spanish staff work, and M. Marsillac has been for months with the Spanish army, knows all their difficulties, and is by no means ill-disposed toward them.

Be it said at once, for the honor of Spain, that, according to every available account, the Spanish soldiers are as brave as lions. Silvestre and his staff atoned for the idiotic strategy of Annual by fighting hand to hand with the enemy till they all died. On another occasion a small Spanish force, commanded by a general, committed suicide to a man when surrounded by the enemy to avoid undergoing the hideous tortures and mutilation which the Riflians inflict upon their captives.

The Spanish soldier, whether private or regimental officer, is a gallant-looking fellow, who wears his ample parti-colored cloak with an amiable and quite unfashionable swagger. I passed trainloads of such on my journey from South to North of Spain; and I have never seen a brighter and more sturdy company than the officers whom I encountered at the artillery school at Segovia. It made one's heart sick to think of the fate to which many of them were doomed by the incompetence of their high command.

Alfonso Says it is the Cross Versus the Crescent.

The Spanish war in Africa has great meaning for Europe, and for our own Empire, especially in relation to Egypt, and might at first appear. The Spanish authorities are diligently spreading the report that it is a religious war, and may therefore spread to the whole of Africa, with disastrous results to the European Powers if Abd El Krim remain uncrushed.

King Alfonso, in the extraordinary speech which he made to the Pope during his visit to Italy, actually proclaimed that the war was one of Cross versus Crescent. The immediate result of this announcement was disastrous to Spain, for Abd El Krim had it translated and circulated among the tribes, with the result that the eastern zone, hitherto neutral, at once rose against the Spaniards. Spain can now hardly count on a single friendly Moroccan tribe, whereas France, in her zone, has numerous devoted allies among the natives. Abd El Krim has recently declared that on his side the war is not a religious one, that it is purely local, and anti-Spanish, and, above all things, that he is well disposed to the French. Yet he has refused to accept the authority of Moulay Youssef, whom the French recognize as Sultan of Morocco; and it is beyond doubt that he has received messages from all over Northern Africa, begging him to raise the standard of Islam, assume the title of Sultan, and organise a great Mohammedan army on the chief Mohammedan festival, Abd-el-Kebir, the Festival of Sheep.

The psychological question, whether Abd El Krim can resist temptation is indeed of some moment even to Australia.



King Alfonso.

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