

**NATO's Eastward Expansion
and Peace-enforcement Role in the Violent Dissolution
of Yugoslavia: 1994 - 2004**

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Discipline
of Politics, School of History and Politics, The University of Adelaide,
October 2007

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, political and geographical realities have changed considerably. One such reality was the balance of power between East and West, which was especially visible in Europe. The contest between rivals, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was over. Ultimately, NATO found itself the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe. The new post-cold war environment forced questions about the appropriate role for NATO. However, that changed with both the process of NATO expansion into former Warsaw pact countries and the ethnic conflicts throughout the former Yugoslavia. NATO found a new purpose during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia as 'peace-enforcer' in the Balkan region.

The focus of this thesis is NATO's role in peace-enforcement in the former Yugoslavia. It examines how NATO dealt with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Specifically, how NATO managed to re-establish its relevance as a security organisation. NATO's military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were crucial in securing the end of hostilities in both those regions. NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) all played significant roles in subsequent peace-enforcement and peace-building roles in the region by suppressing violence through power projection and institution building. In 2001, NATO undertook a third operation in the Balkans, that time of a more limited nature, disarming ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO's presence there also encouraged stability.

This thesis argues that, ultimately, NATO maintained its relevance by the establishing a new role for itself after the Cold War through Eastward expansion and in suppressing ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Both these roles have been successful. The decisive interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM forced the belligerents to stop fighting. NATO's subsequent enforcement of the peace has stopped each conflict from flaring up again. With NATO membership now including most of Europe, it remains the only viable security organisation on the continent. NATO's effectiveness as a security organisation was demonstrated with its ability to end the conflict in the Balkans and providing a stable environment for the people of the region. This intervention was crucial to the definition of a new role for NATO in the post-Cold War world.

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University or either tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I give my consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan or photocopying.

Signed

Paul Tsoundarou

Date:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been written without the contribution of many people dear to me. Firstly, I would like to extend my warmest and most heart felt gratitude to my principal supervisor, Dr. Felix Patrikeeff, who lent me not only his professional guidance, which was most insightful, but also his morale support. No matter the challenges I faced and especially when I lost faith in myself, Felix was able with his words of support, to lift my spirits. Many thanks for his support and friendship. Also, I would like to acknowledge with much appreciation and thanks the efforts of my co-supervisor, Dr. Clement Macintyre, who three times throughout my candidature had to step into the breach. His commitment to assisting me progress with my work, whilst under heavy pressure with other commitments as head of discipline, was deeply appreciated. His words of encouragement and professional advice were always accepted with enormous gratitude. My sincere thanks are also extended to Associate Professor Carol Johnson and Associate Professor Paul Corcoran, who as postgraduate coordinators, were always supportive in that role.

Dedicating time to my thesis would not have been possible without financial support. To that end, my sincere appreciation to Dr. Felix Patrikeeff, Dr. Bhumitra Chakma and Associate Professor Peter Mayer from the Discipline of Politics at the University of Adelaide for their support. Also I am also grateful to the academic staff at the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia and the School of Political and International Studies at Flinders University for providing me with opportunities to teach in their courses, these opportunities were invaluable in my professional development and experience. They continued to look after me throughout my candidature, so thank you for your encouragement and support.

I would also like to thank my fellow postgraduates, whom over the years have become good friends. Thanks especially for letting me expressing my doubts, expectations and goals over endless cups of coffee and tea throughout my PhD candidature, there are too many of you to name, but you know who you all are.

Finally, to my family and friends, but especially to my wife Amanda who has been an inspiration to me. Thank you for loving me, being there for me when I have been down on myself during this long process. You have looked after me with encouragement, dedication, inspiration and patience. I hope you will find as much relief and joy with the completion of this thesis as I will. This work is dedicated to you.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- BiH** – Bosnia and Herzegovina
- CIA** – Central Intelligence Agency
- COMINFORM** – Communist Information Bureau
- CPY** – Communist Party of Yugoslavia
- CSCE** – Council of Security and Cooperation in Europe (Now known as OSCE)
- DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT** – November 1995 Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina
- EAM – ELAS** –
- EEC** – European Economic Community
- EU** – European Union
- FRY** – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- FYROM** – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- ICTY** – International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
- IFOR** – Implementation Force (NATO forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- IMF** – International Monetary Fund
- JNA** – Yugoslav People’s Army
- KFOR** – Kosovo Force (NATO forces deployed in Kosovo)
- KLA** – Kosovo Liberation Army
- LCY** – League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- MASPOK** – Masovni Pokret (Mass Movement for Croatian Uprising in 1971)
- MUP** – Serbian Secret Police
- NAC** – North Atlantic Council
- NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- NATO – RPJC** – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Russian Permanent Joint Council
- NDH** – Croatian Ustache State declared in 1941
- NLA** – National Liberation Army
- NO FLY ZONE** – established in Bosnia and Herzegovina by NATO air patrols
- OPERATION ALLIED FORCE** – NATO Military Action in Yugoslavia
- OPERATION AMBER FOX** – NATO Operation in FYROM
- OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE** – NATO Military Action in Bosnia
- OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOUR** – NATO’s implementation mandate in Bosnia
- OSCE** – Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe

RAMBOULLIET ACCORD – Peace Plan signed by Kosovo Albanians (1999)
RSA – Republika Srpska Armije (The Bosnian Serb Army)
SAFE HAVEN – UN protected zones within Bosnia and Herzegovina
SANU – Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
SAP – Socialist Autonomous Province
SFOR – Stabilisation Force – (NATO’s initial deployment in Bosnia)
SFRY – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
TDF – Territorial Defense Force
UCK – Albanian Acronym for the KLA
UN – United Nations
UNEF II – United Nations Emergency Force II
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICYP – United Nations force in Cyprus
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force – Deployed in Croatia and Bosnia
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
USS – United States Ship
USSR – The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Vecernje Novosti – A newspaper in Serbia
VJ – Yugoslav Army
WEU – Western European Union
YPA – Slovenian Opposition Group

MAPS OF NATO MEMBERS AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

NATO Member States



NOTE: This map is included on page xi of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: NATO E-Generation Maps website, <http://www.nato.int/icons/map/b-map.jpg>

Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1991)



NOTE: This map is included on page xii of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Yugoslavia 1990: *Before the Break-up*, www.geographic.org,
<http://www.geographic.org/maps/former_yugoslavia_maps.html>

Introduction

An Overview of the Thesis Study

This thesis deals with the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's transition from its traditional role as guardian of the Western World during the Cold War against the Warsaw Pact, to the peace-enforcement specialist institution in South Eastern Europe, otherwise known as the Balkans. Specifically, it will examine NATO's Eastward Expansion, Peace-enforcement and Peace-building operations in the Former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and compare these three case studies.

The core hypothesis of this thesis is that NATO emerged as the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War. With its Cold War role at an end, NATO continued to retain relevance by expanding its membership eastward to Russia's borders and enhanced its military credibility through its interventions to suppress ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the FYROM. NATO's expansion and its peace operations at times were problematic, but both processes have proved to be a success, both in defining NATO's post-Cold War role and in ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia. In addition to NATO's successful expansion and peace-enforcement roles, this thesis argues that NATO also made some mistakes in its handling of its peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, but that it had learnt from those mistakes and implemented those lessons during its fully successful role in FYROM.

The thesis deals with the dilemma NATO found itself in, questioning its usefulness and purpose after the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union dissolved. While NATO was

contemplating its fate, a violent outbreak of conflict erupted on NATO's doorstep, in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO and its influence remained limited throughout the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, and only really saw a shift in its policy part way through the bloody conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993-1994. It was the three way ethnic conflict between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, the enormity of the humanitarian suffering on all sides, as well as the serial failure by the United Nations to protect civilians in Bosnia, that NATO sensed both an obligation and an opportunity to carve a role for itself in the post-Cold War world. The Bosnian case study, in the NATO context, was also a test of NATO's resolve to use military force. This resolve was severely tested, and NATO often proved unwilling to act decisively, except toward the end of the conflict where appalling atrocities were committed under the watch of the United Nations forces. NATO's approach was cautious in Bosnia, but ultimately the alliance responded to the challenge and ended the Bosnian civil war with a final military campaign in 1995, followed by a negotiated peace accord between the three sides. NATO's caution in Bosnia had been used by some to attribute blame for the heavy loss of life during the Bosnian War, as it dragged on in uninhibited fashion. However, NATO's decisiveness in ultimately ending the conflict and enforcing the peace from late 1995 through to late 2004 in Bosnia enhanced stability significantly in that war-torn country.

NATO policy and its military intervention in the Kosovo conflict in April 1999, however, differed significantly from that of the Bosnian case study. When NATO finally decided to apply military force against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo and throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it did so with little restraint, indicating that NATO had attempted to apply the lesson learnt in the Bosnian case, which was to apply force quickly to end the conflict, which saved more lives in the longer run. The Kosovo case study, however, has proven to be more complex, since, although the

Kosovo Force (KFOR) patrols and maintains security, its inhabitants are more willing to kill one another under NATO's supervision. This is mainly due to the Kosovo conflict being suppressed quickly and not left to run its natural course. In Bosnia, though, people became tired of war after nearly four years of heavy conflict, hence the people of Bosnia generally welcomed the peace NATO brought to the country. In Kosovo, however, both the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians appeared to have unfinished business to attend to. Also, in Bosnia, separate partitioned areas divide the ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, while in Kosovo, no such formal partition exists. These issues complicate NATO's task in Kosovo, and the Kosovo case study has been the most difficult for NATO and its role in establishing peace and stability of the three examined cases. The KFOR mission in Kosovo continues at present with little evidence of being terminated any time in the foreseeable future. In contrast, NATO's intervention in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was carried out with little difficulty and avoided the problems of the Bosnian and Kosovo case studies.

NATO's limited intervention in FYROM in 2001, demonstrated NATO's resolve in nipping conflicts 'in the bud' and doing so on the basis of the lessons it had appeared to learn from both its peace-enforcement interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO's insertion into the country was not a military campaign, but rather a pre-negotiated presence in FYROM in order to establish stability through the collection of weapons. Disarming the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group was the primary objective. This presence was successful in convincing the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority to negotiate a new Constitution, which was adopted under NATO supervision. The FYROM case study, for NATO, was the most successful. NATO did not have to resort to using violence, the conflict in FYROM had barely taken root when NATO intervened, essentially establishing a preventative

presence to discourage further violence in the country; turning over control of the operation to the European Union late in 2003. The FYROM case study demonstrated how NATO had incorporated the lessons learnt when intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo, and a concerted effort to not repeat mistakes of the past.

The Context of the Study

This thesis is primarily as a study on NATO's role in peace-enforcement and peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM and asks the overarching question of whether this role has been a success. These three different interventions will be compared and contrasted in order to establish the 'learning curve' NATO has undertaken regarding any mistakes or miscalculations it made during these operations. However, NATO's overall position and struggle for relevance through Eastward expansion after the end of the Cold War is also examined in order to establish the importance of its Balkan operations held for its own purpose of maintaining the position of the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe.

In order to establish some realistic perspective on the deep-seated tension, hatred, passion and brutality of the conflicts within the former Yugoslavia, it is necessary to provide a detailed account of the major events that triggered the wars and the intense levels of violence experienced, these extending to rape, murder, torture and even genocide. Understanding the complexities of the wars in the former Yugoslavia allow the reader to comprehend the situations NATO inherited when the decisions were made to intervene in these conflicts, thereby contributing to the argument that when comparing the situation on the ground pre-NATO intervention and post-NATO intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM, it may be concluded that the post-NATO security environment was always far more stable.

Methodology and Theoretical Perspective

The two areas of focus of the thesis are: first, to see whether NATO was able to reassert its relevance after the Cold War, and, second, perhaps more significantly, as part of that effort to reassert its relevance, whether NATO's peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM were successful both in establishing security and enhancing the credibility of the alliance. These twin foci will be framed through the use of a contemporary historical analysis, similar in style to works by Michael Ignatieff in *Virtual War (2000)* and *Empire Lite (2003)* as well as Timothy Garton Ash in *History of the Present* and *Free World (2004)*. Each will help to shape the examination and analyse the political and strategic series of events that led to the end Cold War and its aftermath, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its violent break-up and NATO's three peace operations aimed at ending and preventing further ethnic conflict in the region.

The main focus is applied to the period of the twilight of the Cold War, specifically relating this to NATO, insofar as the end of the Cold War created a dilemma for NATO: Should it preserve its relevance by utilising the intense desire of former Eastern Bloc countries to join the alliance, in order to validate their claim of being Western-orientated through the process of Eastward expansion? Examination of the significant milestones, such as Madrid Summit where NATO made key decisions in favour of expansion, speeches by leaders that highlighted the relevant policies of member and non-member states, especially Russia, toward NATO and its strategic direction provide insight into whether NATO's emerging role was popular or fraught with confrontation during the post-Cold War period, especially in achieving its newly-defined goals of enlargement and peace-enforcement.

The thesis highlights the question of whether NATO's interventions had a positive impact on the areas covered by the three case studies. In doing so, however, it is important to provide a historical analysis of both the key political and security developments leading up to NATO's interventions; specifically, a detailed analysis of the violent break up of Yugoslavia and examining events such as the Srebrenica massacre, the detention camps in Bosnia, the shelling of Sarajevo, and the Racak massacre in Kosovo. With the pre-NATO intervention periods covered, an analysis of the actual military operations NATO undertook to enforce the peace, especially NATO's attempts at encouraging and maintaining security and stability in the region is offered.

With the detailed contemporary historical analysis of both the pre-NATO and post-NATO intervention period provided, the thesis will use comparison of the two periods in order to determine the level of success NATO achieved in its objectives in the three case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM. To determine and analyse whether NATO appeared to learn from mistakes made in the early operations and apply its lessons to the more recent peace operations requires a comparative method to examine the similarities and differences of each peace-enforcement and peace-building model.

This thesis is informed by Stanley Hoffmann's interpretation of Judith Shklar's dystopian liberalism, as this is given expression in one of her most significant essays, 'The Liberalism of Fear'.¹ Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear, according to Hoffmann, is:

compatible with the Kantian one [version of liberalism] but is less philosophical, less purely rationale, more easily compatible with the

¹ Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era*, Updated Edition, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, 1998, p.67.

calculation of consequences, and based much more on emotions and common experiences ... Her [Shklar's] argument is that although at the twentieth century the old liberal faith in reason and progress is no longer credible, there is one experience that everybody who has lived through this century shares, the experience of cruelty and fear. Liberalism, therefore, ought to be based on this common existential experience and should be essentially an attempt at protecting, as much as possible, human beings, and in particular, minorities, refugees, and exiles, against cruelty, oppression and fear.²

Shklar's liberalism of fear acknowledges that liberalism in its most ideal form is not practical, rather, that although the basic tenets of idealism and their focus on the 'good' of humanity is unattainable, it suggests that we should at least be obligated to intervene in situations where human rights are infringed upon. Hoffmann's theoretical perspective on human rights joins Immanuel Kant's emphasis on human rights and Shklar's sense of obligation.³ Hoffmann highlights two areas where human rights are vulnerable in international relations, the perils of globalisation to the individual, and the second threat coming from violence in the form of interstate conflict that threatens individuals right to peace.⁴ Human rights, according to Hoffmann, is easier to deal with than forcing democracy from the outside.⁵ That is clearly demonstrated in this thesis, which shows that NATO's ability to subdue violence once it decided to act in defence of human rights was relatively strong, but establishing functioning democracies in the region was decidedly more difficult.

It is widely accepted that the post-Cold War period, until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, was a period in international relations skewed in favour of the ideals of neo-liberalism.⁶ Yet, specifically and ostensibly, the development of NATO from a realist/neo-realist Cold War relic to a

² Ibid., pp.67-68.

³ Ibid., p.68.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p.69.

⁶ Tim Dunne in John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford Press, 2005, pp.186-196.

modern transatlantic alliance that intervened in low-level ethnic conflicts on Europe's periphery, in order to enforce peace and security, can certainly be seen within the broader context of the liberal approach to international relations. Ultimately, military force was, it will be shown, used by NATO for the purpose of humanitarian intervention, rather than solely for the benefit of the states participating in these military actions.

However, that is not to suggest that NATO's eastward expansion into former Soviet-dominated Europe and its military interventions in the former Yugoslavia did not approach aspects of its post-Cold War period in the tradition of neo-realism. This is best demonstrated by the use of power politics, military force and coercion by NATO members, especially the United States (through the alliance) throughout the period after the Cold War in order to secure their objectives. Thus this thesis recognises the explanatory power of Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism⁷ in instances associated with the rise of NATO and its increased influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkan peninsula throughout the 1990s.⁸

Literature Survey

The intervention of NATO in the ethnic conflicts of the former Yugoslavia did create considerable controversy. On the one hand, NATO was condemned for not preventing instances of genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo and that its interventions were too late. On the other hand, NATO was criticized for intervening in these conflicts because they did not respect territorial sovereignty of the states involved. Another serious accusation was that NATO killed innocent civilians in large numbers, therefore negating any positive results they were attempting to achieve in forcing the combatants to cease

⁷ Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, Routledge, 1999, pp.46-50.

⁸ Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin, 1998, pp.364-365.

fighting. The literature in this area provides a wide spectrum of views, some that criticize NATO's approach, while some tend to regard it with guarded optimism.

Some key texts that demonstrate the debate on the success of NATO and its interventions in the former Yugoslavia are Michael Ignatieff's *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (2000), (written a short time after NATO's military intervention in Kosovo had ended) and Noam Chomsky's *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo* (1999). Essentially, Ignatieff argues in *Virtual War* that NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was justified, but acknowledges the moral and ethical issues of high-tech combat, as well as the violation of sovereignty versus human rights issues. Whereas Chomsky critically examines the role of NATO as a humanitarian intervener, questions the motives behind the process, and whether it was in fact driven by the need to protect human rights, or, in order to safe guard other interests. Chomsky's work highlights the hypocrisy of the NATO campaign to 'save' the Kosovo Albanians, but points to the plight of the Kurds in Turkey that are largely ignored, principally as a result of US interests.

Although Ignatieff was very supportive of NATO initially, his position becomes less certain in *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (2003), where he conceded that the peace-building effort is much more difficult and less successful than the peace-enforcement aspect, demonstrating a sense of frustration with the lack of real results in relation to Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Unlike Chomsky, though, Ignatieff still argued that the missions throughout the former Yugoslavia were just, but not being as effectively implemented as he would have liked. Therefore, Ignatieff and Chomsky provide what can be considered as the opposite ends of the spectrum in the existing body of literature on NATO's intervention in Kosovo.

In addition to work of Chomsky and Ignatieff was another very timely contribution to the, at the time, very small literature base. Tim Judah's book, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (2000), was the third publication of significance in relation to NATO's intervention in Kosovo. The scope was different to Ignatieff in that Judah covered much of the historical background to the Serbian-Albanian conflict, ultimately leading to NATO's military action. Judah's account of the Kosovo conflict and NATO's intervention is comprehensive. *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, does not, essentially, argue any familiar line, but is rather a detailed blow-by-blow account of the historical events leading up to, and including, the military operation undertaken by NATO against Yugoslavia.

The contributions of Chomsky, Ignatieff and Judah were very specific to the situation on the ground in Kosovo. Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig's contribution is the book *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?* (2000), is a useful examination of the role of the NATO military intervention against Yugoslavia, portrayed through the various perspectives of NATO members, including the United States, Britain, Italy, Germany, France and the EU. This book contributes significantly to the field, by providing a detailed account of the opposition that the intervention faced throughout Europe, almost bringing down the German, Italian and British governments.

In the same vein as Weymouth and Henig's examination of perspectives of individual NATO members of the conflict in Kosovo is the edited compilation by Frank Columbus (1999) *Kosovo-Serbia: A Just War?* The book provided a collection of essays and articles relating directly with the war in Kosovo. Specifically, it examines whether NATO's involvement in the war was justifiable morally and ethically. It is essentially, a collection of papers that opposed NATO's intervention in Kosovo, it also

provides alternative perspectives to the conflict, including the perspectives of the Greek, Turkish and Russian governments.

Apart from the literature that directly links NATO with the Balkan wars there is other work that focuses on the actual conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Alan Little and Laura Silber's *The Death of Yugoslavia* (1996) provided a detailed account of the lead-up to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as diligent work relating to actual hostilities that took place, both in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This contribution is useful in providing the backdrop to NATO's role in subduing and ending the conflict in Bosnia. Along the same vein of Little and Silber's study, Christopher Bennett's *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences* (1996) deals with the break-up of Yugoslavia, but draws distance between the usual arguments of ethnic nationalism and hatred as the cause of the disintegration Yugoslavia, and instead points to the internal politics within Serbia, especially between the multi-ethnic state supporters of the Communist Party, and Slobodan Milosevic and his vision for the Serbs within the country. This work contributed significantly to this thesis' examination of the rise of Milosevic, his ideal of greater Serbia, and the dominant role he played in the fragmentation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its spiral into civil war.

Amongst the earliest works compiled from first hand reports of prisoner of war camps was Roy Gutman's book *A Witness To Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of 'Ethnic Cleansing' in Bosnia* (1993). Gutman provides a shocking account of the conditions inside some of the most notorious prisoner of war camps, such as Omarska, in Bosnia. This contribution to the literature put into context the brutality of the war, and its extraordinarily inhumane side into context. That inhumanity ultimately spurred the international community, through NATO, to end the conflict.

Richard Holbrooke's *To End A War* (1999), was an insightful examination of the Bosnian peace process conducted in November 1995 at Dayton Ohio, which ultimately culminated in formalising NATO's insertion into Bosnia as a peace implementation force, was informed by Holbrooke's personal account of the negotiations at Dayton. Although often biased (in line with the Clinton Administration positions on the issue), this is nonetheless an honest analysis of the very tense, long and painful peace process. One of those many difficulties, the establishment of a democratic process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the thread of David Chandler's contribution to the post-War analysis of Bosnia under NATO protection, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (1999). His analysis of the lead up to the first elections in Bosnia, as well as their results, demonstrates underlying flaws in the democratisation process. Nevertheless, this work argues that the democratic progress made in Bosnia is not a clear success, although Chandler's argument is limited because it only takes into account the first few elections in the country.

Alongside the considerable secondary literature base used, this study has drawn information and analysis from a variety of primary sources relating to the Balkan Wars, NATO, and the Peace-enforcement dimension of NATO's role in the Balkan region. Primary sources are used to provide a significant and unique analysis of the main events covered. The analysis of all relevant treaties and agreements is mainly drawn from the original documents, guaranteeing a unique contribution to the field. The use of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the Dayton Peace Accords in relation to Bosnia, the Rambouillet Agreement in relation to Kosovo and the Ohrid Framework Agreement in relation to FYROM in the study was crucial in framing a benchmark of expectations in NATO's success. NATO's role in the implementation of these agreements is used as a measure of that success.

In addition to the key peace agreements, primary news sources were also widely used to confirm the occurrence of major events relevant to the study, adding to the originality of the analysis. Use of the resources made available by the BBC, CNN, Reuters, the *Independent*, Hellenic Resource Network, Bosnia News, Yugoslav State Media and government press and information services of the United States, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were invaluable in gathering primary data for the study.

Therefore, this study brings together many perspectives on the ethnic conflict in the Balkans and especially, NATO's interventions to stop them. The literature available is divergent as is demonstrated by the difference between the contributions of Chomsky and Ignatieff. This thesis places itself in between both sides of the literature available, with Michael Ignatieff's argument of success and legitimacy in *Virtual War* (2000) to Noam Chomsky's argument of failure in *The New Military Humanism* (1999). Although arguing that NATO's peace-enforcement and peace-building were generally successful given the situations before the interventions, this thesis also highlights clearly the main mistakes NATO committed in the process, attempting to provide a clearer balance than much of the existing literature.

The Structure of the Thesis

There are eight chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. Chapter One deals with the origins of the three separate components which are merged deliberately in the thesis: NATO and its role at the time of its founding; the history of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, and the origins and evolution of the 'peace-enforcement' concept. The linking of these three separate components, and a brief background to the period this thesis is concerned with, specifically from the end of the Cold War to 2004, sets the historical context for the current study. Understanding the violent and unstable

history of the Balkans, and its regular reversion to ethnic conflict and hatred, clearly needs to be given such a context in order to fully appreciate the nature of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Understanding the origins of NATO, its purpose, and its *raison d'être*, also needs to be discussed in order to put into perspective the nature of the shift NATO has taken since the end of the Cold War, as well as to underline its increasing significance in a rapidly changing world. The notion of 'peace-enforcement' is the binding tie between the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the NATO alliance. It is this idea that the thesis will focus on primarily; the reasons why NATO pursued this policy, and its impact on the Balkan region.

Chapter Two deals with the period after the end of the Cold War in relation to NATO. In this period, NATO was struggling to justify its existence and its purpose. The chapter deals with how NATO resolved those concerns, answered its critics, and how it began to evolve politically as an organisation, including its adoption of an expansion eastward. Significantly, its eastward expansion programme, which now includes former Soviet republics, has managed to solidify its position as the primary security institution in Europe. Also dealt with here is NATO's approach to these countries, including a considerable section on NATO-Russian relations, and where the future security policy of Europe is heading under NATO leadership.

Chapter Three examines the lead-up to the war which violently broke up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, the manipulation of nationalism by leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the consequences of this for the former Yugoslavia and its ultimate collapse under the strain of the nationalism. This chapter also frames the irreconcilable positions of most ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, ultimately leading the country down the path to civil war. Chapter Three is relevant in

highlighting the tension and ethnic divisions which plagued Yugoslavia before conflict broke out, in order to demonstrate that these political tensions and divisions have a long, deep-rooted basis, which puts the difficulties and successes of NATO's intervention and peace-building efforts later into perspective.

Chapter Four examines the outbreak of violence, and, eventually, full scale war throughout the Balkan region. The conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are analysed, with particular emphasis on the role of the governments of the breakaway republics, their territorial militias, as well as the significant role of the Yugoslav People's Army, and its politically influential leadership in the conduct of war in Slovenia and Croatia. This part of the thesis also examines the key battles in the course of the wars, including the battle of Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Srebrenica and other key areas in Croatia and Bosnia. The deadly and tragic results of many of these battles are set out, providing the rationale for the subsequent interventions undertaken by NATO. This chapter emphasises the hatred and barbarism of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It also demonstrates the hard line attitudes and resistance that NATO encountered during its attempt at achieving peace throughout the region. Ultimately, the chapter sets the scene, showing that the Balkan wars were deep-seated and complex, therefore highlighting how difficult NATO's task was in negotiating and enforcing peace in the region.

Chapter Five examines the Bosnian conflict; the first that NATO engaged in militarily. This was the bloodiest conflict to have been seen in Europe since World War II, and it was NATO that was instrumental in convincing the Bosnian Serbs that it was time to make peace. It did so by putting pressure on Bosnian Serbs through a calculated, but limited, series of military campaigns, which ultimately weakened the operational strength of the Bosnian Serb Army. NATO's approach is analysed, as well as the

reactions of the key belligerents to the organisation's actions. After NATO successfully ended the fighting in Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed; an agreement that would provide the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a firm 'road map' to follow in re-building conditions on the ground. Chapter Six examines the provisions, concessions and expectations of this agreement. In addition, the roles of IFOR and SFOR are also examined in detail in this section, specifically, both the areas of success and failure of NATO in promoting peaceful co-existence between the ethnic groups in Bosnia.

Chapter Six reviews NATO's role in the establishment of a liberal democratic system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose development was regarded by NATO and the international community as vital in solidifying the viability of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. NATO, with the assistance of the UN and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, provided the conditions necessary to conduct a series of democratic elections under the new Constitution as required by the Dayton Accord, and a full analysis of the results of the democratisation of Bosnia and its relative success and failures is also a focus of this chapter. This chapter closes with an examination of the steady downsizing and the eventual turning over of NATO's operation in Bosnia to the EU, and asks whether this has been a sign of confidence that SFOR's achieved its objective of peace and stability in the country, both in terms of enforcing the peace and building it.

Chapter Seven examines NATO's Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the largest military campaign in the alliance's history. NATO's military air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an awesome display of the alliance's military strength, yet it took 78 days to convince the Yugoslav leadership to concede to NATO's demands regarding the situation in Kosovo. This chapter

highlights the humanitarian balance of the air assault against Yugoslavia, whether it was justified and if the 'collateral damage' experienced by civilians was an acceptable price to pay in the pursuit of alliance policies. In addition, this section of the thesis also examines NATO's enforcement wing, Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its role in Kosovo since June 1999, and in particular its success and failures in securing a peaceful, multi-ethnic environment, which was the basis of NATO's intervention in the first place. The establishment of a transitional authority for the province, and the running of elections, all under KFOR guarantee, have contributed to the sense of accomplishment for the international community, especially NATO, but the creation and democratization of local Kosovo institutions contribution to multi-ethnic harmony will be examined as well as whether the peace-enforcement and subsequent peace-building efforts conducted by NATO in Kosovo produced the results that the organisation set out to achieve when it formulated its interventionist policy.

In Chapter Eight, NATO's Operation Essential Harvest and Amber Fox, designed to prevent the spiralling out of control of the last and most limited of all the conflicts, is explored. NATO took pre-emptive measures, both diplomatic and military, to ensure FYROM was not to become another victim of ethnic hatred in the Balkans. Its primary mission was to disarm the National Liberation Army (NLA) rebels. This chapter examines the situation post-disarmament, and how NATO encouraged the ethnic Albanians and Macedonian majority to come to a Constitutional arrangement acceptable to both sides. NATO's most recent involvement in the former Yugoslavia through Operation Essential Harvest and Amber Fox, was the most efficient and successful, this chapter highlights that success in comparison to its more difficult operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This chapter outlines the role of NATO until it handed over operational control of the remaining forces to the EU, after

the situation in FYROM was sufficiently stable and secure, largely due to NATO involvement in the country.

The Conclusion will highlight the argument made throughout the thesis and summarise NATO's role since the end of the Cold War, as well as the comparison of its peace-enforcement and building operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM. Specifically, it will examine the successful result of NATO's intervention in the three case studies above.

Chapter One

NATO, the Balkans and the concept of Peace-enforcement

The Founding of NATO and its Purpose

The founding of NATO was within the context of the end of the Second World War which led to a new political, geographical and security situation in Europe. The Axis powers, consisting of Germany, Italy and Japan had been defeated. The Allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were deciding the fate of the territories that they had contested with the Axis powers throughout the years of 1939-1945.¹ The results of the Second World War were to have an impact on the fundamental principles of international relations for the next 50 years. The Western powers were able to liberate Western Europe, including most of the former German State.² The Soviet Union was left to clear out German forces from Eastern Europe, within which Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia were included. Before the Allied victory, the agreement drafted by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, was an attempt to stem any misunderstanding that might arise after the inevitable victory.³ The principles that were agreed to at the Yalta Conference included respect for fundamental rights, freedoms and free elections. Poland was not to be a projection of the Soviet State, and Yugoslavia was to be a country that would come under equal influence from the Soviet Union and the West.⁴

¹ Charles Messenger, *The Century of Warfare: Worldwide Conflict From 1900 to the Present Day*, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, p.226.

² *Ibid.*, pp.226-227.

³ H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, Crowell, 1966, p.4.

⁴ 'The Yalta Agreement', 2006, *CNN Interactive Cold War*, <<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/documents/yalta.html>>.

However, with the end of hostilities in Europe, it became increasingly clear that Stalin had no real intention of honouring a number of his commitments, especially relating to areas that were now under the direct control of the Red Army.⁵ Poland, whose invasion resulted in Britain declaring war on Germany in the first place, was not to have free and fair elections because the Polish people would undoubtedly return the London-based Polish government-in-exile. Stalin had no plans to see Poland leave his sphere of influence, and, therefore, set up a regime of his own there.⁶ Yugoslavia fell to Josip Broz Tito's Communist Partisans, hence this state no longer wished be associated with the West, although this was another violation of the agreement at Yalta. With communist governments being installed or elected in all Soviet-occupied states, and with a vicious civil war raging between Yugoslav-backed EAM-ELAS communist guerrillas and EDES government soldiers in Greece,⁷ by 1946 the very spirit of the Yalta agreement was dead. As Greece and Turkey were under immense communist pressure, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine, which pledged to assist any state that was struggling with communism.⁸ The Marshall Plan was also instituted, which resulted in massive American financial loans being granted to devastated Western European countries, but not to the Soviet Union or its client states⁹:

The Soviets ... saw the Marshall Plan as a real threat to their control of Eastern Europe. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had already expressed their intention to attend the full-scale conference to be held in Paris in late July [1947]. Pressure was now applied from Moscow to persuade those governments to join the Soviet Union in boycotting the meeting. The Soviets proceeded to stage their own rival conference in September at which the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was createdThe 'democratic' nations of the Cominform declared that they were united in their fight against American 'imperialism'.¹⁰

⁵ Joseph Smith, *The Cold War*, Second Edition, 1945 – 1991, Blackwell Publishers, London, 1998, p.18.

⁶ Charles Messenger, 1995, p.227.

⁷ Peter Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism: 1944-1949*, Cornell University Press, 1989, pp.4-5.

⁸ Charles Messenger, 1995 pp.296-297 & Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, 1992, pp.123-127.

⁹ Charles Messenger, 1995, p.297.

¹⁰ Joseph Smith, *The Cold War*, Second Edition, 1945 – 1991, Blackwell Publishers, London, 1998,

By 1947, Western leaders had already come to regard their cooperation with Stalin through the war years as a necessary price to achieve victory but post-Second World War policies of Western states began to emerge as a policy of detachment in regard to the Soviet Union, whom the West now considered with suspicion. One of the most significant events that confirmed fears of the impending Cold War was the Soviet blockade of West Berlin.¹¹ Germany, was divided into four zones of occupation by the four major powers at the conclusion of the Second World War. Berlin, which fell into the Soviet zone of occupation, was also divided into four. In late 1947, the Western powers agreed to merge their zones into a single West German state, which was to include the areas of Berlin they controlled.¹² The proposed German state was not acceptable to Stalin and the Soviet Union, which initiated a blockade of road and rail communications with West Berlin. In an effort to keep West Berlin supplied, the US and UK began a huge airlift operation, which resulted in a daily transfer of 13,000 tons of food and other essential provisions. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the West grew as a result of the blockade, which ended in early 1949.¹³

The Berlin crisis was, it could be argued, the key crisis involving the Soviet Union and the West which solidified the fears in the latter, and led to polarization between the two parties. In April 1949 the key Western European states, together with the United States and Canada, formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty declared its general purpose through the following preamble:

The parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the

p.18.

¹¹ United States Department of State, *Berlin Crisis*, 2000, <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17378.htm>>.

¹² Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War 1941 – 1949*, Third Edition, Pearson Education Limited, London, 2003, p.83.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.92.

principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.¹⁴

The Treaty, which was signed by Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, consisted of 14 articles, which comprehensively outlined its aims, principles and commitment to the member states. Articles 1 and 2 confirmed a commitment by the alliance to the principles which were stated in the preamble above specifically, to adhere to the UN Charter, to settle any international disputes peacefully and to refrain from threatening to use, or to use, force in any other capacity except as specified by the Charter. The signatories' commitment to developing friendlier international relations by strengthening their free institutions was the first subtle, yet direct, implication that the newly-formed NATO did not approve of the political systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Treaty declared that the organisation's members were to guarantee their freedom, aims and principles. The signatories pledged their commitment to come to the aid of their fellow NATO members if their territorial integrity, political independence or security were threatened. Article 5 specified the fundamental rationale behind the creation of the NATO alliance:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attack by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.¹⁵

Article 5 is the practical element of the Treaty, clearly designated as a warning to the Soviet Union that any further encroachment Westward would effectively bring the

¹⁴ *North Atlantic Treaty*, 4 April 1949.

¹⁵ *North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 5, 4 April 1949.

organisation's members into conflict to protect their political and territorial sovereignty against the former. More significantly, the same article officially obliged the United States to integrate itself into the defence system of Western Europe, thereby acting as a direct deterrent to any perceived Soviet expansionism. Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, stated somewhat undiplomatically that NATO's fundamental role was to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down."¹⁶ With such clear prescriptions in place, there remained the matter of elaborating the detail of how this was to be achieved in the political sense.

Article 5 is clear on the military function of the alliance, whilst Article 6 delineates the NATO's operational and obligatory zone. That zone includes the territory of both the European and North American members or any other territory under the jurisdiction of the member states North of the Tropic of Cancer. The political component, apart from the declared set of general principles, was to leave the organisation free to invite additional states to join. That particular aspect is covered in Article 10 of the Treaty, in which "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."¹⁷

Although the Treaty, as stated in Article 10, appeared to be open, its principal purpose was to recruit additional members who were more committed to the containment of the Soviet Union rather than those simply adhering to the principles of democracy and peace:

Communist control was ... imposed on throughout Eastern Europe and probes were made against Iran, Turkey and Greece. Western democracy was perceived to be in dire peril. Consequently, the United States was

¹⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, p.x.

¹⁷ *North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 10, 4 April 1949.

compelled to adopt the policy of containment exemplified in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.¹⁸

This was demonstrated in the make-up of the next pair of states to accede to the principles of the Treaty: Greece and Turkey, both of which joined NATO in 1952.¹⁹ These two countries had intolerable pressure placed upon them by Communism, the former by its own rebel Communist faction EAM-ELAS, and the latter experienced direct pressure from the Soviet Union, which it bordered.²⁰ These factors drove the reasoning behind accepting both states as NATO members, even though their democratic records were dismal and Turkey itself difficult to designate as a Western European state.²¹ Turkey was dominated by the powerful military establishment; a role provided to the military by the ‘founding father’ of Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, in the interests of keeping the state strong and secular. Greece, although it had a politically open regime at the time of its accession to NATO, was a very unstable democracy, its political system being intermittently punctuated by military coup d’etat ever since its establishment in 1829. Therefore, a commitment to liberal democracy (as was lacking in Turkey) or a stable democratic regime (which was lacking in Greece) were not considered important criteria when it came to granting membership to these states, implying that the principles underpinning the NATO Treaty were to do with ‘desirable’ rather than ‘mandatory’ characteristics of aspiring member states.²² It was Greece’s and Turkey’s strategic position in South-Eastern Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union that NATO valued most in seeing them enter the organisation.²³ This outcome confirmed the earlier-mentioned statement made by the NATO Secretary General: that

¹⁸ Joseph Smith, 1998, p.20.

¹⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, 1992, p.445.

²⁰ Peter J. Stavrakis, 1989.

²¹ As Turkey’s record in attempting to join the EEC/EC/EU continues to demonstrate.

²² Charles-Philippe David, *Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock* in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, McGill-Queen’s, 1999, p.19.

²³ Ibid.

the purpose of his organisation was to “Keep ... Americans in, Russians out, and Germans down.”²⁴

Another important aspect of the Treaty, and its designated role, is the important place United States occupied within the alliance. Perhaps the first indication of the US’s intention to play a dominant role within in the organisation was demonstrated by the location chosen for the Treaty’s signing ceremony: Washington D.C.²⁵ Apart from this, three out of the 14 articles making up the Treaty give the United States government the role of administrator in certain key aspects. No other member state enjoys a comparable role in the Treaty organisation.²⁶

All these functions, which appear administrative in nature, gave the United States the administrative preponderance within the alliance. Although it can be argued that the US’s senior role was justified, since the US emerged as the most powerful country globally after the Second World War, that was nonetheless an indication of the potential for American dominance in the NATO alliance in administrative, strategic and military terms; a situation which, it could be argued, came to pass, and which still exists at present.²⁷ This dominant position within NATO remained the cornerstone of NATO’s de facto task, which came to be increasingly symbolized in resisting the Eastern Bloc’s Warsaw Pact; an alliance originating in May 1955 and remaining a

²⁴ David Yost, 1998, p.27.

²⁵ Truman Presidential Museum and Library, *50th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty*, 1999, <<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/nato/nato.htm>>.

²⁶ Specifically, Articles 10, 11 and 14 gave the following role to the United States: “Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America” (*North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 10, 1949). “The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America” (*North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 11, 1949). Finally, “This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America” (*North Atlantic Treaty*, Article 14, 1949).

²⁷ Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Payne, ‘NATO: At 50, It’s Time to Quit’, *The Nation*, 10 May 1999.

second power bloc in European geo-strategic politics until its collapse in 1989.²⁸ It is the period after 1989 and NATO's transformation from a Cold War alliance to Europe's pre-eminent security organisation and, primarily, its role in suppressing ethnic conflict in the Balkan region that this thesis will focus on. To that end, the long history of the Balkans needs to be touched upon in order to demonstrate the historic volatility and enmity of the region and the difficulty of NATO's task in intervening in the region.

The Balkans: The Powder Keg of Europe

The Balkan Peninsula has been an area of ethnic and religious conflict for thousands of years; a region in which conflict has been instrumental in shaping the framework and structure of its modern states. The Balkans have been unstable ever since the initial fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, but even more so after 1821 and the beginning of the Greek War of Independence, which began a larger disintegration of Ottoman influence in the Balkans. By 1830, Greece and Serbia made up small, but independent, kingdoms carved out of former Ottoman territories. These were very much nation-states in an embryonic form. Moreover, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria all had further claims to the remnants of the Ottoman lands within the Balkan Peninsula, and, more often than not, these claims were in conflict with one another. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro had territorial claims on the remaining Ottoman territories in Europe, specifically, the regions of Macedonia, Thrace, Albania and the Sanjak. These territorial claims by the Balkan states on Ottoman territory were based on historical, ethnic and strategic considerations, and were pursued with such vigour that a series of regional wars ensued.

²⁸ Ibid.

In 1911, Italy and the Ottoman Empire were at war over the territory that makes up present-day Libya.²⁹ Italy won this conflict, which considerably weakened the Ottoman Empire. That encouraged Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro to form an alliance against the weakened Ottoman Empire.³⁰ In October 1912, these states launched simultaneous attacks on the Ottoman territories they coveted, and all were spectacularly successful, this was known as the First Balkan War.³¹ Greece secured Epirus and the port city of Thessaloniki, Serbia occupied Albania and a large portion of Macedonia, while Bulgaria acquired most of Thrace and a small portion of Macedonia.³² By May 1913 the Turks had been driven out of Europe, with the exception of a small strip of territory surrounding Istanbul.³³ With this process, and the distribution of the spoils, came a defining period for the future nature of the Balkans.

Unfortunately for the Balkan region, the intense nationalism and territorialism that has plagued the region for so long, was not brought to a halt by the military actions undertaken by the allied states. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, feeling threatened by a Serbia which had obtained access to the sea through the port of Durrës, had decided to initiate a simultaneous bilateral and multilateral diplomatic drive to pressure Serbia to withdraw from its newly acquired territories in the interest of creating a new and independent state, Albania.³⁴ After initially holding firm, and with Russian support waning, Serbia withdrew from the Albanian coast. Serbia's reluctant departure from Albanian territory led to it seeking compensation in the form of other newly-wrested territory of the Ottoman Empire, and in particular a larger share of Macedonia. This was in conflict with the interests of Bulgaria, which was in control of large areas of

²⁹ Charles Messenger, 1995, p.4.

³⁰ Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912 – 1913: Prelude to the First World War*, Routledge, London, 2000, p.13.

³¹ Charles Messenger, 1995, p.4.

³² Richard Hall, 2000, p.43.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Yale University Press, 2000, pp.83-84.

Macedonia and Thrace and not willing to give up any territory to Serbia.³⁵ The Serbs and the Greeks allied themselves against Bulgaria in anticipation of the attack from the latter.³⁶ These were the origins of the Second Balkan War, which Romania and Turkey joined in opposition to Bulgaria, using the Bulgarian actions as an excuse to re-occupy territory which they had their own claims on. Serbia, Greece, Turkey and Romania all gained additional territory from the war with Bulgaria, which left the latter bitter and hostile toward its neighbours.³⁷ The First and Second Balkan Wars highlighted the claims on the region known as Macedonia, and resulted in the region partitioned between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, it is a region whose status is contested to the present day, largely due to the events of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.³⁸

Further inciting Serbian displeasure and anger at the annexation, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, visited Bosnia on 28 June 1914 to view a military exercise.³⁹ The significance of this date was that it was the anniversary of the Battle for Kosovo, the most sacred date on the Serbian calendar.⁴⁰ Gavrillo Princip, a Bosnian Serb nationalist, opened fire on the limousine carrying Franz Ferdinand and his wife, killing them both.⁴¹ One month later, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, blaming it for the assassination of the Archduke.⁴² That declaration of war was the trigger of the First World War. At the conclusion of this war, The Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, with considerable geopolitical realignment taking

³⁵ Leon Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars 1912 –13*, Pathfinder, New York, 1991, pp.332 -333.

³⁶ Richard Hall, 2000, pp.74-77.

³⁷ Ibid p.127.

³⁸ Although Bosnia had been occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in August 1878, it remained under Turkish suzerainty until 5 October 1908, which was the date Austria-Hungary formerly annexed the territory from the Ottoman Empire. The annexation of Bosnia caused great resentment in Serbia, which regarded Bosnia as a southern Slav territory that had a large ethnic Serbian population, as its future territorial possession. (Misha Glenny, *The Balkans*, Granta Books, London 1999, pp.160 – 163)

³⁹ Charles Messenger, 1995, p.6.

⁴⁰ The battle for Kosovo took place in June 1389. It was a crucial battle where the Serbian Empire of Prince Lazar was defeated by the Ottoman Turks. Although Serbs were to retain independence for another Seventy years, it symbolised the end of the medieval Serbian Empire.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p.7.

place: a number of independent states were formed, and others expanded at the expense of neighbours. At the core of this process of realignment, Bosnia was to be incorporated into the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which later came to be known as Yugoslavia.⁴³ It is Yugoslavia, and its eventual disintegration in 1991 (a focus of this thesis), therefore that is useful to examine.

Charles Messenger encapsulates this by arguing that:

A new state was created in the Balkans – Yugoslavia. This took Serbia and Montenegro, and Austria's former Balkan provinces, including Croatia and Bosnia – Hercegovina. This suited the Serbs, since it gave them domination, but was also favourable to the other ethnic groupings since it transferred them from the losing to the winning side. The creation of this artificial state would, however, create problems with which the world is still wrestling to this day.⁴⁴

Yugoslavia existed as a unitary state in the period between the First and Second World Wars, but tensions were quite evident. Since the multi-ethnic state was comprised of Orthodox Christian Serbs and Macedonians, Catholic Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians, as well as Muslim Bosnians and Albanians, political alliances within the state were nominally along ethnic and religious lines. That proved to be problematic in the promotion of the national interests of Yugoslavia as a whole, since many of the various ethnic groups feared and were suspicious of one another.⁴⁵ By 1939, the logic of seeking a federal solution to the problems of Yugoslavia was seen as becoming more urgent, but with the resulting federal structure dividing Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. By 1941, Germany had invaded the Balkans, and this act suspended the newly-federated state of Yugoslavia. In 1945, the Communist Partisans of Yugoslavia were victorious in their campaign to seize power in Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Marshal Tito. He managed, under his strong leadership, to federate Yugoslavia into five equal states of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and

⁴³ Ibid., p.88.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Misha Glenny, 1999, pp.404-412.

Herzegovina.⁴⁶ That arrangement, whilst Tito was President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), worked well. In 1974 there was a revision in the Yugoslav Constitution, which granted autonomous status to two regions within the Serbian Republic, giving Kosovo and Vojvodina full representative rights at the national level, becoming de facto Republics and dissolving much of Belgrade's influence in those regions of Serbia. Although the Constitution was ratified, the Serbian people grew weary of their Serbia's degradation within the Yugoslav State.⁴⁷ This will be covered in detail below.

Marshal Tito died in 1981, leaving behind a rotational Presidency. This system of government supposed to succeed him, was based on the federal states taking, in sequence, a one-year term in office. This system did not last long, with the rational measures aimed at political balance giving way to more pernicious forms of nationalism.⁴⁸ Slobodan Milosevic gained prominence through his defence of Serbian interests in Kosovo; an act which itself was against the policy of the Communist Party, whose overarching slogan was 'Brotherhood and Unity' and did not discriminate along ethnic lines.⁴⁹ Milosevic became a Serbian national hero for his stand, and eventually allowed him to replace his own mentor, Ivan Stambolic, as the Serbian President. He moved to revoke Kosovo's and Vojvodina autonomy from Belgrade,⁵⁰ which was a significant contributing factor to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, thus triggering an ethnic conflict between Serbs who wanted to remain in a common state and Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians and Albanians who desired independence from Serb domination. Specifically, the wars in Croatia 1990 to

⁴⁶ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.137.

⁴⁷ Misha Glenny, 1999, pp.622-628.

⁴⁸ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, pp. 70 – 71.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.72.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.73.

1992, Bosnia 1993 to 1995 and Kosovo 1990 to 1999. A more detailed analysis of these events is presented in chapter three.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and the ethnic, religious and territorial rivalries pursued by its successor states has proven to be a long-term problem for the Balkan region, and for Europe. This section has demonstrated the past volatility of the area, its history of conflict and nationalism, which ultimately demonstrates the difficult task any international intervention would have to overcome to enforce and create the peace. All three case studies pursued in this thesis, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM are regions that, as demonstrated above, have been the focus of particularly strong ethnic nationalism of the Balkan region for over a century. The violent break-up of the SFRY, which will be covered in more detail in chapter three, was yet another turbulent decade for the troubled corner of Europe. Unlike previous Balkan conflicts, the international community eventually rallied to halt the violence in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM, with NATO playing the crucial role as the military power enforcing the peace in the region. The following section outlines the long evolutionary road to the brand of peace-enforcement used by NATO, as demonstrated in the thesis' three case studies.

Peace-enforcement and Peace-building: The Long Road to Humanitarian Intervention

The evolution of the notion of 'Peace-enforcement', to the point of NATO's military interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, has been a long and difficult one. The concept of peace-enforcement was, especially since the mid-1990s with NATO's interventions in the former Yugoslavia, an enhanced iteration of the concept of peace-keeping. The key difference between the peace-keeping and peace-enforcement is that the latter does not require the consent of the belligerents involved

for the external military intervention to occur in order to stop them fighting, whilst peace-keeping is a process keeps the conflicting sides apart after they have agreed to the terms of the operation. Ultimately, one concentrates on enforcing the peace, through military means, whilst the other keeps the peace through a passive military presence that is respected, usually, by the belligerents involved. Although there are significant differences between the two concepts, peace-enforcement has its origins in the conceptualisation of peace-keeping:

peace-keeping is a conduct of operations by military forces or civilian groups to monitor and supervise cease-fire agreements or to separate two or more disputing parties. To accomplish their mission, peacekeepers observe treaty compliance or interpose a force or group between belligerents ... Peacekeepers are effective only when disputants exhibit a mutual desire for peace and a cease-fire is in effect [and] ... use weapons only in self-defence, and must be impartial in order to present no threat to the disputing parties. By contrast, peace-enforcement is military operations by forces from a single nation or coalition of nations that directly intervene between warring parties in order to restore peace ... However, peace-enforcers are well armed combat forces specifically tasked to use military force to impose a peace on the belligerents.⁵¹

Peace-keeping has been one of the United Nations' main tenets since the 1956 Suez Canal crisis between Egypt, Britain, France and Israel. That crisis was a result of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's implementation of his policy to nationalise the Suez Canal in July 1956, which directly affected the interests of major naval powers Britain and France who both constructed and owned the facilities operating on the Canal. Israel's national interests too were affected by President Nasser's actions, since he declared that Egypt would close the nationalised canal to Israeli shipping. The nationalisation led to a military intervention against Egypt by Britain, France and Israel to secure the canal.⁵² Within days the military intervention was condemned by the international community and the still-fresh memory of colonial interests

⁵¹ Major Thomas M. Murray, United States Marine Corps, 'Peace-keeping or Peace-Enforcement: There is a Difference', *CSC* 1993,
<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/MTM.htm>>.

⁵² United Nations, *Middle East – UNEF I*, 1999,
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr1.html>.

outweighing national self-determination was disturbing to many of the newer members who had recently become decolonised themselves. Under enormous international pressure, including that from the United States, Britain and France withdrew their forces. The first-ever peace-keeping force, correctly known as United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), was stationed to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. Egyptian sovereignty over the canal was recognised. The UNEF was successful in maintaining peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border until 1967, when Egyptian President Nasser demanded their removal in anticipation of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian strike against Israel.⁵³

The UNEF example of United Nations facilitation in checking and preventing the re-emergence of conflict was the first of its kind by the organisation, but it was certainly not to be the last. The Congo, Cyprus (UNICYP), Egypt and Syria (UNEF II) were, in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, further examples of the United Nations' international presence. The main characteristic of these operations was that they existed with the consent of the belligerents involved in the conflict, and they facilitated peace by engaging in observation and separation of forces. Although the UNEF was the first example of peace-keeping, the principles of peace-keeping were only formally set out after the Arab – Israeli conflict in October 1973, with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), which saw peace keepers deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Sir Brian Urquhart, the former UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, also known as the father of peace-keeping, summarised the requirements for peace-keeping in the following points:

- 1) The consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, to its mandate, to its composition, and to its appointed commanding officer;
- 2) The continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating authority, the security council;
- 3) A clear and practicable

⁵³ Ibid.

mandate; 4) The non-use of force except as a last resort in self-defence – self-defence however, included resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeepers from discharging their duties; 5) The willingness of countries contributing troops to provide adequate numbers of capable military personnel and to accept the degree of risk which the mandate and the situation demand; 6) The willingness of member states, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logistical support.⁵⁴

The set of peace-keeping requirements indicated above were formulated for a reason. First and foremost, the United Nations always preferred to be neutral toward any conflict between its member states, and by stipulating the paramount importance of the consent of the parties involved in the conflict ensured that any peace-keeping operation would only commence if the parties involved agreed to the terms of the operation and composition of the UN mandate. That meant that the UN peacekeepers were not entering into a hostile environment, but, rather, facilitating peaceful disengagement of forces and maintaining cease-fire agreements. The peacekeepers, as the principles listed above demonstrate, are only allowed to use force in self-defence, or if the implementation of the mandate has been hindered by any party involved. Since UN peace-keeping mandates were geared toward maintaining the peace, the only way force could be used during peace-keeping was if the peace was threatened. Although the above was the case theoretically, force had rarely been used in any peace-keeping operation during the Cold War period.

The concept of peace-keeping/enforcement began to shift in practical terms after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and even more significantly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁵⁵ The nature of the shift was largely reflected in the area of peace-keeping/enforcement, which began to emerge as a priority of the major powers, which began actively participating, mostly leading, these

⁵⁴ Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, 1985, p.198.

⁵⁵ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour: The New Art of Peace and War*, Hutchinson, London, 1996, p.75.

operations in Kuwait, Croatia, Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁵⁶ In these cases, where violence either related to ethnic, religious or clan conflict arose, the US and its Western Allies were becoming more involved in these kinds of situations, the number of which rose sharply after the end of the Cold War. A post-communist Russia also began to support, and participate in, numerous peace-keeping missions, alongside Western forces, often being integrating into their command and control structures as a sign of the changing period between East and West.⁵⁷

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 became the first major international crisis in which the international community provided a united front against clear Iraqi aggression. The UN Security Council Resolution 660 condemned Iraq, and ordered an immediate cease-fire followed by a complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. By 6 August, UN Security Council Resolution 661 had been passed, issuing sanctions and an embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait.⁵⁸ However, the true international cohesion on the issue was demonstrated on 29 November 1990, when it was clear that the sanctions and embargo would not dislodge Iraqi troops from Kuwait quickly, the United Nations adopted UN Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized all means necessary to implement earlier resolutions if no action had been taken to rectify the situation by 15 January 1991.⁵⁹

The US-led military force assembled on the Saudi – Kuwaiti border in order to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces was the most impressive international coalition assembled since the Second World War. Over 700,000 troops were assembled to oppose Saddam's 500,000 occupation troops, with 550,000 US troops, and over 220,000 Arab

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.90-111.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.6.

⁵⁸ Dilip Hiro, *Iraq: A Report from the Inside*, Granta Books, London, 2003, pp.35-36.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

and Muslim forces also arrayed against the Iraqi regime,⁶⁰ demonstrating that the disunity of the Cold War was finally at an end.

The inability of the Russians to resist US foreign policy credibly after the 1991 Gulf War was a major consideration in the bolder formulation and execution of policy on the international level. The Allied victory in liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion of 2 August 1990, led the American President George Bush to declare 'The New World Order', where the international community would not allow actions such as the Iraqi invasion to pass over without notice, and that morality had entered the realm of international relations demonstrated by the international community pulling huge resources and military power together to fight for the independence of a fellow sovereign states survival, in this case Kuwait.

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 'world order' in which 'the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong ...' A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test, and, my fellow Americans, we passed that test.⁶¹

The 'New World Order' was tested very early after its declaration, with conflict breaking out in a number of regions, perhaps the most notable for its geographical proximity to the West, the former Yugoslavia. Other conflicts that involve the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the African states of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Eritrea-Ethiopia, in addition to the Indian Subcontinent that includes India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka also revealed the futility of Bush's declaration of a 'New World Order'.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp.36-37.

⁶¹ George W.H. Bush, *New World Order: President Bush's Speech to Congress*, 6 March 1991, <<http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>>.

The unfortunate result of the end of the Cold War was the surfacing of localised ethnic and religious conflicts and the emergence of failed states, which often evolved into armed conflict during the 1990s. In a number of these cases, specifically Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda, there were varied levels of involvement from the international community in assisting the resolution of the politico-military situations that emerged there. Haiti was primarily a US unilateral action that involved some 30,000 troops to stabilise and re-instate the democratically-elected President, who a military regime had removed from power.⁶² Apart from restoring democracy and ousting the military regime, the temporary US presence in Haiti did not have any useful flow-on effects on the promotion of democratic and economic institutions, leaving Haiti as one of the poorest states on the globe. Another example of a failed state where the international community intervened was Somalia. In this instance, political instability that eventuated after the ousting of the dictator Siyad Barre in January 1991, the allied liberation militias split along clan lines.⁶³ The fighting which resulted in the clan split threatened the country's population with famine, but in the new spirit of the 'New World Order', the United Nations undertook a considerable humanitarian intervention. Officially designated the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the United States effectively controlled the initial mission known as 'Operation Restore Hope'. Later, the United Nations took fully operational control in the country through UNOSOM II, being a much larger multinational force directly under the control of the UN Secretary General.⁶⁴

That operation, which began in 1992 and lasted until March 1995, was successful in avoiding large-scale famine, but failed to achieve any fundamental progress in re-

⁶² Jacques Richard, *Clinton Fights to Keep Lid on Haiti Crisis*, 1996, <http://www.wsws.org/public_html/prioriss/iwb9-9/haiti.htm>.

⁶³ Stephen Zunes, 'The Long and Hidden History of the US in Somalia', *Global Policy Forum*, 21 January, 2002, <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/analysis/2002/0121somalia.htm>>.

⁶⁴ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, 2000, pp.55-91.

establishing state institutions in Somalia before the UN's withdrawal.⁶⁵ The humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which evolved into a 'peace-building/enforcement' operation, also demonstrated that it was not always possible to impose solutions on unwilling participants, such as Mohamed Farah Aideed, the leader of the main Somali clan, and his opponent, Ali Mahdi.⁶⁶ The former was particularly hostile to the UN forces, which were eventually ordered to capture Aideed. This led to a number of clashes between Aideed militia and numerous UN national contingents, resulting in the deaths of scores of Pakistani and US troops, as well as thousands of Somalis.⁶⁷ The death of the US troops in Somalia had a major impact on US public opinion, given that this country had the largest contingent in Somalia, and the United States therefore began its preparations to withdraw from Somalia.⁶⁸

The reluctance of the US to get involved in ethnic and regional conflict after Somalia was the main reason it avoided intervening until the final stages of the Bosnian War, where its participation in leading the NATO alliance's military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs was crucial in setting up the framework for the Dayton Peace Accord. Without the leadership of the United States to provide the bulk of the military might for both NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, the Europeans were powerless to stop the war for over three years. After the humanitarian suffering in Bosnia became more intense, the United States was able to put the memory of its experiences in Somalia behind to lead NATO forces into Bosnia.

This chapter has introduced the three separate areas of focus that intersect one another in this thesis. The founding of NATO, highlighting the rationale for its establishment as an organisation and its evolution into a Cold War alliance until that role ended in

⁶⁵ Stephen Zunes, 'The Long and Hidden History of the US in Somalia', 2002.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

1989. Also, the examination of the developments in the Balkans of last century until the end of the Second World War draws out the violent upheavals the region underwent, especially in order to create the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This shows that the regions troubled history has been a long one, hence presenting NATO with deep seated ethnic rivalries when it intervened in the area, making their objectives all the more difficult. However that difficulty also makes their successes all the more credible when considering the troubled history of the region. NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe, though, was far from certain, its very relevance as an organisation was questioned. With the historical background of the three intersecting areas of NATO's founding, the Balkans and the evolution of peace-enforcement examined, the rise of NATO after the end of the Cold War and its struggle to maintain relevance in European security will be demonstrated.

Chapter Two

NATO at a Loss: Finding a role after the Cold War, 1989-2001

After the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO found itself in a period of uncertainty between 1989 and 2001. The Soviet-led bloc and the ideology it defended were no more, nor was the direct threat these represented. So what of the post-Soviet role of NATO? The continued existence of NATO after its *raison d'être* had gone became increasingly difficult to justify. There was much debate as to whether NATO should be dissolved and a pan-European security institution,¹ be used to replace it.² Such an organisation, it was suggested, might be the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or Western European Union (WEU), and it would replace NATO as the dominant security apparatus on the European continent.³ The role of the United States in any future pan-European security apparatus was also a contentious one, with some European countries preferring to take matters into their own hands rather than having to rely on the US for their security.

However and despite such discussion, NATO survived attempts by those who tried to undermine its legitimacy. It did so by offering membership to former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, which gave the institution a new lease of life through the concept of 'Eastward expansion'. The other more effective role NATO took on was one of 'peace enforcer' in the Balkans, which, combined with 'Eastward expansion', has helped to shape post-Cold War NATO into

¹ These institutions include countries not just from Western Europe, but former Eastern bloc countries as well, placing them in a better position to become Pan-European institutions.

² Charles Philippe David & Jacques Levesque, 1999.

³ Marie-Claude Plantin in Charles Philippe David & Jacques Levesque, 1999, pp.94-108.

an institution of more than just collective defence, but one which provides humanitarian and defensive assistance against injustices. This chapter seeks to explore the decade that proved to be crucial in the evolution of a Cold War institution into the modern security organisation of the twenty first century, specifically, examining the backdrop until the period of NATO's adaptation to the peace-enforcer in the Balkans.

Collapse of the Warsaw pact and Soviet Union and NATO's rise

The Warsaw Pact was considered to be a Soviet-dominated institution, with its Eastern European member countries being under the indirect influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet supremacy within the organisation was, in large part, one of the reasons for its rapid collapse, since most of the member states resented being dominated by Moscow. The confident predictions made that the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact would be followed by a dissolution of NATO were incorrect for a number of reasons. There was a tendency, especially in Soviet circles, to consider the two military alliances as being equals in their origins and purpose. The Warsaw Pact, however, was an alliance created through coercion as a result of the victorious Soviet Union manipulating its puppet-Communist regimes in the aftermath of the Second World War to create its own sphere of influence and to band these countries together against their perceived enemies, the United States and the Western European members of NATO:

Long before the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the Soviet Union had moulded the East European states into an alliance serving its security interests. While liberating Eastern Europe from Nazi Germany in World War II, the Red Army established political and military control over that region. The Soviet Union's size, economic weight, and sheer military power made its domination inevitable in this part of Europe, which historically had been dominated by great powers. The Soviet Union intended to use Eastern Europe as a buffer zone for the forward defence of its western borders and to keep threatening ideological influences at bay. Continued control of Eastern Europe became second only to defence of the homeland in the hierarchy of Soviet security priorities. The Soviet Union ensured its control of the region by turning the East European countries into

subjugated allies.⁴

NATO was formed to counter the numerical superiority of Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe, as the Western Europeans, especially after the Berlin Crisis of 1948, perceived the Soviet Union as an aggressive and expansionist power. Unlike the Soviet Union which completely controlled its eastern European allies, NATO, despite the key role of the United States, was an institution based on broader consensus, hence the member-states had a right to veto decisions made by the alliance.⁵ Also, members were allowed to withdraw from the alliance if they desired to do so. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet direction, attacked its own members if “local elites dared to deviate from the Soviet line.”⁶ The more striking examples of this were the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, as well as the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army and other Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. It was the level of direct and indirect Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Warsaw Pact member-states that contributed to these states resenting their association with the Soviet Union, and thus contributed to their support for the dissolution of the alliance when the opportunity arose.

The end of the Cold War saw many of the certainties the Cold War environment provided fade into an era of confusion and potential instability. The relationship between NATO members, notably, that of the United States with some of its West European partners was brought into question after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact. Perhaps the most significant aspect in the blurring of this relationship was what Peter Anderson called the “soul-searching” in NATO’s quest for

⁴ Glenn E. Curtis, ‘The Warsaw Pact’, *Federal Research Division of Library of Congress*, Washington D.C., 1992, <http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/WarPact.html>.

⁵ General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, *NATO in a Changing Europe*, Centre for Strategic Decision Research, Warsaw, 1996, <<http://www.csdr.org/96Book/Naumann.htm>>.

⁶ David Yost, 1998, p.28.

a future role as an institution of security for North America and Europe.⁷ Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, stated in September 1990 that: “in the future NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation will become component parts of all-European security structures and later will probably be dissolved in [to] them.”⁸ Nikolai Portugalov, a Soviet expert on German affairs, in October 1990 wrote that: “it is logical to assume that the US military and, above all, nuclear presence in West Germany will not long survive the withdrawal of our troops in the East.”⁹ And to this Jacques Levesque, Director of the Centre of Security and Foreign Policy Studies, University of Quebec added: “In the early 1990s, NATO’s mission and indeed its *raison d’etre* seemed to have fallen victim to its own success.”¹⁰ The success that Levesque focused on was that NATO’s effectiveness as an institution contributed significantly to the collapse of Warsaw Pact, which found NATO impossible to compete with.

A new challenge for the survival of NATO as the dominant security alliance in Europe was emerging. Because the Warsaw Pact failed to destroy NATO through its military force, its former members were now demanding that an all new institution for pan-European security which would unite Eastern and Western Europe into one single security organisation. The rhetoric coming from Eastern Europe was particularly strong. In June 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev called for an end to the old ways and in particular “the practice of building alliances ‘on a selective, and in fact discriminatory, basis’ in order to ‘move toward a world without wars.’”¹¹ A few days after Gorbachev’s statement, the Warsaw Pact formally announced “the formation of a new all-European security system and the creation of a single Europe of peace and

⁷ Peter Anderson, *Airstrike: NATO Astride Kosovo* in Tony Weymouth & Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis: The last American War in Europe*, Reuters, 2001, pp.183-201.

⁸ David Yost, 1998, p.27.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, 1999, p.3.

¹¹ David Yost, 1998, p.47.

cooperation.”¹² Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, agreed with the Soviet position, adding “We need a new security structure, based on CSCE, embracing everybody in Europe, and the United States.”¹³

It is important to note, however, that these East European statements appeared to be coming in response to initiatives put forward by members of the Western alliance. The West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for example, stated in March 1990 that:

The alliances [NATO and the Warsaw Pact] are forming new security structures in Europe, by which they are increasingly being overarched and which in the end could absorb them. Power politics will be replaced by a policy of responsibility. Let us build a world made up of friendly alliance of free nations and democratic states, in which hatred and animosity are superseded by humanity and brotherhood.¹⁴

The priority for most European governments was the evolution of a unified security structure for all states of Europe that valued freedom and democracy. Europe was ready to set aside the hostility, mistrust and fear driven by the Cold War, embracing instead a new future in which all peoples of Europe could co-exist with security.

NATO, because it outlasted the Warsaw Pact, could claim a significant stake in the emergence of any common security structure in Europe. However, the most significant question had still to be answered: what role would NATO, as the sole surviving security organisation of the Cold War, have in the new political environment that was beginning to emerge in Europe? As highlighted above, the Soviet and Eastern European governments were in favour of a new security organisation based on the CSCE. In this they found matching attitudes from their Western counterparts. Even

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid p.48.

harder-line, pro-NATO states such as West Germany fell in with such thinking and the West German government in 1989 – 1990 was in favour of such a solution.¹⁵

On 2 October 1991, a joint initiative undertaken by US Secretary of State, James Baker and German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proposed that:

... a more routine set of meetings ... perhaps as a 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council' [NATO should also offer] to commence planning with liaison countries for joint action on disaster relief and refugee programs, and pledging NATO's support for CSCE in dealing with these and other new security challenges in Europe.¹⁶

In proposing the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Genscher had put into motion the preliminary process for the expansion of NATO, although during the late stages of 1991, this was not necessarily the purpose of the NACC. Instead, it was intended to be a formal institution to facilitate consultation between Eastern and Western Europe on limited matters, such as disaster relief and refugees. Indeed, the joint initiative took pains to state the continued importance held by the CSCE as the body poised as the pan-European institution to best deal with security issues, and that NATO would lend a supporting role to it. The NACC was endorsed at the NATO Rome summit in November 1991 and had its first meeting on 20 December 1991, in Brussels.¹⁷

The inaugural NACC meeting was significant because it was at that point that NATO received the message from Boris Yeltsin, the successor Russian President to Gorbachev, questioning the issue of Russian membership to NATO, and stating it as a long-term political aim by the Russian government.¹⁸ This indicated that NATO had,

¹⁵ Paul Letourneau & Philippe Hebert, *NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design* in David & Levesque, 1999, p.114.

¹⁶ Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1998, p.13.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

in fact, gained the initial legitimacy it needed in order to branch out eastward, especially since the Russian Federation itself had demonstrated a long-term aim of joining the alliance. This however, was not the end of the debate as to which security institution would take on an expanded role in Europe. Not every NATO member was in favour of the proposed expanded operational role of the NACC. France was not positive about an expanded role for NACC, instead supporting an expanded role for either the Western European Union (WEU) or the CSCE.¹⁹

Although the Republican Administration of George H.W. Bush attempted to make headway in consolidating NATO as a pan-European security institution, the Democrat Administration under Bill Clinton was not as enthusiastic about expansion. Indeed, it was not until 1994 that the US endorsed NATO expansion eastward as a result of the return to the US of Richard Holbrooke, who was Ambassador to Bonn at the time, and largely in favour of NATO expanding to the east.²⁰ Also, the increased enthusiasm by Eastern European states for membership in NATO was further influenced by the Russian military action in its breakaway republic of Chechnya. By 1995, for Eastern European states, joining NATO was the guiding principle of their foreign and security policy. Specifically, these states called for admission to NATO:

Because in their opinion the complex problems of political and economic transformation cannot be solved in a “security vacuum.” ... they [Eastern European States] fear the rekindling of nationalism and ethnic conflict spilling over onto their territories as well as the revival of old patterns of geopolitical competition. They are also afraid of being treated by Russia as a “buffer zone” ... in particular ... power in Russia being taken by proponents of neo-imperial, militaristic, or nationalistic policies, and in the long term, Russia could return to a threatening military posture.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., p.15.

²⁰ Jane M.O. Sharp, *The Case for Opening Up NATO to the East* in David and Levesque, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, 1999, p.28.

²¹ Martin Kahl, *NATO Enlargement and Security in a Transforming Eastern Europe* in P. J. Dutkiewicz, J. Robert, *NATO Looks East*, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1998, p.13.

The debate over which organisation would evolve into the new pan-European security institution was coming to an end. NATO proved the popular choice as the institution to provide the basis for a pan-European alliance, since most of the Eastern European states wanted to join the organisation. The appeal of adapting the CSCE (which later became the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) and the WEU had lost favour. The Eastern European states perceived NATO membership as a contribution to their evolving “common system of democratic values ... strong security framework and ... promote stability of system transformation.”²² NATO was given the boost it needed to maintain its relevance in the post-Cold War era.

NATO Enlargement at Madrid 1997: Relevance of NATO Secured

The expansion of NATO had become the preferred option of the Eastern European states, and joining NATO had become official policy for many of them. This section deals with the first and second waves of expansion by NATO, which began with the absorption of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in July 1997 at the Madrid Summit. In addition to the two ‘waves’ of enlargement, NATO has also pursued special ties with other countries, such as Russia and the Ukraine, which will be explored in this section. The significance of the enlargement process for NATO’s peace-enforcement duties in the Balkans is considerable. The Kosovo crisis, for example, came at a crucial time of the enlargement. Hungary was initiated into the organisation with an immediate request by NATO to use its territory as a base of operations during its military campaign against Yugoslavia. So, apart from expansion being a significant process for NATO as an institution, it also had an impact on the peace-enforcement capacity of the alliance in the Balkan region.

²² Ibid.

The most significant decision the NATO alliance made during the 1997 Summit was the acceptance of three East European states as members. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were formally invited to join the alliance, and they hoped to attain membership before the 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO in April 1999. For their part, the Presidents of the three candidate countries, Kwasniewski, Havel and Horn, stated the following as part of their joint statement at the Summit:

We see the invitation extended to us in Madrid as recognition of the tremendous efforts undertaken by our societies following the changes in 1989/1990. We are indeed very proud that the transformations of our political systems and economies have made us eligible to be considered as an integral part of the Alliance. We see the invitation extended to our three states as the beginning of the NATO's enlargement process.²³

It is significant to note that the process of political and economic transformation which led them to being invited into NATO was of the democratic, free-market kind. Since Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were former Soviet satellites, their political systems were all essentially communist and their economies were linked into the closed Soviet economy. In order for these states to become members of a Western European institution, they had to transform their political system to a liberal democracy and their economy to one based on the free market model. The statement demonstrated the understanding that there was more hardship to be faced by the three states in the continuing transition process before they conformed entirely to NATO standards; a process that would certainly continue long after their accession to NATO was complete. In addition to the enthusiasm and commitment the three leaders demonstrated on behalf of their own people, they offered some encouragement for other aspiring former Eastern Bloc states that were in similar circumstances to them:

On this very special day, we also think very much about other countries aspiring for membership in NATO. It is our firm belief that NATO will

²³ Kwasniewski; Havel, V. H., 'President's of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary Speech', Brussels, NATO, 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970708h.htm>>.

gradually invite other European democracies that wish to join it and meet the criteria for membership. It is our intention to assist this process.²⁴

That sentiment demonstrated that aspiring to accede to NATO required determined policy in order to meet the membership criteria of the alliance. In addition to achieving a minimum form of 'convergence' with existing members, it is also expected that members of these institutions will lend support and policy advice to other prospective members, that was considered by the potential candidates as crucial support within the institution, which in many instances, gave candidate states a voice without being formally represented. For that reason, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary all offered assistance to the other applicants for candidate country status, otherwise known as the 'second phase' of enlargement in their efforts to join NATO.

One example that highlights the sponsoring of candidate countries from within the alliance was Greece's fervent backing for Bulgaria and Romania's entry into NATO.²⁵ The reasons for this were essentially the promotion of security in the broader geopolitical region²⁶, since Greek foreign and security policy considers Bulgaria and Romania within NATO to be a far more stable and secure prospect for Greece's own security interests.²⁷ The Defence Ministers of all three countries meet at least twice a year, and have now also included Turkey and Italy also expressed their support of Bulgaria and Romania's entry into the organisation.²⁸ So the support and assistance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was a considerable boost to the hopes of those candidates awaiting membership in the second wave of 2003.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ George Papandreou, 'Greek Foreign Policy: A Policy of Stability, Cooperation and Development', *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues*, Winter 1998-99, p.5.

²⁶ Given that Hungary is within the geopolitical area of the Balkan region, Greece as the only Balkan member of NATO at the time was an enthusiastic promoter of wider membership within the region. With Hungary's inclusion in the first wave of expansion, this gave further hope to fellow Balkan countries, Romania and Bulgaria, of being accepted in the second wave. This ultimately was the case.

²⁷ Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*, <http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/>.

²⁸ Paul E. Gallas, 'NATO Enlargement', *CRS Report for the US Congress*, 5 May 2003, p.5, <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21055.pdf>>.

The proceedings of the 8-9 July 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid also included another milestone in NATO's external relations, specifically with the Ukraine. On its agenda for discussion and ratification was the signing of the NATO - Ukraine Charter. For NATO, it was a signal of its triumph over the Soviet Union and, in particular, Russia, because it has established a significant political presence through its information office in Ukraine, the second most populous republic in the former Soviet Union after Russia.²⁹ Russia had long insisted that NATO expansion as an undesirable result, but particularly so in former Soviet Republics; something that could directly threaten Russia's security.³⁰ Ukraine, on the other hand, welcomed NATO's presence as a deterrent to any Russian designs on its territory, and regards NATO as its best prospect for security. On the signing of the Charter, Javier Solana, the then NATO Secretary General, remarked on this matter in the following way:

The Alliance and Ukraine are now ready to take the process a significant step forward. Together our aim is to make a real, substantive contribution to cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The NATO-Ukraine Charter now needs to be implemented speedily and fully. The partnership will grow by making the greatest possible use of the new mechanisms it provides.³¹

Solana clearly approved of the course NATO was taking in relation to the Ukraine, wanting to strengthen the NATO – Ukraine Charter and to implement it fully, with little indication of any measures taken to soothe the sensitivities of Russia, and its objections in this regard. Solana's statement, overall, indicated that on the most basic level, NATO's priority was to expand its influence eastward, toward the Russian frontier, regardless of the sensitivities of Russia. NATO's approach to relations with Russia will be covered further below.

²⁹ David K. Willis, *Klass: How Russians Really Live*, Avon Books, New York, 1981, p.218 and CIA World Fact Book, *Ukraine*, 2005, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html>>.

³⁰ 'The Russian Reaction to NATO Expansion', *Global Beat Issue Brief* no. 28, *New York Times*, 24 February 1998, <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib28.html>>.

³¹ Javier Solana, 'Secretary General's Remarks', 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709a.htm>>.

The NATO Documentation and Information Centre (NDIC) in Kiev, which opened in May 1997, was the first of its kind in any prospective partner country of the former Soviet Union. The NDIC was opened to help explain NATO to Ukrainians and promote the benefits of the NATO-Ukraine partnership.³² Besides organising regular conferences, seminar and roundtables, the NIDC also organises visits to and from NATO headquarters, while liaising with journalists and distributing NATO publications.³³ Apart from the obvious benefits, such as removing the misconceptions which were nurtured during the Cold War and satisfying the Ukrainian people that NATO was with them, the office was a tangible demonstration of NATO's determination to spread its influence to the very borders of Russia, and thereby removing altogether the 'shall we or shall we not?' expansion debate. NATO's move to represent itself in Ukraine also displayed quite openly Russia's inability to thwart the courting and expansion policy that was being pursued by the West, and that placed the former superpower in an embarrassing situation. Ukraine's President H. E. Kuchma enthusiastically stated during his speech at the summit that:

Madrid of 1997 will undoubtedly go down in history as a city where the dividing line left by the Cold War in the very centre of Europe, is eliminated. In the conclusion of the Charter, the deep internal transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance is reflected, as well as the democratic course of Ukraine and its real gains in integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. I am convinced that these processes will go on and on in parallel. As large a country as Ukraine by European standards feels that it is an integral part of the Central, Eastern and Southern Europe and is ready to take part in providing peace and stability in these regions and in the continent in general.³⁴

Also, as far as NATO-Ukrainian relations were concerned, in his speech, President Kuchma saluted the decision by NATO to expand Eastward to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary; countries which he referred to as 'democratic countries,

³² 'NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership', *NATO Online Library*, 1997, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/html_en/nato_ukraine07.html>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Leonid Kuchma, 'Opening Statement by the President of the Ukraine', NATO Madrid Summit, 9 July 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970709i.htm>>.

close neighbours and partners of Ukraine.’³⁵ In a conciliatory move, Kuchma also praised the signing of the NATO – Russia Founding Act, which was primarily for the purpose of promoting cooperation and understanding between the membership of NATO and the Russian Federation.³⁶

It is important to note the significance of Ukraine in the geo-strategic context, not just for NATO and Russia, but also to the rest of Europe. Apart from being the second-largest former Soviet republic in terms of population, it is also one of the larger European countries, both in terms of territory and population. A country of over 47 million people³⁷ with geographical proximity to the Russian Federation, the Black Sea, the Balkan and the Caucasus regions cannot be ignored. In addition, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was left with one of the largest nuclear arsenals. This made it imperative for the West to forge friendly ties with Ukraine and convince the country to give up any aspirations of retaining those weapons, but, instead to destroy them with Western assistance.³⁸ Ukraine also inherited much of the former Soviet Union’s conventional military capability, which included significant numbers of fighter/bomber planes, tanks, artillery, and a vast array of warships, as well as armed forces of over 780,000 personnel.³⁹ Much of this weaponry, in particular the Black Sea Fleet, was claimed by Russia and this remained a bone of contention until both countries agreed to share the rusting, but nonetheless

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ ‘Remarks by President Clinton, Prime Minister Aznar of Spain, Secretary General of NATO Solana, and President Kuchma of Ukraine in Signing Ceremony of NATO-Ukraine Charter’, The White House, *The Clinton Foundation*, 9 July 1997, <<http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/070997-speech-by-president-at-ukraine-russia-charter-signing.htm>>.

³⁷ CIA World Fact Book, ‘Ukraine’, 2005, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html>>.

³⁸ ‘Ukraine Special Weapons’, *Federation of American Scientists*, 25 April 2000, <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ukraine/>>.

³⁹ Oleg Varfolomeyev, ‘Ukraine Forging a New Path’, *Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, Perspective* Volume VIII, number 4 March-April 1998.

impressively sized, fleet.⁴⁰ Although Ukraine, due to heavy financial constraints, was not able to maintain either a nuclear arsenal or large armed forces,⁴¹ it could not be ignored at any level as far as European Security was concerned, and NATO certainly could not ignore the considerable strategic significance of Ukraine in its plans for future collective Euro-Atlantic security. However, Ukraine would not be admitted as a full member of NATO anytime in the foreseeable future, due partly to its political instability. Ukraine's lack of fortune in not qualifying to join NATO is in contrast to its fellow former Soviet republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, who were admitted in the second wave of expansion in 2003. They remain the only former Soviet republics to join the alliance to date.

The Second Wave of NATO Expansion in 2003

At NATO's Prague summit on 21–22 November 2002, important developments took place. NATO, for only the second time since the fall of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade earlier, invited seven new members to join the ranks of the military alliance. Seven states outside the organisation were invited to attend: the three former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, three former Warsaw Pact countries being Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) and Slovenia (a former Yugoslav republic). It is also important to point out that three of these states, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, are Balkan countries, indicating that NATO has a long-term commitment to the troubled region.

These developments were important for two reasons. First, by extending an invitation to a second wave of former Eastern Bloc states, NATO demonstrated that it remains the most important and effective military alliance on the European continent, and that

⁴⁰ 'Black Sea Fleet', *Federation of American Scientists*, 7 September 2000, <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mf-black.htm>>.

⁴¹ Oleg Varfolomeyev, 1998.

NATO members and their proposed Eastern colleague-states, are eager to keep NATO moving as a military alliance and the key Euro-Atlantic supranational institution:⁴²

“However, we must be honest. Without the presence of NATO there can be no European security. That is why we [Greek government] support the eastern enlargement of NATO and the addition of three new members.”⁴³

Therefore, the continued commitment to the NATO alliance is evident not only ostensibly but also in every practical sphere. Second, the constant movement eastward by NATO, first with the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and now the addition of not only former Warsaw Pact countries such as Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, but also the inclusion of former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, inconceivable in NATO’s Madrid 1997 Summit on expansion, has now become a reality, demonstrating that NATO takes its responsibility seriously as a pan-European security institution by inviting countries whose region could be regarded as unstable. This invitation by NATO for further expansion eastward was the sign that Europe’s division is all but over. According to NATO’s publication relating to the Prague summit, the following had been achieved on that momentous day:

Decisions taken by the alliance in Prague have put an end to the divisions that have scarred Europe during the 20th century and set in motion a modernization process to ensure that NATO is able to deal as effectively with the security challenges of the 21st century as it was with the threats of the last. In the process, NATO leaders have shown their commitment to maintain the alliance as their central institution for collective defence, security consultation and multinational military actions.⁴⁴

NATO is very concerned about the potential rise of an alternative security institution with the encouragement of France and Germany within the European Union; the advent of the Euro-Army a case in point. NATO wants to ensure, especially through its

⁴² George Papandreou, ‘Greek Foreign Policy’, 1998-99, p.5.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ ‘NATO After Prague: Introduction’, December 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/prague>>.

expansion process and peace-enforcement operations throughout the troubled Balkan region, that it maintains its relevance in the post-Soviet era. Particularly, the statement made after the Prague summit stressed that the leaders of NATO demonstrated their commitment to consider NATO as their 'central institution' for collective defence and other multinational military activities, attempting to negate many of the dual NATO/EU members' commitment to the establishment and maintenance of the Euro-Army.⁴⁵ Further proving the point of NATO's insecurity from the point of view of losing influence over its European Union members:

[The] Alliance has demonstrated – once again – its capacity to adapt to meet new challenges that are very different from those in the first decades of its existence, but are no less formidable. These new challenges cannot be successfully overcome without co-operation between Europe and North America. And it is NATO alone that guarantees the transatlantic link in security.⁴⁶

It is clear from this that NATO took the opportunity of its latest enlargement as an ideal platform to spell out why it should still be regarded as the pre-eminent security institution in the Western world. The statement makes it eminently clear that the new challenges such as ethnic conflict and terrorism, require the consolidation of Europe and North America in order to be successful, and then, just a little later in the same document, it is claimed that NATO alone is equipped to ensure that the task is achievable.

Although NATO has undergone two waves of expansion, thereby extending its sphere of influence and responsibility, it has nonetheless had to regularly demonstrate its worth and credibility. The most recent challenge to NATO's credibility, coming soon after the Prague Summit, was the question of how to deal with Iraq, specifically the latter's supposed concealment of weapons of mass destruction. NATO's Secretary

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

General, George Robertson, promised to provide Turkey, the only NATO member-state that shares a land border with Iraq, assistance in defending itself against a possible attack from Saddam Hussein if there was retaliation from the latter to Turkey's decision to allow US forces to use base facilities on its soil. Belgium, France and Germany all initially opposed military action against Iraq, and refused to agree to the proposed deployment of Patriot anti-aircraft missiles and AWACS surveillance planes in Turkey.⁴⁷ What followed was unprecedented in the history of the alliance. Turkey enacted Article 4 of the NATO charter, which states the following: Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.⁴⁸

So, although most European states are keen to remain or become members of NATO, the alliance needs, at times such as the situation regarding Turkey, reassurance regarding its global significance, and survival as the world's pre-eminent military alliance. The expansion process, as covered earlier, is one of the surest ways to keep a supranational organisation significant. The accession process is long and drawn out, but ultimately, in the view of most parties involved, necessary and worthwhile. Many of the second wave applicants had waited for NATO membership since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, a long wait of 14 years.

Officially, the accession process began with the invitation extended during the Prague Summit in November 2002 to the seven countries to join the alliance. The next step for the countries invited was to engage in accession talks, held between December 2002 and March 2003. The accession talks focused on issues such as the applicant countries' confirmed interest in joining the organisation, as well as their willingness to

⁴⁷ 'Turkey Puts Brakes on US Deployment', *BBC News*, 17 February 2003, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2773161.stm>>.

⁴⁸ *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Article IV, April 1949.

adhere, and contribute, to the political, legal, financial and military obligations of the alliance.⁴⁹ Apart from the generalities of accession obligations, there were also the specific components of the talks with each accession aspirant, relating to any particular political, legal and military reforms the invited state had to complete before accession could be formalized. The end result of this process was that each such state submitted a timetable to NATO, indicating when the expected reforms would be initiated and completed, in readiness for formal inclusion into the alliance.⁵⁰

Once the accession talks were completed, NATO prepared separate accession protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for each country; all of these were signed in March 2003. These protocols were amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty, and were to be ratified by each alliance member in order for each of the invited states to become formally associated with the treaty. Once the protocols were ratified by the member states, the next official step was for the Secretary General of NATO to offer a formal invitation to these countries to join the North Atlantic Treaty. This process was completed in time for the NATO Summit in May 2004.⁵¹ However, with NATO expansion consistently encroaching further into Russia's former sphere of influence in former Soviet and Eastern Europe, NATO found it necessary to engage Russia positively, establish a relationship with the former superpower that would encourage cooperation and stability in NATO's newly acquired areas of influence. Some even wondered whether Russia could be a full member of NATO sometime in the future.⁵²

⁴⁹ Paul E. Gallis, *NATO Enlargement*, 5 May 2003, p.5.

⁵⁰ 'The Road to NATO Membership', *NATO Online*, November 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/more_info/membership.htm>.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² James A. Baker, 'Russia in NATO?', *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002, <<http://www.twq.com/02winter/baker.pdf>>.

Russia and NATO: A Relationship of Cooperation and Turbulence

NATO's relationship with Russia after the post-Cold War has been a sensitive one. With NATO encroaching further into territory formerly controlled by Moscow, and the apparent damage NATO's eastward expansion has done to Russian prestige, the country's ill-feelings and sense of suspicion toward the Alliance still exist in some quarters. That became evident in Russia's policy opposing NATO expansion, in addition to its pro-Serbian position during the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.⁵³ Russian and NATO foreign policy have often been a source of tension between one another, in addition to Russian domestic policies regarding the Chechen problem. Russia's unexpected deployment to Kosovo's Pristina airport, contrary to NATO schedule for entering the province after Serbian troops withdrew from Kosovo, almost developed into conflict. NATO commanders, including General Wesley Clark, were adamant that the deployment of Russian forces be removed. And yet, despite this backdrop of disagreement and tension, Russian – NATO relations have been progressively developing into one of cooperation and mutual consultation.⁵⁴

Given the nature of the relationship between Russia and NATO during the tumultuous period of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, when there was considerable cooperation between the two sides, punctuated by points of serious policy disagreements, the partnership established between Russia and NATO withstood these difficult periods. However, an important point to examine is at what level are NATO – Russian relations at currently, what is the nature of the relationship and how does that relationship function? These issues will be explored in the context of Russia's importance as the former powerbroker of the region, and NATO's attempt to both

⁵³ Lawrence Freedman, 'The Future of International Politics in the Wake of Kosovo', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 21 July 1999, <http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jdw990721_01_n.shtml>.

⁵⁴ 'Russian – NATO Relations in new Framework Developed Positively', *Pravda English Edition*, 13 June 2003, <<http://english.pravda.ru/world/2003/06/13/48185.html>>.

pacify Russian objections with a mixture of presenting it with a *fait accompli* as well as offering a special partnership between Russia and NATO.

A major test for Russian – NATO relations was the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of the Germany. Ten years before the first wave of NATO enlargement, the Soviets and NATO were jostling over whether a reunified Germany would be encouraged to be neutral, or join the NATO alliance.⁵⁵ Ultimately, the Soviets agreed to East Germany being absorbed by the West; its membership of NATO was within the context of East Germany becoming an extension of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁵⁶ The expansion of NATO influence to the former German Democratic Republic would set the precedent for future Russian – NATO relations, with a series of serious problems developing in their evolving relationship, and most, if not all, of the issues were resolved primarily to the satisfaction of NATO, as will be demonstrated below.

In Jacques Levesque's work on Soviet foreign and security policy before its collapse, he indicates that although the Soviet Union pursued a tougher line initially, Gorbachev in particular saw the end to the division of Europe and a more politically and economically integrated continent as being the Soviet Union's only hope of avoiding a political and economic disaster:

The Soviets chose not to take that route [using military force to prop up Communist regimes in Eastern Europe] essentially to avoid jeopardising a vast, ambitious plan to establish a new international order in Europe, within which the USSR hoped to play a new and important role.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ 'German Reunification Case Study: Two Plus Four Talks', Foothill College, <<http://www.foothill.fhda.edu/unification/twofour.html>>.

⁵⁶ David M. Ackermann, 'NATO Enlargement: Senate Advise and Consent', *CRS Report for Congress*, 2 May 2003, p.4, <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21240.pdf>>.

⁵⁷ Jacques Levesque, *NATO's Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive Historical Precedent* in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, 1999, p.157.

For its part, NATO has pursued a policy of careful engagement toward Russia. It has attempted to allay the fears of Russians, emphasizing that they are not considered an enemy of NATO. Although political disagreements exist with Russia, NATO policy does not always focus on these disagreements. Examples of this included NATO policies in relation to its Eastward expansion, NATO's military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo and NATO member-states bombing of Iraq.⁵⁸ Regardless, both NATO and Russia have continuously stressed the importance of their mutual relations to regional and international stability and security.⁵⁹ In the course of his February 2002 visit to Poland, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson gave a speech on "Building Security in an Uncertain World". In this speech, he underlined the need for NATO to adapt to the new security environment to effectively counter issues such as terrorism, in which he also acknowledged that NATO-Russian relations are crucial. He also highlighted some of the perceptions that dominate thinking on both sides of the relationship:

I recognise that there are quite a few people who get nervous whenever we talk about closer cooperation with Russia. Many in Russia feel the same way about closer cooperation with NATO. The real threats to our security, from regional instability to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and nuclear, biological and chemical agents, to terrorism, to cyber-warfare, to organised crime, do not recognise borders and are faced by NATO Allies and Russia alike. Isolating or ignoring Russia would only hobble our response to those dangers.⁶⁰

An interesting development in this regard was the international conference organised by the School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University on 22 February 2002; an event co-sponsored by NATO. Quite appropriately called Russia-NATO Strategic Partnership: Not Whether but When? It involved high-level

⁵⁸ 'Formal NATO – Russia Relations', NATO-Russia Archive, Berlin Information-Centre for Transatlantic Security, <[http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/relations.htm#III.per cent20Sourcesper cent20ofper cent20Disagreement](http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/relations.htm#III.per%20Sourcesper%20ofper%20Disagreement)>.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ George Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/0211/e0213a.htm>>.

participants from NATO and partner countries, including the US Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, and Dr. Irina Hakamada Vice-Speaker of the Duma and member of the Union of the Rightist Forces⁶¹ addressed the conference, which focused on the state of NATO-Russia relations in the political and military spheres and prospects for their further development. With such topics as Russia's possible membership of NATO, Russian public opinion of NATO, the war on terrorism and freedom of speech in Russia, the conference exposed and engaged many of the issues that needed to be ironed out in order to maintain close relations between Russia and NATO.⁶²

The maintenance of these relations is further manifested in various joint initiatives which are pursued by both Russia and NATO in the interests of both mutual understanding, as well as security and cooperation. The international conference discussed earlier was beneficial, but also a NATO-organized workshop on *Decommissioning Nuclear-Powered Vessels*, which included both NATO members and Russia. The workshop was hosted in Moscow on 22 April 2002 and was attended by High Level officials, notably Mr. V. Lebedev, the Secretary of State and Deputy Minister, Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia.⁶³ That workshop was productive because it addressed the main technical problems involved in dealing with vessels with damaged cores and unusual coolant conditions, land-based structures which are contaminated and effective wastage storage.⁶⁴

⁶¹ The Duma is the Russian Federation's Legislative Assembly. The Union of Rightist Forces describes itself as a liberal democratic party which adheres to "the democratic control of society over the government, private property, economic freedom, equal rights and opportunities for all citizens, and tolerance" ('The Russian Federation Votes 2003 – 2004', Union of Rightist Forces (SPS), *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, <<http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/parties/union.asp>>).

⁶² 'Working Toward a NATO - Russia Strategic Partnership', *NATO Update*, 27 Feb 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/02-february/e0222b.htm>>.

⁶³ 'NATO-Russia workshop on Decommissioning of Nuclear – Powered Vessels', *NATO Update*, 8 May 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/0422/e0422a.htm>>.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

The increased development of NATO – Russian relations was, to a large degree, the result of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, which was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the then NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and all member Heads of State on 27 May 1997, at the Madrid 1997 NATO Summit. This Founding Act recognized officially that NATO and Russia were no longer adversaries and indeed acknowledged the new era of improved relations between the former Cold War foes.

The NATO Rome Summit on the 28 May 2002 was to mark the most significant turning point in NATO – Russia relations since the Madrid Summit of May 1997. Putting aside the wide range of political differences between them during the five years between the Madrid and Rome Summits,⁶⁵ the formal signing of “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality”, that established the NATO-Russia Council, which was established in order to: “... serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia”.⁶⁶

An important reason for the enhancement of the level of relations, ultimately strengthening the NATO – Russia Council was the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, which left over 2,752 civilians dead.⁶⁷ After this, it was the key policy of the United States to search for new allies in its War against Terror. Russia, which has had much experience in terrorism by the way of the Chechen separatists, sympathised with the United States and to that end Russian President Putin extended the support of the Russian people. It was in that spirit that the NATO –

⁶⁵ Differences in policies pursued for the resolution to the Kosovo problem, the Chechen separatists within the Russian Federation, military and economic sanctions on Iraq, the United States plans for Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and continued Russian opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion into former Soviet States.

⁶⁶ ‘Rome Summit Lays Foundations for a Stronger NATO-Russia Relationship’, 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/0527/e0528a.htm>>.

⁶⁷ Phil Hirschhorn, ‘New York Reduces 9/11 Death Toll by 40’, *CNN New York Bureau*, 29 October 2003, <<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/index.html>>.

Russia Council would attempt to tackle the following security issues such as the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defence reform, civil emergencies, new threats and challenges.⁶⁸

This list was given as a basis to future cooperation within the NATO – Russia Council. The Council will take decisions by total consensus, by parties that will all be considered equal in status within the Council. The Rome Declaration states the Council “will work on the basis of continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate”.⁶⁹

Further, in order to solidify the expectations of the NATO – Russia Council so that it does not end up being just ink on a page, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated that:

There will be high expectations of all. Expectations that this will not be just another glitzy protocol event, but a real breakthrough. Expectations that the NATO-Russia Council will not just talk but will act, not just analyse but prescribe, not just deliberate but take decisive action. We have a profound obligation to ensure that these expectations are not disappointed. And if we need a reminder of why, then there is a simple answer. There is a common enemy out there.⁷⁰

Another event of major significance in increasing institutional ties between NATO and Russia was the first-ever meeting of the 19 NATO Ambassadors with their Russian counterpart in Moscow on 13 May 2003, in the capacity of the NATO – Russia

⁶⁸ ‘Rome Summit Lays Foundations’, 2002.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Council (NRC). Although highly symbolic in demonstrating that Russia is not only a distant partner to NATO, but an integral and decisive ally, the latter's first ever full meeting in Moscow also had other, more practical, objectives. Issues of interest at the council meeting included Afghanistan, in the context of the War on Terror, and how terrorism is being combated in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Secretary General Lord Robertson made the following statement in relation to the Moscow meeting of the NRC:

[The NRC is] evolving into a productive mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. Substantial progress has been made in moving towards practical cooperation in most areas of cooperation which were identified in the joint declaration in Rome. Those include agreed threat assessments on aspects of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, agreement on political modalities for future NATO-Russia peace-keeping operations and a planned procedural exercise to address these modalities.⁷¹

The success of the consultative mechanism that was established between NATO and Russia, through the formation of the NATO – Russia Council in Rome, a year before this meeting took place in Moscow, is evident in not only such meetings, but also in the pragmatic efforts by both sides to cooperate fully when it comes to terrorism. As terrorism is a significant menace to not only western society, but Russia as well, it is the perfect focal point for the NATO – Russian security relationship to develop further into closer cooperation between the two sides. NATO, for its part, views the NRC with enormous importance, going as far as stating “The individual Allies and Russia work ... as equal partners, on a wide range of Euro-Atlantic security issues of common interest through the NRC”.⁷² Considering the enormous tension that has existed in the past between NATO and Russia, whether it concerned NATO actions in Bosnia,

⁷¹ ‘Historic Meetings in Moscow’, 13 May 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/05-may/e0513a.htm>>.

⁷² Ibid.

Kosovo or its eastward expansion programme, the constant development of the NRC into something workable is a noteworthy achievement.

In essence, therefore, Russia, as a consequence of the Rome Summit, became an equal partner with the NATO alliance members on most crucial security issues that are of mutual interest, which represents the practical achievement of the NRC. Once enemies in the Cold War, the opposing sides have, it seems, come together and resolved many of their disputes in addition to finding a common enemy. The 'War on Terror' has produced that common enemy; an enemy strong enough to warrant the closest cooperation between NATO and Russia to date, going beyond the level of cooperation many observers would have considered possible in the short- and medium-term. Russia's once fervent opposition to NATO expansion eastward has eased, and NATO's policy of excluding Russia in favour of all its former satellites has come to an end. The next logical step in NATO – Russian relations appears to be, although still a distance prospect and fraught with difficult issues to overcome, full membership for the Russian Federation.

The expansion eastward by NATO, and the necessity in forging closer ties with peripheral states has been an important component to NATO's continued success in maintaining its relevance as the pre-eminent security institution of Europe, however, apart from the political machinations of the organisation, the expanding alliance needed to alter its financial expenditure from that of a Cold War environment to a budget more suitable to conditions in the post-Cold War world in order to ensure its ability to shift its focus to a pan-European organisation, with the ability to rapidly deploy forces into such places as the former Yugoslavia. As covered in this chapter, NATO has managed to evolve into a very different organisation to that of its former Cold War manifestation. The organisation has taken

the difficult step of recognising the importance of expanding its membership eastward, which in itself was a step that continues to make the organisation relevant and secured its future for the foreseeable future. In addition to the two phases of expansion eastward is NATO's relationship with the Russian Federation, the closer ties being forged and the establishment of many areas of mutual interest have ensured cooperation on many levels, regardless of several serious differences in foreign and security policy in the recent past. The activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty after 11 September 2001 in order to offer assistance to the United States also demonstrated that NATO has attempted to adapt the ever shifting security threats that are emerging globally, thereby ensuring its relevance as a flexible, efficient and effective military alliance.

Apart from eastward expansion and the establishment of closer ties to Moscow was NATO's other area of focus, ethnic conflict in the Balkans. The disintegration of Yugoslavia threatened to expose NATO as unwilling to intervene in an ethnic conflict bordering some of its member-states that potentially threatened their security also. Although NATO eventually demonstrated that will to intervene militarily it was, for hundreds of thousands of people killed in the destruction of Yugoslavia, too late.

Chapter Three

The Road to War in Europe: The Political Disintegration of Yugoslavia

Apart from being notable as the first conflict to erupt in Europe since Second World War, Yugoslavia's disintegration and degeneration into violence gave it another important role: as the spoiler of the 'New World Order' which President George Bush Senior had declared earlier that year, after the defeat of Iraq by the international alliance. The fact that Yugoslavia was simmering as a potentially explosive trouble spot so soon after Bush's declaration of a 'New World Order' drew considerable international attention to the Balkans. This chapter examines the path to the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the impact the political dismemberment of the state had within the country. The consequences of which was ethnic conflict throughout the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ultimately leading to NATO's intervention in the region.

Tito's Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: Unity by Force

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was the second state in history to bear the name 'Yugoslavia', and was the creation of Marshal Josip Tito in the aftermath of the Second World War. It was a mixture of different ethnic and religious groups, which had often been hostile to one another in the course of their history. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Albanians and Bosnian Muslims made up the major ethnic groups, with Turks, Roma, Italians and a few others also being represented in the new state. Religions present there included Orthodox and Catholic Christianity as

Map 3: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ethnic Composition (1991)

NOTE: This figure is included on page 68 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: 20th Century Middle East, State University of New York at Binghamton, <http://history.binghamton.edu/hist275/Map_Yugoslavia.jpg>

principal form of legitimacy was perforce to be based on the notion of ‘South Slavs’ well as the Islamic faith. It is understandable, given this context, that unity here would have to be achieved through the building and maintenance, of an artificial state, whose (Yugoslav) and *bratsvo i jedinstvo* (Brotherhood and Unity), regardless of their historic, linguistic, cultural and religious differences.¹

Table 1 demonstrates the fragile ethnic mix of the Balkan region in the early 1990s, with most countries in the area possessing a significant ethnic minority of a neighbouring state within their boundaries. The Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia

¹ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.138.

and Herzegovina were a great source of tension between Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, as were the Albanian minority in Serbia an enormous source of tension between Serbia and Albania. It was the complex links to their respective motherlands that these ethnic minorities had which has been used to account for the outbreak of ethnic conflict and for the subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Table 1: The Balkan Minority Link in 1990

NOTE: This table is included on page 69 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: CIA World Fact Book 1990

In spite of the obvious tensions present in uniting so many varied groups, Tito's record in the war, his charisma and diplomatic skills enabled him to create the Yugoslav State.² He was credited with maintaining this unity, within a carefully crafted federative structure during his 35- year rule (1945-1980) of the new country. Stevan Pavlowitch sums up Tito's achievement in the following way:

By reuniting the Serbs and Croats who had been set on each other by the Axis powers, and by granting the Macedonians the ethnic recognition which the monarchy had refused them, Tito's communist regime gave a more solid foundation³ to Yugoslavia, even if it did not actually solve her national question.

It is important to understand how Tito was able to not only achieve the impressive task of uniting many of the varied ethnic groups within Yugoslavia to fight a war of resistance against the axis powers during the Second World War but also how he

² Ibid.

³ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences*, Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing, 1996, p.53.

maintained this unity in his later role as President of a united Yugoslavia. The key to his success was seemingly the Marxist-Leninist universalist ideology which Tito's resistance group, the Partisans, so successfully employed. Unlike the extreme nationalist forces, such as the Croatian Ustase or Serbian Chetniks, the Partisans were open to all ethnic and religious groups, fighting under the banner 'Brotherhood and Unity'. Indeed, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Partisans war cry was 'Neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Moslem but Serbian and Moslem and Croatian', indicating the Partisans inclusiveness of the different ethnic groups being stronger united.⁴ Another significant innovation by Tito was to promise all the major ethnic groups of Yugoslavia a federated state after the war was over, thereby guaranteeing cultural, religious and economic autonomy within the larger Yugoslav state.⁵

In November 1945, six months after Germany had surrendered to the allies in Europe, The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was declared by Tito. Within two months of this, the first Communist Constitution of Yugoslavia was ratified, confirming the federal structure of the new republic. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted the status of full republics within Yugoslavia, and theoretically possessed the right to secede if they so wished to do. Two provinces within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, which had significant ethnic Hungarian and Albanian minorities respectively, were given autonomous status within the Serbian republic. This federal structure was based on the USSR model that had been designed in 1936, which consisted of fifteen republics and a number of autonomous oblasts (provinces/regions). It was designed to keep the country together by recognising the necessity of achieving an equitable balance

⁴ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.120.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.137.

between the various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia.⁶ Tito's ambitions did not end with the federating of Yugoslavia. He envisioned, along with Communist regime in Bulgaria under Georgi Dimitrov, and, to a lesser extent, the Romanian and the Greek Communist Parties, to unify the Balkan Peninsula into a federation of Communist states.⁷ This ambition was seen to be attractive in two ways. First, it would alleviate the fears of the non-Slav communities of Yugoslavia because it potentially sought to incorporate Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania into the Balkan federation. In addition to potentially addressing the ethnic minority issues by creating a Balkan federation, it would have also been ideologically prudent, since Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania were all Communist regimes, and the Greek Communists were also fighting to take control of Greece.⁸

By 1948, Stalin had ejected Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) after repeated attempts to subdue Tito's ambitious project.⁹ The Soviet-Yugoslav split was fundamental in the evolution of Yugoslavia as an independent player in the international arena. Although Tito was to enjoy the benefits of the Yugoslav-Soviet split, through the United States making overtures of military and economic assistance to Belgrade,¹⁰ the short-term effect was less favourable. Bulgaria and Albania, along with the Greek Communist Party, which became disillusioned with Tito's desire to annex Greek Aegean Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia of Yugoslavia, were divided into 'Titoist' and 'Stalinist' camps.¹¹ As rapidly as he became popular throughout the Balkans, he came to be condemned, and

⁶ Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslavian Inferno*, New York, Continuum, 1994, p.75.

⁷ Peter Stavrakis, *Greek Communism*, 1989, pp.134-135.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid p.171.

¹⁰ Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 1992, p.236.

¹¹ Peter Stavrakis, *Greek Communism*, 1989, p.188.

his pursuit of Yugoslav dominance in the Balkans led to his isolation by the Cominform. After the Soviet-Yugoslav split, Yugoslavia was in need of an external patron, which quickly and ironically became the United States.¹² President Truman's administration allocated \$US20 million in 1949 to Yugoslavia in economic aid, which by 1960 amounted to \$US2 billion in non-repayable, without it, Yugoslavia would have collapsed economically.¹³

The rapid alteration of circumstances since the Soviet-Yugoslav split forced Tito to alter his policy and tactics in his foreign dealings. Bulgaria and Albania remained in the Soviet sphere of influence,¹⁴ and without Stalin's backing, Tito's desire to dominate the region through a Communist Balkan federation would not come to fruition. With the Balkan federation all but a pipedream, Tito focused on the unity of the Yugoslav federation. To that end, Tito explained that the internal borders within the Yugoslav federation did not mean:

Drawing a boundary line between this federal unit and the other, and now you on the other side shall do as you please, and I shall do as I please on my side of the boundary. No! These boundaries, figuratively speaking, should resemble the white lines on a marble column. The boundaries of the federated units within the federal state of Yugoslavia do not denote separatism but unity.¹⁵

Therefore, although the new Yugoslav state's Constitution was very much one which established and fostered institutions of governance both at a republican and federal level, in reality Tito sought to centralise as much power as possible in his hands.

¹² Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 1996, p.59.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 1992, p.126.

¹⁵ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.141.

Federal laws would always take priority over republican ones, and any laws that were enacted in the republics had to conform to the federal ones.¹⁶

In 1953 there was a move towards decentralisation, although this was based more on 'communal' and local governing organs, which were designed to undercut the six constituent federal republics, so that the ethnic groups governing those republics were kept in line with the needs of a united Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1953 degraded the rights and position of the six republics Constitutionally, with the most notable alteration in the Constitution being the dropping of the notion of republican 'sovereignty', which, in effect, reduced the republics to regional administrations, lacking the right to claim separate sovereignty from that of the federal republic: "[t]he lion's share of legislative power remained with the federal organs, which retained a sphere of exclusive jurisdiction and were empowered to enact fundamental or general legislation as a framework for action by the republics".¹⁷ As Skilling suggests, within seven years of Yugoslavia's creation, Tito had managed to create a situation which implied a working federal republican system of south Slav states with wide-ranging autonomy, placating the national and ethnic groupings within Yugoslavia, although, in effect, through his dominance of federal organs, he was able to control, almost exclusively, all the functions of the Yugoslav state.

Tito was not only isolated by the community of Communist states under the direction of Stalin, but Yugoslavia was under economic and political sanction from the Cominform. There was even military intimidation of Yugoslavia by the Soviet

¹⁶ H.Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist Eastern Europe*, 1966, p.152.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.153.

Union.¹⁸ Without links to the West, and its relations with the East all but severed, it became increasingly likely that Yugoslavia would collapse both politically and economically.¹⁹ It became clear that the Yugoslav strategy had to accommodate the rapidly evolution of events which threatened the new state. Tito moved to develop the ‘Yugoslav Way’ essentially, a Yugoslav interpretation of communism tailored to its own predicament. Tito was a good guerrilla fighter, but it appeared that he was no ideologue, so this task was left to Milovan Djilas, who later became a well-known dissident, and Edvard Kardelj.²⁰ Tito took the opportunity to purge those who were loyal to Stalin’s Cominform, resulting in some 11,000 casualties from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY).²¹ The economic support from the United States was a huge coup for Tito, whose politics was staunchly Communist, but had through his efforts achieved the advantage of being disassociated with the Eastern European – but in particular Soviet – Communist parties. The benefits to both sides were obvious, the Yugoslavs were able to maintain their dogged opposition to Stalin and survive independently, while the US was able to take advantage of the Tito-Stalin split to project itself further into the predominately Communist Balkan Peninsula:

The public rift between Yugoslav leader Tito and Stalin exhilarated US policymakers. They had not foreseen it, but they were eager to capitalise on it senior US military and diplomatic officials were eager to reach out to Tito, offer him short-term aid, and provide encouragement.²²

The unique situation Tito carved out for himself, and for Yugoslavia, was that he became the only independent communist who had cordial dealings with the United States. The United States’ “aim was to provide the minimal assistance necessary to

¹⁸ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, 1996, pp.57-58.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.59.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.54.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.58-59.

²² Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, 1992, p.236.

sustain Tito. They did not intend, however, to embrace independent Communist governments”.²³ The US, in exchange for substantial economic aid, expected certain foreign policy realignments from Tito, and mainly in relation to Yugoslavia’s support of the Greek Communists in the Greek civil war of 1946 - 1949. The Yugoslavs isolated the Greek Communist guerrillas, whom were defeated by the US armed and trained Greek government forces in 1949, hence ending the Communist threat in Greece permanently. With Yugoslavia tacitly recognising US interests in the region, the Soviet Union was left with little influence in Yugoslavia, leaving the fledgling Balkan state, in the short-term, dependent on US foreign and military aid. It was the Tito-Stalin split that enabled Yugoslavia, ultimately, to forge a Yugoslav national identity, and to pursue its independent path both domestically and internationally outside of Stalin’s control. However, the period between the Tito-Stalin split and the establishment of the new Constitution of 1974 was the most stable of the SFRY, especially because of Tito’s tight control of the political power in the country. Even Tito, though, was unable to ignore the increasing desire amongst the individual republics for greater autonomy within the federation. In order to stifle any movements toward independence by the republics within SFRY, Tito formulated the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY so that each republic would have more control over its internal affairs.

The 1974 Federal Yugoslav Constitution: Premise for Division

The significance of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 and its deviation from previous Constitutions of the Yugoslav state was evident in the Constitution’s preamble which stated: “The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely

²³ Ibid., pp.236-237.

expressed in the common struggle of all nations.”²⁴ The preamble is unambiguous in its meaning, that the different nations within Yugoslavia have the right to self-determination, inclusive of the right to secession, an extraordinary move to grant the republics, finally, the autonomy they were promised after 1945.

This Constitution, drafted for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was the sixth Yugoslav Constitution, and it was to be the last under Tito. Its primary function was to devolve significant authority from the federal institutions to the republican and autonomous regions within Yugoslavia.²⁵ Up until this point in the history of the Yugoslav state, although a federation of constituent republics comprising of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia, Tito, managed to control much of the significant policy areas of Yugoslavia hence, very little practical autonomy had been exercised by the republics. Under his rule in Belgrade, nationalism and separatism were forbidden, and, indeed, even inklings of these were crushed.²⁶ This was also the case in the Kosovo and Metohija region, which, although it was Constitutionally part of the Serbian republic, was always a source of political and cultural instability within Yugoslavia with ethnic rivalry between the Albanian majority and Serbian minority in the region.²⁷

From 1945 through to 1966 the problem of Kosovo was left to the security apparatus, which was Serbian-dominated. The police record in Kosovo was stained with various killings and other human rights abuses, which included enforcing of the use of Serbo-

²⁴ Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities*, Cambridge, Documents & Analysis Publishing, 1999,p.54.

²⁵ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.143.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans*, 1999, pp.579-580.

Croatian as the language of Kosovo.²⁸ Use of the Albanian language, although ethnic Albanians constituted the majority of the population in the province, was generally not allowed. The mid-1960s saw the taking of a direction away from the oppressive policies toward the Albanians of Kosovo, to one of gradual and incremental granting of political and cultural rights for the region's dominant ethnic group, although not to a sufficient level as far as the Albanians of Kosovo were concerned, who essentially sought autonomy from Belgrade:

Tito is still remembered with genuine affection by many Albanians in the former Yugoslavia. They see him as the man who halted or reversed the most objectionable policies of the previous Yugoslav regime – the colonization programme and the suppression of the Albanian language – and who gave the territory of Kosovo a form of autonomy, which, by the 1970s [in reference to the 1974 Constitution], had come close to attaining equal status with other federal units of the Yugoslav state.²⁹

This was in line with Tito's priority of keeping all the peoples of Yugoslavia happy by de-centralising the federation in order to avoid ethnic unrest after his policy of enforcing a high level of centralisation was not acceptable by all the ethnic groups. Specifically, the 1974 Constitution, extended to the Serbian regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina similar rights to those of the six federal republics within Yugoslavia.

Article 4 of the 1974 Constitution defines the status of the autonomous provinces:

The Socialist Autonomous Province are autonomous socialist self-managing democratic socio-political communities based on the power of an self-management by the working class and the working people, in which the working people, nations and nationalities of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in the common interest of working people, nations and nationalities of that republic as a whole, they do also within the Republic.³⁰

²⁸ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, London, Papermac, 1999, p.314.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999*, 1999, p.54.

Noel Malcolm argues that what the above article meant in real terms after its implementation was that the 1974 Constitution:

... gave the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six republics with their own direct representation on the main federal Yugoslav bodies also making them equal to the republics in most forms of economic decision-making, and even in some areas of foreign policy.³¹

The provinces were to set up their own state institutions and administer their own education, including at University level.³² In Kosovo, Albanian was designated an official language along side Serbo-Croatian.³³ Encouragement from the federal authorities saw Kosovo establish trade links with Albania, as well as recruiting Albanians into prominent positions in institutions such as the police force, which, traditionally, were controlled by the Serbian minority.³⁴ The Albanian flag was already permitted to fly in Kosovo as early as 1969, but this devolution of power to the provinces, which also essentially meant devolution of power along ethnic lines in Kosovo, was to become an important framework for the eventual disintegration of Yugoslavia.

As Malcolm stated above, the equivalent nature of the autonomous provinces alongside the republics went much further than just re-adjusting the Constitution to allow the Albanian language to be spoken and the Albanian flag to be raised. It also had serious consequences for the role to be played by the Serbian government in Belgrade as is demonstrated below. The consequence, specifically of the 1974 Constitution, was Belgrade's diminishing political control over its two autonomous

³¹ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 1998, p.327.

³² *Ibid.*, p.326.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.325-327.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.327.

provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which effectively became self-governing with the SFRY.³⁵

Specifically, Article 5 of the 1974 Constitution is a clause that gave each republic within Socialist Federal Yugoslavia the right to control its territory.³⁶ No alteration to boundaries could be made without the specific consent of the republic concerned.³⁷ What gives credibility to Malcolm's statement of: "a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six republics" is the extent to which the Constitution accommodated the self-management of the autonomous provinces. The republics had the right to determine any boundary changes that affected them, but the Constitution also afforded the autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic the same right,³⁸ effectively cutting Belgrade out of decisions regarding Serbia's own territorial composition.

Apart from securing the right to de facto territorial sovereignty in the 1974 Constitution, the establishment of independent economies, particularly that of Kosovo, and the setting up of 'National Banks' in the autonomous provinces underlines the extent to which the term 'autonomy' is to be used loosely during the period 1974-1989.³⁹ Given that the province of Kosovo and Vojvodina were allowed to control taxation policy, their own provincial Constitutions, executive councils, provincial administration, legislative assemblies, Constitutional and supreme courts, and

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Marc Weller, *The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999*, 1999, p.54.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

universities, the only difference between the republics and the autonomous provinces was, for the latter, the absence of the right to secede from Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

Further to the right of each republic to secede from the Yugoslav Federation, an enormous step in decentralization took hold in the form of another notable Article of the 1974 Constitution, specifically article 294 states: “Agencies in the Autonomous Provinces shall be responsible for the enforcement and implementation of republican laws and other republican regulations, applied throughout the territory of the republic, in the territory of the province.”⁴¹ Article 294 was for Belgrade, and Serbia as a whole, a disaster for the unity of the Serbian republic. With ‘Serbian law’ within Kosovo legislated and implemented by Kosovo Albanian administrators due to the extensive autonomy given by the 1974 Constitution, it was clear that the Kosovo Albanian majority within Kosovo were free to administer the province as they pleased, with little to no regard for Serbian law even though officially, Kosovo still was required to enforce Serbian republican law as well as its own provincial ones.

The 1974 Constitution was designed to relieve some of the aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians for self-determination by giving them nationality status, almost equivalent to the other six republics within the Yugoslav federation. Tito’s desire to see Yugoslavia remain unified was administered with a balance of force and placation of desires for autonomy by most ethnic groups within the country. The 1974 Constitution would prove to act as a catalyst for the disintegration of Yugoslavia for two reasons. First, it gave the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo a true taste of freedom and independence from Serb rule, which appealed to them greatly, and any return to pre-

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.57.

1974 conditions would prove to be unacceptable. Second, the Serbian response, although muted initially, was one of disappointment and disillusionment; a sense of loss brought on by Belgrade's perceived slipping grip over effective control of Kosovo ultimately leading to an exodus of ethnic Serbs from the province.⁴² It was the political and cultural status of Kosovo, largely allocated by the 1974 Constitution, which the former Serbian and Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, was able to manipulate to his advantage to attain political and military control of Serbia. Milosevic's rise to power was one of the most important factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Balkan wars between 1991-1999.⁴³

Tito was the glue that bound Yugoslavia together, but with his passing in May 1980 at the age of 87, Yugoslavia would fall into ethnic strife. During his 35 years of rule, Tito was able to keep Yugoslavia together, even though at times his policies created tension between the different nationalities. There was no clear successor to Tito, apart from a clumsy and cumbersome collective presidency, which ultimately failed to keep Yugoslavia not only from disintegration, but also failed to keep the dismemberment of the federation peaceful. Instead, nationalism was taking hold of the various national groups within Yugoslavia, which by the late 1980s had rendered the collective presidency as a vehicle to pursue ethnic interests rather than those of Yugoslavia. The emergence of political opportunists such as Slobodan Milosevic, or true nationalist proponents such as Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic were to formulate policies that ignored Tito's Brotherhood and Unity and ultimately ensured the end of Yugoslavia.

⁴² Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 1998, p.331.

⁴³ Paul Moon, *Milosevic: Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Crisis*, Palmerston North, New Zealand, Campus Press, 1999, p.32.

Yugoslavia, and all its peoples, went into a genuine state of mourning after Tito's death.⁴⁴ That outpouring of grief indicated two specific concerns for the Yugoslav people. For many Yugoslavs, especially those under the age of 35, there was no recollection of any other leader apart from Tito, and this, in turn, caused for them great anxiety regarding the prospects for a country which lost its great leader, but had no clear or deserving successor to replace him. Christopher Bennett confirms a degree of panic amongst the Yugoslav leadership after Tito's death and in the actions they took immediately after to secure the country:

In the months leading up to and immediately after Tito's death the JNA was on a state of high alert in case the Warsaw Pact decided to invade the country at this critical juncture. In reality, Yugoslavia's new leaders exaggerated the Soviet threat in an effort to bring the country together. The threat to Yugoslavia's security came in the absence of external danger. For the real threat came not from without, but from within.⁴⁵

Paul Moon also emphasises the uncertainties that gripped the country after their long-time leader's death:

Even years after Tito's death, the Yugoslav dictator was viewed by much of the world as something of a hero – he had led an apparently successful, politically autonomous socialist experiment in Europe for over three decades. Within the country though, the signs of decay had been evident long before 1980, and pressures for change were building up behind the dam of Tito's archaic Communist ideals. The only certainty as that with Tito's death, all sorts of new ideas, opportunities, and dangers would be hurled through Yugoslavia.⁴⁶

Both Bennett and Moon make valid points. Bennett when he discusses the Yugoslav leadership's anxiety over maintaining the unity of the country, and by arguing that although the only real way to maintain that unity was to present an outside security threat. With the benefit of hindsight he has demonstrated that in reality the biggest

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.32.

⁴⁵ Christopher Bennett, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.77.

⁴⁶ Paul Moon, *Milosevic and Yugoslavia*, 2000, p.32.

threat to Yugoslavia's security and integrity was very much from within. Moon, on the other hand, points out that despite the uncertainties faced by post-Tito Yugoslavia, there were nonetheless also some opportunities, even if these were not taken advantage of. Unfortunately, post-Tito Yugoslavia would go through a very difficult period economically and politically, which also contributed to the destabilisation of the country.⁴⁷ The lack of economic stability would contribute significantly to the ultimate collapse of the country politically.

According to official Yugoslav figures, the country was affected by high unemployment, hyperinflation and massive foreign debt. Workers salaries had dropped by 24 per cent by 1988 and living conditions were regressing to levels seen in the mid-1960s.⁴⁸ Alongside the ethnic rivalries beginning to play out, the political and economic conditions in Yugoslavia during the mid-1980s led to protests, in one instance, of up to four million Yugoslavs, clearly demonstrating public resentment at government economic policy which contributed to the falling of their standard of living.⁴⁹ Overall, the conditions for the rise of nationalism were adequate, as can be demonstrated by the rise of Slobodan Milosevic who offered a dream to his people.

The Reawakening of Serbian Nationalism in Yugoslavia

The emergence of competing nationalisms after Tito's death was not unforeseen, it was just a matter of which nationalism from the main Yugoslav groups would grip the country first and how intensely that nationalism would manifest itself. The frustration Serbs felt regarding the status left to them by Tito began to manifest itself definitively on 24 September 1986, when a memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and

⁴⁷ Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, Boulder, San Francisco, Westview Press, 1995, p.45.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.46.

Arts (SANU) was published in the mass-circulation paper *Vecernje Novosti*.⁵⁰ By later standards, this pronouncement was quite mild in terms of nationalist rhetoric, but for that particular period it was considered a politically destabilising publication.⁵¹ The publication found that the Serbs of Croatia were in a parlous state:

Except during the period of the NDH (the fascist Croatian state formed in 1941), Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political question. If a solution is not found, the consequences will be damaging on many levels, not only for relations within Croatia but also for all of Yugoslavia.⁵²

Up until that point, it was entirely unacceptable to refer to specific ‘national interests’ ahead of the bigger ‘Yugoslav brotherhood and unity’ principle.⁵³ The fact that the publication was given credibility through its association with the Serbian intelligentsia was even greater cause for concern, given that the Serbian intellectuals were seen as the driving force behind the new-found nationalism.⁵⁴ Apart from the veiled attack on Croatia, the memorandum listed Serbian grievances concerning the status of Kosovo.⁵⁵ The Serbian President, Ivan Stambolic, was surprised by the nationalist tone of the memorandum. Much of Serbia’s ruling elite condemned the document. Slobodan Milosevic, who was Stambolic’s protégé at the time, remained silent.⁵⁶ According to Little and Silber, though, the draft memorandum itself was not the source of the resulting nationalism:

The draft Memorandum did not create nationalism, it simply tapped sentiments that ran deep among the Serbs, but which were suppressed and,

⁵⁰ ‘The Witch Hunt Against the Memorandum’, *The Balkan Repository Project*, <<http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/kosta/memorandum/the.witch.hunt.against.the.memorandum.html>>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, London, BBC & Penguin Books, 1996, p.33.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Alex Dragnic, *Serbia and Yugoslavia: Historical Studies and Contemporary Commentaries*, New York, Colombia University Press, 1998, p.66.

⁵⁵ Ibid p.70.

⁵⁶ Alan Little and Laura Silber, 1996, p.33.

as a result, exacerbated by Communism. The Academy's tract echoed opinions whispered throughout Serbia.⁵⁷

The Croats and Slovenes were relieved that the Serbian political leadership condemned both the memorandum, and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that produced it. Instead of taking this as a sign that the leadership did not want to pursue the road of nationalism, the Croatian Communist leaders relied on a 30-page pamphlet which was produced by Croatian émigrés known as the 'the Croatian National Council' to counter the Serb nationalistic statement. Alex Dragnic analyses the reaction of the Croatian National Council to the memorandum in the following way:

The pamphlet had all the familiar anti-Serb statements, e.g. that the Serbs only wanted the type of Yugoslavia which they could use to dominate the other peoples of the country moreover, the pamphlet, far from criticising nationalism and separatism, saw in them positive meaning. In Yugoslavia, it said, the desired goal was a confederal arrangement whereby the republics would have the status of sovereign states, while the common state would become an association of states. This was clearly in conformity with the course that the Croatian leaders had already chosen.⁵⁸

The Croatian response to the SANU memorandum, as indicated above, was to raise the ante, by breaking more taboos and declaring that they were in favour of a Yugoslav confederation in which each republic was sovereign, and only loosely associated with the other five republics.⁵⁹ Rather than using the usual 'brotherhood and unity' rhetoric, the Croats not only resorted to nationalism themselves, but were keen to steer it in the direction in which would benefit them the most.⁶⁰ The Croats denied the legitimacy of Serbian grievances, claiming that the SANU memorandum resorted to tactics of hate and fear aimed at dominating Yugoslavia, rather than seeing the

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Alex Dragnic, 1998, p.69.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.70.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.72.

memorandum as an unauthorised work by the SANU. Thus, the seeds for ethnic conflict and disintegration had been sown.

The main concern for the Serbs was the distribution of their ethnic group throughout the country, which placed many ethnic Serbs outside the direct control of the Serb Republic. According to the 1981 Census (which was taken one year after Tito's death), 36 per cent of the Yugoslav population were ethnic Serbs, two million of those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 1.3 million in Serbia's autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and 4.9 million in Serbia proper.⁶¹ It was the distribution of the Serbian nation across these internal boundaries, which led to controversies such as the memorandum issued by the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts. It was also an issue of Serbian national unity, and in particular the Serbs plight in Kosovo, which propelled the nationalist agenda firmly onto the stage of Serbian politics.

Kosovo: A Nationalist Trigger between 1981 and 1989

Understanding the ethnic tension that ensued between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in the period 1981 through to 1989 is crucial to explaining the events leading to NATO's intervention in 1999. The Kosovo Albanians, as a result of the 1974 Constitution, were enjoying autonomy from Belgrade, to the detriment of the local Serb minority. It is difficult to ascertain what incident specifically brought on the wave of ethnic tension in the early 1980s between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Noel Malcolm believed that one specific incident contributed significantly to the tension. On 11 March 1981, in the eating hall of the University of Pristina, a student found a cockroach in his soup. He apparently flung his food tray on the floor. This

⁶¹ Christopher Bennett, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, pp.112-113.

action prompted other students to protest the conditions in the University.⁶² A protest that was sparked by the quality of food in the University cafeteria and widened to include the overall conditions at the University began to take on a political dimension after 3,000 to 4,000 spectators of a football game joined the students at the University. This large crowd had quickly been confronted by police firing tear-gas. The content of the slogans chanted by the ethnic Albanian protestors began to engage in taboos of the Tito era, such as “Kosovo – Republic! ... We are Albanians – not Yugoslavs! ... Unification with Albania!”,⁶³ in response to this display the police charged and fired more tear-gas, injuring 32 and arresting many more.⁶⁴

It can be said that the incident cited by Malcolm as being the catalyst for the modern struggle of ethnic Albanians against Serbian rule was simply an act of a disgruntled set of students who were appalled by their living and studying conditions. Clearly the protestors saw these conditions as a result of discrimination by Belgrade in not developing the region in line with other more affluent areas of the country. That accusation however, was despite a disproportionate allocation of federal Yugoslav development funds of 30 per cent of the total to Kosovo, which accounted only 8 per cent of the overall population.⁶⁵ The bulk of the financial aid forwarded to Kosovo was provided by the Serb Republic and the Federal government, yet it remained the poorest in Yugoslavia. Various reasons for the economic situation in Kosovo despite the financial assistance have ranged from demographic (a high birth rate among Albanians of 32 per 1,000 - which is the highest in Europe), Albanians’ alleged

⁶² Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 1998, p.334.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp.336-337.

backwardness, lack of management skills, corruption, unproductive enterprises, and lack of planning skills.⁶⁶

Due to the increased tension that had developed between the communities, incidents such as the one described above became commonplace, with tanks rolling into the streets the following day but failed to stop a group of several thousand construction workers from protesting. That protest ended in clashes with police, and other similar disturbances erupted throughout the major centres of Kosovo. In the ethnically mixed town of Mitrovica, metal workers joined in the protests that caused serious concern to the authorities. Special units of security police were brought in from all over Yugoslavia, curfews went into effect and general state of emergency in Kosovo was declared.⁶⁷ As a result of these incidents and subsequent ones, according to a survey conducted by the Belgrade magazine *NIN* in 1986 showed “1,200 people had been given substantial prison sentences, and another 3,000 sent to gaol for up to three months”.⁶⁸ After eight years of clashes between Kosovo Albanians and the authorities, “584,373 were arrested, interrogated, interned or reprimanded. Seven thousand of these were jailed, hundreds more dismissed from school, university and work”⁶⁹ It is important to remember that these events were taking place whilst Kosovo was under the control of the ethnic Albanians, as it had been since 1974.

It was not only the Albanians who suffered due to the lack of economic development of Kosovo: “While the economic lag was felt by both Albanian and Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo, the cultural isolation was a singularly Albanian phenomenon. This is why

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.332-337.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.335.

⁶⁸ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p.40.

⁶⁹ Mark Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia*, London, 1992 in Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000.

Kosovo Serbs resented being forced to learn Albanian and to attend schools with instruction in the Albanian language”.⁷⁰ Kosovo Serbs were also the victims of desecrated churches, stolen or destroyed property and sustained pressure to leave Kosovo:

Even before the 1974 Constitution, the Kosovo Albanians persecuted the Serbs. They desecrated their churches, stole or destroyed their property, employed duress to get them to sell their holdings, and engaged in other acts designed to force them to leave Kosovo.... The Serbs’ growing national frustration was skilfully used, after a party coup in 1987, by Slobodan Milosevic, the new leader of the Serbian communists. Instead of party forums he used populist methods taking over ... the role of the protector of national interests ... the protection of the endangered Serbs in Kosovo became a means of political manipulation.⁷¹

It was this discrimination by the Albanian authorities in Kosovo against the Kosovo Serbs that Slobodan Milosevic was to use as a vehicle for his rise to power within Serbia. The foundation of Milosevic’s leadership was his ability to exploit the most serious ethnic tension the region had seen in decades. Milosevic used Serbian nationalism as a tool in securing and legitimating his leadership, in turn disenfranchising the Kosovo Albanians of their political and social rights.

Milosevic’s Nationalism: No-one Should Dare Beat You!

Against the backdrop of ethnic friction between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, Milosevic became the head of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986. On 24 April 1987, Milosevic travelled to Kosovo in place of Stambolic, the Serbian President and Milosevic’s mentor, to attend a meeting of the Kosovo provincial Communist Party in Kosovo Polje on the outskirts of Pristina.⁷² Outside this meeting, 15,000 Kosovo Serb demonstrators engaged the provincial Kosovo Albanian police in

⁷⁰ S. Trifkovic, *The Kosovo Dossier*, London, The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, 1999, p.53.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.37.

orchestrated clashes.⁷³ Milosevic was urged to go outside and address the demonstrators. He was visibly shaken by the intensity of the anger of the crowds outside the building. The words he would utter to the crowd were to change the course of events which contributed significantly to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Clearly moved by the events occurring before him, he declared “No one should dare beat you.”⁷⁴ Milosevic, up until that moment had always been a cautious advocate of the Titoist ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ philosophy, which did not discriminate along ethnic lines. He was now speaking out in favour of his ethnic Serbian kin in Kosovo against the ethnic Albanians. Milosevic’s utterance of ‘no-one should dare beat you’ became a modern day Serb rallying call. Silber and Little go further and observe that “sentence enthroned him as a tsar” of the Serbian nation.⁷⁵

Up until that point, Milosevic preferred to maintain a low profile, however the events that took place in Kosovo drew him into a chain of events which he saw as an opportunity to gain political credibility amongst the Serbian people of Yugoslavia. A report on the Balkans by the International Crisis Group in 1998 described Milosevic cynically as a man who owes his political success due to his manipulative techniques:

As a political character, Milosevic is anything but a stereotypical Serbian underdog ready to sacrifice himself in defiance of an overwhelming enemy. He has behaved more like Scheherazade, the heroine of The Arabian Nights who conjured up a new story each night for a thousand and one nights in order to charm a demented Shah and save herself from execution. Like Scheherazade, Milosevic has survived by anticipating dangerous situations and preparing for them. He is a quintessential opportunist. His habitat is the

⁷³ Ibid., p.37.

⁷⁴ Robert Thomas, *Serbia Under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s*, London, Hurst & Company, 1999, p.44.

⁷⁵ Alan Little and Laura Silber, 1996, p.38.

realm of the short term.⁷⁶

According to Bennett, “His driving force was an overwhelming lust for power, not visions of a Greater Serbia, and for that reason he was far more dangerous than a nationalist.”⁷⁷ Whether it was a pursuit of power or the interest of the Serbian nation, his use of the protests that erupted in Kosovo Polje on 24 April 1987 was to catapult the energetic, skilled bureaucrat to the Presidency. That event, according to then Serbian President Ivan Stambolic, transformed Milosevic who had been set afire by the Kosovo issue. In his speech in Kosovo Polje, Milosevic realised the unique position he found himself rising as the saviour of the downtrodden Serbian people in Kosovo:

You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured with injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilise when it's time to fight ... You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants But I don't suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia.⁷⁸

Milosevic's championing of the Kosovo Serb cause by expressing their most basic concerns struck a chord with them and ensured that they were to become amongst his most loyal supporters. No major Serbian or Yugoslav political figure in the Communist party had been willing or able to speak in favour of any particular ethnic group within Yugoslavia because it ran against the ideal of Tito's 'Brotherhood and Unity', an ideal which Milosevic himself publicly promoted in the past. In his speech, he indicated a significant shift from the brotherhood and unity ideal, by siding with the Serb and Montenegrin plight in Kosovo, he publicly acknowledged that there was

⁷⁶ Paul Moon, *Milosevic*, 2000, p.41.

⁷⁷ Christopher Bennett, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.83.

⁷⁸ Alan Little and Laura Silber, 1996, p.38.

oppression of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia by others. His reference to the Serbian and Montenegrin character, was a divergence from the 'Brotherhood and Unity' paradigm that removed the emphasis of the various ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, essentially alienating the non-Serbs of the country. Milosevic's new status as the voice of the Serbian nation within Yugoslavia was driven by his concern over the living conditions and mistreatment of the Serbs in Kosovo as well as his political ambitions. He saw an opportunity to use the situation to his advantage and incidentally, to the advantage of the Serbian nation.

Milosevic proclaiming that no-one should dare beat the Serbs of Kosovo was a turning point in Serbian politics. Milosevic decided from that point on playing the nationalist card in order to propel his career. During a meeting of the executive of the League of Communists, Milosevic declared "What we are discussing here can no longer be called politics, it is a question of the fatherland".⁷⁹ By openly raising the concerns of the Serbian 'fatherland', which was ostentatiously nationalist, he was in conflict with the ideals of the League of Communists. By actively encouraging direct Serbian control of the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Milosevic proactively sought to increase his control over much of Yugoslavia.⁸⁰

So, the skilful bureaucrat and successful banker, through the unexpected opportunity presented to him during the trip to Kosovo Polje, found through the expression of the Serb nationalist cause in Kosovo, the vehicle for his ascension to the Serbian Presidency. This meant turning on his former mentor, Ivan Stambolic, who considered

⁷⁹ Robert Thomas, *Serbia Under Milosevic*, 1999, p.44.

⁸⁰ Paul Moon, *Milosevic*, 2000, p.39.

Milosevic out of control and a threat to the unity of Yugoslavia.⁸¹ Milosevic, as the President of the Serbian Republic, was in control of the most powerful political position within the largest republic of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. That position would prove to be the ideal political platform he would need to carry out his nationalist agenda within the country.

The character of Slobodan Milosevic notwithstanding, he was the dominant political figure in the former Yugoslavia from 1989 up until his removal in 2000. His complete grasp of political and military power of the Serbian nation was demonstrated in his ability to manipulate nationalist sentiment to dissolve the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, start a separatist war in Croatia during 1990-1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 – 1995 for the ethnic Serbs in an attempt to create a ‘Greater Serbia’, where he himself would play the leading political role. He also proved throughout his Presidency, first of the Serbian Republic and then during his term as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that he was a political survivor. Even after his prominent role in promoting conflict in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and in all cases resulting in defeat for the Serbian ‘cause’, he stubbornly remained in power until he was ousted by a popular revolt in September of 2000.

His role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia was initiated by the nationalistic approach he took on the Kosovo issue. The consequences of his policies, especially in putting Serbs within Yugoslavia first, ultimately led to the ethnic conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Milosevic’s Balkan policies ultimately led to military intervention by NATO in the region. It is the outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia that is the focus of chapter four. Examining the situation on the ground as a

⁸¹ Ibid., p.40.

result of the war in Yugoslavia proves useful in determining the pre-NATO intervention conditions in order to measure the level of ultimate success NATO achieved in securing peace post-NATO intervention.

Chapter Four

The Death of Yugoslavia and the Outbreak of Ethnic Conflict: Prelude to NATO's Presence in the Balkans

The rotating presidential system that Tito had designed to succeed him as President of Yugoslavia, as well as the growing nationalism amongst the different ethnic groups within the country were to prove that Yugoslavia as a state was no longer feasible. The nationalist policies which were being pursued by leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Milan Kucan of Slovenia and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to prove not only politically disastrous for the unity of the state, but would ultimately lead to a violent and bloody break-up of the country. The degeneration of the ethnic relations within the country into armed conflict, the first of its kind on the European continent since the end of the Second World War, left hundreds of thousands of people dead, millions displaced and also left European and International supranational institutions, including NATO, fumbling over what policies to formulate and implement to stop the conflicts.

This chapter aims to analyse the events that triggered the violence and cover the wars in the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This chapter will demonstrate the overall poor security environment that existed in the former Yugoslavia prior to NATO intervening in the region to enforce the peace. By examining the break up of Yugoslavia, it puts into context the immensely complex and difficult task NATO encountered as it secured peace and stability.

Slovenia and the ‘Ten Day War’

Unlike the other wars that broke out in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995, the conflict in Slovenia differed significantly in two major respects: it was a very short conflict and it was not fought over ethnicity. Slovenia, the small and lightly populated republic, was positioned in the far North-East of Yugoslavia, unlike its counterparts within the federation was comprised mainly of Slovenes with no significant other minorities.¹ Whilst Milosevic rapidly increased his control over half of the country,² Slovenia, of all the Yugoslav republics, provided the most rigorous opposition to his nationalist agenda. A range of opposition groups within Slovenia pressured a reluctant Slovene government, run by the Slovenian Communist Party, to oppose Milosevic. It was the conflict between the Communist party of Serbia and the Communist party of Slovenia, rather than between the Serbian and Slovene people, that put the relations between the two Yugoslav republics to a very low point and brought tension and mistrust into the collective institutions of the federation, making the country even more difficult to function effectively.³

Slovene Communist Party leader Milan Kucan, like Serbia’s Milosevic, decided that the only way to ensure his party’s political survival was to pre-empt or incorporate the anti-communist parties, especially the Slovenian nationalists who were organising themselves as an effective opposition, going so far as to organise cultural events that would have otherwise been considered ‘anti-communist’.⁴ It is interesting to note within the context of the Yugoslav republics that although “the party leaderships ... of

¹ Christopher Bennett, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.101.

² Milosevic controlled the Serbian, Montenegrin, Kosovo and Vojvodina votes on the 8 member collective presidency by placing his loyal associates in power in those republics and provinces.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1995, p.90.

Slovene president Kucan and Serb president Milosevic, were different in style – the first far more discreet and the second playing directly and personally to the crowd – the issues were strikingly similar”.⁵ The similarities were claiming national rights over territory and their stated duty to protect the nation and its territory; In Slovenia’s case, implicitly meaning its right to set up a separate Slovenian Army consisting of Slovenian soldiers, whilst in the Serbian context the claims had more significance in emphasising Serbian territorial integrity and the right of individual Serbs to not be mistreated in traditionally Serbian lands such as Kosovo.

In April 1988, as a response to the Slovene students who had been promoting Slovene national identity and non-communist views through their journal *Mladina*, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) decided to take decisive action against the movement which the Slovenian youth were promoting.⁶ On 16 June 1988, a meeting of the federal parliamentary committee for national defence of the SFRY placed three Slovene journalists under house arrest for supposedly exposing secrets of the army within the context of fighting arms sales and counterinsurgency activities undertaken by the JNA.⁷ The significance of this move though follows, since, the subsequent military trial of these journalists demonstrated little regard by the Yugoslav military authorities for their individual or communal rights. They were not even tried in the Slovene language. “For Slovene public already antagonistic to federal power, there could scarcely have been a better lightning rod of solidarity or confirmation of their views”.⁸ The repercussions of this trial had an enormous consolidating effect on

⁵ Ibid., p.91.

⁶ Ibid., p.95.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Slovenian public opinion, which were now convinced that Slovenian independence was necessary.

Apart from the inherent desire to form a national army as a symbol of independence, the JNA's role in the trial of the three Slovenian journalists hardened the Slovenian people's resolve in limiting the role the Yugoslav People's Army had to play in the republic. As early as the 1980s Slovenia had confronted the federal government for greater autonomy in defining its own tax principles and allowing limitless landholding. It also requested that its alpine border with Italy and Austria to be exclusively Slovenian land, which would assist in the maintenance of a viable territorial defence.⁹ In 1989 the Yugoslav military leadership decided to open itself to a few concessions, including local postings for Slovene recruits in the JNA, the maintenance of nationally homogenous military units in the JNA, and even gave the Slovenes limited control over some weapons stockpiles within the republic.¹⁰ Unfortunately for Yugoslavia, the Slovenes had had enough of the Army's attitude toward them, and the damage had already been done.

The Fourteenth Party Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was held in January 1990.¹¹ This Congress was to be the last one ever to be held in a united Yugoslavia. The Slovenes played a crucial role in the premature disbanding of the congress, stating their frustration at the slow pace of reforms that they demanded both at a political and economic level to be instituted by the federal Yugoslav government, particularly by its reformist Prime Minister, Ante Markovic.¹² The concession that

⁹ Ibid., pp.95-96.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.96-97.

¹¹ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, London, Routledge, 1999, p.138.

¹² Ibid., p.141.

was on offer from the conservative elements of the congress toward the future of Yugoslavia was “the renunciation of the leading role of the party”.¹³ The Slovene delegation on the other hand had proposed numerous motions, all of which were rejected by the Milosevic dominated Congress that included:

The transformation of the federal party into an association of independent parties of the republics, the ending of all prosecution on the basis of Article 114 of the penal code (counter revolution) as well as all other political trials throughout Yugoslavia, a ban on torture, and an anchoring of the right of disassociation “within the framework of the Constitution”.¹⁴

Following the rejection of all the Slovene-sponsored motions, the Slovene party chief, Ciril Ribicic, complained that minimal attention had been given to the Slovene demands for reform, and then the Slovene delegation walked out of the Congress.¹⁵ The walkout was a strong indication that the deadlock that existed between the Serbs and the Slovenes was unable to be broken, and that the latter had decided that the pursuit of their concessions within the congress was futile. It also demonstrated that the Yugoslav federation and the Communist party that controlled the country, was in serious decline.

The reforms that the Slovene delegation proposed above were indicative of a party that wanted to intrinsically remove itself from the workings of the federal state, to dilute any hold the federal state held over Slovenia through the Constitution, and to clear the path for Slovene independence. Yugoslavia at this point was on a course of dissolution, with Slovenia following the path of independence and Milosevic continuing with his promotion of Serbian rights within Yugoslavia. The Slovene walkout from the Fourteenth Congress was indicative of the political situation within

¹³ Ibid., p.138.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.139.

Yugoslavia, with Slovenes and, to the lesser extent, the Croats, on one side of pro-independence, whilst the Serbs, as well as Milosevic's political allies in Kosovo, Vojvodina and considerable support from Macedonia,¹⁶ promoting a more centralist and conservative approach to Constitutional, political and economic reforms in a unified Yugoslavia were on the other. Both sides had entrenched themselves into a politically opposite positions, and the episode at the fourteenth party congress made the situation irreconcilable.

From the time of the failed party congress, the Slovenes had firmly decided their course of action, and it was to become an explicit challenge to the practical and theoretical power and position of the federal state within that republic. Although Slovenia technically remained a constituent component of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its newly formed non-communist government began the process of building the framework for a politically sovereign and probable independent Slovenia with earnest.¹⁷ The democratic election that took place in Slovenia on 8 April 1990 was perhaps the clearest sign of defiance by Ljubljana against both the federal government and Milosevic's Serbia, inciting the anger and reactions from both parties. It was also around this time that the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) collapsed, an event that both Milosevic and the Yugoslav military were distressed about what they saw as the political end of Yugoslavia .¹⁸ The army had begun to formulate its role in the continuing political instability throughout this period. For example General Blagoje Adzic "openly reproached the Serbian leadership for behaving in arrogant way toward the other peoples of Yugoslavia and for having

¹⁶ Ibid., p.161.

¹⁷ Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, Boulder, San Francisco, Westview Press, 1995, p.118.

¹⁸ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, 1999, p.141.

ignored the possibilities for political solutions”.¹⁹ Certainly the army was not pleased with either the assertive nature of Serbian politics, or the explicitly separatist politics of the Slovene government.

The first point of contention between the newly elected government in Slovenia and the federal government focused on military issues. Slovenia had steadily and consistently built up a Territorial Defence Force (TDF), but Federal Secretariat for National Defence had ordered the newly-elected Slovene officials to instruct their TDF to “hand over their weapons and ammunition to units of the JNA”.²⁰ The failure of the Slovenian authorities to respond to the federal order became the military equivalent of the fourteenth party congress, an irreversible blow to the stability of relations between Slovenian government and the Yugoslav military.

The JNA considered itself, since the death of Tito, the ‘glue’ that held the rival Yugoslav ethnic groups together. General Kadijevic, Defence Minister of SFRY was particularly concerned, and declaring his and the JNA’s intentions regarding the situation in Slovenia:

The very existence of Yugoslavia as a socialist state is under threat by counter-revolutionaries. There are connections between these circles in Yugoslavia and émigré circles ... They have great influence on the foreign banks and the IMF and they put conditions on their aid, too, for us – more freedom and human rights and democracy. Enemy forces are in acceleration. The CIA has concluded that the Mladina editorial board is similar to Solidarnosc in Poland. The CIA has concluded the fall of Communism in Yugoslavia has begun. We must stop the counter-revolutionary actions.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., p.140.

²⁰ Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 1995, p.118.

²¹ Alan Little & Laura Silber, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.53.

The General's attack against the Slovenian Presidency was even more scathing than the attack he launched against Mladina:

Kucan (President of Slovenia) is attacking the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in order to cover up his own mistakes in letting an anti-Army atmosphere develop in Slovenia ... In the future the Army will act the way it sees fit.²²

These statements by General Kadijevic, and his particular references to Mladina and its role in giving the CIA evidence to support the theory that Yugoslavia was collapsing, in addition to his direct attack on President Kucan, demonstrated the seriousness with which the Yugoslav military took the unfolding of events in Slovenia. The Slovenian response ultimately came from the controversial appointment of Janez Jansa as Defence Minister of Slovenia only two weeks into the job. He arrogantly remarked:

That it would be necessary to quickly end the situation whereby Slovenian troops were commanded by Serb officers in the Serbo-Croatian language There is no known case in history where the less developed part of a state would have commanded the more developed part.²³

Jansa argued that Slovenia paid more than four times as much as it was obligated to for the JNA and that the aim of the new Slovenian government was to briskly organise a Slovenian Army for the Defence of Slovenian independence.²⁴

The political and military tension between the Slovene and Federal authorities continued to simmer throughout 1991, and the above events led to the most significant political event that had occurred up until that point. On 24 June 1991, Slovenia

²² Ibid.

²³ Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 1995, p.199.

²⁴ Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslavian Inferno*, 1994, p.97.

officially declared its independence from Yugoslavia.²⁵ Slovenia took advantage of the chaos that existed in the federal presidency, where Stipe Mesic, the Croatian representative on the Yugoslav collective presidential council, was next in line to take over the presidency. Mesic's accession was blocked by the Serb delegation, mainly because Mesic was a known Croatian nationalist and had no intention of working toward keeping Yugoslavia together. However, Mesic ultimately managed to take his place as president of the collective presidency and held it between May and December 1991, when he resigned from the post as the last president of the SFRY.²⁶ The Slovenian Prime Minister, Lojze Peterle, stated that since Slovenia no longer was a member of the federation, the Yugoslav state no longer existed.²⁷ Under such conditions, the Army decided it was best to avoid the political institutions and unilaterally began to station personnel and equipment in an effort to resume control of the border posts of Yugoslavia with Italy and Austria, which had been taken over by Slovenian Territorial Defence Forces. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect to this move by the Slovenes as far as the federal authorities were concerned was the attendance of the Austrian Consul General and several provincial governors at the independence ceremonies.²⁸

The Slovenian political leadership considered the intervention of the JNA a likely scenario once they had declared independence. They had prepared for this intervention by purchasing weapons and discreetly training the Slovenian Territorial Defence Force.²⁹ They were in a better position to know the mountainous terrain, and also had

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Stipe Mesic, 'ex-Yugoslavia's Last President, Ready to Lead Croatia into EU', *EU Business*, 16 January 2005, <<http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/050116192029.y5a2wxb7>>.

²⁷ Paul Mojzes, 1994, p.97.

²⁸ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 1995, p.162.

²⁹ Paul Mojzes, 1994, p.188.

many JNA officers amongst their ranks, making it easy to penetrate the JNA's communications system. The control of the Yugoslav border posts with Italy and Austria being taken over by Slovenia was the excuse the JNA needed to attack Slovenia. The JNA entered Slovenian territory through both the Bosnia-Croatia route with air force fighter jets, tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Paul Mojzes described the ensuing conflict in the following way:

Initially they [JNA] encountered no opposition. However, when the ground forces reached the most mountainous terrain, they were suddenly pounced upon from the mountain heights by the Slovene National Guard, they were stopped in their tracks. The federal army units – young, inexperienced conscripts in an alien terrain with no clear sense of mission and inadequate ammunition- were no match for the experienced and highly motivated Slovenian Guardsmen. The fighting resulted in about 50 killed and 200 wounded, but many federal units surrendered.³⁰

Viktor Meir's observation of what ensued between the JNA and the Slovenian Territorial Defence Force:

On the first day the army formations marched in the direction of the frontier, on the second day the army formations became enmeshed in the net of the Slovenian Territorial Defence forces, and on the third day they had to give up for the most part, while most of their barracks remained blocked' but Meir also maintains that there was a period during the JNA onslaught when the Slovene authorities were somewhat anxious. 'That (the anxiety) was on 1 and 2 July, when the army began to conduct aerial attacks against Slovene targets, such as television stations and communications centres'.³¹

Figures vary, depending on the source, but Warren Zimmerman who was the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia, claimed that the JNA only used 2,000 troops in the Slovenian conflict.³² The Slovenian Defence Minister claimed that 22,000 JNA personnel were involved in the 'aggression' and that 2,000 retreated across the border

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, 1999, p.177.

³² Ibid., pp.177-179.

with their equipment, 12,000 were unaccounted for during the conflict until its end, and 8,000 were captured and released to go where they wished.³³ Either way, it is easy to argue that the JNA had the overwhelming capability to overrun the Slovenian forces if they had the will, it is perhaps the very lack of will that was shown by the JNA in Slovenia which helped the latter win the conflict. It was a mistake they would not make in Croatia in the future.

Within ten days, the JNA had retreated and the humiliation of both it and the federal authorities were complete. This ten day war, although a very short conflict with a small loss of life, managed to not only rock the peoples of Yugoslavia, but of the entire European continent. The Slovenes were clearly the victorious party, whilst the JNA and the federal authorities, were humiliated.³⁴ The Croats, who keenly observed the ability of the Slovenes to challenge the might of the JNA, were emboldened to take an even harder line with their own independence. This mini-war perhaps can best be described as the beginning of the long and torturous period of violent conflict that in some ways has yet to end, more than a decade after the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The war also had an impact on the development of the European Community (later known as the European Union) as a player in ending conflict within Europe. After the 25 June declaration of independence by Slovenia, the European Community's response was rapid. It set up a meeting between Prime Minister Markovic and Foreign Minister Loncar of Yugoslavia, and Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Kucan of Serbia,

³³ Ibid., p.179.

³⁴ 'History – Slovenia', *Countries Quest*, 1997, <<http://www.countriesquest.com/europe/slovenia/history.htm>>.

Croatia and Slovenia.³⁵ According to Susan Woodward the EC “insisted on a cease-fire and began negotiations to bring it about” while the CSCE “called for an immediate and complete cessation of all hostilities and a return to barracks of both YPA [JNA] and Slovene TDF units”.³⁶

For Europe, the explosion of violence in Yugoslavia ended the decade of speculation as to how far Yugoslavia could survive without its life-long leader Tito. Instead, the emphasis was shifted to diplomatic activity in an effort to end the violence before it took hold throughout the country, as indicated above by the EC diplomatic drive in June 1991. As with most cases where particular ethnic groups strive to form their own sovereign state, the Slovenes had caught the West, particularly Europe, in a moral dilemma. Theoretically, they felt obligated to the ideal of self-determination, which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords, but how would a move by the EC or indeed the international community at large affect the system of inviolable, sovereign and territorially integral states? It was the moral dilemma that continued to haunt the Europeans and Americans well into the Bosnian War.

It was difficult for the EC to develop a united, cohesive policy regarding the situation unfolding in Yugoslavia and especially so without fully considering the political, legal and moral issues potentially involved. The issue would not resolve itself immediately, when the collective presidency on 18 July 1991 “ordered the army to withdraw from Slovenia ... the presidency acknowledged its inability to protect YPA troops and their families, and these units were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and

³⁵ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 1995, p.163.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Montenegro”.³⁷ Instead, the EC and international community would not make a final decision on their policy on Yugoslavia until the conflict in Croatia, which will be discussed in the following section, was well underway.

The battle for Greater Serbia and Croatian Independence

After the JNA’s humiliation at the hands of the Slovene Territorial Defence Forces, it became increasingly apparent to the Croatian leadership that politically, the Serbs had little motivation for winning the war in Slovenia because Milosevic was interested in promoting his idea of ‘Greater Serbia’ rather than protecting the multi-ethnic Yugoslav state. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia had a significant ethnic Serb minority within its borders, meaning Milosevic would take Croatian independence more seriously than that of Slovenia. In preparation of a JNA attack, Croatia’s Defence Minister urged Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, to order the Croatian National Guard to surround the barracks of the JNA throughout Croatian territory, in order to prevent the JNA from taking simultaneous action on both the Slovenian and Croatian fronts. Tudjman, though, was not in agreement with his Defence Minister, who after convincing everyone but Tudjman and one other in the government, resigned from his post.

Laura Silber, the Balkan correspondent for the *Financial Times* and Allan Little, a BBC correspondent, remarked on Tudjman’s steadfast approach to avoiding a conflict with the JNA; “Tudjman’s calculation was that Croatia was not in a position to take on the JNA militarily. He placed his faith ... not on military readiness but in winning international goodwill”.³⁸ Tudjman wanted to be seen by the international community as the injured party, that war would be inevitably thrust upon Croatia by the JNA, and

³⁷ Ibid., p.171.

³⁸ Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.170.

that by not being seen to provoke the JNA, the international community would respond in kind with its recognition of Croatian sovereignty and independence.³⁹

While Tudjman was seeking to avoid provocation in order to gain the support of the international community, the Croatian Serbs were formulating their response to the fast disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. To the Croatian Serbs, residing in a newly independent Croatian state was unacceptable, so a political and military strategy needed to be refined to prevent the Croatian Serbs being separated from Serbia proper. Milan Babic, a key figure in Croatian Serb affairs, later to be declared the President of the separatist *Republika Srpska Krajina* (Serbian Republic of Krajina), believed that the Croatian Serbs, particularly around the town of Knin, were being discriminated against by the Croatian authorities.⁴⁰ Babic, just as many other Serbs in Croatia, was concerned that if Croatia were to successfully break away from the Yugoslav Federation, the Serbs of Croatia would, as a minority within independent Croatia, find themselves discriminated against. This perception was given some credibility due to existing instances of abuse against Croatian Serbs within Croatia.⁴¹

On 17 February 1990 the Social Democratic Party of Serbia was founded by Jovan Opacic and Jovan Raskovic at a meeting in Knin, Croatia. Raskovic was elected President of the SDS by the 10,000 strong gathering.⁴² The large turnout to the founding session of the SDS was indicative of the sense of insecurity felt by ordinary Serbs within Croatia at that time. The SDS political platform recited:

... the problems faced by Serbs in Croatia and evoked the threat of

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ 'The Prosecutor Vs Milan Babic', The *International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, United Nations, Case No. IT-03-72-I, <http://www.un.org/icty/babic/trialc/plea_fact.htm>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

genocide, stating that the Serb Diaspora in Croatia was a “historical victim which dates from before Starcevic’s *Pravas* [Party of Right] movement and the True Right genocide.” The platform endorsed redrawing regional and municipal lines to reflect the ethnic composition of the areas, and asserted the right of territories with a “special ethnic composition” to become autonomous through a referendum. The party platform did not, however, endorse abuse of non-Serbs within the redrawn regional and municipal lines.⁴³

The SDS political platform was significant in its subsequent electoral success in multiparty elections held in Croatia in April 1990. Those elections resulted in the SDS winning the municipalities of Knin, Donji Lapac, Gracac Benkovac, and Glina.⁴⁴ The Croatian government became concerned about the organised movement of the Croatian Serbs and their success during the April/May election, this concern would increase further when the Serbs, concerned about Croatian discrimination, began to demand regional autonomy within Croatia. This was in response to the proposed Croatian Constitution that was to remove regionalisation within the country.⁴⁵

This would mean that the various regional associations founded by Serb majority areas would become illegal. In addition to this, the proposed Croatian Constitution by President Tudjman also stated that Croatia was to no longer be a socialist state and that the red star of the old Yugoslav flag was to be replaced by the Croatian chessboard.⁴⁶ Most disturbing to the Serbs of Croatia however, was the emphasis on Croatian sovereignty within a confederation of sovereign states that would replace Yugoslavia.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ ‘Yugoslav Crisis and The World’, Balkan Repository Project, 1990, <<http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/chronology/chron90.html>>.

The achievement of full sovereignty was the basic requirement of the Croatian government.⁴⁷

In response to the Croatian government's attempts at minimising Serb autonomy within Croatia, the Croatian Serbs, led by the SDS leadership, organised a Serb assembly in Srb on 25 July 1990. This assembly was well attended, with an estimated 100,000 Croatian Serbs participating.⁴⁸ This demonstrated further that the Croatian Serbs had considerable anxieties about the evolving anti-Serb sentiments within Croatia. The assembly at Srb voted on and accepted the following declaration of the expectations and demands the Croatian Serbs would make to the Croatian authorities. Specifically they stated that the Serbian nation within Croatia was:

A sovereign nation with all the rights entailed in the sovereignty of a nation. The Declaration also established the Serbian Assembly, with its seat in Srb, as the political representative of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the Serbian National Council ("SNC") as the executive body of the Assembly. The Declaration stated that the SNC had the right to hold a referendum of Serbian people on issues related to sovereignty, and was responsible for implementing the decisions of the Assembly. The Declaration further stated that the Assembly declared null and void all Constitutional and legal changes in Croatia that were inconsistent with the Serbs' sovereignty as a nation or their right to autonomy. Finally, the Declaration stated that if Croatia remained in Yugoslavia, the Serbs in Croatia would demand cultural autonomy, but if Yugoslavia became a confederation of independent republics, the Serbs in Croatia would demand political and territorial autonomy.⁴⁹

The declaration issued at Srb on 25 July 1990 was a popularly accepted articulation of the Croatian Serb position in Croatia.⁵⁰ The Croatian Serbs were, in practical terms, taking their destiny into their own hands, declaring their right to autonomy and essentially implementing it with the establishment of the Serbian National Council.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ 'The Prosecutor Vs Milan Babic', *The International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

The SNC met for the first time on 31 July 1990 in Knin. At the second session of the SNC on 16 August 1990, the assembly called for a referendum on Serb autonomy for areas habited by majority Serbs within Croatia. The result of the referendum was 97.7 per cent of those who participated voted in favour of autonomy and sovereignty for the Serbs of Croatia.⁵¹ This result ultimately led to the declaration of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina on 1 October 1990.⁵² The Croatian Serbs' demand for autonomy within Croatia, it seemed, was not serious. The main aim was the declaration of independence and secession from Croatia on 28 February 1991, by which Krajina would remain within Yugoslavia.⁵³ This set the stage for armed conflict between Croatian and Serbian forces throughout the region.⁵⁴

Sporadic fighting began to take place between the local Serb resistance and the Croatian police units in May 1991, primarily in the Dalmatian hinterland and eastern Slavonia regions of Kninska Krajina, Lika, Kordun and Baranja.⁵⁵ Although some skirmishes were instigated by the local Serb resistance, other incidents were a result of the Croatian drive to consolidate control over key areas of the republic, especially in Serb dominated Knin and its hinterland.⁵⁶ The Croatian Serbs Territorial Defence Forces of the so-called Krajina Republic, were rapidly extending the areas under their direct rule, with Glina, Kostajnica, Okučani and Dali all falling to the Krajina Serb advance.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ 'Yugoslav Crisis and the World', The Balkan Repository, 1990.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 1996, p.170.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.170.

⁵⁷ Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, pp.170-180.

Before his resignation as Croatian Defence Minister in the July 1991, General Martin Spegelj had embarked on a rapid campaign to adequately arm his recent creation, the Croatian National Guard, with the weapons it would require in any Serbo – Croat war. The National Guard imported arms from numerous countries, including Hungary, which supplied many Soviet and Eastern European manufactured AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, recognized the world over as one of the most robust, easy to maintain, and cost effective piece of military equipment ever designed.⁵⁸ The Croatian National Guard also came into possession of reasonable quantities of arms from their sieges of JNA barracks, particularly in Zagreb, Varazdin and Djakovo.⁵⁹ Regardless of the various attempts to equip themselves, the Croatian National Guard was no match for the JNA, which was one of the better-equipped armies of Europe.⁶⁰

The self-declared *Republika Srpska Krajina* ('RSK'), led by Milan Martić, was becoming more and more aggressive toward the Croatian government and population within its area of control. This was partly caused by President Tudjman's refusal to give regional autonomy to the Croatian Serbs, something that increasingly discredited the more moderate Croatian Serb faction, led by Jovan Rasković. By July 1991 the militants within the SDS party were gaining strength and began to assert their policies for outright secession openly.⁶¹ One example of this harder line of Serb militantism was in relation to the village of Kijevo, a Croat populated village surrounded by 'RSK' held territory. As far as Martić, and many other Croatian Serb leaders, were concerned the village was not only a security threat, but also contrary to the newly established

⁵⁸ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.172.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.173.

⁶¹ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 1996, p.170.

order within the Serb controlled areas.⁶² It had to, therefore, be incorporated into the 'RSK' with or without the consent of the Croatian government.⁶³ On 18 August 1991, Milan Martić issued an ultimatum to the local Croatian police, stationed in Kijevo, to 'leave within 48 hours or face attack'.⁶⁴ 20 August 1991 saw Milan Babić, a key figure in the leadership of the Croatian Serbs, announced that the interests of the Army and the Serbs coincide, whilst also stating that both the Serbian nation, especially the Army, needed a sea port, and that the Croatian coastal town of Zadar would be adequate for that purpose.⁶⁵

On 26 August 1991, one week after the ultimatum, Martić and the then little known Ratko Mladić, who arrived from Bosnia and Herzegovina to fight with his Serb compatriots, attacked Kijevo.⁶⁶ Twelve hours of bombardment flattened the village, after which, Krajina Serb troops entered. Milan Martić recollects the events during the Kijevo campaign:

It was a joint action between the police and the army [JNA] and in two days we [Krajina Serbs and JNA] liberated Kijevo. The Army provided the heavy weapons and I [Martić] provided the infantry. When Colonel Mladić came to Knin, we saw that we could trust the Army ... To be honest we seemed to be superior to the Croats. They were running away. Of course there were a few burnt houses, that's the way it goes in these actions with artillery. We thought it wouldn't last long and we were right.⁶⁷

The Kijevo operation became an important symbol in two ways. It was the first time that the policy of 'cleansing' the ground of a rival ethnic group was deliberately planned and executed, making Kijevo the test case for the policy of 'ethnic cleansing'.

Second, the Croats viewed the Kijevo operation as one of resistance against Serbian

⁶² Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.171.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.172.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

expansionism, and it became part of the Croatian resistance psyche.⁶⁸ Also, it was the first time during the low-level war between the Croatian and Krajina Serb forces that the JNA officially joined the fight, effectively becoming the army of the Serbian people rather than the protector of the Yugoslavia as a whole. Kijevo was significant for one more reason, it was where the infamous Ratko Mladic began his contribution to the Serb cause. His role lasted throughout the war in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With the operation in Kijevo a solid victory for the Serbs, it was only a matter of weeks before the Croatian National Guard would begin a counter-strike. When the counter-strike occurred, the 'low level' war in Croatia was at an end. The more deadly phase of the war would take its toll on the region. By the end of 1991, an estimated 3,210 Croatian lives would be lost and over 17,000 would be injured.⁶⁹

The more intense phase of the war between Serbian and Croatian forces was evident in the battle for the Croatian towns of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Both towns endured terrible hardship during the ferocious fighting. Vukovar, being situated close to the Serbian border, was perhaps one of the most important battles of the Croatian fight for independence, which, according to many Croats, was considered to be a symbol of the extent of Croatian suffering during the conflict. According to 1991 census in Yugoslavia, of the 84,024 residents of Vukovar, 43.7 per cent of the population were registered as Croats, 37.4 per cent registered as being Serb, and a mere 7.3 per cent

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ 'Commentary', *Fourth World Bulletin*, University of Colorado, Denver, Vol 2 No.1, October 1992, <<http://carbon.cudenver.edu/public/fwc/Issue3/croatia-2.html>>.

registered as Yugoslav.⁷⁰ This ethnic mix, however, would not withstand the battle for Vukovar, which is detailed below.

Vukovar was devastated by the encirclement and then capture of the town by the JNA. Many of its inhabitants killed or forced to flee the area while Serb troops escorted them out. Although the remaining infrastructure was of little practical use to the conquering Serbs, strategically, Vukovar provided Serbia proper with greater defensive territorial depth. Without Vukovar, the Croats lost one of their best staging areas for an attack on Serbia itself.⁷¹

The siege of Dubrovnik by the JNA, the ancient Croatian port situated along the Adriatic sea, has been confirmed by many observers, including Bennett (1996) and Judah (2000), as the biggest public relations disaster the Serbs created during the entire campaign in Croatia. Many Westerners were familiar with Dubrovnik, either through its rich history or as a tourist resort, its sheer beauty and historical significance gave it a special status as a fortress of resistance against, what had been considered by many as unfocused and unjustified aggression on the part of the Serbian military. In the cases of Vukovar and Zadar, the JNA claimed that their military intervention was justified because they were rescuing the Serbian population and relieving a besieged barracks from Croatian forces. In Dubrovnik, however, there was no JNA barracks besieged or a significant Serbian minority to protect, since Serbs comprised no more than 7 per cent of the 49,728 residents of Dubrovnik.⁷² The Serbs of the city were as ready as their Croatian neighbours to defend their ancient city from the JNA assault.

⁷⁰ Christopher Bennett, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.168.

⁷¹ Gabriel Partos, 'Vukovar Massacre: What Happened?', *BBC News*, 13 June 2003, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2988304.stm>>.

⁷² William J. Fenrick, 'Cultural-Historical Perspective of Dubrovnik', Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780, 1992, <<http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/XI-A.htm>>.

Colin Woodard describes the events as they unfolded around Dubrovnik on 1 October 1991:

The JNA surrounded the city with armour and artillery, warships, and infantry. Communications and electricity lines were cut, and residents soon found themselves huddled in candle-lit basements or within the ancient stone fortresses of the Old Town as mortars and artillery shells rained down upon them. It went on for six months, but the walls proved their strength against modern (if not entirely up-to-date) artillery. One hundred thirty five millimetre shells often struck the walls without much of a mark, although they wreaked terrible havoc whenever they struck less substantial structures.⁷³

Although as Woodard stated above, Dubrovnik's ancient fortress walls were able to withstand much of the artillery and coastal bombardment. The mere fact that the JNA was bombarding an important historical icon with no apparent rationale, did the Serbian cause much harm in the eyes of the international community.⁷⁴ The siege that commenced in October 1991 and lasted eight months was a front opened due to an internal issue within what was left of the rump Yugoslavia. Specifically, the Montenegrins, the only other ethnic group to remain loyal to Yugoslavia other than Serbs, had suffered many casualties in the JNA's war against Croatia. These losses, however, were for little or no direct gain to Montenegro. The Slavonian and Krajina fronts in Croatia were geographically distant from Montenegro. It was decided that a new front against Croatia would be opened up closer to Montenegro, where the direct benefit of territorial annexation of large coastal strips of Croatia, including Dubrovnik, would occur.⁷⁵

⁷³ Colin Woodard, 'The Balkans: Morning in Dubrovnik', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, <<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1996/nd96/nd96woodard.html>>.

⁷⁴ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, p.184.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.182-183.

The Serb attack on the Croatian town of Dubrovnik was perceived by the international community as unjustified.⁷⁶ The Dubrovnik offensive contributed to some foreign governments, who had been sympathetic toward the Serbs, to reconsider their position.⁷⁷ This event turned public opinion away from the Serbian cause at a time when they needed it, since the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not long in coming. Therefore, the assault on Dubrovnik was a catastrophic mistake on the part of the JNA and solidified NATO's future resolve against Serbian aggression in the battle for Croatia and Bosnia.

The JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups managed to control about a third of Croatian territory by January 1992. The Croatian National Guard was outgunned and outmanned in every respect militarily. The Yugoslav forces were in control of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and the Krajina region of Croatia. The first phase of the conflict in Croatia was coming to an end, the JNA got what it wanted. The Croatian government and people were tired of losing the war, so an uneasy truce was signed to cease hostilities on 2 January 1992.⁷⁸ Following the ceasefire, the European Union countries established diplomatic relations with Croatia on 15 January 1992⁷⁹ which was a huge boost to the battered country.

At that point, in mid-February 1992, fearing the ceasefire would not hold without support, the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, decided to initiate a peace-keeping operation to separate the majority Serb areas of Croatia from

⁷⁶ Srdja Pavlovic, 'Reckoning: The 1991 Siege of Dubrovnik and the Consequences of the "War for Peace"', *Spaces of Identity* Vol 5, University of Vienna, <http://www.univie.ac.at/spacesofidentity/_Vol_5_1/_HTML/Pavlovic.html>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Igor Ilic and Slavoljub Leko, 'Chronology of Events', UNPROFOR in Croatia, Zagreb, 28 March 1995, <<http://www.hr/hrvatska/WAR/UNPF-chron.html>>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

the rest of the country.⁸⁰ Taking into consideration the Secretary General's report and recommendations for the dispatching of peace-keeping forces to Croatia as well as the demands of the Yugoslav government, the United Nations Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, which established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for twelve months as a temporary measure in order to facilitate overall peace settlement to the political and military issues pertaining to the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia.⁸¹

Up until this point, the international community was essentially a spectator and the distributor of humanitarian aid to isolated communities. Apart from European Community observers, the world stood back and watched the conflict unfold, clearly lacking the political will to respond to the ever-deepening crisis. It was, therefore, a significant move on the part of Boutros Boutros Ghali to encourage the United Nations to deploy peace-keeping forces inside Croatia to prevent the conflict from flaring up again. However, the United Nations effectiveness in preventing further conflict in the future would prove inadequate, as demonstrated further along, so that when war broke out in Bosnia, NATO would be considered the better option rather than the United Nations. Unfortunately, NATO at this stage was still determining its post-Cold War role and did not consider intervening in the conflict, given that it was being dealt with by the United Nations.

According to Boutros Boutros Ghali, 13,000 troops were needed in order to supervise and patrol the ceasefire line between the ethnic Serbs in the *Republika Srpska Krajina* and Croatian forces. Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, was in favour of the UN

⁸⁰ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace*, London, Hutchinson, 1996, pp.111-112.

⁸¹ Igor Ilic and Slavoljub Leko, 'Chronology of Events', 1995.

deployment along the ceasefire lines, but Serbian Krajina leader, Milan Babic, was against any significant UN presence. Babic even threatened that the UN could expect large casualties if they did deploy. The UN plan included deploying mainly along the 350 mile Croatian border region, but also in mixed towns and villages where much of the fighting had concentrated during the conflict.⁸²

Whatever the objections of either side, the United Nations authorised the deployment of UNPROFOR through UNSC Resolution 749 on 7 April 1992. UNPROFOR was to be deployed in three different United Nations protected zones, with the force itself deployed in four operational zones of East, West, North and South.⁸³ The immediate aim of UNPROFOR was to establish the conditions of the Vance Plan, which amongst other things included the facilitation of the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatian territory, the complete demilitarization of the three UN protected areas within Croatia as well as the continuance of local governance under UNPROFOR supervision until a permanent political solution would be agreed to by the parties involved.⁸⁴

What the United Nations peacekeepers had come to discover during their deployment in Croatia, and what NATO would also discover when they entered the conflict in Bosnia, was a very different place than the pre-war Yugoslavia. The once tolerant and harmonious country had given way to extreme nationalism and the desire for an ethnically segregated society. Milos Stankovic, a British UN soldier deployed in Croatia and Bosnia during the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, recounts in his book, *Trusted Mile* how particularly sensitive the situation in the Balkans had become during

⁸² John M. Broder & Carol J. Williams, 'UN Secretary General to Call for 13,000 Troops in Balkans', *Los Angeles Times*, Vol 112 no.5, Washington, 14 February 1992, <<http://www-tech.mit.edu/V112/N5/balkans.05w.html>>.

⁸³ Igor Ilic and Slavoljub Leko, 'Chronology of Events', 1995.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Yugoslavia's violent disintegration. For example, Stankovic whose family hails from a proud line of prominent Serbian figures both from political and military circles, was warned not to speak Serbo-Croatian, the standard language used throughout Yugoslavia. Although essentially the same language, Croats and Serbs alike were now distinguishing their accents and also using words which were distinctly Croat or Serb. If a word did not exist to differentiate Croatian from Serbian, they would create a word that would.⁸⁵

The person who cautioned Stankovic on the sensitivities of the use language in the former Yugoslavia, Nick Stanfield, also had family roots in Yugoslavia, his family were Krajina Serbs. He, therefore, understood the importance of not having his ethnic identity discovered by the local Croats. Below is part of a conversation Stankovic and Stanfield had relating to the linguistic sensitivities of the region. Stanfield explains to Stankovic:

Well, people ask you where you've learnt the language, and you have to trot out the same old lie about university and coming here on holiday before the war. Throw in a few deliberate errors, struggle a bit and you might get away with it ... if I were you I'd keep my mouth shut here in Croatia. Save it for Bosnia ... You speak with an *ekvaski* accent ... obviously your from Serbia, whereas here they [Croats] speak with an *ijekavski* Dalmatian accent. And the words are different too.⁸⁶

Examples that Stanfield extended to Stankovic were simple things like the words for bread, in Serbo-Croatian it was *Hleb*, in Croatian it is *Kruh* and to Bosnians it is *Hjleb*. Stanfield claimed thousands of words have suffered the fate of the humbled word "bread", the word for helicopter in Serbo-Croatian is *helikopter*, but Croats have changed it to *zrakomlat*, which literally translates to "air-beater". The most astonishing

⁸⁵ Milos Stankovic, *Trusted Mile*, London, Harper Collins Publishers, 2000, p.59.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

example was the variations for the word belt, with Serbo-Croatian calling it *Kajs*, while the Croats changed it to *okolotrbusnipantolodrzac*, literally translating to “around-the-stomach-trouser-holder”.⁸⁷ The most telling example is the establishment of Serbo-Croat to Croatian and Croatian to Serbo-Croat dictionaries, which are apparently quite substantial to translate all the thousands of new politically correct words to replace Serbo-Croat ones. Although Stanfield best summarised the situation to Stankovic, which the latter was clearly amazed and astonished at the huge cultural and linguistic changes gripping the country he once called home; “They’ve become so politically correct here in Croatia. Serb words are out. Croatian words in. And if there isn’t a dual, they’ve simply made up a new word rather than use one the Serbs are also using ... all politically correct words, thousands of them.”⁸⁸

The ethnic tension between the Serbs and Croats was still intense as a result of the conflict. This was evidenced by the sustained effort made to change anything the Croats had in common with their Serbian enemies, especially their language. Nevertheless, the situation on the ground in Croatia had somewhat stabilised as a result of the cessation of hostilities between the Croatian National Guard and the JNA. The period between late 1992 – 1995 was relatively calm in Croatia. Although the ceasefire remained, political nationalism continued to be strong in Croatia. President Tudjman of Croatia, and the nationalist government of the ruling Croatian Democratic Party, was stoking the fire of conflict by focusing on the lost territories and the necessity of their return. The outbreak of conflict in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 – 1995 distracted the Serbs, and gave the Croatian government, and more importantly, the Croatian military, time to recover from its heavy defeats by the JNA.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp.59-60.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Specifically, the Croats were able to build up a more credible military force in order to protect themselves from further aggression and recover lost territory.

On 12 January 1995, three years after Croatia was recognized as a sovereign state by the European Union, and after the cease-fire had held for over three years, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali regarding Croatia's intention to terminate the deployment of UNPROFOR by 31 March 1995.⁸⁹ Although conceding that UNPROFOR had managed to carry out its early tasks of overseeing the withdrawal of JNA troops and assisting in the ending of hostilities, Tudjman went on to state that many of the key aspects of the Vance plan had not yet been achieved. Overall, the Croatian government was not at all satisfied with the situation in occupied Croatia, despite the various economic and political agreements signed between Zagreb and the occupying Serb authorities in Knin. It was here that the failure of the United Nations to prevent a new conflict from developing occurred. This failure also provided one of the key arguments against relying on the United Nations in the Balkans, an argument that would lead to the emergence of NATO as the more credible alternative.

The Croatian Army, in early May 1995, attacked one of the three main Serbian enclaves that made up the self-declared *Republika Srpska Krajina*, comprised of occupied Croatian territory. It was an efficient military operation, with many observers, including⁹⁰ Ivo Pukanic of *Nacional*, Croatia's Weekly Magazine, indicating that the United States provided the Croatian military with logistical assistance through its operation in Western Slavonia. Whatever the case, a couple of

⁸⁹ Igor Ilic and Slavoljub Leko, 'Chronology of Events', 1995.

⁹⁰ Ivo Pukanic, 'US Role in Storm', *Nacional*, 24 May 1995.

points were made quite clear after Croatia's attack on Western Slavonia. First and foremost, the Croats had managed to prove that they were able to be as ruthless as they had portrayed the JNA attacks on Croatian population centres. The worst was still to come, with Croatian brutality in the attack on the Krajina region in August 1995:

Croatian Army soldiers burned entire Serbian villages and summarily executed more than 120 mostly elderly Serbs in the two months following the Croatian government's recapture of Krajina. An August 31 decree 'temporarily' revoked the property rights of most Serbs who fled the Krajina region and placed such property under the control of the Croatian government, which then allotted the property to Croats who had been displaced or expelled by rebel Serbian forces in 1991 and thereafter. Croatian authorities also obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid to rebel Muslims loyal to Fikret Abdic and rebel Serbian forces following the Croatian Army's recapture of the Krajina region in August.⁹¹

The expected military response from the Milosevic government in Belgrade and the Yugoslav Army did not eventuate. Given that Milosevic championed the separatist movement by the Serbs in Croatia, the subdued response by his government was even more bizarre. Dragan Janic, a journalist in Belgrade covering the event, was clearly amazed at the lack of attention the Croatian attack on Western Slavonia was getting in Belgrade:

On Monday evening, Belgrade television reported about the intervention of Croat forces only in the 21st minute of its central daily news program ... State news agency, Tanjug, reported on developments in Western Slavonia in time - on Monday morning - but in the afternoon the same day and on Tuesday, it sent reports with a delay of several hours ... The next day, on Tuesday, political parties came out with their statements again, and just a mildly speaking half-hearted statement of the SPS was also publicized. The statement demanded from the UN Security Council to intervene and stop Croat attacks on Western Slavonia.⁹²

⁹¹ 'Croatia', *Human Rights Watch*, New York, 1996, <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Helsinki-06.htm>>.

⁹² Dragan Janic, 'Echoes of the Croatian Military Action in Belgrade Lukewarm and Restrained', *Alternative Information Network*, Belgrade, 4 May 1995, <<http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199505/50504-004-trae-beo.htm>>.

The near apathy demonstrated by Serbia's ruling Socialist Party and the lack of press coverage on the Croatian offensive was receiving in Serbia, was indicative of Milosevic abandoning the Croatian Serbs and their independence. The statement above demanding the UN Security Council to intervene was a clear change in policy direction. Essentially, Milosevic and his government demonstrated little commitment to the Greater Serbia project in Croatia. This was in large part due to the United Nations' economic and military sanctions against Serbia.⁹³ These sanctions were driving the Serbian economy into the ground, inflation was at an astronomical high, and unemployment was pervasive.⁹⁴

The Supreme Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issued a statement which also indicated that Yugoslavia was not considering military action. Even if not intervening meant sacrificing the territory gained through the previous conflict, as well as the ethnic Serbs living in those territories. The Supreme Defence Council called the "aggression of Croatia against the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) ... a criminal act against civilian population" but that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still was "holding firmly the standpoint that there is no military solution [to the crisis in Croatia]."⁹⁵

The absence of a strong and decisive response from the Serbian government in Belgrade was interpreted in Zagreb as a green light for further military action to recapture Croatian territory under Serb control. The Croats had two remaining areas to liberate, Eastern Slavonia and the Krajina. The former was a small slither of territory

⁹³ 'Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic Sanctions', United States General Accounting Office, April 1993, < <http://archive.gao.gov/d45t15/148968.pdf>>.

⁹⁴ According to the U.S. General Accounting Office in April 1993, the Serbian economy suffered enormously. UN sanctions had, by 1993, contributed to unemployment of around 50%, inflation was at 200% per month and productivity was 25% lower than normal.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

bordering Serbia itself, the latter was better protected and included the Croatian Serb capital, Knin. The Croats decided, rather than taking the war to the border of Serbia, and risk a military intervention by the Yugoslav Army (VJ)⁹⁶, the Croatian Army would concentrate on removing the Serb stronghold within Croatia, the Krajina region.

The Croatian onslaught was launched at the beginning of August 1995, the largest land assault in Europe since the Second World War, targeted the Krajina region with ferocity and brutality.⁹⁷ The commencement of this war, once again, demonstrated the inability of the United Nations to prevent it. From this point, the credibility of the United Nations was undermined, leaving NATO as the only reliable organisation in the region. If there were any doubt in the minds of the international community that the Serbs alone had the monopoly on cruelty and ethnic cleansing, the Krajina offensive would prove that the Croats could be just as cruel and savage as they claimed their enemies were. Robert Fisk, a journalist working with *The Independent*, was covering the events from the Balkans as they unfolded:

Every house in Kistanje has been destroyed by the Croat army ... No Serb will ever return here ... Villages without houses, a land without people. It is strange how natural it all seems, the overturned cars, the clothes lying on the street ... In the centre of Kistanje, a Croat drove a truck into the war memorial, smashing the Cyrillic names of Serb martyrs ...the stink of rotting flesh drifted past a wrecked bar ... The UN soldiers around Knin are finding the bodies of newly-murdered Serb civilians at the rate of six a day. It goes unreported, of course, because the world is watching Sarajevo ... the Croatian army's 'special forces' carried out what it calls a 'cleaning sic campaign' through the Plavno valley ... the UN found two elderly men dead, one with a bullet in the back of the head, the other with his throat horribly slashed ... the UN found three more Serb corpses, one of them a woman of 90.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ The Yugoslav Army (VJ) was the renamed Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).

⁹⁷ Kevin Fedarko, 'Battle Cries', *Time Europe*, 14 August 1995, <<http://www.time.com/time/europe/timetrails/serbia/sr950814.html>>.

⁹⁸ Robert Fisk, 'Croats Burn and Kill with a Vengeance', *The Independent*, London, 4 September 1995, <<http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/greenside/761/168krajina95.html>>.

The first hand reports such as the one above by Fisk were regular within the week of the Croatian assault. The devastation that the Croatian forces inflicted onto the Croatian Serbs was criticised by much of the international community. Indeed, NATO had just managed to negotiate a common position on the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, were again divided over how to respond to the Croatian military operation.⁹⁹ The French and the British formally condemned Croatia's re-entry into the Balkan conflict, however the United States and Germany ostensibly condemned the offensive, but privately were congratulating the Croats for achieving what the West had not up until that point, punishing the Serbs.¹⁰⁰

Klaus Kinkel, Germany's Foreign Minister at the time, suggested that Germany regretted the Croatian offensive but clearly added that the years of Serbian aggression had tried the patience of Croatia. Similarly, US President Bill Clinton called for restraint, but indicated that the Croatian offensive was a direct result on the Krajina Serb attack on the Muslim forces in Bosnia near the Croatian border.¹⁰¹ Both the Americans and the Germans saw the Croatian military offensive as an expression of Croatia's sovereign right but the Russian Federation was scathing of German and US policy on the Croatian offensive.¹⁰²

The Croatian military success was astounding. The local Serbs who had been left weapons by the JNA before its departure in 1992, were no-match for the tactically reorganized and militarily re-supplied Croatian military.¹⁰³ So how did the Croatian

⁹⁹ Kevin Fedarko, 'Battle Cries', *Time Europe*, 14 August 1995.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Christopher Bellamy, 'Flight From Croatia: How the Croats Armed and Trained for Victory', *The Independent*, London, 8 August 1995,

<<http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/greenside/761/168krajina95.html>>.

military manage to acquire the upper hand in only a short three-year period? Since there was a strict United Nations arms embargo on the entire former Yugoslavia, the transfer of larger weapons systems such as tanks and heavy artillery was prohibited. The main problem in assessing the balance of power in the region was that Croatia had declared only limited amounts of weapons systems in its possession,¹⁰⁴ for example, it was widely believed in defence circles that Croatia only possessed six Mig-21 fighter jets, when it actually possessed 36 Mig-21s.¹⁰⁵ Also, 230 Tanks were estimated to be in the hands of the Croats, revised estimates after the Krajina assault put that figure over 430 Tanks, 2,000 artillery pieces and mortars instead of the 900 estimated.¹⁰⁶

Croatia's victory, though, was not only a matter of what weapons systems they had been hiding from the United Nations, but also newly acquired weapons systems in spite of the arms embargo at that time.¹⁰⁷ Whilst the fighting was raging across the Krajina region, it was clear that the Croats had been cheating the arms embargo and getting assistance from states supposedly enforcing the embargo. Christopher Bellamy asserts that Croatia definitely was in possession of weapons that should not have gotten through the weapons embargo:

Reports from the front during the three-day Croatian operation indicated that crates of new Kalashnikov assault rifles had been issued. Machine-guns had been imported from France, Singapore, Germany, Israel, South Africa and Argentina. The Croats' forces have also acquired hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, including the latest Russian RPG-22 anti-tank missile and the Iгла (Needle) anti-aircraft missile ... Croatia has acquired US Stingers and British Blowpipes via Chile.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Mainly Soviet and Yugoslav made weaponry that Croatia inherited from the JNA after the break up of Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁵ Christopher Bellamy, 8 August 1995,

<<http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/greenside/761/168krajina95.html>>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

In addition to the acquisition of new weaponry, the Croatian National Guard also worked consistently in an effort to improve efficiency and effectiveness in order to enhance their capabilities. Specifically, Croatia concentrated on improving its command, control, communications and organisation of its armed forces. The modification of artillery shells to base-bleed ammunition¹⁰⁹ was used against Krajina Serb towns.

The six hundred year old Serb presence in Slavonia and Krajina effectively came to an end, with almost 600,000 Serbs forced to flee their homes and villages as the Croatian military advanced. Although NATO acted against ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia was not prevented. However, the failure of the United Nations to prevent the Croatian offensive and the ethnic cleansing of the Croatian Serbs would further enhance NATO's credibility in the region, especially in Bosnia. The battle for Croatia was the start of major ethnic conflict in the Balkans, but it was to be followed by the far bloodier civil war of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the international community intervened through UNPROFOR in the Croatian conflict in order to keep the peace, it ultimately failed. NATO, though, was not ready for any kind of participation in a peace-enforcement effort until the closing stages of the Bosnian conflict. It was the Bosnian civil war where NATO began to discover its new role in Europe, but that was little comfort to the victims of the war in Croatia, both Croat and Serb alike.

¹⁰⁹ This type of ammunition carried significantly less drag on the shell, hence being able to travel much further due to its increased efficiency.

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 - 1995: Recognition and Collapse of Multi-ethnic State

The ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the major rationale behind NATO formulating a more assertive role for peace in the region. However the conflict in Bosnia continued for two years before NATO began to intervene. Many complex factors contributed to the tension leading up to the war in Bosnia, none more so than the dissolution of the SFRY. The incident considered to be the spark of the war in Bosnia, according to Radha Kumar, occurred at a Serbian Orthodox Wedding on 1 March 1992, when the wedding procession was moving through the streets of the Old Muslim quarter of the City. At that point, the wedding guests displayed Serbian flags that were construed by the local onlookers as a provocation.¹¹⁰ The display of Serbian nationalism was considered especially provocative in light of the recent referendum on Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia. That referendum approved independence, although only by the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, while the Bosnian Serbs rejected it. Unidentified gunmen, presumably Muslims although Serbs may also have been responsible, opened fire on the procession, killing the bride's father and wounding the Orthodox priest.¹¹¹

This incident led to an escalation of tensions, and barricades were raised all over Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serb leaders, such as Momcilo Krajisnik, who was the speaker of the Bosnian Parliament, claimed an injustice had been done to the Bosnian Serb people. The barricades were dismantled quickly through joint patrols of Bosnian police and the JNA, who were a calming presence on the streets.¹¹² Within a month though, in regions far from Sarajevo, especially in Bosanska Krajina, in a town on the

¹¹⁰ Kumar, R., *Divide and Fall?: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition*, London, Verso, 1999, p.38.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., p.39.

Bosnian-Croatian border called, Bosanski Brod, fighting began between Serbs and Muslims. This area was vital to linking up Serbian populated areas within Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia's Krajina region.¹¹³ Following this incident, fighting spread to the Zvornik and Bijeljina, these towns being the vital links between majority Serb populated areas in Bosnia's northwest. Within these areas, Serbs comprised 63 per cent, Bosnian Muslims around 15 per cent and Croats almost 10 per cent of the total population.¹¹⁴

The Bosnian Serbs were not pleased with the pro-independence result of the referendum. If Bosnia were to become independent, the Bosnian Serbs would be isolated from Belgrade, the main source of their support. Therefore, in order to counter the secessionist movement of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats against Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs would resist to the point of violence. Through civil war the Bosnian Serbs could carve out territory from Bosnia which they saw themselves as entitled to. This was evidenced by further fighting which developed along the Drina River, near the shared border between Serbia and Bosnia. Control of the Drina River region, along with north western Bosnia, were vital in securing a land link to Serbia proper. Establishing a land link between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs was especially important during conflict, since, it would provide a vital supply route.

Initially, the fighting between the various ethnic groups within Bosnia did not involve conventional armed forces, mainly because neither side had developed any at that point. The Bosnian Serbs would ultimately be equipped by the JNA,¹¹⁵ the Bosnian Croats would be supplied by the Croatian National Guard, but the Bosnian Muslims

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ 'Military: Ministry of Defence', *GlobalSecurity.org*, 1998, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/serbia/mod.htm>>.

suffered the most because they were unable to acquire weapons due to an international arms embargo on the region. Specifically, United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 made it illegal for the Bosnian government to acquire weapons to defend itself.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, arms did trickle in from sympathetic Muslim countries, particularly from the Arab world. These weapon transfers were unofficially approved by the United States, which made no attempt to thwart their delivery.¹¹⁷

In addition to the various armed forces in Bosnia were the nationalist paramilitary groups, such as Arkan's Tigers. This Serb nationalist paramilitary group, led by the notorious Zeljko Raznatovic¹¹⁸, were infamous for their brutal activities in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia. Arkan's Tigers found their way into Bosnia to continue their frightening activities there, including assisting in acts of 'ethnic cleansing'.¹¹⁹

The well-known strategy of Arkan's Tigers during combat operations was indeed frightening. The most important part of an operation, such as their initial operation in Bijeljina, the Tigers would surround the village to ensure that entry and exiting the area was impossible. Once the area was secure, the Tigers would then proceed to go from house to house, evicting people and ordering them to collectively meet in a pre-designated area, perhaps the main street of the village or town.¹²⁰ Males would then be separated from the females, and after ensuring that anything of value was taken from the latter group, they were allowed to flee the village. Then, according to Kumar, "The houses would then be plundered and destroyed, generally by fire. Some of the

¹¹⁶ Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, 'When Policy Kills: More Deadly UN Issues', *National Review Online*, 27 January 2003, <<http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel012703.asp>>.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Also known more commonly as Captain Arkan.

¹¹⁹ Ed Vulliamy and Stacey Sullivan, 'Bloody handiwork of Arkan', *Special Report on Kosovo, Guardian Unlimited*, 16 January 2000, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,193489,00.html>>.

¹²⁰ R. Kumar, *Divide and Fall*, 1999, p.39.

men would be murdered, others put to forced labour or herded into makeshift prison camps.”¹²¹

With the Arkan Tigers descending on Bosnian towns, the Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic, pleaded with the JNA to defend these towns against the Serb paramilitary units. Izetbegovic was confident that the JNA would not support the Bosnian Serbs in a military campaign to dismantle Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they had done in Croatia. This was because the JNA was supposedly in favour of maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia. The JNA did act on Izetbegovic’s request, at least ostensibly, by deploying in Bijeljina. However, this had little effect on the paramilitaries, who continued their operation unabated and unconcerned about the JNA’s presence.¹²²

The European Community and the United States, wishing to avoid another conflict as brutal as the one fought out in Croatia, decided to recognize the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 7 April 1992.¹²³ The Europeans hoped this move would discourage the JNA from officially entering the conflict in favour of the Bosnian Serbs. A major criticism of the EC was that they did not recognize Croatia and Slovenia immediately after their unilateral declarations of independence, which, according to the German government at the time, gave Milosevic and the Serbs the green light to deploying the JNA into these areas to re-establish control.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., pp.40-41.

¹²³ Richard Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, *European Journal of International Law*, Vo 14, No.1 p.36-65, 1993, <<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art4.html>>.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Instead, the EC recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state had certain ramifications. First, it was a speedy pledge by the international community that the people of Bosnia were recognized as a sovereign state, and that any attempt to partition Bosnia was not acceptable. Second, the recognition of Bosnia's territorial integrity so early in the conflict meant that the JNA would be in an awkward position with the international community if it were to remain officially in Bosnia.

Therefore, the JNA did not participate in the conflict much beyond the 27 April 1992 as the ethnic army of the Bosnian Serbs. This was because it was the date when Serbia and Montenegro declared the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,¹²⁵ leaving the JNA deployed in Bosnia acting outside the borders of the new Federal Yugoslav state. Instead, many officers left the JNA, many taking with them a supply of light and heavy weaponry to help establish the *Republika Srpski Armije* (Bosnian Serb Army). The JNA did, though, play a crucial role in assisting the Serb paramilitaries establish control over nearly 60 per cent of Bosnian territory before their departure.¹²⁶

The Bosnian Serb Army became the military arm of the Bosnian Serb separatist movement. As a result, the evolving conflict in Bosnia could be claimed was a civil war, as the belligerents consisted of the three major ethnic groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these were fighting one another. This meant international intervention was limited, since it was not officially a war of invasion and occupation. Under international pressure, Milosevic ordered the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) back to the borders of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 10 May

¹²⁵ Saskia Hille, 'Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia', *European Journal of International Law*, Vol 6, No.4, 1995, <<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No4/art4.pdf>>.

¹²⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, London, Papermac, 1998, pp.236-238.

1992.¹²⁷ However, all Bosnian Serb soldiers and officers within the former JNA were transferred to the Bosnian Serb Army, along with their weapons.¹²⁸ The Bosnian Serb Army was under the direct command of General Ratko Mladic, whom by that stage had control of 60 per cent of Bosnian territory.¹²⁹

The declaration of the new Federal Yugoslavia was significant in shaping the nature of the Bosnian conflict. Milosevic was eager to separate responsibility for the war in Bosnia from that of Croatia, where he was seen as the main agitator of the conflict. With the JNA pull out of Bosnia, he could claim that he had little to no control over Mladic's Bosnian Serb Army or those of the paramilitaries, who forced numerous people from their homes and committed torture and murder. The worst atrocities of the Bosnian war did in fact occur after the JNA had withdrawn from Bosnia. Within three months of Milosevic issuing the orders for the JNA's departure, Serbian paramilitary groups had embarked on a killing spree, with thousands reportedly being killed within the span of weeks.¹³⁰

Every indication was that the war in Bosnia was heading toward a far more brutal form than had been experienced until then, and certainly so with regard to civilians. The establishment of prisoner of war facilities was not exclusive to the Bosnian Serbs¹³¹, however, the conditions within the Serb-run facilities was certainly gaining the attention of the international media. The detention camp in the town of Manjaca was the subject of interest for journalist Roy Gutman, who compiled first-hand accounts of

¹²⁷ Saskia Hille, 'Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia', *European Journal of International Law*, 1995.

¹²⁸ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 1998, pp.236-238.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.238-239.

¹³¹ Roy Gutman, *A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of 'Ethnic Cleansing' in Bosnia*, Dorset, Element, 1993, p.28.

the horrors from these prisoner-of-war camps. Gutman, after inspecting one of the camps, claimed that the Serbs were damaging their own reputation by allowing such cruelty to occur:

The scene was a harrowing, if unintended, demonstration to a visiting reporter of the indignities that the all-powerful Serbian army metes out everyday to a Muslims and Croats in the ethnic cleansing of all nationalities in territories it conquers.¹³²

He indicated how the prisoners seemed to always have their heads bowed, suggesting the possible level of humiliation the captives suffered at the hands of their captors. First-hand reports by Gutman also chronicled the extraordinarily difficult living conditions within these camps, and suggested that Muslim and Croatian prisoners were often sleeping on wet floors with only ferns as their bed. With one blanket between four prisoners, they were often crammed into very small spaces. According to Gutman, eight people were crammed into spaces the size of a horse stall, and had access to a shower only once every two weeks.

The Omarksa camp, of which little was known at its inception, was reputedly far more brutal in its treatment of its detainees than that of the Manjaca camp run by the Bosnian Serb Army. Since the end of the war, and the subsequent trials at the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, more light has been shed on both the initial intention and purpose of the Omarksa, Keraterm and other prisoner of war camps. According to evidence given by personnel stationed at the camp:

The Omarska camp was initially intended to be of short duration ... it was expected to conclude its work after approximately 15 days. Nonetheless, it continued its operation until late August 1992. Investigators drew up lists of people to arrest and bring to the camp based upon information they

¹³² Ibid.

obtained during the interrogations of detainees.¹³³

According to the Judgement, the Omarska camp had three categories of detainees within the complex. The first category contained those whom the Serbs had determined posed the greatest threat to their cause in Bosnia, or as the Serbs themselves defined this group as “people who had directly organised and taken part in the armed rebellion”.¹³⁴ The second category of people consisted of “persons suspected of organising, abetting, financing and illegally supplying arms”¹³⁵ to the resistance (i.e. Muslim and Croatian) group. The third category was essentially people who were, in the words of Simo Drljaca, “of no security interest”.¹³⁶ One contemporary account of the Omarska detention facility considered it, no matter the category, as a “death camp”.¹³⁷ Many relatives of those sent to Omarska claim that many were never seen again.¹³⁸

The Judgement report of Miroslav Kvočka, a convicted war criminal at The Hague, described the role of Omarska. Ultimately a sense of fear pervaded the camp, physical and mental torture systematically used there.¹³⁹ Intimidation, extortion, and exploiting small privileges such as refusing inmates meals or the use of toilet facilities, were used by the prison guards as leverage to further humiliate and abuse the detainees.¹⁴⁰ The prison guards, according to the evidence presented at the War Crimes Tribunal, even allowed outsiders to enter the camp and administer adhoc beatings of detainees. One

¹³³ ‘Judgement Report of Miroslav Kvočka’, International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, <<http://www.un.org/icty/kvočka/trialc/judgement/kvo-tj011102e-1.htm#IIA3>>.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Roy Gutman, *A Witness to Genocide*, 1993, p.41.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ ‘Judgement Report of Miroslav Kvočka’, paragraph 45, International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

witness testified that “during the night, terrible screams could be heard, moans, beatings, from practically all the rooms which served as the Omarska concentration camp.”¹⁴¹

At the time of Roy Gutman’s discoveries of these Death Camps, it took a while for the international community to react to these stories of misery and suffering. On 18 August 1992, a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee received a staff report that outlined the fact that the international community, specifically Western governments, as well as the United Nations, had prior knowledge of the operation of these camps.¹⁴² Amongst the report’s findings were that the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia by the Serbs, was largely successful. Specifically, that the Serbs had managed to establish a greater Serbia by gaining control of 70 per cent of Bosnia which linked up with Serbia itself, in addition to Serb-controlled areas of *Republika Srpska Krajina* in Croatia.¹⁴³ There was a specific reference to the brutality of the camps, where the organized killings were considered, according to the report, by the camp authorities as “recreational and sadistic”.¹⁴⁴

The Staff report prepared for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee launched a scathing attack on the United Nations and the United States, for their failure in preventing these atrocities:

The United Nations did not respond in a timely manner to early reports from the field about atrocities in the prison camps. The US state department also had early reports of killings associated with the forcible transfer of populations but did not follow up the reports. The failure to respond

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² George Kenney, ‘How Media Misinformation led to Bosnian Intervention’, Living Marxism, The Balkan Repository Project, April 1997, <http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/conc_camps/html/Kenney.html>.

¹⁴³ Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.251.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

reflects the systematic defects in the way the international community and the United States monitor human rights crises.¹⁴⁵

The report went on to lay some of the responsibility for the lives lost during the conflict at the feet of the international community; specifically claiming that had the international community paid closer attention to the atrocities taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier, many lives could have been saved.¹⁴⁶ This is a position that became more and more common in relation to the United Nations' role in Bosnia, which ultimately found itself having to take a far more active role in the conflict, and dramatically increase its attempts to implement both ceasefires as well as a political agreement that would end the conflict. This would prove quite lengthy, drawn out and an extraordinarily difficult process, but one that the international community had finally decided it would fully back in order to find a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict in Bosnia.

It was under those conditions that eventually, the United Nations were drawn into Bosnia in order to, at the very least, keep supply routes for food and other basic materials, open for besieged towns and villages throughout the country. In conjunction with the efforts of the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the countless diplomatic initiatives by the European Union and the United States, who together would present a number of peace plans in order to stop the violence and re-establish security and peace in the region. The main peace proposals prepared, such as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, need to be examined in order to demonstrate how the United Nations and the European Union failed to achieve peace. Their efforts were in contrast

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

to NATO's intervention which succeeded in establishing peace where clearly the other organisations had failed.

Attempting Peace: The Vance-Owen Peace Plan

One of the earliest and most comprehensive peace initiatives designed to end the Bosnian conflict was made after the appointment of former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Owen, to the role of peace envoys for the Balkans. These high profile envoys, one representing the United Nations, and the other, the European Community, would establish a collaborative effort in order to secure a political settlement for the seemingly intractable Bosnian war. Cyrus Vance and David Owen formulated a peace proposal in February 1993, which became known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP).

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was the first high profile plan to be presented to all the combatant sides in Bosnia. Its basic premise was the division of Bosnia into ten autonomous cantons, three ethnically Serb, three Muslim, and three Croat, with one as an ethnically mixed canton.¹⁴⁷ Although the plan intended to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, independent state, its formulation was such that it weakened the central government substantially. It was a plan that was, ever so reluctantly, endorsed by the Clinton Administration, under the condition that all the parties in the Bosnian conflict could agree to it. In an interview with *The Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Owen was asked why the peace process that was taking place at that point, specifically referring to the Vance-Owen Plan, was the right one for the time? His response put the situation into context:

¹⁴⁷ David Owen, *The Balkan Odyssey*, London, Indigo, 1996, p.95

It was clear to me by the end of August 1992 that there was no will in any of the major Western nations to take up arms against Serbian expansionism. So it had to be dealt with primarily by negotiation. You can argue that force ought to have been used earlier when Serbia began to fight to protect, as they saw it, their Serb nationals in different parts of Yugoslavia. In July 1992 I had argued publicly that selective air strikes should be used to tip the balance against the Bosnian Serbs, almost exactly at the same time as candidate Clinton was arguing the same case during the election campaign. But even then I never believed that the West should commit ground combat forces in Bosnia.¹⁴⁸

Lord Owen was clearly frustrated with the lack of effective international involvement in ending the crisis, and in early 1993 there was little substantive or credible negotiation in the international community for military intervention to end the war. He believed the only alternative was an attempt to reconcile the warring sides through a comprehensive diplomatic peace process. This process relied entirely on the combatant's will and determination in reaching an agreement. What his statement also indicated, is that he knew which side would be the most difficult to negotiate with. The Bosnian Serbs would be expected to give up significant gains. Convincing the Bosnian Serbs, who had won 70 per cent of Bosnian territory through the war, that a political settlement based on the idea of a provincialised single country where the Serbs would have to share administration of the country, would prove a challenge. However, it was a challenge that Cyrus Vance and David Owen thought might be possible to achieve.

Importantly, the negotiations that took place between the three leaders of Bosnia's ethnic groups in the context of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, were the first time they were to meet face-to-face since the outbreak of hostilities the previous year. Therefore, getting these leaders in the same room was considered a major achievement initially, after all, Alija Izetbegovic had claimed months earlier, that sitting down to

¹⁴⁸ David Owen, 'Interview with David Owen on the Balkans', *Foreign Affairs Journal*, 16 Feb 1993, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930301facomment5168/none/interview-with-david-owen-on-the-balkans.html>>.

negotiate with Radovan Karadzic was akin to Winston Churchill sitting down to negotiate with Adolf Hitler in 1940.¹⁴⁹ Regardless of Izetbegovic's comparison of Karadzic to Hitler, Vance and Owen managed not only to get both men to negotiate with each other, but to essentially agree to the conditions of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

According to the official statement made by Lord Owen, and Cyrus Vance, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan would provide one internationally recognized state but with highly autonomous regions. The Constitutional Principles section defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as a decentralized state, with guaranteed freedom of movement throughout. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan provided for both democratically elected national and local governments as well as a mechanism for resolving any legal disputes between them. The Plan also stressed strong, internationally monitored human rights provisions designed to protect all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁰ The Military Paper section of the agreement required the cessation of hostilities within seventy-two hours of the activation of the agreement: withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo in five days and from any remaining areas in fifteen days. The separation and return of forces to designated provinces within forty-five days was required but with the ultimate aim of the complete demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and eventually the whole country.¹⁵¹

The political aspect to the agreement was encapsulated in The Map section of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The map delineated a ten-province structure reconstituting

¹⁴⁹ '1993: Peace Plan for Bosnia', *BBC News*, 19 February 1993, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/2/newsid_2491000/2491351.stm>.

¹⁵⁰ David Owen, *The Balkan Odyssey*, London, Indigo, 1996, p.95.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Bosnia and Herzegovina. It stipulated that a nine member interim central government (three members from each party) would have to take decisions by consensus. The Plan also stipulated that multi-ethnic provincial governments to be set up to reflect all groups fairly, based on the pre-war census. More importantly, was the expectation that the reversal of ethnic cleansing would be undertaken immediately.¹⁵² Also the Plan stated that an International Access Authority was to be established to guarantee freedom of movement and that National authorities be created to restore power, banking services, telecommunications and civil aviation.¹⁵³

Map 4: Vance-Owen Peace Plan

NOTE: This map is included on page 142 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: *Partition, Conflicts and Peace Processes: Bosnia's Failed Peace Plans*, <http://www.partitionconflicts.org/partitions/regions/balkans/peace_process/05_05_02>

An examination of the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by the Vance-Owen Plan, led to serious concern by all sides involved in the conflict. Neither the Serbs, Croats or Muslims were given territorially contiguous areas to govern, which did not appeal to any of the sides.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Interestingly, the Vance-Owen Plan, especially through its proposed division of Bosnia into 10 separate areas of administration, was not intended to fortify the division of Bosnia as the VOPP's critics argued. Rather, it was designed to increase the dependence of each mini province on one another, so that neither the Serbs, Croats or Muslims could live in a separate, contiguous area. Establishing contiguous zones, Vance and Owen argued, would facilitate the separation of the ethnic groups and would be perceived as a solution that legitimised ethnic cleansing. In many ways, the Vance-Owen Plan appeared to satisfy all sides, since, it allowed the Serbs to have separate administrative zones with substantial autonomy, a major prerequisite for the Bosnian Serbs in order to come to any political agreement, while, in addition, being able to proclaim the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina by creating common institutions and not allowing any ethnic group to be dominant in the proposed state.

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, however, did not prove popular with the Bosnian Serbs, even though Milosevic and ordinary Serbs agreed to it in order to remove international economic sanctions against Serbia. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, was severely pressured by Milosevic to accept the VOPP, but Karadzic instead put it to a vote of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale.¹⁵⁴ The Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the VOPP; a move that both frustrated and angered not only the international community, particularly those who actually believed that the plan could succeed, but also the Serbs in Serbia itself.¹⁵⁵ Milosevic, who was trying desperately to get the Bosnian Serbs to end the war in Bosnia, was especially angered by the Bosnian Serb

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Chris Stephen, 'Lord Owen Says Milosevic Failed to Cut Bosnian Links', Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 7 November 2003,

<http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=163461&apc_state=henitri2003>.

parliament's rejection of the VOPP.¹⁵⁶ That pressure, as well as the threat of international military intervention to enforce the VOPP, put the Bosnian Serbs into a difficult position. They could not afford to be isolated from Serbia, which was their sole source of support and certainly could not risk a major confrontation with implementation troops from the international community.¹⁵⁷ Under these conditions Radovan Karadzic, fresh from the Bosnian Serb parliamentary rejection of the VOPP, declared that they would reconsider the VOPP.¹⁵⁸

That '180 degree-flip' was announced by Fred Eckhard, the spokesman for Cyrus Vance and David Owen, on 30 April 1993. Fresh talks based on the VOPP would be conducted by all parties, including Izetbegovic, Karadzic, Boban, Milosevic, and Tudjman, which would be hosted by the Greek government of the former Prime Minister, Constantine Mitsotakis in Athens:

Eckhard hinted that he believed the Serbian change of mood came out of fear of some form of American military intervention. He said it was 'impossible to separate these things' and that Vance and Owen had continually drawn the attention of the Bosnian Serbs to 'the rising level of frustration in Washington' over the failure of UN Security Council condemnations and sanctions to stop Serbian aggression against the Muslims in Bosnia.¹⁵⁹

Interestingly, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was not only unpopular with the Bosnian Serbs, much of the international community, including especially the freshly elected Clinton Administration of the United States, had serious concerns about the plan.¹⁶⁰ According to the Centre for Security Policy decision brief on 4 February 1993

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Stanley Meisler, 'Serbs Promise to Reconsider Rejection of UN Peace Plan', *Los Angeles Times*, 30 April 1993, <<http://www-tech.mit.edu/V113/N25/serbs.25w.html>>.

¹⁶⁰ 'Thanks, But No Thanks: Clinton Should Back Bosnia in Rejection Vance-Owen "Peace in our Time"', Decision Brief 93-D-3, Centre for Security Policy, 4 February 1993, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_13>.

appropriately called *Thanks, But No Thanks: Clinton Should Back Bosnia in Rejecting Vance-Owen 'Peace in our Time'*, the plan was flawed in many different areas.

Amongst the strongest criticism of the plan was made in the following statement:

The Vance-Owen plan unmistakably rewards Serbia's aggression and legitimizes its systematic practice of genocide in territories seized by force ... Non-contiguous enclaves - drawn as much by war and ethnic cleansing as by traditional demographics - will simply invite future conflict, not diminish its likelihood ... It is, at best, irresponsibly naive and, at worst, utterly reckless to pretend that - absent appropriate punishment being meted out to Serbia for its aggression - the parties will conform to the Vance-Owen plan's requirements for peaceful coexistence and co-governance of the federation.¹⁶¹

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was slightly revised on a number of occasions in order to appease all sides, but ultimately, it was to fall by the wayside. Unlike David Owen's claim that it was the right plan at the right time for Bosnia and Herzegovina, clearly it failed because it was the wrong plan at the wrong time. As indicated above, the creators of the VOPP desperately countered accusations of formulating a sell-out plan. Elements of the media and the international community referred to the VOPP as the 'Peace in our time' plan, in a direct correlation with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's speech after his infamous and unsuccessful negotiations with Adolf Hitler in 1938.¹⁶² The international community, particularly the Clinton Administration, perceived the plan as a formal way of rewarding Serbian aggression, and following a policy of appeasement.¹⁶³ The Bosnian Serbs, as demonstrated by their parliament voting down the plan, saw the proposal as a disastrous one, requiring of them too many territorial concessions. The Bosnian Muslims saw the plan as a complete injustice. The only reason the plan was on the table for considerable length of time was because there was nothing else in its place.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

The VOPP was finally discarded as a failed diplomatic attempt at getting the sides to mutually agree to a peace deal. It had become increasingly clear after the failure of the VOPP that a more aggressive form of diplomacy, supported by NATO's military might, would be required in order to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This section has demonstrated that persuading the combatants of Bosnia to agree to peace was extremely difficult, and that the United Nations and the European Union failed to forge a settlement. The difficulties encountered by the United Nations puts into perspective the enormity of NATO's task of stopping the war militarily and to get both sides to agree to a political settlement.

Chapter Five

NATO and the Bosnian Conflict: Peace-enforcement by NATO in the Balkans 1994 – 2004

In mid-1995, after five years of continual conflict within the former Yugoslavia, and over three years of conflict within Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO intervened militarily to end the conflict between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation.¹ NATO's military action against the Bosnian Serb Army was also the first attempt by any organisation to apply the concept of peace-enforcement in the Balkans. It was these successful military actions against the Bosnian Serb Army which severely crippled it, and encouraged the latter to negotiate the subsequent Dayton Peace Agreement.² The Dayton Peace Agreement required NATO to have the prominent place in Bosnia and Herzegovina's security landscape for the following decade until the European Union took over the much-reduced international forces in December 2004.

The focus of this chapter includes the process and events leading up to the military intervention as well as the eventual occupation of Bosnia by NATO forces. The ramifications for the people of Bosnia during and after NATO's intervention and subsequent occupation, the impact on their security which improved considerably after the insertion of NATO forces will also be examined. In addition, as Bosnia was NATO's first combat theatre, this chapter will also examine what NATO learnt from

¹ 'The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, How did it Evolve', NATO Topics, 23 September 2005, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/evolution.html>>.

² 'Operation Deliberate Force', Globalsecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deliberate_force.htm>.

its peace-enforcement experience in Bosnia, and whether any of these lessons were applied when NATO undertook its intervention in Kosovo in mid-1999 or in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2002.

The United Nations Failure to Secure Peace: NATO Intervenes in Bosnia

International missions in Bosnia were primarily under the control of the United Nations. Initially, NATO's role in Bosnia began as early as 1992, but was limited to the enforcement and monitoring of the arms embargoes throughout the whole of the former Yugoslavia, which included Bosnia, but was primarily aimed at Serbia and Montenegro.³ Later, NATO's role was expanded to support UN actions on the ground and to protect UN peacekeepers. NATO was also responsible for the establishment and patrolling of the 'No Fly Zones' in April 1993 which closed Bosnian airspace to Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb military aircraft and helicopter gun-ships.⁴ In addition to the No Fly Zones, in May 1993 UN Security Council Resolution 824 established the UN Safe-Havens of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovinaac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa and Tuzla.⁵ However, from February 1994 which saw sixty eight people killed by a Bosnian Serb shell in a Sarajevo market place,⁶ NATO's role in manipulating the circumstances both politically and militarily through the use of force became far more prominent, as will be demonstrated below.

NATO's initial military engagement against the Bosnian Serbs took place on 28 February 1994 whilst enforcing the 'No Fly Zone' over Bosnia. In this incident, a

³ 'The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, How did it Evolve', NATO Topics, 23 September 2005, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/evolution.html>>.

⁴ John Kreindler, 'NATO's Changing Role Opportunities and Constraints for Peace-keeping', *NATO Review*, June 1993, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9303-4.htm>>.

⁵ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armor*, 1996, p.115.

⁶ 'Market Massacre in Sarajevo', *BBC On This Day*, 5 Feb 1994, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4305500.stm>>.

number of US F-16's shot down four Bosnian Serb warplanes over central Bosnia.⁷ NATO also began to strike at ground targets, when on 10 April 1994, Bosnian Serb forces were closing in on the UN declared safe haven of Gorazde. That attack was followed by an ultimatum by NATO to the Bosnian Serb Army to pull back from Gorazde, which was complied with.⁸ This was the first clear indication that the threat and application of NATO firepower would begin to influence the situation on the ground, particularly in relation to how the Bosnian Serb Army would revise its military tactics in the face of a superior military force. The Bosnian Serb Army were unmatched by the forces arrayed against it on the ground, especially by the Bosnian Muslim Army, however, with NATO's involvement, the balance of power shifted considerably.

On 23 September 1994, UNPROFOR Commander General Bertrand de LaPresle of France, called on NATO to attack Bosnian Serb targets, since the former had attacked a French light tank unit northeast of Sarajevo with rocket propelled grenades. One of the soldiers was seriously wounded in the Bosnian Serb attack.⁹ In response, NATO¹⁰ warplanes attacked an unmanned Serb T-55 tank, which was involved in the Siege of Sarajevo, two miles away from the UN controlled airport. The attack was requested by the UNPROFOR commander in order "to prove that he would not take the attack on the French tank lying down," as stated by Squadron Leader Major Nigel Branston,

⁷ 'Bosnia Keeping The Peace', *Time News Service Daily*, 1995, <<http://www.time.com/time/daily/bosnia/bosniatimeline.html>>.

⁸ 'Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace', *New York Times*, 1995, <<http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/apchrono.html>>.

⁹ Perilita Etedgui, 'The Rohde to Srebrenica', 1998, <<http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/nelson/rohde/warchronology.html>>.

¹⁰ Specifically, NATO members the United States and the United Kingdom.

spokesman for NATO in the Naples headquarters in Italy.¹¹ Branston described NATO's retaliation strike:

A US A-10 Warthog ... located the tank and ran a strafing sortie at 6:25 p.m. The pilot reported back that he was unsure he had hit the target shrouded in shadows, Branston said. Two British Jaguars then swept the area near the Bosnian Serb base at Lukavica, each dropping a 1,000-pound bomb.¹²

The NATO action caused serious disagreements within both NATO itself, as well as the UN military hierarchy in Bosnia. This was especially true of Lt. General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia, who opposed military action against the Bosnian Serbs, primarily because the Bosnian Serbs often retaliated against UN personnel by taking them hostage or attacked their convoys and patrols.¹³ Under these circumstances, France and Britain, which comprised the bulk of the UN force in Bosnia, conducted cautious military policies toward the Bosnian Serbs.¹⁴ The United States, on the other hand, did not have any troops deployed on the ground, and the Clinton Administration wanted to pursue a tougher policy toward the Bosnian Serbs. However, it was not US forces on the ground that were vulnerable to Bosnian Serb reprisals. Nevertheless, NATO needed to resolve the disagreements between its members over the strategy to pursue against the Bosnian Serbs.

Both NATO and UNPROFOR could no longer tolerate the intense fighting that was raging in and around the Sarajevo area. In response to the Bosnian Serb Army's devastating artillery barrages against the city, an ultimatum by UNPROFOR for the removal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and their return to UN weapons control

¹¹ Carol J. Williams, 'NATO Warplanes Attack Tank After Attack By Bosnian Serbs', *Los Angeles Times*, 23 September 1994.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ 'Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace', *The New York Times* on the Web, <<http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/apchrono.html>>.

¹⁴ 'The Balkan Tragedy', *CNN News*, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/time/>>.

points or withdrawal of these weapons out of the 'exclusion zone' was issued.¹⁵ This withdrawal would have to be concluded by 1200 hours, 25 May 1995. If the Bosnian Serbs did not withdraw or hand over their heavy weapons by the deadline, NATO would retaliate with air strikes. The Bosnian Serbs not only ignored the ultimatum, but they used their heavy weapons to shell the besieged towns of Sarajevo and Tuzla, killing 71 people and wounding 150.¹⁶ NATO responded by bombing a weapons depot near the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale. More air-strikes followed two days later, which resulted in the Bosnian Serbs capturing 350 UN peacekeepers which they used as hostages.¹⁷ The UN peace keepers taken as hostages were all released by 18 June 1995, thanks largely to the intervention of the Milosevic government in Serbia. That gesture by Milosevic aided in removing the constraints NATO members felt in pursuing tougher military action, due to concerns about the safety of their UN hostages. However, tension would increase dramatically during the events that took place in and around the UN safe haven of Srebrenica less than three weeks later.

On 6 July 1995, the Bosnian Serbs began a military campaign that would catch the United Nations completely off guard. The Bosnian Serb Army did this by intensifying their attacks against the UN declared Safe Areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. Around Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb Army had a strength of around 8,000 to 12,000 troops, up to 3,000 were estimated to be from Serbia and these troops were backed by up to 30 tanks and multiple artillery pieces.¹⁸ The Bosnian Army was far less prepared, with only 3,000 troops and very little heavy armour, they were clearly out-manned and out-

¹⁵ 'Bosnia: Uncertain Paths to Peace',

<<http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/apchron.html>>.

¹⁶ 'The Evolution of NATO and ACE', SHAPE document, 1995,

<<http://www.shape.nato.int/HISTORY/evolut95.htm>>.

¹⁷ Perilita Etedgui, 'The Rohde to Srebrenica', 1998.

¹⁸ Roy Gutman, 'UN's Deadly Deal: How troop-hostage talks led to slaughter of Srebrenica', *Newsday*, 29 May 1996, <<http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/srebrenica/gutman.html>>.

gunned by the Bosnian Serb forces arrayed against them.¹⁹ The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica started at 3.15am with an artillery and tank barrage mainly on civilian targets which lasted two days, killing two people and injuring a further six.²⁰ Bosnian Serb infantry moved in, capturing five of the thirteen Dutch-manned UN outposts deployed around the besieged town.²¹

Attempting a response to the Bosnian Serb challenge, the UN demanded that the attacks on Srebrenica be stopped and ordered the small Dutch contingent of around six hundred soldiers to halt any Bosnian Serb move to enter the enclave.²² The UN did have a deterrent in place against the Bosnian Serb Army in case it decided to attack the UN Dutch unit, that deterrent was the threat of NATO air strikes.²³ Unfortunately, according to Gutman, the Commanders of the United Nations forces based in the safe havens of Srebrenica and Tuzla assessed the situation inadequately. The UN did not believe a full assault on Srebrenica and Tuzla was likely due to the sheer number of Muslims residing in these towns. If the Bosnian Serbs conquered both towns, it would dramatically increase the number of refugees in Bosnia.²⁴ On 9 July 1995 the Bosnian Serb Army attacked a Dutch outpost capturing 30 soldiers, which were taken to Bratunac by the Bosnian Serbs as hostages.²⁵

On the same day, the Dutch were to find themselves committing one of the most controversial acts of the UN deployment in Bosnia, when after the Bosnian Serb Army took some of their number hostage, the Dutch decided to withdraw from the area to

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Roy Gutman, UN's Deadly Deal: How troop-hostage talks led to slaughter of Srebrenica, *Newsday*, 29 May 1996, <<http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/srebrenica/gutman.html>>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

their bunker, sending a message to the UN command to do something immediately to stop a massacre from taking place.²⁶ Adding to the confusion of the situation, the Bosnian Muslim Army opened fire on the retreating Dutch contingent (fatally wounding one soldier) in order to prevent the UN from leaving the town completely unprotected.²⁷

On 10 July 1995, as a response to constant Bosnian Serb shelling of Dutch outposts in and around Srebrenica, the Dutch Commander, Colonel Karremans, requested NATO air support in order to deter further attacks:

UN Commander General Janvier initially refused [the request of NATO support by Karremans], but agreed after another request from the colonel. Serb attacks stopped before the planes arrived and strikes were postponed ... The Dutch commander told town leaders that NATO planes would launch massive air attacks against the Serbs if they had not withdrawn from [around] the safe area by 0600 the following morning.²⁸

These massive air attacks promised by the Karremans to the people of Srebrenica in order to remove the encroaching Bosnian Serb Army never came. The result of the UN's role in Srebrenica was to discredit the organisation for the lack of will and capability they demonstrated in defending the town from the Bosnian Serb advance into the UN protected Safe Haven.²⁹

The Bosnian Serbs invaded Srebrenica, on 11 July 1995. Statistically, there was little rationale for attempting to incorporate Srebrenica into the Bosnian Serb Republic, since, 75 per cent of the town's population was Bosnian Muslim and only 25 per cent

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ 'Srebrenica Massacre: Ten Years On', Open Society Archives, 2005, <<http://www.osa.ceu.hu/2005/highlights/07/>>.

²⁸ 'Flashback, Srebrenica 1995', *BBC News*, 14 March 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_675000/675945.stm>.

²⁹ Ibid.

were Bosnian Serbs.³⁰ The invasion of Srebrenica followed a Bosnian Serb siege of the town that resulted in fuel and food supplies running desperately low in the poorly defended enclave.³¹ The situation was made far more critical due to the refugee situation, since, Srebrenica was hosting thousands of displaced Bosnian Muslims from other areas in Bosnia which had fallen to the Bosnian Serbs, this compounded the problem enormously. The local Muslim fighters had to ask for the weapons they had handed over to the UN weapons pound back because they were vastly out-gunned by the advancing Bosnian Serb Army.³²

On 11 July, although the Bosnian Serbs had not withdrawn, there were no air strikes against them yet, clearly challenging the credibility of the UN. At 9.00am, Colonel Karremans had received a message from UN headquarters in Sarajevo that he had lodged his request for NATO air strikes on the wrong form.³³ By 10.30am, the resubmitted request for air strikes had been approved, but NATO airplanes had to return for re-fuelling in Italy.³⁴

At 2.30pm, two Dutch F-16 fighters dropped two bombs on Bosnian Serb positions surrounding Sarajevo, targeting two tanks, the ordinance missed their targets.³⁵ The Bosnian Serbs, furious over the attempted bombing of their military units by NATO jets, threatened to kill the Dutch hostages and to shell the refugees trying to leave

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ 'Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica', *BBC News*, 9 June 2005, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/675945.stm>>.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Roy Gutman, 'UN's Deadly Deal', *Newsday*, 29 May 1996.

Srebrenica.³⁶ These threats resulted in the cessation of NATO's bombing of Bosnian Serb targets. The emboldened Bosnian Serb Army made their move on the town:

The Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic entered Srebrenica two hours later, accompanied by Serb camera crews. In the evening, General Mladic summoned Colonel Karremans to a meeting at which he delivered an ultimatum that the Muslims must hand over their weapons to guarantee their lives.³⁷

The humiliation of the Bosnian Muslims and the failure of the UN did not end with the entry of the Bosnian Serb Army into Srebrenica, but the series of events which unfolded over the period immediately after the Bosnian Serb occupation of the town were to be a wake up call for the United Nations and NATO as a sign of their ineffectiveness as the defenders of Srebrenica.

The deportation of Bosnian Muslim women to territories controlled by the Bosnian Army, as well as the shelling of escaping Bosnian Muslim fighters numbering around 15,000 through the mountains was just the start.³⁸ The worst day for the UN Dutch contingent of Srebrenica occurred on 13 July 1995, when they turned over 5,000 Muslims who they had been sheltering at their outpost in Potocari in exchange for the 14 Dutch peacekeepers who had been taken hostage during the operation.³⁹ By 16 July, the Dutch, stripped of their weapons and medical supplies by the Bosnian Serbs, were free to leave the area. On that day, it was revealed that the massacre of around 7,079 Bosnian Muslim men occurred within five days of the Bosnian Serbs overrunning the town.⁴⁰

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ 'Flashback, Srebrenica 1995', *BBC News*, 14 March 2000.

³⁸ Roy Gutman, 'UN's Deadly Deal', *Newsday*, 29 May 1996.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ 'Flashback, Srebrenica 1995', *BBC News*, 14 March 2000.

The tragic attack on Srebrenica, and the subsequent human rights abuses as a result of the Bosnian Serb occupation, highlighted the weakness of the rules of engagement the United Nations and NATO were limited by. These limitations impacted on both organisations ability to prevent the Bosnian Serb assault. The magnitude of the humanitarian disaster in Srebrenica in relation to the conflict overall is highlighted by David Rohde who states that:

Of the 18,406 Muslims, Serbs and Croats reported still missing [throughout the entire conflict] ... as of January 1997, 7,079 are people [men] who disappeared after the fall of Srebrenica. In other words, approximately 38 per cent of the war's missing are from Srebrenica.⁴¹

As a result of the Bosnian Serb assault on the UN Safe Haven of Srebrenica, the United States and its allies together with the Russians, met in London. The result of that meeting was the substantial alteration of the complicated 'dual key'⁴² system required to authorise NATO air strikes in the Bosnian theatre of operations. That decision removed the requirement acquiring the approval of United Nations before any NATO military action, made it easier for NATO to use its air power to prevent another Srebrenica from happening again. That decision freed NATO up to select a whole new array of Bosnian Serb targets that it could attack and destroy in order to weaken their forces.⁴³

As a result, on 25 July 1995, the North Atlantic Council agreed to extend the scope of the operational objectives of any future air strikes. NATO, after learning the difficult lesson of Srebrenica, decided that although its operations would still support the

⁴¹ Adam Jones, 'Case Study: The Srebrenica Massacre, July 1995', *Gendercide Watch*, March 2003, <http://www.gendercide.org/case_srebrenica.html>.

⁴² The 'Dual Key' system required any military action be authorised by both the United Nations and NATO simultaneously.

⁴³ 'Fact Sheet-Bosnia: NATO Involvement in the Balkan Crisis', Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, 1 November 1995.

United Nations missions on the ground, it would retain full authority to use its forces as it saw fit:

NATO's planning is designed to ensure that military preparations by the Bosnian Serbs which are judged to present a direct threat to Gorazde, or direct Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde, will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's air power. The planning provides for NATO and the UN to take the necessary decisions to launch significant air strikes in the event of such actions. There is a strong feeling among Allies that such operations, once they are launched, will not lightly be discontinued. In the face of the inherent risks, the Alliance is determined.⁴⁴

The failure of the UN and NATO to protect the civilians of Srebrenica was not only a major embarrassment to both organisations, but a humanitarian disaster resulting from the lack of firm action taken by either of them. Srebrenica was, though, a wake up call to NATO that discovered linking itself with a weak United Nations decision making process risked its own credibility and limited its capacity to save lives. This led to the de-linking of the United Nations from the command structure of NATO forces deployed to protect the remaining safe havens of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovinaac and Gorazde. Srebrenica would prove to be the tragedy needed to get NATO into high gear in order to protect the safe havens not just in theory, but effectively.

The ramifications of the tragedy in Srebrenica continued seven years after the massacre occurred. The Dutch government of Prime Minister Wim Kok resigned on mass on 15 April 2002, only a few days after a damning report was released on the Dutch role in the massacres in Srebrenica. The role of the Dutch peacekeepers in the aftermath of the Bosnian Serbs overrunning the town was particularly criticised by the report which was commissioned five years earlier “the 110 lightly armed Dutch

⁴⁴ Javier Solana, ‘Statement by Secretary General following North Atlantic Council Meeting on 25 July 1995’, 25 July 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950725a.htm>>.

peacekeepers became unwitting collaborators in ethnic cleansing when Bosnian Serb forces overran the supposedly UN-protected enclave of Srebrenica.”⁴⁵ The Prime Minister stated the following just prior to his entire government resigning “The international community has fallen short in offering sufficient protection to the people in the so-called ‘safe area’”.⁴⁶

The resignation of the Dutch Government, years after its failure during the Srebrenica crisis, was a clear indication of how its complete mismanagement still haunted the Dutch. Although the resignation was of little comfort to those who suffered and died during the Bosnian Serb operation in Srebrenica, it did provide a sense of limited accountability on behalf of the government responsible for the deployed Dutch peacekeepers who abandoned the safe haven, essentially because they themselves felt abandoned by their own government at the time of the crisis.

The Bosnian Serb Army, although aware of NATO’s new resolve post-Srebrenica, were not convinced of NATO’s ability to carry out its threat in practice. That approach, however, proved to be the eventual undoing of the Bosnian Serb Army’s success on the ground. On 28 August 1995, the Bosnian Serb Army once again shelled Sarajevo in open defiance of NATO and its threat to use air strikes to stop them. The shelling⁴⁷ hit, once again, a Sarajevo marketplace. As a result, 37 people were killed and 85 were injured in the attack.⁴⁸ That attack by the Bosnian Serbs was, for NATO, the last straw. The Sarajevo market shelling was the catalyst for NATO undertaking the bombing of various Bosnian Serb positions. It would prove to be the most

⁴⁵ Matt Daily, ‘Dutch Parliament to Debate Caretaker Government’, *Reuters*, 16 April 2002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ That shelling of a Sarajevo market, whether stray or deliberate has yet to be independently determined.

⁴⁸ Perilita Ettetdgui, ‘The Rohde to Srebrenica’, 1998.

widespread and effective NATO engagement against the Bosnian Serb Army since its involvement in Bosnia began in February 1994.

On 30 August 1995, NATO planes and UN Rapid Reaction Force artillery attacked Bosnian Serb targets on and around Mount Igman in Sarajevo in response to the Sarajevo market attack.⁴⁹ The air strikes, code-named 'Operation Deliberate Force', concentrated on Bosnian Serb gun positions, ammunition dumps, factories, anti-aircraft gun and missile facilities around Sarajevo.⁵⁰ According to the *Los Angeles Times*:

Allied officials had said any retaliation would involve a series of 'substantial' attacks designed to destroy several major targets, such as Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps and communications centres. They dismissed suggestions that the action would begin a military campaign against the rebel Serbs. 'It won't go on for days,' one official said. 'It's only meant to respond to Monday's shelling'.⁵¹

US President, Bill Clinton, on the other hand, was not as dismissive of the attacks as the anonymous NATO official. His remarks at Hickam Air force Base, where he was attending events commemorating the end of the Second World War, were strong and determined:

The massacre of civilians in Sarajevo on Monday (Aug. 28), caused by a Bosnian Serb shell, was an outrageous act in a terrible war -- and a challenge to the commitments which NATO has made to oppose such actions by force, if necessary ... [and that the use of NATO air-power against the Bosnian Serbs was] the right response to the savagery in Sarajevo ...The campaign will make it clear to the Bosnian Serbs that they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by continuing to attack Sarajevo and other safe areas and by continuing to slaughter innocent

⁴⁹ Art Pine & Tracy Wilkinson, 'NATO Warplanes Attack Bosnian Serb Position', *Los Angeles Times*, 30 August 1995.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

civilians. NATO is delivering that message loud and clear.⁵²

President Clinton's message after the market attack was very clear: the Bosnian Serbs were required to stop the war and negotiate a settlement, if they did not, they could expect more military action against their communications centres, ammunition dumps and units deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵³ These NATO attacks on the Bosnian Serb Army would, if carried out, contribute to making them increasingly vulnerable to the military offensives of both the Croatian and the Bosnian Muslim Army.⁵⁴ The Bosnian Serbs, according to the strategy of both NATO and the Clinton Administration, would consider the continued cost of air strikes against them to be unfeasible and would therefore be more amenable to negotiate a final settlement to the conflict.

According to Christopher Bellamy, the 30 August 1995 attack by NATO planes and United Nations Rapid Reaction Force units against the Bosnian Serb military installations was the first time in the four years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia that NATO and the United Nations used a fuller array of forces at their disposal. That use of force was meant not only to compel the Bosnian Serbs to restore the status quo around Sarajevo and stop the killing, but also to force the Bosnian Serbs to end the war. This was the phase where NATO's operations in Bosnia shifted from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement.⁵⁵ Thus, a turning point for NATO had come to pass, where the use of force, it seemed, would, from then on, be a credible threat against further Bosnian Serb aggression.

⁵² Louis Arana-Barradas, 'President Warns Bosnian Serbs', *Air Force News Service*, 30 August 1995, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/n19950901_969.htm>.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armor*, 1996, p.118.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.119.

It was not only the Bosnian Serbs who suffered losses in these NATO attacks: five UN peacekeepers and a French Mirage 2000 fighter jet were lost during their missions against Bosnian Serb targets, the two pilots of the jet ejected safely. In addition to that, according to CNN, the Serbs responded with some ‘light shelling’ around the Croatian city of Dubrovnik and the Muslim enclave of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵⁶ The Bosnian Serbs, though, were not entirely deterred by the NATO attacks of August 30 1995. NATO would have to use firm and consistent force against the Bosnian Serbs again before they were to give up their military operations throughout Bosnia.

The war in Bosnia underwent a crucial transformation during the month of September 1995; one in which NATO finally asserted its authority in the region and took determined and consistent action in order to end the conflict completely in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Initially, the Bosnian Serbs appeared to have run out of military resolve since NATO’s ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ got underway. The Bosnian Serbs decided to comply with the demands of NATO to halt their military operations in and around Sarajevo.⁵⁷ In return for NATO ending Operation Deliberate Force, the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weaponry from the 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo.⁵⁸ In addition to this, a framework agreement for a new Constitution was signed by the parties on 1 September 1995 in New York. This was the first concrete political step in the unfolding peace process. As insurance against further Bosnian Serb military action, which often targeted civilians, the North Atlantic Council authorised NATO military commanders to renew their air strikes at any time if the Bosnian Serbs once

⁵⁶ ‘NATO Continues Attack on Bosnian Serbs as Peace Talks Inch Forward’, *CNN News*, 30 August 1995, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/august95/8-30/talks/>>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armor*, 1996, p.116.

again attacked any of the UN Safe Havens.⁵⁹ In statements after the North Atlantic Council meeting, NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana issued the following statement:

The Council took note of a report by the NATO military commanders on Operation 'Deliberate Force'. The reply of General Mladic is not sufficient and does not constitute a basis for terminating air strikes. We expect the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the conditions of the United Nations and in particular :- no Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas;- Bosnian Serbs withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 20 km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo without delay;- complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport ... Assuming Bosnian Serb compliance, Bosnian Government forces are expected to show restraint and not take advantage of the situation in and around Sarajevo. NATO air operations continue over Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO aircraft will react immediately to any attack or display of hostile intent against them by Bosnian Serbs.⁶⁰

Solana's statement primarily focused on two overriding concerns for NATO at that particular stage in the war. First, there was his very clear warning to the Bosnian Serbs that any continued attacks on Sarajevo or other UN declared Safe Havens, would result in further military action by NATO forces.⁶¹ Pressure from NATO's Secretary General, backed by the practical application of military force by NATO, strengthened the significance and credibility of the organisation. In addition, NATO's new resolve and determination contributed to its image of being the pre-eminent institution capable of handling the application of force. Also, it indicated the weakness of the UN, specifically, the need for NATO to issue warnings to the Bosnian Serbs on behalf of UN personnel on the ground who the UN could not protect through its own devices, demonstrating how constrained and weak the UN was in Bosnia at that crucial stage.

⁵⁹ Javier Solana, 'NATO Council Meeting', 2 September 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950902a.htm>>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Second, in addition to the clear warnings and threat of military action aimed at the Bosnian Serbs, Solana's statement after the North Atlantic Council meeting on 2 September 1995 also warned the Bosnian Muslims not to take advantage of the Bosnian Serbs' commitment to withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo for the purposes of launching their own counter-offensive.⁶² Rather than encouraging the Bosnian Muslims to take back territory, NATO's aim was to ultimately stop the fighting so that negotiations toward a peace process could succeed. Therefore, any Bosnian Muslim counterattack against the Bosnian Serb Army would not be within the spirit of NATO's attempt to stop the conflict.⁶³

Although NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo brought immediate relief to the besieged city, there was a sense of disappointment and resentment at what NATO was trying to achieve in Bosnia, particularly within Bosnian Muslim government circles. As a result of the Bosnian Serbs ceasing their military activities, NATO began to focus its efforts toward a permanent political agreement based on a formula of 51 per cent of Bosnian territory remaining under Bosnian Serb control and 49 per cent under Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat control.⁶⁴ Alija Izetbegovic, even as the NATO bombs fell on the Bosnian Serbs noted that:

... the world still doesn't want to help them [Bosnian Muslims] on the battlefield, rather at the peace table. So, he explained, he accepted a bitter compromise [referring to the proposed framework of the 51/49 formula] in order to end the war.⁶⁵

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Christiane Amanpour, 'Sarajevans Reap Benefits of NATO Attacks', *CNN News*, 12 September 1995, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/sep95/9-12/5pm/index.html>>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

The Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, claimed that the proposed basis for a solution (notably the 51 per cent, 49 per cent formula) rewarded Serb aggression, but that the Bosnian Muslims were powerless to do anything about it and felt that the death of a further 10,000 to 20,000 people as being too high a price to continue the war.⁶⁶ Bosnian historian, Mustafa Imamovic, declared the following in relation to NATO's position in the Bosnian war and its aims: "I think this deal will just be a break until the final outcome, because diplomacy now is simply registering facts on the ground ... NATO isn't fighting for any side in Bosnia just saving its own face."⁶⁷

What Imamovic stated above about NATO using Bosnia to save face and lift its prestige might have some basis in reality, however, the events on the ground by 15 September 1995 indicated that NATO's bombing of the Bosnian Serb Army was having a substantial impact on its ability to defend itself from Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces who appeared to be pressing the advantage. That offensive cost the Bosnian Serbs 1,500 square miles of territory in Western and Central Bosnia, whilst an estimated 150,000 Bosnian Serbs fled, predominately to Eastern Slavonia, the Serb held region of Croatia.⁶⁸ According to Christiane Amanpour:

Although NATO says it has not bombed those areas, the UN said the air campaign could have weakened Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic's defensive capability ... His logistic ability to re-supply and his command and control to orchestrate that supply has been restricted.⁶⁹

NATO forces were pushing the advantage against the increasingly overwhelmed Bosnian Serb Army, with NATO actively pursuing the overall collapse of it.⁷⁰ Far

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Christiane Amanpour, 'Serbs Lose Ground to Croat, Bosnian Forces', *CNN News*, 14 September 1995, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/sep95/9-14/amanpour/index.html>>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armor*, 1996, p.119.

from not helping the Bosnian Muslim forces on the ground, NATO continued its attacks against Bosnian Serb Army targets.⁷¹ On 10 September 1995, NATO launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from US warships stationed in the Adriatic Sea, targeting air defence installations around Banja Luka.⁷² By the time the final NATO air assaults ended on 14 September 1995, NATO had managed to conduct over 3,400 sorties, of which 750 were air to ground missions⁷³, thus demonstrating the high level of commitment NATO had to obtaining a clear end to the war. Although the primary military objective of NATO was to destroy the Bosnian Serb air defence network, they also targeted the communications network, essentially disabling much of the infrastructure of the breakaway Bosnian Serb Republic.⁷⁴ This weakened the Bosnian Serb Army to such an extent that the Bosnian and Croatian Armies were able to press the advantage, with the Serb forces withdrawing from many areas which they anticipated having to hand over under any peace agreement. As the Bosnian Serb Army was pushed back further, the Muslim forces lost their momentum and stalemate took hold along the front lines.⁷⁵

On 5 October 1995 President Clinton announced a cease-fire agreement between the combatants in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the details President Clinton provided at the time, the cease-fire would be comprehensive, and would ultimately lead to peace talks in the United States:

It seems that the agreement requires an end to all offensive operations, all reconnaissance and all sniping. Also, the cease-fire would be contingent upon the restoration of gas and electric power to Sarajevo, and the assurance of free passage from Sarajevo to Gorazde. It would last 60 days,

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., pp.119-120.

⁷³ Ibid., p.120.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

or until a peace agreement is reached. The cease-fire would be enforced by UN forces in the region.⁷⁶

With the ceasefire finally taking effect, and the conditions appearing suitable for a permanent peace in Bosnia, on 16 October the United States announced the location that would host the peace talks. That location, the Wright – Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, would be prepared to take the three Balkan leaders, Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for sustained negotiations between their respective delegations. The peace process undertaken at Dayton would not have begun had NATO not militarily weakened the Bosnian Serb Republic militarily to such an extent that the latter no longer held a vast military superiority against the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces arrayed against them. Therefore as clearly demonstrated, NATO's decisive military response after the Srebrenica massacre was instrumental in bringing about the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, ultimately saving lives.

The Uneasy Peace: The Dayton Peace Accords

With all the warring parties involved in the Bosnian conflict persuaded by NATO force to finally accept a cease-fire agreement, the difficult process of negotiating a diplomatic and political solution to bloody conflict became paramount. The launching of the peace process, which NATO had gone to war in order to achieve, was a clear indicator that NATO's military operations against the Bosnian Serbs were the incentive needed in getting all parties to take the negotiations seriously. The Dayton Peace Accord was an agreement that was considered by all sides as far from ideal. It was because of the lack of enthusiasm for the final deal by all sides, that the agreement

⁷⁶ 'Cease-fire in Bosnia on October 10th?', *BosNews*, 5 October 1995, <<http://www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9510/msg00084.html>>.

would need to be enforced by NATO troops on the ground in Bosnia. NATO's willingness to guarantee any negotiated agreement in Dayton was the determining factor in allowing peace to be given a chance in the Bosnian conflict.⁷⁷ In the words of former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and key US negotiator at Dayton: "we knew we had entered the realm of serious negotiation for the first time."⁷⁸

The first stage of Dayton negotiations were conducted within the framework of proximity talks; a form of shuttle diplomacy between President Milosevic of Yugoslavia who represented the interests of the Bosnian Serbs, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who represented the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia who represented the interests of the Bosnian Croats.⁷⁹ Negotiations on previous agreements which were signed, such as the Vance-Owen Peace Agreement, were conducted with the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both were hardliners and did not concede much when involved in negotiations. Milosevic, unlike the Bosnian Serb leadership, viewed NATO intervention against the Bosnian Serbs as the result of years of unwillingness by the latter to compromise; that they essentially had brought NATO's wrath upon themselves.⁸⁰ Therefore, Milosevic was keen to bring an end to the protracted conflict, even if it meant difficult concessions on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, and especially so in order to have the international sanctions against Yugoslavia lifted.⁸¹

⁷⁷ 'Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement' Department of State, *PBS Online*, 30 November 1995, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html>.

⁷⁸ Alan Little and Laura Silber, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 1996, p.366.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.364.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.365.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

The key aspects of the Accord were that Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain as a single state, with full recognition and respect of its sovereignty by its neighbours (in particular, Croatia and Yugoslavia).⁸² This condition particularly satisfied the Bosnian Muslims, who had keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina as one state as their paramount concern throughout the entire negotiation process. The Constitution proposed as a result of the negotiations provided for effective federal institutions that consisted of a Presidency, a bi-cameral legislature, and a Constitutional court.⁸³ A single currency and central bank were also provided for in new Constitution.⁸⁴ Ultimately, the Constitution:

... provides for the protection of human rights and the freedom of movement of people, goods, capital, and services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina ... [Muslims, Serbs and Croats] will live in a single state ... which will have [responsibility] for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs policy, immigration, monetary policy, international and inter-Entity law enforcement, communications, inter-Entity transportation, air traffic control, and financing of government operations and obligations.⁸⁵

This commitment to a single state, with unified institutions was a major success for the Bosnian Muslims and for NATO, since the aim of both parties was to retain a united Bosnia as a single state, even if the power of the central authority was diminished by the autonomy allowed to the Bosnian Serb Republic. Although the Dayton Accord gave the Bosnian Serbs strong autonomy within the new Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a solid achievement of the agreement was that the Bosnian Serbs were not given the opportunity to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁸² 'Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement', Department of State, *PBS Online*, 30 November 1995, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html>.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Map 5: Dayton Peace Accord and Rapid Reaction Force Deployment

NOTE: This map is included on page 169 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Bosnia Divided Before and After the War, Mission: Peace, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/mission_peace/maps/map1/map1.html>

Territorial issues, the most important aspect of the conflict, were also resolved. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise known as the Muslim-Croat Federation, were to administer 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serb Republic was to be left in control of the remaining 49 percent (in stark contrast to the 70 percent they controlled at the height of their military campaign).⁸⁶ Sarajevo was to be restored entirely to the control of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Gorazde was to remain in their control also, but with an improved land corridor connecting it with the rest of Muslim-Croat controlled territory.⁸⁷ Brcko, a town on the Croatian border, was left for future arbitration. In March 1999, the Brcko dispute was settled with a multi-ethnic governing body taking

⁸⁶ Roy Gutman, 'Signed, Sealed and Undelivered', Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 1995, <http://iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/war/war_38_199511-12_01.txt>.

⁸⁷ 'Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement', Department of State, *PBS Online*, 30 November 1995, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html>.

up responsibility in the town, with law-enforcement being undertaken by a multi-ethnic police force.⁸⁸

As far as the political party system to take shape in the new state institutions, the Dayton Accords envisaged free and democratic elections to be held a year from the signing of the agreement.⁸⁹ The results of these elections and their consequences will be dealt with in the following chapter. The peace process would allow refugees and other displaced people to return to their former areas to vote or register to vote in their new locations. It was also the aim of NATO to implement an agreement that would serve to establish international standards of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this end, all signatories to the Accord committed to cooperate fully with the international investigation and prosecution of war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law that occurred during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹⁰

All sides, according to Bosnia's Constitution, were to cooperate fully with the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, including the Bosnian Serb Republic. Ironically, had Milosevic not been representing the Bosnian Serbs during the negotiations, there would have been no chance that a Radovan Karadzic/Ratko Mladic negotiating team would have agreed to it, especially since they were responsible for such atrocities like Srebrenica. The most important aspect of the agreement regarding potential future leadership of the country was the exclusion from the electoral process of indicted war

⁸⁸ 'Brcko Final Award', Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, 5 March 1999, <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-offices/brcko/default.asp?content_id=5358>.

⁸⁹ 'Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement', 30 November 1995, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

criminals such as Karadzic. They were not allowed to run for election, or hold any official governmental posts.⁹¹

Apart from providing the provisions for guaranteeing human rights by deploying human rights monitors throughout the country, and allowing them unfettered access throughout Bosnia, the basic human rights of freedom of movement and settlement were also dealt with in the agreement. Under the Dayton Accords:

All of Bosnia's people will have the right to move freely throughout the country without harassment or discrimination. Refugees and displaced persons will have the right to return home or to obtain just compensation. The agreement creates a Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons to adjudicate claims.⁹²

Obviously, this particular provision in the agreement was particularly designed to appease the Bosnian Muslims, who had suffered enormous dispossession, and the prospect of being in one country without freedom of movement would be a farce. That aside, the Bosnian Serbs considered the idea of people returning to their homes anathema to their dream of creating a new state and a concept that was against the whole reason for them fighting the war. However, NATO did what it could to avoid the official partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The most significant part of the Dayton Agreement, as far as NATO was concerned, involved the creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR) from NATO personnel.⁹³ As evidenced throughout the Bosnian conflict, NATO clearly was more effective when left to its own devices, and 'de-linking' itself from the UN increased its operational scope. Therefore, NATO would be the muscle behind the IFOR operation with

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ 'The General Framework Agreement', Annex 1A, Article VII, IFOR website, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm#8>>.

UNPROFOR in Bosnia being withdrawn.⁹⁴ This was, effectively, the final transition phase from the ‘peace-keeping’ paradigm to the ‘peace-enforcement’ paradigm in the Bosnian conflict. Although peace-keeping had played an important role in the conflict, it was clear that after six years of war in the former Yugoslavia, it had not been effective enough in quelling the fighting. Ultimately peace-enforcement had to be used to discourage the combatants from continuing the war.

The agreement also obliged the parties to withdraw completely behind the agreed cease-fire lines within 30 days in order to establish demilitarized zones of separation, 2km wide on either side of the DMZ.⁹⁵ All parties were obligated to cooperate fully with IFOR and to provide “for unimpeded freedom of movement for IFOR by ground, air and water throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. It provides for Status of Forces protection for IFOR forces.”⁹⁶

The limitation of heavy weapons as a threat to the stability of Bosnia was also a major component of the military aspect of the Dayton Agreement. All heavy weapons were to be withdrawn to barracks by all parties within 120 days of the agreement as a confidence-building measure, this was considered Phase III of the redeployment of forces.⁹⁷ In addition, all weapons that could not be transferred to barracks or containment were to be demobilized and handed over to IFOR. These weapons

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ ‘Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement’, Department of State, 30 November 1995.

⁹⁷ ‘The General Framework Agreement’, Annex 1A, IFOR website, 1995,

<<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm#3>>.

included landmines and other unexploded ordinance, communications equipment, vehicles and other military equipment.⁹⁸

Another significant aspect of the Dayton agreement was the founding of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), which would include the IFOR Commander and the equivalent representatives of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb military establishments.⁹⁹ This commission was to provide a central mechanism where complaints, problems and inquiries of a military nature could be aired and addressed, especially in relation to violations of the cease-fire agreement.¹⁰⁰ The Joint Military Commission was to also be styled as a form of database of information relating to military issues, in order to create a climate of transparency in military matters.¹⁰¹ The signatory parties were obligated to cooperate with the Joint Military Commission in this regard.¹⁰² The JMC assisted in promoting a sense of interaction and transparency between the military forces within Bosnia, and reduce the level of mistrust overall.

Another confidence-building measure that was agreed upon involved the restriction of the importation, exportation and general use of weapons.¹⁰³ The agreement provided for a series of negotiations between the sides that would deal with arms control and deployments within Bosnia and Herzegovina. These confidence-building measures placed importation restrictions and limits on equipment such as ammunition, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopter gun-ships and warplanes.¹⁰⁴ These restrictions

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ 'The General Framework Agreement', Annex 1A, Article VIII, IFOR website, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm#8>>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

were designed to assist in easing the military tension between all sides, where the potential for the resumption of hostilities was still high.

The General Framework Agreement, and the Dayton Agreement, would only succeed with NATO's implementation force establishing the environmental conditions on the ground that would allow the peace agreement to take root, and ultimately, steer the country to peace and stability.

The Aftermath of Dayton: Implementation Through IFOR and SFOR

On 14 December 1995, Bosnia's warring factions formally agreed to and signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Paris, after concluding the negotiation process in Dayton, Ohio. Two days later, NATO's North Atlantic Council undertook the largest military operation in its history to date, code named 'Operation Joint Endeavour'.¹⁰⁵ NATO's mandate in Bosnia, through IFOR, was to enforce the military aspects of the agreement according to UN Security Council Resolution 1031. IFOR's role, identified in the Dayton Peace Agreement was as follows:

IFOR's mission will be to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the settlement in an even manner. Its tasks will include monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces as well as controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be an active, robust force capable of not only of implementing a peace agreement but also defending itself vigorously under all circumstances.¹⁰⁶

IFOR began its duties on 20 December 1995 and was given a mandate of a year. During 1996, NATO's IFOR claimed major success in keeping the peace and implementing military aspects of the Dayton agreement. According to NATO official sources:

¹⁰⁵ 'The General Framework Agreement', IFOR website, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm#6>>.

¹⁰⁶ 'The General Framework Agreement', Annex 1A, Article VI, IFOR website, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm#6>>.

It accomplished its principal military tasks by causing and maintaining the cessation of hostilities; separating the armed forces of the Bosniac - Croat Entity (the Federation) and the Bosnian Serb Entity (the Republika Srpska) by mid-January 1996; transferring areas between the two Entities by mid March; and, finally, moving the Parties' forces and heavy weapons into approved sites, which was realised by the end of June. For the remainder of the year IFOR continued to patrol along the 1,400 km long de-militarised Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and regularly inspected over 800 sites containing heavy weapons and other equipment. In carrying out these tasks it opened 2,500 km of roads, repaired or replaced over 60 bridges, and freed up Sarajevo airport and key railway lines.¹⁰⁷

IFOR managed to achieve a reasonable number of its prescribed tasks. IFOR did manage to effectively separate, with little resistance, the armies of the Bosnian Serbs from those of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Considering the magnitude of such a task, with the memory of war still extremely fresh, and with elements of the militaries on all sides against the agreement, the fact that there was such little resistance to NATO carrying out its mandate was an accomplishment in itself.

Although in the broad sense IFOR was succeeding in its task to implement the security aspects of the Dayton agreement¹⁰⁸, there were some events that IFOR did not handle well at all. Amongst IFOR's tasks was the process of territorial transfers between all parties. These territorial transfers were the most difficult task that IFOR handled, since much emotion was involved in removing people from their homes and relocating them. One of the worst situations that arose was the return of Grbavica and Ilidza, the Serb-populated and -controlled suburbs of Sarajevo, to the Muslim-Croat federation in order to reunite the city under one administration.

¹⁰⁷ 'History of NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Hercegovina', *SFOR Informer Online*, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>>.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

The Sarajevo Handover: NATO's Implementation Difficulties

Apart from the successes that IFOR achieved during its mission in Bosnia, there were a number of difficulties. One such implementation difficulty was the transfer of Sarajevo's predominately Serb districts of Grbavica and Ilidza to Bosnian Federation control. Chaos was rife before the transfer was scheduled to take place. Jackie Shymanski described the situation in Ilidza:¹⁰⁹

The fires burned in a music school, two factories, a pharmacy, an apartment building and the Ilidza police station. The fires have been blamed on Serbs fleeing Ilidza who want to intimidate their Serb neighbours who wish to stay in their homes.¹¹⁰

NATO and UN officials blamed this 'gang behaviour' on Serbs who had been ordered by the hard-line Bosnian Serb leadership to discourage Serbs from living in areas beyond their control. These incidents were undertaken in order to demonstrate that Muslims, Serbs and Croats could not live together under any circumstances, hence justifying a segregated state.¹¹¹

The most disturbing aspect of the violence and gang-like behaviour that tore through the suburbs of Sarajevo was that the NATO forces responsible for the security of the people, as well as protecting and overseeing that the agreement was fulfilled, did not prevent the disruptive gangs from operating. For its part, "NATO commanders [said] preventing arson is the responsibility of international police which in turn says it has no power to arrest those setting fires or looting public property".¹¹² As the destruction and arson continued, many local Serbs had decided that they would not be forced to

¹⁰⁹ On 10 March 1996.

¹¹⁰ Jackie Shymanski, 'Chaos not Peace: NATO intervenes as Bosnian Serbs ransack Suburb', *CNN Mission: Peace*, 10 March 1996, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/9603/10/>>.

¹¹¹ 'Arson, Murder Escalate in Serb-held Suburbs', Hellenic Resource Network, *Bosnet Digest*, V5 #91, <<http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/bosnet/1996/96-03-10.bos.html>>.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

flee their homes and property in Ilidza, they formed a group called ‘the Serbian Democratic Initiative’.¹¹³ Members of this group had, according to their leader Dusan Sehovac, pleaded with the UN for help against the intimidation they were experiencing by their fellow Bosnian Serbs. According to Sehovac, they replied that it was not in the UN mandate to help.¹¹⁴

NATO’s ground commander in Bosnia, Lt. General Sir Michael Walker, urged the few remaining Serb residents to seek assistance from their own leaders. It was these very leaders who were encouraging the Bosnian Serbs of Grbavica and Ilidza to flee their homes before the Bosnian Muslims took control. He stated “We can’t guarantee your [Bosnian Serbs] security, but we are here ... We in the international community believe it is safe for you to stay in the suburbs.”¹¹⁵ Sehovac responded to the comments made by both the UN and NATO’s ground commander “The international community is driving us out of here instead of helping us stay ... We have no support from anywhere.”¹¹⁶

Ultimately, NATO authorised Bosnian Muslim fire-fighters from the neighbouring suburb of Hrasnica to fight some of the Ilidza fires.¹¹⁷ They were protected by French NATO troops whilst undertaking their task. Hrasnica’s Fire Chief, Nevzet Kolasinac, told of how his four year old son was killed by the Serbs, and that he also owned a flat in the area, yet there he was trying to save Serbian homes from destruction.¹¹⁸ Kolasinac’s example demonstrated that locals, who had suffered during the conflict,

¹¹³ ‘Collapse of Law and Order’, Hellenic Resource Network, *Bosnet Digest*, V5 #91, <<http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/bosnet/1996/96-03-10.bos.html>>.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ ‘Bosnian Firefighters Finally Called In’, Hellenic Resource Network, *Bosnet Digest*, V5 #91, <<http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/bosnet/1996/96-03-10.bos.html>>.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

were expected to help their former enemies, while NATO did not prevent the burning of the suburbs.¹¹⁹ The failure to prevent the arson and murders in Grbavica and Ilidza before the handover of these suburbs was primarily that of NATO and the UN to bear. Both the UN and NATO did not entirely accomplish their mission to protect innocent civilians from being killed, their property from being damaged, or prevent the forced evacuation of people from the area. It was one of NATO's low points during the implementation phase, although admittedly, getting the Serbs to relinquish control of these suburbs in line with the Dayton Accord was a major achievement.

NATO of course rejected any assertion that the alliance was to blame, or that it could have done more to stop the violence.¹²⁰ The commander of the approximately sixty thousand NATO troops inserted into Bosnia and Herzegovina, Admiral Leighton W. Smith, drew heavy criticism from career diplomats and foreign press for his lack of engagement to stop such incidents as Ilidza and Grbavica:

Sarajevo's unification under the rule of the Muslim-Croat Federation as a phase in restoring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, noting, however, that Serb evacuation was a price too high for it ... NATO Secretary General Javier Solana [said] ... that the way in which Sarajevo was united was a serious blow to plans for a multi-ethnic Bosnia.¹²¹

Admiral Smith's response to that criticism was quite telling of the broader dangers facing the NATO mission:

I don't like getting into the gray areas of the mission, because you start getting into areas where you say, 'do something,' and then you can't enforce it. If you do that your credibility is undermined ... My biggest fear is false expectations. There are things people think we ought to be doing, or should be doing. We either can't or are not mandated to do it, or no trained

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Chris Hedges, 'Diplomats Fault Bosnia NATO Chief', *New York Times*, 28 April 1996.

¹²¹ Evacuation of Serbs is Too High a Price For Unification of Sarajevo, Hellenic Resource Network, *Yugoslav Daily Survey*, 21 March 1996, <<http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/yds/1996/96-03-21.yds.html#12>>.

to do it. We are not trained to do police work. Training to be a policeman is entirely different than training to be a soldier. We have got to be very careful not to mix the two up. I could get bashed up pretty bad by stepping out of my range.¹²²

The lack of action taken to stop these incidents had exposed some of the problems that potentially faced Bosnia in implementing peace, especially in relation to setting up a multi-ethnic society in the country. Had IFOR taken action at Ilidza and Grbavica, some Serbs might have remained in the city and have provided a multi-ethnic model for the rest of the country to follow. Unfortunately, Admiral Smith's in-action resulted in the mass intimidation by Bosnian Serb authorities of their own people to leave those suburbs and erase their existence in Sarajevo.

NATO's assertion above that IFOR troops were not trained to be a police force, and that they had not been mandated to take action, was correct. However, NATO allowing the Bosnian Serb police to remain in the suburbs after their official transfer to Bosnian Muslim control was construed as weakness by the Bosnian Serbs. It was Bosnian Serb police that Smith had allowed to remain, which supervised and participated in the looting and burning of Serb property; actions completely against the spirit of the Dayton Agreements.¹²³

Ultimately, whether trained as policeman or not, a multinational peace-enforcement force standing by should have had the material capability to discourage the Bosnian Serb authorities and thugs to leave their own community alone. NATO did, however, carry out its prescribed task of transferring the suburbs from Bosnian Serb to Bosnian Muslim control and prevent any inter-ethnic violence from occurring. The fact that it was not safe for any Serb to stay in Ilidza and Grbavica was where IFOR failed, and no

¹²² Chris Hedges, 'Diplomats Fault Bosnia NATO Chief', *New York Times*, 28 April 1996.

¹²³ Jackie Shymanski, 'Chaos not Peace', *CNN Mission: Peace*, 10 March 1996.

matter the overall success of IFOR, the Sarajevo incident can be considered the lowest point of NATO's peace-enforcement operation in Bosnia. The mistakes of Grbavica and Ilidza, however, were not repeated again by IFOR.

IFOR's role in Bosnia essentially established and maintained the peace; it separated the armed forces of Bosnia's two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; it also supervised the transfer of territory between the two entities, according to the requirements of the Dayton Peace Accords; and it oversaw the redeployment of heavy weapons into storage. All the aspects of the peace agreement that needed implementation on the ground were considered completed by June 1996.¹²⁴

Ultimately, IFOR was able to secure a physically stable and secure environment. That stability allowed the United Nations and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to establish the election framework required for a more democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR remained until the conclusion of the election process in September 1996. Once the elections were conducted, IFOR's mandate had officially expired. However, it was clear that the more ambitious aspects of the Dayton Accords had yet to be fully implemented. One important area was the return of refugees to their original towns and villages, something IFOR did not attempt wholeheartedly due to its limited time-frame. Unfortunately, the political and civil environment was not sufficient for NATO to withdraw entirely from Bosnia, hence the much reduced

¹²⁴ 'NATO's Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Online Library: NATO Fact Sheet, 8 May 2001, <[http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-Bosnia and Herzegovina.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina.htm)>.

Stabilisation Force (SFOR) was established in order to expand on IFOR's original mandate.¹²⁵

SFOR was created under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1088 on 12 December 1996 as the successor to IFOR and charged with taking over the implementation of the unfulfilled aspects of the Dayton Accords. According to NATO:

The primary mission of SFOR is to contribute to the safe and secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. Its specific tasks are to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace. To promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward and to provide selective support to civilian organisations within its capabilities.¹²⁶

The major difference between IFOR and SFOR was that IFOR was the 'hammer' operation, establishing its military superiority on the ground and enforcing the military terms of the agreements, and with its 60,000 strong presence, was strong enough to conduct its mandate without interference from the local army and militias.¹²⁷ SFOR was a heavily reduced force, initially 32,000 thousand strong.¹²⁸ SFOR's strength continued to decline due to the increasingly less volatile security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹²⁹ indicating that SFOR was succeeding in providing an adequately secure environment and the need for a large deployment of forces was no longer necessary.

Every NATO state with armed forces had committed troops to the SFOR operation. In addition to NATO forces, many non-NATO members had also made substantial

¹²⁵ 'History of Stabilisation Force in Bosnia', *SFOR Informer Online*, 1998.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ 'NATO's Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Online Library: NATO Fact Sheet, 8 May 2001

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ SFOR's forces as of February 2002 stood at 18,000 troops.

commitments to the operation.¹³⁰ Overall there were 18 NATO members and 15 non-NATO members participating in SFOR.¹³¹ That there were 15 non-NATO members participating in SFOR was significant for a number of reasons. First, that NATO was able to effectively assert its command and control over an operation that was not exclusively undertaken by its own membership. That, to some extent, demonstrated the high level of respect NATO had among the mainly European contributors, in particular the Eastern European states. Second, the effective cooperation of the broad-based coalition was a testament to the considerable development of political and military ties between Eastern and Western Europe since the Cold War ended. Non-NATO countries were not excluded from the decision-making process, being consulted on most important issues and asked to express their positions on all North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions:

On October 25, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), based on the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, decided to implement, between November 1999 and April 2000, a revised structure for the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). In the new structure, SFOR continues to have its HQ in the Sarajevo area (transferred in 2000 from the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza to the purpose-built Camp Butmir). Below this are three multinational divisions commanded by major generals each with four Battle Groups (BG) except MND-SW with only three. Those BGs are reinforced battalion task forces with their own organic capabilities. There are also now dedicated Operational Reserve Forces able to intervene anywhere within the Theatre of Operations.¹³²

Multinational Division North (MND-N) had its headquarters located in Tuzla in Northern Bosnia, not far from both the Yugoslav and Croatian borders. The MND-N

¹³⁰ 'Participation of Non-NATO Nations', *SFOR Online*, 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>>.

¹³¹ The contributors to SFOR as of September 2001 were Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA. Non-NATO members at the time of deployment: Albania, Austria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.

¹³² 'Restructuring, History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina', 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>>.

Division consisted of 5,000 personnel from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and United States of America.¹³³ Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) was commanded from the historic city of Mostar, close to the Croatian Adriatic coast. It had 4,600 personnel and contributing countries included Albania, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco and Spain. The Multinational Division Southwest (MND-SW) was based in the Northern city of Banja Luka, closer to the northern Croatian border region. MND-SW had around 4,000 personnel active in the area. Canada, Czech Republic, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom contributed to this division.¹³⁴ In addition to these MND's, there were 1,700 personnel active in 'Theatre Troops', they were based all over Bosnia and Herzegovina were composed of troops from Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia.¹³⁵

The restructuring of SFOR as indicated above, highlighted the growing confidence of NATO in their effort to restore the peace in Bosnia. Its reduction of some 40,000 troops since IFOR was deployed in 1996, and 12,000 since the establishment of SFOR, was indicative of the success IFOR/SFOR had overall in securing a peaceful environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³⁶ In addition, the restructuring of SFOR by moving its HQ from the once volatile Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza to a purpose built HQ called Camp Butmir, signified a strong commitment by NATO to the region until it transferred operational control of a much reduced peace-keeping mission to the European Union (EURFOR) in December 2004.¹³⁷ However, an extremely contentious

¹³³ 'SFOR Organisation', *SFOR Online*, February 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm>>.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ 'NATO's Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina', NATO Fact Sheet, 8 May 2001.

¹³⁷ 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', The CIA World Fact Book, 2005,

issue that SFOR had to deal with before it could hand over its mandate, was to ensure Bosnia had only one unified Armed Force. This would ensure the reduction of military tension between the various mini-armies that still existed in the country.

Integrating Separate Armies: SFOR Attempts the Seemingly Impossible

One of the more important tasks IFOR and then SFOR was to keep apart the various ethnic-based armed forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO successfully kept the warring sides apart, however, the maintenance of three separate armed forces which, in total, numbered 430,000 troops after the war out of a population of only four million was not feasible.¹³⁸ The number of military personnel in Bosnia has since declined dramatically to less than 34,000 in 2001, but not enough according to SFOR and NATO, who considered those numbers and that kind of expenditure far too high for a country of that size.¹³⁹

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of two formal armies, the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (VF) and Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). In accordance with the dual ethnic composition of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the VF was divided into two sub-armies, a Bosnian Muslim one (VF-B) and a Bosnian Croat one (VF-H). Adding to the complexity of the military situation in Bosnia, each army and sub-army are under civilian control, hence each army has its own Ministry of Defence, whether it was the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb or a Bosnian Croat one. In addition to the three Defence Ministries was

<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html>>.

¹³⁸ Sgt. Peter Fitzgerald, 'The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *SFOR Informer Online*, 28 November 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/127/p03a/t0103a.htm>>.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

the collective tri-Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁴⁰ each acted as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of their respective ethnic force within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There were more than 34,000 professional troops and around 15,000 additional reservists in the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina after demobilization in 2002.¹⁴¹ The VF had 24,000 of these troops, with VF-B constituting the bulk of the force with 16,618 troops while VF-H with less than half of their number at 7,225 troops.¹⁴² The VF had four corps, three of which were VF-B and were based at Sarajevo (1st Corps), Tuzla (2nd Corps) and Bosnia and Herzegovinaac (5th Corps)¹⁴³ The remaining Corps was the 1st Guard Corps of the VF-H which was based in Mostar¹⁴⁴ The VRS on the other hand consisted of 10,000 soldiers and was also divided into four corps. Banja Luka hosted 1st Corps, the 3rd Corps in Bijeljina, the 5th Corps in Sokolac and the 7th Corps was based in Bileca.¹⁴⁵

Both the VF and the VRS had combat arm units, which included motorized infantry, mechanized infantry, armoured infantry, field artillery, and defence artillery.¹⁴⁶ Both armies also included other units such as reconnaissance, signal, engineering, and logistical support. Both had air defence units composed as two separate air forces.¹⁴⁷ It is clear that the number of soldiers and equipment in the three armies was too high and overall did not contribute to the stability of the country. Pressure from NATO had been mounting on all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to reduce their armed forces and spending on defence. The period 1999 – 2001 saw a 15 per cent reduction in troop

¹⁴⁰ One Bosnian Muslim, one Bosnian Serb and one Bosnian Croat.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Bosnia and Herzegovinaac was controlled by Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian Muslim rebel who turned on the Bosnian Muslim Army during the conflict.

¹⁴⁴ Mostar was the city which involved bitter fighting between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces, eventually city was controlled by both sides.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ ¹⁴⁶ Peter Fitzgerald, *SFOR Informer Online*, 28 November 2001.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

numbers, but more reductions were necessary according to SFOR.¹⁴⁸ In October 2001, the OSCE launched an initiative in order to get across the message to the Bosnian government and people on the disadvantages of maintaining an excessive level of military expenditure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Robert Beecroft, Head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina stated on 11 October 2001:

The Bosnia and Herzegovina militaries simply cannot be sustained the way they are ... They could fulfil their mission far more effectively if their personnel strength were significantly reduced ... In only a few countries is the defence budget as high [6 per cent of GDP] as it is in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The bottom line is that a defence budget is not supposed to represent an undue financial burden on a country in peace time.¹⁴⁹

During the first ever visit of the Bosnian Tri-Presidency to NATO headquarters on 13 March 2002, Secretary General Lord Robertson stated:

The strongest message the Alliance had to give was that it wanted Bosnia's success. He reiterated NATO's commitment to Bosnia, adding that although much progress had been made in the country since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, much more needed to be done. In particular, Lord Robertson explained that the armed forces had to be reduced and grouped under a united command and control structure. This, he said, was 'an absolute prerequisite' for joining NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.¹⁵⁰

Robert Beecroft and George Robertson's statements are reflective of the problems of developing nations who are recovering from a war or of states that find themselves with serious territorial disputes.¹⁵¹ The three ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina are still suspicious of one another. After over three years of brutal conflict, it was understandable that they wanted to keep their separate militaries intact. However,

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ George Robertson, 'First Visit of Tri-Presidency to NATO HQ', 13 March 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/0311/e0313a.htm>>.

¹⁵¹ The insecurity of such predicaments necessitates, often in the view of these states, a strong defence. India, Pakistan, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel are just some of the states in the international community that have hefty defence expenditures because their independence and existence is perceived to be under threat by rival powers.

SFOR and the OSCE expressed concerns that were well founded. Bosnia could not afford such a high level of military spending when it needed to focus on rebuilding and joining European security, economic and political organisations to ensure its stability. Toward that goal, SFOR with the cooperation of the OSCE, played a significant role in urging and facilitating the process of further demilitarisation of all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the integration of their separate armies into one national army.

According to the Dutch Brigadier General, Ton Strik, Assistant Chief of Staff for Joint Military Affairs declared in October 2001 “The armed forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the process of restructuring and we as SFOR together with other organisations of the international community are assisting them”.¹⁵² General Strik stated that the aim of SFOR was to assist in reshaping the AF in Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a force to serve the people. The overall personnel of the Armed Forces were to be reduced to 20,000 as agreed by the Joint Military Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵³ The aim of the restructuring was not just troop reductions but the disbanding of entire units and the closure of some site facilities.¹⁵⁴ SFOR’s role in convincing all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina in reducing their armed forces went a long way in establishing some goodwill and trust. That goodwill continued to grow to a point where the maintenance of separate armies was no longer considered necessary.

It took much effort, but on 5 October 2005, almost ten years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the state parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed the Bosnia and Herzegovina Defence Law and Law on Service in the Armed Forces of

¹⁵² Peter Fitzgerald, ‘The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, *SFOR Informer Online*, 2001.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Bosnia and Herzegovina. These laws effectively created one integrated national army for Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁵ This military reform was a large step taken by the Bosnian government to fulfil criteria directly facilitating their entry into NATO's Partnership for Peace program, a necessary requirement before eventual entry into NATO itself at a later stage.¹⁵⁶ However, the achievement of an integrated army in Bosnia was a significant step for the peace-building process of the country. As demonstrated, NATO played the crucial role of convincing the Serbs, Croats and Muslims of Bosnia of the importance of a unified army and provided the stable environment that allowed it to be possible. An integrated army represents a new step toward long term stability in the region, and will also contribute to the healing process in general by demonstrating that soldiers and armies that fought one another could be brought together to serve a common purpose. Another area where SFOR has been, partially successful at least, is in tracking down indicted war criminals and handing them over to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Detaining of Persons Indicted for War Crimes: SFOR's Role

The Dayton Agreement specified that indicted War Criminals be turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. There were, as of September 2007 161 people indicted for war crimes, of which 94 cases have been concluded by the ICTY.¹⁵⁷ The accused war criminals are charged with committing crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.¹⁵⁸ The ICTY does not only

¹⁵⁵ Sean McCormack, 'Passage of Defense Reform Legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Office of the Spokesman for US State Department, 6 October 2005, <http://www.usembassy.it/file2005_10/alia/a5100607.htm>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ 'Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia', *Thirteenth Annual Report*, A/61/27 S/2006/666, 21 August 2006, <<http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2006/AR06.pdf>>.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

cover the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also those in Croatia and Kosovo. This section will primarily cover those directly indicted for War Crimes in Bosnia, and the role that SFOR played in capturing and turning over indictees to the ICTY.

Of the over 94 cases that have been heard by the tribunal as of September 2007, a number of those charged voluntarily turned themselves in, whilst others were captured by NATO's SFOR forces, or turned over by their own governments. One of the very high profile Bosnian Serbs apprehended by SFOR in April 2000 was Momcilo Krajsnik, Assembly President of Republika Srpska.¹⁵⁹ In this regard, Richard Holbrooke stated of Krajsnik's arrest by SFOR troops: "This is a great day for those of us who have fought for a single multi-ethnic country in Bosnia ... [Krajsnik was] one of the worst of the people in the region -- a racist, a separatist, a war criminal".¹⁶⁰

Biljana Plavsic, successor to Radovan Karadzic as President of Republika Srpska, turned herself in to the Tribunal on 11 January 2001.¹⁶¹ She gave herself up after learning that there was a public indictment of her by the ICTY for crimes against humanity and genocide.¹⁶² She initially denied the charges against her, but after turning herself in, she was treated leniently, with the ICTY dropping the charge of genocide. At the age of 72, she was sentenced to eleven years in prison.¹⁶³

In February 2002, SFOR mounted an operation to locate and apprehend Radovan Karadzic, former wartime President of the Bosnian Serb Republic, but did not find him. Karadzic has been indicted for War Crimes since 14 November 1995 and his

¹⁵⁹ 'NATO Detains Highest-ranking Bosnian War Crimes Suspect to Date', *CNN*, April 3 2001, <<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/04/03/bosnia.arrest.01/>>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ 'Statement by the Prosecutor on the Surrender of Biljana Plavsic', Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 11 January 2001, <<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p552-e.htm>>.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ 'Biljana Plavsic: Serbian Iron Lady', *BBC News*, 27 February 2003, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1108604.stm>>.

arrest and transfer to the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague was a very high priority. The operation was conducted by SFOR forces in the town of Celebici, in Republika Srpska:

This operation highlights SFOR and NATO's heightened will to use a wide range of capabilities and means against all PIFWC(s) [Persons Indicted For War Crimes] that do not voluntarily surrender ... SFOR and NATO remain committed to bringing all PIFWIC(s) to justice and urge the government of the Republic of Srpska to fulfil its commitment to the Dayton Accords by turning in these indicted individuals.¹⁶⁴

The nine-year presence of SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina did, from time to time, result in the capture of war criminals. Although the failed Karadzic operation could be considered a major setback for the ICTY, SFOR's capture of another indicted war criminal, Momir Nikolic, demonstrated that it did have the ability to act under certain circumstances in a decisive way. That sentiment was echoed by NATO's Secretary General George Robertson, who stated the following after the capture of Nikolic:

Today's detention serves as a warning that there will be no hiding place for anyone accused by the tribunal of those horrific crimes ...Let me be crystal clear to those with guilty consciences: you have only two choices -- turn yourself in with dignity or justice will be brought to you.¹⁶⁵

Nikolic was wanted for the massacre of around 8,000 men and boys from the Bosnian Serb offensive undertaken against the town of Srebrenica in July 1995. His capture in early April 2002 was a firm sign that NATO had not given up on implementing the obligations required by all sides from the Dayton Peace Accord, and in particular, the isolation and capture of indicted war criminals. In addition to the capture of Nikolic by SFOR, NATO's key member, the United States, through its Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated that Serbia was to get more financial aid, but on the condition that

¹⁶⁴ 'Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *NATO Online*, 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/0225/e0228a.htm>>.

¹⁶⁵ Patrick Lannin and Nedim Dervisbegovic, 'NATO Troops Snatch Bosnian – Serb Genocide Suspect', *Reuters*, 2 April 2002.

it cooperated fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. His spokesperson, Philip Reeker, stated:

Although Yugoslavia made significant progress with respect to the certification criteria, the secretary has determined that it would be premature to certify at this point ... We have communicated our decision to Belgrade authorities, and have reiterated to them our desire to see further progress on certification issues ... We've said numerous times in written and oral statements that all indictees need to be transferred and often referred specifically to Mladic and Karadzic ... So we want Mladic in The Hague.¹⁶⁶

On 7 March 2003, operations by SFOR began within the area of Pale, the former Bosnian Serb capital, and stronghold of Radovan Karadzic, and Lukavica.¹⁶⁷ These operations were being conducted in support of the Office of the High Representative's efforts to disrupt the activities of Momcilo Mandic and Milovan Bjelica who were allegedly providing financial assistance to Radovan Karadzic and other Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC).¹⁶⁸ SFOR maintained the authority, which was vested in it through the General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, to disrupt any activities linked to the support of any persons who were eluding the established International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁹

Although some PIFWC have eluded capture, with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic being among them, far more have not escaped justice for the role they played during the war. NATO, through SFOR's deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, managed to track down and arrest people indicted for War Crimes and send them onto the ICTY. SFOR succeeded in demonstrating that indicted war criminals were not safe to move freely in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they did have the capacity in many

¹⁶⁶ Elaine Monaghan, 'Powell Defers Decision on Frozen Yugoslav Aid', *Reuters*, 2 April 2002.

¹⁶⁷ 'SFOR Operations in the Vicinity of Pale and Lukavica', NATO Press Release, *SFOR Online*, 7 March 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2003/p030307a.htm>>.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

instances to enforce the rulings of the ICTY. The arrest and trial of PIFWC was, and continues to be, an important part of the healing process for the former Yugoslavia. In addition to pursuing justice for the victims of war crimes, Bosnia and Herzegovina also required the establishment of a democratic process, one that would reflect the political views of the country, but without the violence of the past.

Chapter Six

Stability Through Elections: NATO and its Peace-building Role Through Establishing Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The standard of democracy any state has developed is difficult to define, but there is a clear difference between an established democracy and that of a developing democratic system. Established democracies such as the United States and European states are considered the benchmark in that regard. After NATO intervened to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its mission to enforce the peace in the country needed more than just military power. A process of peace-building in order to establish political institutions through elections was also necessary. How well these new political institutions represented the interests of the three main ethnic groups would be crucial in determining whether Bosnia would remain peaceful. This chapter focuses on the relative success of the peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically, how the country has shifted from a state of war to a democracy.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had to re-build its political, economic and social systems while recovering from a bloody conflict. The Dayton Peace Accord provided for a set of democratic institutions that would be established in the country in order to enhance and maintain political stability. IFOR and subsequently SFOR, had the role of forging the newly developing democratic state from a post-conflict society into a free, democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina. The democratisation process would ease the tension among the former adversaries and encourage political compromise, ultimately leading the country to its integration with the European and International communities.

Although the democratisation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been shaky and criticised for being controlled by the extremist parties, it will be demonstrated below that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have taken advantage of their Constitutional rights to elect their representatives and have put the country firmly on the path of democratisation, therefore contributing to the stability of the country.

Before the conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, the republic held elections which were marred by extremist politics.¹ Its results were based primarily on the three ethnic groups voting along nationalist lines. This was at the expense of pro-Yugoslav liberal reformists and communist reformist parties. Of the 240 seats in the bicameral parliament, a total of 202 (84 per cent of the seats) were won by the three major nationalist parties.² The Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) won 87 seats (with 33.8 per cent of the vote). The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) won 71 seats (with 29.6 per cent of the vote) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won 44 seats (with 18.3 per cent of the vote).³ The fact that the ethnic nationalist parties received around 81 per cent of the overall vote in the pre-conflict elections indicated that ethnic divisions were becoming more apparent in the country. Also, given that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was so brutal, could NATO and the OSCE expect that the people would turn away from these nationalist parties in the post-conflict era?

The voting along ethnic lines pre-conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be explained by the fact that politically astute leaders of the nationalist parties were able to communicate their ideas effectively because the people were more open to their nationalist rhetoric. According to Mark Thompson, “Bosnia [is] full of uneducated

¹ David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, London, Pluto Press, 1999, p.29.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

people who don't know what politics is, what they can do, what's right and what's wrong. Only the nationalist parties and the communists exist for these people".⁴ Thompson's assertion that Bosnia was an illiterate society is a broad generalisation, however, his statement does capture one simple truth about the region, nationalism and conflict have often managed to rip the area apart. Although education is not an immunisation against nationalism, educated societies could be considered less susceptible *en masse* to nationalist rhetoric. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina had, through electing ethnic nationalist parties in the period prior to the war, demonstrated that nationalism was a force to be reckoned with.⁵

Ironically, it appears that the democratically elected representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina took the rhetoric of war to a higher level. The multi-ethnic nature of Bosnia was no longer feasible under the emerging nationalist conditions that had swept the once tolerant country. According to Susan Woodward:

In Bosnia - Herzegovina ... These leaders, to retain their position as representatives of their nation, not just in electoral terms but in terms of territorial rights to self-determination, had to go beyond holding a monopoly over an ethnic constituency within Bosnia – Herzegovina to destroying the Constitutional alternative for an independent Bosnia – the idea of a civic state where ethnic difference was not politically defining and citizens were loyal to ethnic tolerance and multi-cultural civilization.⁶

As Woodward indicates, much of the nationalism employed was designed to elevate the leadership aspirations of a few opportunist politicians in Bosnian politics, in a way similar to the way that Milosevic in Serbia used the Kosovo problem and applied nationalism to turn public support over to him.⁷ The Bosnian Muslim Party of

⁴ David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, 1999, p.29.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.29-30.

⁶ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 1995, p.233.

⁷ Tim Judah, *The Serbs*, 2000, pp.162-163.

Democratic Action (SDA) was committed to keeping Bosnia together under their dominance, since Bosnian Muslims constituted around 48 per cent of the population.⁸ The Bosnian Serb branch of Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) held the view that since the Bosnian Serbs constituted around 33 per cent of the population,⁹ they were entitled to make up their own decisions on self-determination.¹⁰ The Bosnian Croatian branch of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was tied to the governing HDZ of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, and if Bosnia were to fragment, the Bosnian Croats saw their future tied to the newly-independent Croatia. Soon after the 1991 election, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out.

Therefore, democracy had failed to provide peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina once before, after such a traumatic experience with democracy in 1991, what faith could the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have in democracy during the post-conflict era? It was under that climate of suspicion and ethnic tension that NATO and the OSCE had to cultivate an environment that was stable enough to conduct successful elections in the post-conflict era. This was a formidable task, but both organisations succeeded in their mission. As the Dayton Accord stipulated, the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), in addition to its duties of enforcing the peace, had the task of supervising a democratic election process within two years of its deployment.¹¹ Given the lack of infrastructure and goodwill between the three ethnic communities as a result of the three year conflict, establishing a democratic process in two years was a very optimistic appraisal of the situation. Nevertheless, NATO, the

⁸ 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', *The CIA World Factbook*, 1 November 2005, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html>>.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Alex Dragnic, 'The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Some Reflections', *South East European Monitor* (Vienna) Vol 3 1996, p.95.

¹¹ 'Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement', Department of State, 30 November 1995.

UN and the OSCE had their agenda and they also envisaged that soon after the election was complete and the new Constitutional institutions were working adequately, there would be no need for a heavily armed force to remain in the country. The answer theoretically lay with the Dayton process, and the Constitution to which the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had agreed too.

The first democratic elections were in aid of establishing the post-conflict parliamentary democracy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new democracy was envisaged as having various branches of the government. Those included the Executive Branch (including the Chairman of the three member rotating Presidency, who acts as the chief of state). The chairman of the Council of Ministers would be the head of government and of the Council of Ministers.¹² The Legislative Branch would consist of a bicameral parliamentary assembly: the National House of Representatives (upper House) and the House of Peoples (lower House).¹³ The Judicial Branch consisted of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court which were both to be supervised and directed by the ministry of Justice.¹⁴ Although generally, the above parliamentary democracy appeared similar to other democratic institutions, in actual fact, the Constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique.

The Executive Branch of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first of its kind to be found anywhere internationally. The complexity of the political institutions established by the new Constitution and the election process are demonstrated by examining the Presidency. The office of Presidency would be shared

¹² 'Background Note: Bosnia', The US Department of State, *European Bureau of European Affairs*, December 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/bosnia_0012_bgn.html>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

by three co-Presidents.¹⁵ The three-member presidency would be made up of one representative from each of the three major ethnic groups, one Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat. The co-Presidents would be elected for four-year terms directly by the people.¹⁶ Although complicated, the tri-Presidential system was designed to provide an equal level of representation between the three communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the executive branch. The tri-Presidential system was intended to increase political stability by ensuring that the leaders of each community were required to work together at the highest level.

Given the importance of the Executive Branch, inter-ethnic cooperation within the institution was critical. The Presidency would be responsible for conducting the high level foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the appointment of ambassadors and other international representatives, representing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in European institutions and international organisations with the primary aim of seeking membership of those that Bosnia did not already hold membership.¹⁷ The Presidency also would have the responsibility of negotiating, accepting and/or rejecting, with the approval of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ratification of international treaties. In addition to these important functions, the Presidency would also have the responsibility of recommending the annual budget allocated to the Council of Ministers by the Parliamentary Assembly.¹⁸ With such broad powers invested in the co-Presidency by the Dayton Accord, it was expected that the position was too important to bring into deadlock with inter-ethnic

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ 'Background Note: Bosnia', December 2000.

rivalry. However, if the Executive Branch were to collapse, NATO's SFOR would ensure that peace and stability would continue to prevail.

In addition to the democratically elected Executive Branch, the Dayton Accord envisaged the establishment of a democratically elected Legislature. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be established after the first multi-party elections held post-conflict, would consist of two houses. The House of Peoples, would consist of fifteen delegates, of whom five would be Bosnian Muslim, five would be Bosnian Croat and five would be Bosnian Serb.¹⁹ For any official business to be acceptable, nine delegates would be required to be present, so long as there were three representatives from each ethnic group.²⁰ The delegates for the House of Peoples are selected from their respective entity parliaments, the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were to be elected from the House of Peoples of the Muslim-Croat Federation, whilst the Bosnian Serb representatives were to be elected by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.²¹ The second house would be the House of Representatives, which would be made up of forty-two representatives, fourteen of those elected by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, whilst twenty-eight were to be elected directly by the people of the Muslim-Croat Federation.²²

It must be noted that the federal Parliamentary Assembly would be separate from the functions of the two entities legislative bodies, the House of Peoples of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. These legislative bodies would have similar roles in their own entities as those of the

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

Parliamentary Assembly at the national level. Although Constitutionally complex, the existence of three separate legislative bodies within Bosnia and Herzegovina was necessary.

First, the federal Parliamentary Assembly would provide for the necessary tri-national representation that the country required. All ethnic groups would be able to debate national issues that had an impact on any of them in this institution, further demonstrating the nature of the post-conflict situation. The federal institutions were to represent the unified aspects of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring equal participation of all three communities. Second, the establishment of two other legislatures for the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska were necessary to give each community the autonomy they required in order to govern their own affairs. That way, the Dayton Accord, through the election process, would attempt to create a political establishment within Bosnia and Herzegovina that would strike a balance between unity and ethnic autonomy.

Although the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was burdened with complexity, the underlying theme of the Constitution agreed to at Dayton was the establishment of political equality between the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Every branch of the government was set up so that each ethnic group enjoyed one third of the representative power. However, one third of the political power was not representative of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it were to be consistent with the population breakdown, the Bosnian Muslims would have had more representation being the numerical majority, the Bosnian Serbs would have around one third and the Bosnian Croats, who comprised about one fifth of the population, would have received less representation in all political institutions.

The Bosnian Croats have ultimately gained the most from the Dayton Peace Accord. As the smallest of the three groups, it has secured equality, both in the Muslim-Croat Federation and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through not only the legislature but also through the three-way co-Presidential system and the Judiciary.²³ The Bosnian Muslims were the biggest losers in the Constitution, having to share the power equally even though they represented the largest ethnic group in the country.²⁴ The blow is compounded by the fact that the Muslim-Croat Federation, the entity that most Bosnian Muslims reside in, the power is also equally shared with the Bosnian Croats. Politically, the Bosnian Serb community have benefited on the whole, but certainly have not come out as successfully as the Bosnian Croat community. The one-third representation in both the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives relates, roughly, to their population size.²⁵

Examining the Constitution and the Political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is evident that such an agreement, with such painful concessions by both the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, could only be enforced by outside powers. The necessity of NATO and its enforcement capabilities in order to support the democratisation and stabilisation process in Bosnia was made clear by David Chandler who states:

The peace agreement signed at Dayton was unlike any other peace treaty of modern times, not merely because it was imposed by external powers to the conflict, but because of the far – reaching powers given to the international community which extended well beyond military matters to cover the most basic aspects of government and state. The majority of annexes to the Dayton Agreement, were not related to the ending of the hostilities, traditionally the role of a peace agreement, but the political project of

²³ ‘Summary of Dayton Peace Agreement’, Department of State, 30 November 1995.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Republika Srpska accounts for 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs are uncontested masters of their national assembly, unlike in the Muslim-Croat Federation, whose national assembly is shared by both Croats and Muslims, who together, control 51% of Bosnia.

democratising Bosnia.²⁶

Certainly the Dayton Agreement and subsequent implementation had been, according to the first United Nations Administrator for Bosnia, Carl Bildt, “by far the most ambitious peace agreement in modern history.”²⁷ The Dayton Accord created a new state, but that state was largely considered an imposition by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁸ However, given that the three ethnic communities were embroiled in a war only a year earlier, the new state had, by authority of the annexes of the Dayton Agreement, many of its functions undertaken by various international institutions. The table below, from the General Framework Agreement, indicates to what extent international organisations had control over many aspects of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 2: The Dayton Annexes

Annex	Area of Authority	International Body
1-A	Military Aspects	NATO (IFOR/SFOR)
1-B	Regional Stabilisation	OSCE
2	Inter-Entity Boundary	NATO (IFOR/SFOR)
3	Elections	OSCE
4	Constitution	UNHR
Article IV	Constitutional Court	ECHR
Article VII	Central Bank	IMF
6 Part B	Human Rights Ombudsman	OSCE
Part C	Human Rights Chamber	CoE
7	Refugees & Displaced	ECHR
8	National Monuments Preservation	UNESCO
10	Civilian Implementation	UNHR
11	International Police Task Force	UN

Source: General Framework Agreement, 1995; Chandler 1999;

²⁶ David Chandler, *Faking Democracy*, 1999, p.43.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

Table 2 indicates the nature and role of the international organisations and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apart from NATO, which was allocated the responsibility of military aspects and the securing of the inter-entity boundary, the OSCE was in control of organising the elections in the country. The UN High Representative had the responsibility of overseeing the civilian implementation of the Constitution agreed to at Dayton. However, the necessity of such strong involvement in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina had raised some important issues. Could Bosnia and Herzegovina be considered sovereign, given the level of interference from international organisations such as NATO, OSCE and UNHR? Also, was the democratic development of the country being thwarted because so many state responsibilities were undertaken by foreign institutions, outside the jurisdiction of the democratically elected institutions of the country?

The international organisations such as NATO, OSCE and the UNHR were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to stabilise the country rather than to undermine its sovereignty. That stability was achieved through the creation and maintenance of the peaceful environment necessary for the new Constitutional institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be established and solidified. Ultimately, all state powers and responsibilities would be turned over to the democratically elected government once complete stability and confidence in the country was established.²⁹

Besides those concerns, NATO through IFOR, the OSCE, and the UN, managed to organise an election in September 1996 in a calm, if not necessarily tolerant,

²⁹ 'SFOR Plans Future Force Structure', *NATO Online*, 17 Dec 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/12-december/e1217b.htm>>.

atmosphere.³⁰ Any endorsement of indicted War Criminals as candidates in the election was also not allowed, with the SDS being threatened with an electoral ban by the head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, Robert Fronwick, if the SDS did not remove Radovan Karadzic as the head of the party.³¹ When Karadzic did resign as head of the SDS on 8 July 1996, Fronwick was insistent that the SDS still be banned from the elections, even if it meant abandoning the elections in September.³² However, the UN High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, was satisfied with Karadzic resignation from the SDS, as being sufficient grounds for the election process to proceed as scheduled.³³ Eventually, most political parties, including the SDS, complied, to a degree, with the UN High Representative and OSCE criteria for being eligible to participate in first nationwide elections since the conflict ended.³⁴

Table 3: Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996)

PARTY	SEATS	PERCENT
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	19	45.2
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	9	21.4
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	8	19.0
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	4.8
Joint List	2	4.8
Party for Peace and Progress	2	4.8

Source: Kasapovic, 1997 and Chandler, 1999, p.70

One of the problems of the democratic process was that it did not allow enough time for the wounds of war to heal. The Dayton Accord was signed in November 1995 and the elections took place on September 1996, only ten months later. It was, therefore, little surprise that the electoral results delivered more seats to the nationalist parties

³⁰ Stefan Krause, 'Chronology of the Balkan Peace Effort', 20 July 1996, <<http://archive.tol.cz/BalkanPeace/Chronology/Chron.V02N16.html>>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² 'OSCE May Ban Bosnian Serb Party from Elections', *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 131 9 July 1996, <<http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-07/jul09.omri>>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

than to the less extreme parties. Although the Bosnian people had seen the destructive side of ethnic nationalism including conflict, given a new opportunity through the September 1996 elections, they generally opted for what they knew rather than alternative political parties.

All the political parties that were in power before and during the civil war were convincingly returned to office.³⁵ As Table 3 indicates, Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action got 45.2 per cent of the national vote winning nineteen seats, the most seats in the new parliament. Karadzic's former party, the Serb Democratic Party, now led by Biljana Plavsic, got 21.4 per cent of the vote, with nine seats resulting.³⁶ The Croatian Democratic Union came in a close third with 19 per cent of the vote and a total of eight seats in the new parliament.³⁷

Of the three nationalist parties, Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party (SDS) lost the most support from the previous election in 1990. As indicated by Table 3, around 14 per cent of eligible voters actually voted for the three alternative pro-peace parties, winning a total of six seats in the new parliament.³⁸ Although admittedly a small percentage of the vote, the existence of the pro-peace parties alone was a signal that people were beginning to, slowly, turn away from the nationalist parties. Any drop in the nationalist vote could be considered a success in the peace-building effort.

The elections in September 1996 were not only for the nation-wide elections, but for the two separate mini-states as well. The election results for the Muslim-Croat

³⁵ 'Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996' in Chandler, 1999, p.70.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

Federation in September 1996 are shown in Table 4. The Parliamentary system of the Muslim-Croat Federation used the same concept of ethnic equality when determining the level of representation the ethnic groups would be afforded in the legislative institutions. Like the national federal state model, the Muslim-Croat Federation's executive branch had a dual Presidency with both a Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat President. Its legislative branch was also similar to the federal one. It had two houses, the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The former consists of seventy-four seats, thirty seats were for the Bosnian Muslims, thirty are reserved for the Bosnian Croats and fourteen are for any other candidates. The House of Representatives had one hundred and forty seats, which relied on direct election of its members.

Table 4: Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Federation (1996)

PARTY	SEATS	PERCENT
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	78	55.7
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	35	25.0
Joint List	11	7.9
Democratic People's Union	3	2.1
Croatian Party of Rights	2	1.4

Source: Kasapovic, 1997 and Chandler, 1999, p.73

The results were similar to those of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The nationalist parties, as with the national elections, won the largest proportion of the vote.³⁹ The Bosnian Muslims overwhelmingly voted for Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which won 55.7 per cent of the vote, delivering to the party seventy-eight seats in the House of Representatives.⁴⁰ The Bosnian branch of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was again the most popular with Bosnian Croat voters, winning 25 per cent of the vote and establishing itself as

³⁹ 'Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Federation (1996)', in Chandler, 1999, p.73.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

the second largest party in the Parliament with thirty-five seats⁴¹. The remaining sixteen seats went to minor parties, the Joint List and Democratic People's Union being non-ethnic based with a combined 10 per cent and fourteen seats.

Again, the electoral results for the Federation were disheartening for IFOR, the UN High Representative in Bosnia and the international community at large because of their heavy reliance on the main nationalist parties.⁴² However, again a small percentage did not vote for the nationalist parties in the Muslim-Croat federation, the same percentage as in the nation-wide election, which was a positive sign that the need for peace-building was making headway with some voters.

In addition to the Bosnian nation-wide and the Muslim-Croat Federation elections there were also elections conducted in Republika Srpska, the second mini-state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republika Srpska had undergone some significant political changes. These changes included shifting its regional capital from Pale, which was the stronghold of wartime Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic, to the town of Banja Luka in the North of the country.⁴³ The most pressing issue of the time was the political struggle between the hardliners and the more moderate leaders for control of Republika Srpska and its political institutions.⁴⁴ The results for the September 1996 elections are indicated in Table 5:

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² John Graham, 'Bosnia Election', *PBS Online Newshour*, 20 September 1996, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/september96/bosnian_election.html>.

⁴³ Chris Hedges, 'Dreams of 'Greater Serbia' Live on in Pale Bar', *Bosnia Uncertain Paths to Peace*, *New York Times*, 12 May 1996, <<http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/0512yugo-bosnia.html>>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Table 5: Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Republika Srpska (1996)

PARTY	SEATS	PERCENT
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	45	54.2
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	14	16.9
Party of Peace and Progress	10	12.0
Serb Radical Party	6	7.2
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	2.4
Joint List	2	2.4
Others	4	4.8

Source: Kasapovic, 1997; Chandler, 1999, p.75;

With 54.2 per cent of the vote, the nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was swept back into power in the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, even without its former leader Karadzic.⁴⁵ The SDS won forty-five seats out of the eighty-three available in the assembly, representing a comfortable majority.⁴⁶ Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) polled second place, with almost 17 per cent of the vote and fourteen seats in the assembly.⁴⁷ Considering the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces from their area of control during the war, this figure was a success because it represented the large numbers of people that returned to the hometowns to vote.

The presence of the SDA as the second largest party in Republika Srpska meant that Bosnian Muslims did take up their right to vote. In order for the Bosnian Muslims to vote in Republika Srpska, they had to either cross into Republika Srpska to vote in their hometown or vote in absentia, either way, not an achievement to be underrated. The return of citizens to their hometown to vote was an important right established in the Dayton Accord, the fact that around 20 per cent of the votes within Republika

⁴⁵ 'Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Republika Srpska (1996)' in Chandler, 1999, p.75.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Srpska⁴⁸ were cast by non-Serbs was a clear indication that the electoral aspects of the Dayton Accord were being implemented successfully.

Another important step forward in the peace-building process was that many Bosnian Serbs voted for alternate parties, such as the Party of Peace and Progress that managed a surprising 12 per cent of the vote⁴⁹ giving it ten seats in the assembly. The Serb Radical Party, a branch of Vojislav Sesejl's extreme nationalist party in Serbia itself won 7.2 per cent of the vote, totalling six seats in the new assembly.⁵⁰ Although the triumph of the SDS indicated that the Bosnian Serbs, as with the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, primarily trusted the political party that led them through the conflict rather than turning to something new.⁵¹

However, the September 1996 election in Republika Srpska would be re-run in November 1997 due to an internal crisis in the mini-state.⁵² The UNHR and SFOR became increasingly dominant in the internal affairs of Republika Srpska, sparking a crisis between the President, Biljana Plavsic, and the National Assembly deputies who felt she was conceding too much to the international institutions present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chandler explains:

The political domination of the international community over the internal affairs of the RS was demonstrated in July 1997, when international pressure on RS President Plavsic resulted in a rift between the President and National Assembly. The political crisis led to further direct intervention in the domestic politics of the entity as the international community supported Plavsic's control over internal affairs in order to combat the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Table 4 and Table 5 in Chandler, 1999, pp. 73-76.

⁵² David Chandler, *Faking Democracy*, 1999, p.77.

‘increasingly anti-democratic atmosphere’.⁵³

US President Bill Clinton, and NATO, took advantage of the split between Karadzic and Plavsic, by actively supporting the latter with political and financial backing.⁵⁴ NATO supported her over her opponents by occupying public buildings in Banja Luka and providing staff to work in her office.⁵⁵ When she dissolved the National Assembly and called for fresh elections, which the Constitutional Court of Republika Srpska declared unconstitutional, the United Nations High Representative, the OSCE, and SFOR all lent their support to Plavsic and voided the Constitutional Court’s ruling.⁵⁶ The call for fresh National Assembly elections for November 1997 was accomplished and they were to be conducted within OSCE specifications. Although these series of events proved to be a major challenge to the new democratic institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the subsequent elections conducted in 1997 averted a Constitutional crisis that could have destabilised the country. The strong intervention by SFOR and the UNHR in the crisis demonstrated that the development of peace and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina still required the help of NATO and the UN. More importantly, both organisations still retained the will to effectively undertake their role in order to stabilise the situation. The results of November 1997 election were as indicated in Table 6.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Gary Dempsey, ‘Taking Sides and Taking Chances in Bosnia’, CATO Institute, 12 February 1998, <<http://www.cato.org/dailys/2-12-98.html>>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ ‘Periodic Report’, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 28 August 1997, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/5/ex_yug/yug_pr5.htm>.

Table 6: Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Republika Srpska (1997)

PARTY	SEATS	PERCENT
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	24	28.8
SDA-led Coalition	16	19.2
Serb Radical Party (SRS)	15	18.0
Serb Peoples' Alliance (SNS)	15	18.0
RS branch of Milosevic's Socialists (SPS)	9	10.8
Independent Social Democrats	2	2.4
Bosnian Social Democratic Party	2	2.4

Source: OSCE MBH, 1998; Chandler, 1999, p.77;

Although only the second election in just over a year for Republika Srpska, the results were quite different from the previous election in September 1996. First, was the huge drop in support for the Serb Democratic Party, whose vote dropped dramatically (by some 25.4 per cent) that cost the party twenty-one seats in the National Assembly.⁵⁷ Second, the sprouting of alternate political parties which the Bosnian Serbs could vote for increased the democratic choice in Republika Srpska. Amongst the political parties contesting the 1997 elections in Republika Srpska, four of them had not appeared previously but polled strongly in the 1997 election. The Serb Peoples' Alliance (SNS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) were all political parties that had their origins in Serbia itself. The SNS was the main opposition party at that point to President Milosevic's SPS party in Serbia itself, whilst the SRS had been in coalition with the ruling SPS at the time of the election. The SDA again increased its vote, giving the party a 19.2 per cent of the vote and sixteen seats in the National Assembly.⁵⁸ The constant increase in the SDA vote was a very positive signal that increasing numbers of Bosnian Muslims were continuing to exercise their Constitutional right, as afforded to them by the Dayton Accord, to vote for deputies in their place of birth, even if they no longer resided there due to the war.

⁵⁷ 'Electoral results relating to Party share of vote for Republika Srpska (1997)' in Chandler, 1999, p.77.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Table 7: Political Party Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000)

PARTY	SEATS	PER CENT
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	8	18.8
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	9	18.0
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	6	17.8
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	5	11.4
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)	4	11.4
Party for Democratic Process (PDP)	2	6.4
Party of Independent Social Democrats / Democratic	1	5.1
Socialist Party (SNSD/DSP)		
Socialist Party (SPRS)	1	2.6
Serbian Peoples Alliance (SNS)	1	1.9
New Croatian Initiative (NHI)	1	1.6

Source: OSCE Bosnian Elections Website; Election World, 2000, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>

In the November 2000 Bosnia-wide national elections, the overall turnout was 64.4 per cent of eligible voters.⁵⁹ As with the September 1996 national election, three out of the top four political parties represented were the nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).⁶⁰ However, the Social Democratic Party, another Bosnian Muslim political party, essentially was the biggest winner, polling as the second largest party with 18.0 per cent of the vote.⁶¹ The Social Democratic Party's election result indicated that Bosnian Muslims were turning away from the SDA, the nationalist party which had dominated the Bosnian Muslim political landscape since the first Bosnian elections in 1990.

The Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina also polled well considering their relatively recent addition to the ballot, with some 11.4 per cent of the vote and gaining four seats in the assembly.⁶² Milosevic's SPS did not poll all that well, with a disappointing 2.6 per cent of the vote, and not managing to win even a single seat in the parliament,

⁵⁹ 'Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

essentially losing their voice in the legislature of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶³ Though the nationalist parties still, in general, managed to dominate the newly-elected House of Representatives, their overall popularity had waned considerably from the September 1996 election results. Similar trends were apparent in the election results of the Muslim-Croat Federation in November 2000, whose overall voter turnout reached 67.8 per cent of eligible voters.⁶⁴

Table 8: Political Party Representation in Muslim-Croat Federation (2000)

PARTY	SEATS	PER CENT
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	38	26.6
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)	37	26.1
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	25	17.5
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)	21	14.9
Democratic People's League (DNZ)	3	2.1
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party (BPS)	2	1.7
New Croatian Initiative (NHI)	2	1.6
Pensioner's Party of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (SPF)	2	1.3

Source: OSCE Bosnian Elections Website; Election World, 2000, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>

Although the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was just able to manage attaining the highest number of seats in the Federation's House of Representatives with 26.6 per cent of the vote, the result was a disappointing one for the party which had commanded over double these figures (with 55.7 per cent support) in the September 1996 elections.⁶⁵ The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) also suffered a loss of ten seats and 7.5 per cent of the vote from the September 1996 election, dropping from thirty-five to twenty-five seats.⁶⁶ The fall of HDZ from power in Croatia proper and

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ 'Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁶⁵ See Table 4.

⁶⁶ See Table 4.

the death of the party's founder and long time leader, Franjo Tudjman, were factors in HDZ lack lustre performance in the elections of the Muslim-Croat Federation as well as the HDZ general collapse in Croatia itself.⁶⁷

The rise of milder political parties to the forefront was a clear indication that Bosnian politics was moving away from the nationalists' parties whose policies and leadership triggered the 1992 – 1995 war. The party to profit most from the poor performance of the SDA in particular was the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) coming second overall both in the Bosnia-wide elections and in those of the Federation.⁶⁸ That was an outstanding result for the SDP which had never contested an election previously and once again demonstrated that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were willing to vote for lesser known parties that were not nationalist. Another party to profit from the losses SDA suffered was the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina which received 14.9 per cent of the vote with twenty-one seats making it the fourth largest party in the legislature, and the third largest Bosnian Muslim political party in the Federation.⁶⁹ A total of thirteen more parties that participated won seats, with four winning two seats, and eight winning one seat.⁷⁰ The evolution of new parties and their electoral impact in the Assembly had been an encouraging sign that Federation's democratic system was developing positively.

There were some who argued that the election process was not as positive as it seemed.

The European Stability Initiative (ESI) suggested that the political process in Bosnia was not functioning as democratically as the election results had indicated, and

⁶⁷ Beth Kampschorr, 'Croats say they will begin Self-Government', *Central Europe Review*, Vol3 No.11, 10 March 2001, <<http://www.ce-review.org/01/11/bosnianews11.html>>.

⁶⁸ 'Political Party Representation in Muslim-Croat Federation (2000)', in *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

although moderate political parties had been elected by the voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, parties like the SDS, HDZ and SDA were still too influential:⁷¹

Many observers now believe that the prominence given to elections in the Bosnian peace process has been misguided. Four rounds of elections in four years have not brought about any transformation of the political environment. They have not removed the war-time leadership from power. They have not produced political processes which bind the three ethnic groups together. Most strikingly of all, they have not generated political platforms which credibly address the country's many acute problems.⁷²

Although these criticisms do carry some weight, they need to be put into perspective. The Bosnian conflict was as brutal as war could get, and although the national structures and political institutions in 2000 were still not effectively unifying every aspect of political, economic and social life of the three ethnic groups of Bosnia, significant inroads were being made. People were returning to the home towns to vote, crossing into 'enemy' territory in the process.⁷³ Voting for alternate parties⁷⁴ was a firm indication that many in the federation were tired of the nationalist policies that brought them to conflict. The democratic process was a good start to the goal of effectively unifying the country, even if it was a slow one.

The results for 2000 elections in Republika Srpska, as indicated in Table 9, were not as encouraging as the election results of the Muslim-Croat Federation in 2000. Voter turnout in the Republika Srpska election was 64.0 per cent of eligible voters.⁷⁵

Table 9: Political Party Representation for Republika Srpska (2000)

⁷¹ 'Elections in 2000 Risks For The Bosnian Peace Process', *European Stability Initiative (ESI)*, 5 January 2000, <http://www.esiweb.org/docs/showdocument.php?document_ID=6>.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ 'Political Party Representation in Muslim-Croat Federation (2000)', in *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ 'Political Party Representation for Republika Srpska (2000)', *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

PARTY	SEATS	PER CENT
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	31	36.1
Party of Independent Social Democrats / Democratic Socialist Party (SNSD/DSP)	11	13.0
Party of Democratic Progress RS (PDP)	11	12.2
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	6	7.6
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)	4	5.2
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)	4	5.0
Socialist Party of Republika Srpska (SPRS)	4	4.9
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	4	4.2
Democratic People's League (DNS)	3	3.5
Serbian People's Union RS (SNS)	2	2.3
Pensioners' Party RS (PSRS)	1	1.3

Source: OSCE Bosnian Elections Website; Election World, 2000, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>

Through all the problems it faced during the lead-up to the September 1996 campaign, as indicated earlier, and the drubbing it got in the November 1997 election,⁷⁶ the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) made a comeback in the November 2000 elections. Its winning 36.1 per cent of the vote in Republika Srpska gave it the strongest showing of support of any political party, not just in Republika Srpska, but also throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷⁷ Its total of thirty-one seats in the National Assembly dwarfed its nearest rivals, the SNSD and PDP, which each gained eleven seats and around 12.5 per cent of the vote. The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) was routed in Republika Srpska with 7.6 per cent of the vote and six assembly seats, a loss of 9.3 per cent and eight assembly seats from its 1997 electoral performance.⁷⁸

This was an indication that some Bosnian Muslims did not vote in Republika Srpska, in addition to considerable numbers voting for alternate, more moderate parties on the

⁷⁶ See Table 6.

⁷⁷ See Table 7 and 8.

⁷⁸ See Table 5.

ballot.⁷⁹ As Table 12 indicates, those alternate parties were far more effective than in the November 1997 election in Republika Srpska,⁸⁰ with nine parties, including the New Croatian Initiative (NHI), receiving one or more seats.⁸¹ From that stand point, the continued process of democratic development continued to slowly gain ground, with the increased presence of more varied political parties accumulating support for their more moderate policies. Although the SDS made up some ground, it did not come close to returning to the dominating position it enjoyed immediately after the war ended.

Since September 1996, although not without its critics and problems, the election process had been steadily leading the country down the path of democracy. That was made evident by the many new political parties with varying policy objectives and perspectives for the future of Bosnia have emerged, thus enriching the democratic process of the new state. The electoral success of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) in both the Bosnian-wide and the Federation elections in 2000, rivalling the nationalist SDA was a sign that on some level, the nationalist parties were losing their total domination of the political landscape. The HDZ and the SDS were seriously challenged by the emerging parties, both losing popular support. The HDZ was significantly sidelined in the October 2002 elections both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Muslim-Croat Federation as indicated in Table 10.

Table 10: Political Party Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002)

PARTY	SEATS	PER CENT
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⁷⁹ 'Political Party Representation for Republika Srpska (2000)', *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁸⁰ See Table 6.

⁸¹ 'Political Party Representation for Republika Srpska (2000)', *Election World*, 2000, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	10	21.9
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	5	14.0
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)	6	10.5
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)	4	10.4
Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)	3	9.8
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)/Democrats (DK) Coalition	5	9.5
Party of Democratic Progress RS (PDP)	2	4.6

Source: Election World, 2005, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>

Although the overall voter turnout for the October 2002 general election was at a low 53.9 per cent,⁸² the results showed a sustained trend in the further dilution of the major nationalist parties. Since the first post-conflict democratic election in September 1996 under the supervision of NATO forces, the SDA retained largest political party status, but the October 2002 election saw it win only ten seats and 21.9 per cent of the overall vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁸³ a huge loss on the September 1996 results that gave the SDA 45.2 per cent of the vote and nineteen seats in the legislature.⁸⁴ The SDS has also lost much ground since the end of the war, from a height of 21.4 per cent in 1996⁸⁵ to 14 per cent in 2002.⁸⁶ The HDZ itself had mustered 19 per cent of the vote in 1996,⁸⁷ in 2002 it was a mere 9.5 per cent and that was with the help of their Democrat coalition partners.⁸⁸

Therefore, the democratic transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina since NATO's deployment has been, for the most part, a continuing success. Although some problems between the various hardline nationalist parties arose, especially within the SDS in

⁸² 'Political Party Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002)', *ElectionWorld*, 2005, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ See Table 3.

⁸⁵ See Table 3.

⁸⁶ 'Political Party Representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002)', *ElectionWorld*, 2005, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/bosnia.htm>>.

⁸⁷ See Table 3.

⁸⁸ See Table 10.

Republika Srpska, the decisive intervention of NATO's SFOR and the United Nations High Representative managed to take control of the situation and re-establish order. If it were not for NATO, the country would not have been stable enough to conduct fair elections. For all the criticism of Bosnia's lack of democracy, or as Chandler called it 'Faking Democracy', there needed to be allowances made for the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was still recovering from a civil war. That these ethnic groups were living and working together at all was a major accomplishment. Also, the continued sidelining of the nationalist parties will doubtless go on, as the democratic institutions strengthen their legitimacy amongst the people. Another tangible result of the success of the democratisation and stabilisation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina was that by late 1994, NATO felt the political and security environment in Bosnia was stable enough to wind up its mission in the country.

NATO's SFOR Winds Down its Mission in Bosnia: EUFOR Takes Over

When IFOR entered Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1996, conditions were unstable. NATO therefore committed around 60,000 personnel to ensure it had enough firepower to deal with any eventuality. It was crucial that these forces had the capabilities necessary to encounter any potentially hostile actions against it or against the maintenance of peace and stability in general. This was, as already indicated, achieved with the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina made, for the most part, safe enough for a series of democratic elections to be held under calm conditions. With the establishment of the political institutions, through the election process, the Dayton Peace Accord had been, after nine years of NATO's presence, mostly implemented.

With the security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina constantly improving since the insertion of IFOR and SFOR between 1996 and 2004, there were several readjustments made to the size of force, which in 2002 stood at 18,000 troops, less than one third of its original size.⁸⁹ The composition of the force shifted from an exclusively NATO task force to a force much smaller and far more international in character. These large reductions in troop strength indicated the significant structural and organisational changes that SFOR had undergone over the nine year period that it was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With such large reductions and the introduction of non-NATO forces into SFOR, concerns were being raised about SFOR's continued effectiveness as a result of these structural changes.⁹⁰

NATO's Secretary General responded to these concerns on 25 April 2002, by giving a speech to SFOR troops, highlighting the effectiveness of NATO's presence, regardless of its constant transition into a smaller force:

The size and composition of SFOR has changed noticeably since it began. Today [25 April 2002], it consists of about 18,000 troops - roughly one-third the size of NATO's original force here ... But I can say that any force restructuring will not diminish our military effectiveness ... Through the successful execution of its mission, SFOR has helped create the necessary pre-conditions for important nation-building activities such as the return of displaced persons and refugees to their pre-war homes, the creation of a modern police force, the modernisation of the legal system, and the running of democratic elections.⁹¹

Lord Robertson's assertion regarding SFOR's success is justified. The period between 1996 and 2002 had seen significant movement toward the building of national institutions that all ethnic groups participated in, and there had also been some movement on people returning to their pre-war homes and regions. Lord Robertson

⁸⁹ *SFOR Informer*, 25 April 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/137/p03a/t02p03a.htm>>.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

concluded his speech with the following optimistic assessment of NATO's accomplishments in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

As NATO looks at its future commitments, we must not lose sight of the fact that NATO's engagement in the Balkans has been an impressive success. Instead of fighting, the communities here are rebuilding ... You can see the tangible improvements if you look around you - the new shops opening up in the town centre, the repairs to previously abandoned homes in the countryside, the crops growing in freshly tended fields, the increased road traffic along your patrol routes. I wish all of you continued good fortune and success on your tours of duty with SFOR.⁹²

Adding further credibility to the argument that NATO was satisfied that SFOR's presence was coming to an end, the number of personnel was reduced further in 2003 to 11,900 troops.⁹³ This number was further reduced again at the end of 2003. NATO ministers of Defence, in their meetings on 1 and 2 December 2003, decided to reduce SFOR to a force of around 7,000 soldiers.⁹⁴ Importantly, the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers also suggested an examination of options for SFOR, including the possible termination of the mission by December 31 2004, and having SFOR replaced by an EU mission, called Eurofor,⁹⁵ this would be similar to the developments in nearby FYROM. NATO's spokesman, Jamie Shea, had the following statement to issue in relation to SFOR's further downsizing:

The force reductions are feasible not only because of the improving security situation in the country, but also because NATO has robust and effective 'Over The Horizon Forces' that can be rapidly deployed into the country if necessary ... Regular exercises are held to ensure these troops are familiar with the situation on the ground and can quickly reinforce the troops on the ground.⁹⁶

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ 'SFOR Plans Future Force Structure', *NATO Online*, 17 Dec 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/12-december/e1217b.htm>>

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Shea's statement confirmed that NATO had evaluated the situation, and considered that the extraordinary improvement in the security situation within Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 had been achieved and maintained, regardless of the continued downsizing of SFOR. Significantly, as indicated by Shea's statement, in order to reassure the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina of NATO's commitment to maintaining stability in the country after its withdrawal and handover to Eurofor, NATO provided a well-prepared contingency plan that would re-intervene in order to restore peace and stability if required. After nine years of peace-enforcement and peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFOR's mission was finally terminated on 1 January 2005, with NATO handing over the responsibility of maintaining peace and security in the country to EUROFOR. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not the only country that required NATO's presence to that end, with the crisis in Kosovo demanding more of NATO's new found skills in peace-enforcement and peace-building.

Chapter Seven

The Proactive Alliance: NATO and its Peace-enforcement Role in Kosovo

Whilst NATO had managed to stabilise Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new crisis was developing in another part of the Balkans, the Serbian province of Kosovo, which would ultimately require intervention. Fighting between ethnic-Albanian fighters, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian military forces was occurring frequently and was causing deaths and displacement of people. On 24 March 1999, NATO unleashed a series of devastating military air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to end the fighting and restore peace.¹ Code-named Operation Allied Force, it was NATO's most substantial military action since its enforcement intervention in Bosnia and had played a significant part of the redefinition of NATO's role in Balkan security. The military hostilities were not intended to get the NATO alliance into a drawn-out military conflict, rather; the air strikes were designed to coerce Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, into accepting political autonomy for the Albanians of Kosovo. After two months of air-strikes against FRY, NATO's military operation was suspended, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and NATO troops replacing them to provide security.²

This chapter will assess Operation Allied Force, its background and the insertion of KFOR into Kosovo to enforce the peace. Similar to the analysis of NATO's role as a

¹ Larry E. Craig, 'The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties? From "Terrorist" to "Partners"', United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 31 March 1999, <<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/fr033199.htm>>.

² 'Operation Joint Guardian', Allied Forces Southern Europe, Public Information Office, 18 Jan 2001, <<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/kfor/kfor2.htm>>.

peace-enforcer in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this chapter will assess whether NATO's peace-enforcement and peace-building role in Kosovo has succeeded. This chapter argues that although NATO's military action against FRY caused unnecessary deaths of innocent civilians, it did bring an end to the conflict between the Serbian military and the KLA. NATO's subsequent occupation of Kosovo, although fraught with continuing problems of ethnic unrest, has managed to generally enforce the peace.

The Road to Rambouillet: The Mechanism for NATO's Intervention

The United States, through its special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, gave what the Serbs obviously interpreted as an unofficial green light to use heavy force to dislodge the KLA. The US officially considered the KLA as a terrorist organisation during the early stages of the conflict:³

The violence we have seen growing is incredibly dangerous,' Gelbard said. He criticized violence 'promulgated by the (Serb) police' and condemned the actions of an ethnic Albanian underground group Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) which has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Serb targets. 'We condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a terrorist group.'⁴

Whether the major Serbian offensive in the Drenica region was a direct result of Gelbard's statements against the KLA is not entirely clear, but certainly would have encouraged the Serbs to take military action against the rebel group. However, the US conducted an about-face in their position toward the KLA after the Serbian offensive in Drenica.⁵ After the Serbian attack on Drenica, the Clinton Administration focused less on supporting the Serbian position, and more on the prevention of another major conflict that they may have to intervene in later as with the case of Bosnia. Richard Holbrooke states:

³ Larry E. Craig, *The Kosovo Liberation Army*, 31 March 1999.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

Diplomacy will only work with Milosevic if it's backed up with force ... Milosevic should understand, and this is the core point, that this is not a replay of Bosnia, that NATO is poised and involved in a way it wasn't for four years in Bosnia. If he thinks this is empty theatre today, he's making a big mistake ... The lesson of Bosnia was: to not get involved early is to get more deeply involved later In Kosovo today, several hundred have died, about 10,000 to 50,000 are now refugees ... If that keeps up, we'll have a serious, much more serious situation on our hands. The lesson of Bosnia is: Do it early, it'll be more expensive later and it'll be harder to put the fabric of society back together.⁶

The Contact Group which consisted of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France, played a significant role in the diplomatic efforts to end the violence and find a peaceful solution to the conflict; a solution that, unfortunately, would not be forthcoming by diplomacy alone. The Contact Group met on 9 March 1998 in order to draft a response to the Drenica incident.⁷ The United States and the United Kingdom advocated a swift and harsh response, whilst Russia, France and Italy did not consider any military action as appropriate.⁸ In the end, they reached a united position by announcing:

A comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, including Kosovo, a refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for internal repression or for terrorism, the denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo, and a moratorium on government financed credit support for trade and investment, including government financing for privatisation, in Serbia.

President Milosevic succeeded in getting a ten-day deadline before the Contact Group would implement any specific steps to stop the violence and to actively seek and support a political solution through dialogue.⁹ Although that deadline was extended

⁶ Richard Holbrooke, *ABC Lateline*, 15 June 1998 as quoted in Larry E. Craig, 'Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in Kosovo', United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 12 August 1998, <<http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/1998/kosovo.htm>>.

⁷ Wade Boese, 'UN Security Council Approves Arms Embargo on Yugoslavia', Arms Control Association, March 1998, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_03/kosovo.asp>.

⁸ 'Kosovo: A Long Road to War', British American Security Information Council (BASIC), European Security, <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/confprev/Kosovo/timeline3.htm>>.

⁹ *Ibid.*

another four weeks by the Contact Group, after their meeting on 25 March,¹⁰ the situation spiralled out of control, with the KLA intensifying their attacks against Yugoslav Army and Police units throughout the province.¹¹ The Contact Group's involvement evolved into one with NATO and the EU stepping into the breach, as it became clear that diplomacy was failing.¹² NATO, still enforcing and building the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, was mindful of what a protracted conflict would cost in the longer term, especially in any future peace-building efforts.

To that end, US President Clinton invited Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the ethnic Albanians to the Oval office. Rugova indicated his concern that if the United States did not intervene in Kosovo, it would evolve into full-scale war and become another Bosnia. To these concerns Clinton replied: "We will not allow another Bosnia to happen in Kosovo."¹³ Throughout June and July 1998, NATO military planners began to consider their military options. Specifically, technical issues such as what level of force should be used, number of personnel in any future peace-keeping force, and what would be required if NATO faced Yugoslavia militarily in order to impose such an eventuality were all examined. However, there was concern about military intervention without the support of the UN Security Council, particularly China and Russia.¹⁴ This was the first serious sign that NATO would commit itself militarily in order to prevent another Bosnia in Kosovo.

However, as with Bosnia and Herzegovina, threats of the use of force against Yugoslavia by NATO were not enough to end the spiralling violence. Demonstration

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ 'Kosovo: A Long Road to War', British American Security Information Council (BASIC), European Security, <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/confprev/Kosovo/timeline3.htm>>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

of NATO's resolve and military strength to secure peace was achieved through the deployment of NATO troops along the Albanian-FYROM-Yugoslav border.¹⁵ In addition to the troops was the participation of 80 fighter jets in a NATO exercise code-named 'Determined Falcon', conducted in Albania on 15 June 1998.¹⁶ The fighting on the ground intensified, however, with NATO constraining Yugoslav forces with their presence in the area, the KLA went on the offensive capturing up to 40 per cent of Kosovo.¹⁷ By 12 October, NATO had decided on a military intervention through airpower, with the already massive deployment of military equipment in the area, it was able to strike at Yugoslav forces immediately after the activation order was issued.¹⁸

NATO had deployed significant firepower around the FRY, with over 430 combat aircraft, of which 260 were American.¹⁹ Specifically, six A-10 Thunderbolt anti-tank planes arrived at the Aviano airbase, Italy, from their US base in Spangdahlem, Germany, as well as six B-52 bombers landing in Britain from their base in Louisiana.²⁰ Also, the aircraft carriers *USS Eisenhower*, *USS Kitty Hawk* and *USS Theodore Roosevelt* were also sent to the area to bolster NATO forces in the region.²¹ Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, all aspiring NATO members at the time of the crisis, pledged to open their airspace to NATO combat and support aircraft,²² thereby further isolating Milosevic. NATO expected:

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ 'NATO to decide on Activation Order', *CNN News*, 12 October 1998, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/12/kosovo.01>>.

¹⁹ 'Warthogs, Tankbusters and B52 Bombers', *CNN News*, 12 October 1998, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/12/kosovo.01>>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

... an immediate cease-fire, the pullback of all troops from the Serbian province, an assurance that refugees can return home safely and a promise of talks with ethnic Albanians over Kosovo's future. [National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger stated] "He [Milosevic] can come into compliance or face NATO military action"²³

Under this pressure, Milosevic agreed to a cease-fire. The agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic included autonomy for the Kosovo Albanian majority, as well as the removal of some Yugoslav troops, but that some 25,000 Yugoslav and Serb troops and police were allowed to stay in the province to defend against the KLA.²⁴ Also, Milosevic allowed for an OSCE monitoring mission of 2,000 people. In order for Milosevic to agree to the OSCE monitors, however, he requested that NATO remove the activation order that kept NATO combat aircraft ready to bomb Yugoslavia.²⁵ The activation order was not lifted, therefore postponing the military strikes, but not necessarily ruling them out in the future.

Fighting between KLA and Yugoslav forces continued, with the KLA once again taking advantage of the cease-fire and moving into areas the Yugoslav and Serb forces were persuaded to abandon. A total of 170 military engagements resulting in over 200 deaths took place between October and December 1998.²⁶ The renewed fighting in Kosovo posed a danger to the OSCE Verification Mission in the province. NATO deployed a French-led force of 1700 troops in FYROM, called Operation Joint Guarantor (XFOR) and activated on 5 December 1998, it was sent as a potential

²³ 'NATO Readies Warplanes as Holbrooke, Milosevic Resume Talks', *CNN News*, 12 October 1998, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/12/kosovo.01/>>.

²⁴ 'Kosovo: A Long Road to War', Basic, <<http://www.basicint.org/europe/confprev/Kosovo/timeline3.htm>>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

extraction team for the OSCE Verification Mission, in case the fighting endangered them.²⁷

Only one month after the extraction team was put in place, the one incident that decidedly placed NATO on the side of the ethnic Albanians occurred: the massacre at Racak.²⁸ On 15 January 1999, Serb paramilitary and police units, in search for KLA fighters, entered the village of Racak, in the process murdering 45 civilians.²⁹ On 31 January, NATO demanded that the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership meet in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo problem.³⁰ Under serious pressure from NATO, both sides agreed to attend peace talks at Rambouillet, Paris.

The Rambouillet Peace Process was an initiative of the Contact Group in order to negotiate a comprehensive, Dayton-style agreement (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina) for the Kosovo problem.³¹ Beginning on 6 February 1999, the summit was to last for three-weeks with the goal of producing a lasting, peaceful solution to the conflict.³² It also ambitiously envisaged the bringing together of the Serbian President and the entire spectrum of Kosovo Albanian community leaders, in order to have them negotiate a mutually acceptable deal. The Rambouillet Peace Process was, like the Dayton negotiations for Bosnia, an attempt at forcing through a peace settlement.³³

The Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if the [sic] fail to take the opportunity [Rambouillet conference] now offered to them. [In support of these aims] ... [The North Atlantic] Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorize air strikes against targets

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 2000, p.35.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., p.35.

³¹ 'Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward', International Crisis Group, 12 March 1999, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1599&l=1>>.

³² Ibid.

³³ Marc Weller, *The Kosovo Crisis 1989-1999*, Vol 1, p.392.

on FRY territory.³⁴

That process, partly due to the diverse spectrum of leaders involved, particularly in the Kosovo Albanian camp, was flawed from the outset. The conditions under which the talks would be conducted were not conducive to an atmosphere of trust and friendship. However, both sides did succumb to the threat of military action issued by NATO.³⁵ Ultimately, NATO's threat of force convinced the Serbian leadership to attend the talks, however they issued a strong protest to the UN Security Council about NATO's threats of military action against Yugoslavia.³⁶

The Yugoslav leadership, it appeared, were more concerned about the content of the agreement than with the consequences of air-strikes if they did not sign the accord drafted at Rambouillet. The Serbs were required to make too many concessions in order for the accord to work, therefore rejecting it.³⁷ The Kosovo Albanian leaders, especially the KLA leader Hashim Thaci, also initially rejected the Rambouillet Accord because he viewed it as too limited and not sufficient in achieving their aspirations for complete independence.³⁸ The United States, however, through their Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, implied that if the Kosovo Albanians signed the agreement and the Yugoslav side did not, it would be the latter that would suffer the consequences of NATO bombing.³⁹ If, on the other hand, the Albanian delegation did not sign, then they could not count on further support from the international

³⁴ Ibid., p.393.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p.398.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Sabrina P. Ramet, *The USA: To War In Europe Again*, in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis*, 2001, p.171.

³⁹ Marc Weller, *The Kosovo Crisis 1989 – 1999*, 1999, p.398.

community.⁴⁰ Overall, it was this inferred threat that brought about the unified position of the Kosovo Albanian delegation in support of the Rambouillet Accord.

The failure at negotiating a peaceful solution at Rambouillet was primarily due to its reliance on the threat of military action to pressure both sides, but primarily the Yugoslav government, to an acceptable resolution.⁴¹ Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina where Milosevic's concessions had led to a peace accord, he would not relinquish Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. Especially since Kosovo was considered the heart of the Serbian nation and it was also the cause he championed in 1989.⁴² The Kosovo Albanians, too, were not in any mood to accept anything short of full sovereign independence for the self-styled 'Republic of Kosova' that Ibrahim Rugova had declared in 1992.⁴³ The Rambouillet solution gave neither side exactly what they wanted, but was particularly provocative to the Serbian side, which was looking for assurances to guarantee its territorial integrity.⁴⁴

The result of the Rambouillet negotiations was the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo. However the agreement was problematic, primarily because the Yugoslav government rejected it. According to principles of the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo, all parties involved agreed to the following eight points:

- 1) Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution in Kosovo as a prerequisite for stability and democracy.
- 2) Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo.
- 3) Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, as well as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.55.

⁴³ Ibid., p.69.

⁴⁴ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 2000, p.48.

new Europe. 4) Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 5) Recognising the need for democratic self-government in Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all national communities in political decision-making. 6) Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as well as the rights of the members of all national communities, recognising the ongoing contribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo. 7) Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under the auspices of the members of the Contact Group and the European Union and undertaking with respect to these members and the European Union to abide by this Agreement. 8) Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be central for the development of relations with European institutions.⁴⁵

The principles laid down by the document included the basic components of what could have been the basis of a mutually acceptable agreement between the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanian community of Kosovo. The statement ‘[the] need for a peaceful and political solution to the Kosovo problem’⁴⁶ would have been welcome in Belgrade, since a political solution to the Kosovo problem would have eliminated the continuous international condemnation of the Yugoslav government for its excessive use of force in Kosovo. In addition, Belgrade would have been satisfied with an agreement that included as its basis the principles of the United Nations charter (specifically ones relating to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia) and this, in turn, would have contributed to easing the anxiety of Yugoslavia in losing their legal sovereignty over the province.

The point on self-government, though, was a far more sensitive issue for both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians. The Serbs were willing to concede limited autonomy, which allowed for primarily culture, education and social welfare to be the administrative responsibility of the Albanians, with security and most other political

⁴⁵ ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo’, Kosovo and Yugoslavia: Law and Crisis, *Jurist – The Law Professors Network*, 23 February 1999, <<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm#Frame>>.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

control remaining with Belgrade.⁴⁷ The Albanians, on the other hand, were not interested in any agreement that kept them within the official boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁴⁸ The ethnic Albanians, both KLA extremists like Hashim Thaci and the moderate LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, agreed on one basic principle, independence for Kosovo.⁴⁹ Attempting, in part, to satisfy the Kosovo Albanians' determination of achieving independence, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, attached a letter to the agreement that was not formally part of it. In it, a referendum on the future status of the province was provided for:

This letter concerns the formulation (attached) proposed for Chapter 8, Article 1 (3) of the interim Framework Agreement. We will regard this proposal, or any other formulation, of that Article that may be agreed at Rambouillet, as confirming a right for the people of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after three years.⁵⁰

Therefore, the idea that an agreement, which essentially did not satisfy the basic conditions of either side, could work through the threat of force was difficult. As with most agreements, though, the detail is the key to its overall success, and it is worth examining some of the more important and controversial articles and sections within the Rambouillet Accord and analyse why the agreement proved to be a failure with all sides, even though for tactical reasons the ethnic Albanian representatives did put their signature to it at the end of the negotiation process.

In Article I (4) of the agreement under 'principles', it is clear the kind of Agreement Rambouillet was pursuing: essentially a Kosovo independent of both Serbian and Yugoslav administrative rule. The following excerpt is indicative of this position:

⁴⁷ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, pp.210 – 214.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.215.

Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government through legislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with this Agreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions in Kosovo. The right to democratic self-government shall include the right to participate in free and fair elections.⁵¹

The establishment of democratic institutions in Kosovo was an important principle for NATO and the Contact Group, who drafted the agreement. Unfortunately, the level of autonomy for the Kosovo Albanians provided by Rambouillet was unacceptable to the Yugoslav side because of the pervasive nature of the proposed institutions.⁵² The extent to which the executive and judicial branches of the proposed Kosovo institutions would not be answerable to the Serbian or Yugoslav governments or parliaments, even though Kosovo would in the short-term remain officially within Serbia, was also unacceptable.⁵³ Another article that limited Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo was Article II (7) stating:

Federal organs [FRY] shall not take any decisions that have a differential, disproportionate, injurious, or discriminatory effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void in regard to Kosovo.⁵⁴

Although the above article, given the need to reassure the people of Kosovo, was understandable, it was also ambiguous. The level of ambiguity in determining what represented decisions that were considered “differential, disproportionate, injurious, or discriminatory effect on Kosovo”⁵⁵ and therefore void, was therefore dangerous. Who would determine what decisions were discriminatory as far as any federal decisions were taken in regard to Kosovo under the Agreement? In addition to this, Article II (8) stated that under no circumstance could the FRY declare martial law in the

⁵¹ *Rambouillet Accords*, Article I, (4), 1999 in ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo’, Kosovo and Yugoslavia: Law and Crisis, *Jurist – The Law Professors Network*, 23 February 1999, <<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm#Frame>>.

⁵² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.18.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.219.

⁵⁴ *Ibid* Article II, (7).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

province, which does not allow for any contingency in Kosovo for dealing with any anarchical behaviour.⁵⁶ The proposed Constitution that was formulated at Rambouillet was even more unacceptable to the Yugoslav side. Article I (6.c) of the proposed Constitution extended the authority of the Kosovo government to the area of foreign relations. Its area of responsibility regarding foreign affairs would be identical to the ones afforded to Serbia and Montenegro under Article 7 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁵⁷ Granting Kosovo equal status as a fellow republic along side Serbia and Montenegro within the Federal Yugoslavia was unacceptable to the Serbian republic, of which Kosovo was technically a part.

The most unacceptable part of the proposed agreement to the Yugoslav government was the Annex B of the Rambouillet Accord. It was especially alarming to the Serbs, since, it gave NATO full access to Yugoslav territory and facilities:

together with their [NATO's] vehicles, vessels, aircraft, free and unrestricted passage throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training and operations.⁵⁸

These conditions, according to the Serbian delegation, were clearly unacceptable and “tantamount to occupying the whole of Serbia”⁵⁹ and the most important reason for them rejecting the deal. This condition was the deal-breaker in many respects, because not only did the Rambouillet agreement dilute entirely Serb control over Kosovo, but Annex B went further by diluting Yugoslav sovereignty over its entire territory while obligating it to allow NATO troops virtually free passage and control throughout the

⁵⁶ Ibid Article II, (8).

⁵⁷ Ibid Article I (6c) of the Constitution.

⁵⁸ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.210.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

FRY. Slobodan Milosevic, in a televised interview with Western media shortly after the Albanian signing of the Rambouillet Accord in France, made it clear how the Serbs, both the public and government, viewed the whole process:

What was tried to be imposed in Rambouillet was not autonomy at all, that was independence. And I really don't believe if you show it [the Rambouillet accords] to any honest American, that there is one single honest American will tell you, that if they were on the place of our delegation, would sign that. [as spoken by Milosevic in English]⁶⁰

The threat of NATO bombing Yugoslavia over the failure to agree to the Rambouillet Accord galvanized Serbian public support for Milosevic and his rejection of the agreement. That support was displayed through mass political rallies and protests throughout Yugoslavia. At one such political rally, the ultra-right Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Seselj, had offered an ominous warning to both NATO and the Kosovo Albanians in a speech denouncing the whole peace process and the prospect of NATO bombing: "If NATO bombs us, we Serbs will suffer casualties, but no Albanians will be left in Kosovo".⁶¹

Seselj's statement outlined a strategy or policy the Yugoslav government was willing to pursue, if indeed NATO did take military action against the country for rejecting the highly unpopular Rambouillet agreement. It cannot be said, therefore, that NATO was not aware of the potential consequences resulting from its bombing campaign. In effect, Seselj was indicating that the Serbs were willing to start a process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as a response to any NATO bombing. It was a promise, as demonstrated below, that was delivered.

⁶⁰ Slobodan Milosevic in 'The Fall of Milosevic Part 1: Defiance', *BBC Discovery Channel* through *SBS Television*, Australia, 2002.

⁶¹ Vojislav Seselj in 'The Fall of Milosevic Part 1: Defiance', *BBC Discovery Channel* through *SBS Television*, Australia, 2002.

Operation Allied Force: NATO Attacks the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

As a response to Yugoslavia's failure to sign the Rambouillet agreement, NATO leaders decided that the Serbs had given NATO the pre-text needed to choose sides in the conflict over Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, the combatants in Kosovo were, it seems, unwilling to come to terms with each other.⁶² NATO, however, tried to intervene earlier in Kosovo by forcing Rambouillet upon the combatants. Unlike the Dayton peace process for Bosnia and Herzegovina, that strategy failed for Kosovo.⁶³ However, learning from their mistakes in acting too late in Bosnia, NATO decided that the Rambouillet Accord would be the last attempt at a diplomatic solution and the side unwilling to agree to the terms of the agreement would be held responsible.⁶⁴ Yugoslavia, being the party unwilling to sign, would be bombed as punishment until they accepted the agreement.⁶⁵

The air strikes that NATO launched against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Operation Allied Force on the evening of 24 March 1999 started a military campaign that would last 78 days.⁶⁶ Four Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf) F-16AM fighter jets were amongst the first NATO warplanes to enter Yugoslav airspace. The Dutch pilots were informed (by an AWACS reconnaissance aircraft) that three MIG-29 aircraft had taken off from an airbase near Belgrade.⁶⁷ In an interview with *Janes' Defence Weekly*, Lt Col Jon Abma of the RNLAf, commanding officer of the

⁶² Especially since casualty figures in the Kosovo conflict were relatively low when in comparison to those of Croatia and Bosnia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war had also continued intensely for over three years.

⁶³ In Bosnia the international community failed to act decisively early, with three peace plans falling by the wayside before peace was achieved.

⁶⁴ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 2000, p.87.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.36.

⁶⁷ Joris Janssen Lok, 'How Dutch F-16AM's Shot Down A MIG-29', *Janes Defence Weekly*, Amendola Airbase, Italy, 1 April 1999, <http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jdw990401_01_n.shtml>.

Belgian-Netherlands Deployed Air Task Force (DATF), described the events that happened during the first moments of Operation Allied Force:

The four F-16AMs headed out toward the threat, working to detect the MiGs on their own radars. Subsequently, one of the MiGs was picked up by all four F-16s. When within range, our flight leader fired one AMRAAM against the MiG. It was an instant hit, after a flight of 30 seconds.⁶⁸

Although this operation was conducted around 18km away from the actual targets, the effectiveness of NATO hardware and ordinance, such as the AMRAAM air-to-air missile that travels 4,000km/h with lethal accuracy,⁶⁹ were demonstrated the moment the conflict began. The RCAF accounted for one of the MIG-29s, the other two also disappeared from radar, although elsewhere USAF F-15s had shot down a couple of Serb MIG-29 fighters at around the same time as the Dutch operation.⁷⁰

According to the former US Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, the objectives of the NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia were to: “reduce, diminish, degrade, damage Milosevic’s military capability; to go after those items of his power which allow him to continue his long campaign of purging and cleansing ... ethnic Albanians in Kosovo”⁷¹. That assessment by Cohen was given on 21 April 1999, almost a month after the NATO air campaign began. Around 250,000 people were internally displaced in Kosovo before the NATO air-campaign against Yugoslavia.⁷² However, the systematic expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians out of Kosovo into Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro only began after NATO started bombing

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² ‘Kosovo Crisis Update’, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 6 April 1999, <<http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-Refugees1.htm>>.

Yugoslavia.⁷³ ‘Operation Horseshoe’, according to former German Foreign Minister Joska Fisher, was a plan that the Serbs had put in motion with the purpose of emptying Kosovo of its Albanian inhabitants.⁷⁴ Any criticism that it was the NATO bombing that triggered the massive cleansing operation by the Serbs in Kosovo, President Bill Clinton quite flatly declared: “Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was not a response to bombing.”⁷⁵ Noam Chomsky argues that the US administration was in denial about the results of the initial bombing, and how the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo was caused in part, or at least was aggravated, by the air war. Peter Anderson asserts though that given all the above, the Clinton Administration and its military leadership were not unanimous in their approach on Kosovo.⁷⁶

Despite this, at the NATO Summit on 23 April 1999, the collective leadership of the alliance gave the following conditions to Yugoslavia and Milosevic in order to halt the military campaign. All violence by Milosevic’s forces in Kosovo had to come to an end.⁷⁷ Milosevic was expected to all these forces from Kosovo and agree to allow all refugees to return to their homes.⁷⁸ Yugoslavia was expected to allow humanitarian aid into Kosovo and agree to an international military presence in Kosovo.⁷⁹ Ultimately, Milosevic was to provide a “credible assurance of his [Milosevic’s] willingness to

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.240.

⁷⁵ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism*, 1999, p.81.

⁷⁶ Peter Anderson, *Air Strike: NATO Astride Kosovo* in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?*, London, Reuters by Pearson Publishing, 2001, p.183.

⁷⁷ Steven Woehrel, *Kosovo: Issues and Options*, 1999, p.168.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.”⁸⁰

The controversial aspect of NATO’s military campaign against Yugoslavia was the way its perception varied depending on whether one was a victim or a supporter of the military strikes. The daily briefings given to the media by NATO’s then-spokesman, Dr. Jamie Shea, concentrated mainly on delivering information on the success of NATO’s military objectives after missions were carried out. When NATO briefings involved reporting NATO’s mistakes, such as the accidental killing of civilians by NATO forces, Shea and NATO referred to these incidents as ‘collateral damage’.⁸¹

For the ordinary Serb civilians living in Yugoslavia, the perception of NATO’s air campaign was very different. Civilians could not be convinced, with good reason, that the smart bombs and other weaponry that NATO used would not harm them if they were sheltering in their homes.⁸² Serbian civilians took NATO attacks on their television stations and power stations, where people were working inside, as attacks against civilian, not military, targets where they were vulnerable.⁸³ That feeling prevailed no matter how much NATO attempted to portray the campaign as not being anti-Serb, but anti-Milosevic.⁸⁴

A comparison between the perspectives of NATO, Serbian civilians and third parties reveals the vast difference in opinions encountered during the NATO’s military campaign. Taking evaluations from the same day by both NATO and Serbian civilians

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Jamie Shea, ‘NATO Press Briefing’, 6 May 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/b990506a.htm>>.

⁸² Sabrina P. Ramet & Phil Lyon, *Germany: The Federal Republic, Loyal to NATO*, in Tony Weymouth & Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis*, 2001, p.97.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

demonstrated two stark perspectives of the same events. An example of this is on 6 May 1999. NATO's Jamie Shea gives the following assessment of the operations of that day:

Despite those weather limitations, we were able to strike at a wide range of Serb forces in Kosovo, we attacked artillery pieces, a command post, surface to air missile batteries, a military convoy near Prizren, armoured vehicles south of Djakovica and at least 7 tanks. I think that this range of strikes on fielded forces in Kosovo demonstrates our increasing grip on the operational theatre and that we are progressively pinning down the Serb forces and cutting them off from Belgrade. But we are now also increasingly moving into the phase where we can take out those forces ... There were a number of more strategic targets, or fixed targets elsewhere in Yugoslavia that were struck last night, there were radio relay facilities at Kaponik and at Novi Pazar, fuel facilities at Sombor, Prahovo and Nis, a bridge at Uzitze and ammunition facilities at Paninje and Kacak. We also attacked once again the airfield at Ponikve and I am happy to report that after last night's operations all of the NATO aircraft returned safely to their bases.⁸⁵

NATO's briefing portrays, in a positive light, the destruction that NATO wrought on Yugoslavia on that single day.⁸⁶ The reality of the impact of NATO's air campaign, though, was much more sombre. Within the first month of the war, much of Yugoslavia's military and state infrastructure was heavily damaged.⁸⁷ The long list of key military targets destroyed includes the main coastal radars at Herceg-Novi and Kruc in Montenegro; air traffic controls, shelters and storage facilities at military airports throughout Yugoslavia⁸⁸, the main SA-2 and SA-3 sites of Belgrade's air defences; half of the dozen or so Yugoslav Air Force MIG-29s, along with numerous

⁸⁵ Jamie Shea, 'NATO Press Briefing', 6 May 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/b990506a.htm>>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Zoran Kusovac, 'Milosevic Finds His Bridges Burnt', *Janes Intelligence Review*, 29 October 1999, <http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990426_01_n.shtml>.

⁸⁸ List of military facilities included Batajnica, Golubovci, Ponikve, Ladjevci, Slatina, Nis and Sombor; electronic communications and secure data transmitters at Jastrebac, Tornik, Fruska Gora, Gucevo, Grmija, Kutlovac, Cigota, Crni vrh, Mokra gora and Bogutovac;

MiG-21s and other aircraft, ultimately demonstrating the effectiveness of NATO's bombing campaign throughout Yugoslavia.⁸⁹

Indicative of NATO's strategic objective to weaken Milosevic militarily and politically, was its targeting of dual use facilities (both civilian and military). Such targets included all crude-oil refining facilities, which were ultimately destroyed. In addition, the damaging or destruction of an estimated 75 per cent of the Yugoslavia's oil reserves.⁹⁰ Numerous military storage facilities, major military and police headquarters and crucial defence technology installations were also targeted.⁹¹ The Air Force Technical Institute at Zarkovo and the Security Institute in Belgrade, (considered key facilities for co-ordination of all defence production), were also destroyed. Except for two basic chemical plants in Baric and Sabac, spared probably for fear of contributing to an ecological disaster, military production in Serbia had essentially been neutralised.⁹²

To demonstrate further the perspective of an ordinary Serbian civilian, Aleksandar Zograf, recorded much of his correspondence during NATO's air campaign and published some of it after the conflict. Designed to offer the perspective of the ordinary Serbian civilian, he wrote the book *Behind the Front Lines*, from which part of his account of 6 May 1999 is taken:

Speaking of bombings, they are still finding the bodies under the ruins in a small town of Surdulica, a week after NATO had bombed a civilian block of houses. It was a horrible event, with most of the victims being children, hiding in a shelter. The bodies were torn to pieces, and it was very hard to identify them. It was reported that two more people committed suicide,

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

after this event ... According to information that I heard on Radio Free Europe, the number of Serbs fleeing Kosovo is, proportionally, even bigger than the number of Albanians. Everybody seems to [be] running away from the place, except for the men in uniforms, and that is so frightening. OK, I'm trying to send this before another black-out.⁹³

These two accounts from NATO's Jamie Shea and the Serbian civilian Aleksandar Zograf, taken on the same day, contrast the reality that either side experience throughout the air war. NATO bombing killed innocent civilians in their hundreds, and the grief that caused considerable.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the lesson learnt by NATO in not acting soon enough in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to deaths of many civilians due to the prolonged nature of the civil war. However, by intervening earlier in the Kosovo conflict, NATO managed to prevent the conflict from becoming another protracted conflict like Bosnia. The death of innocent civilians was not the agenda of NATO, they were accidental. Yet the ethics of accidentally killing civilians in order to save others was difficult to justify. Vaclav Havel, the former Czech President, gave his reasoned explanation for the necessity of the Kosovo intervention:

There is one thing that no reasonable person can deny: this is probably the first war that has not been waged in the name of 'national interest,' but rather in the name of principles and values ... [NATO] is fighting out of concern for the fate of others. It is fighting because no decent person can stand by and watch the systematic state-directed murder of other people ... The alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and legal documents dictate. This is an important precedent for the future. It has been clearly said that it is simply not permissible to murder people, to drive them from their homes, to torture them, and to confiscate their property.⁹⁵

⁹³ Aleksandar Zograf, *Bulletins from Serbia: emails and cartoon strips from the front line*, Guilford, Biddles, 1999, pp.56-57.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism*, 1999, p.88.

Havel's analysis of the justification of NATO's peace-enforcement action on moral and ethical grounds was, for the most part, an accurate indication of NATO's primary objective in Kosovo, essentially to avoid another Bosnia and Herzegovina and to avoid blame for allowing such a situation to be repeated again.⁹⁶ Havel's description of the intervention being carried out mostly in order to defend the human rights of people, rather than being out of any national interest, was in-line with NATO's own argument for the intervention.

As a multinational alliance of 19 member states, NATO itself was also far from cohesive on the approach to the Kosovo problem, in particular the application of force through air power.⁹⁷ Each member-state had its own domestic agendas to pursue, and launching a war was not a high priority. In addition, NATO's internal problem was that each member-state had a national position on the Kosovo issue that was not always in-line with NATO's policy. Germany's government was made up of a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party.⁹⁸ The Green Party was traditionally anti-war and opposed to sending German troops beyond its borders, therefore Germany's participation in NATO's military campaign in Kosovo put the Green Party into a difficult position.⁹⁹ This saw the possible splitting of the German coalition and potential fall from power of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, all due to the Green Party's objection to NATO's campaign.¹⁰⁰ Both Italy, with its geopolitical interests in maintaining good relations in the Balkans at the expense of

⁹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, *ABC Lateline*, 15 June 1998 as quoted in Larry E. Craig, 'Bosnia II: The Clinton Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in Kosovo', United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, 12 August 1998, <<http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/1998/kosovo.htm>>.

⁹⁷ Sabrina P. Ramet & Phil Lyon, *Germany: The Federal Republic, Loyal to NATO*, in Tony Weymouth & Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis*, 2001, pp.88-89.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Germany,¹⁰¹ and Greece, which has both cultural and historic bonds to the Serbian people, found it very difficult to maintain a balanced policy in relation to supporting NATO's military intervention against Yugoslavia.¹⁰²

Russian anger at NATO's military action against Yugoslavia was demonstrated just before Operation Allied Force began. Yeltsin was informed, through a telephone conversation with US President Bill Clinton, of NATO's intent to attack Yugoslavia, but this occurred just two hours before the first sorties were carried out. Yeltsin was outraged and felt betrayed. In a televised interview, he revealed his response to Clinton, part of which was in the translation that follows:

I'd said [to Clinton]: We'd done so much together [Yeltsin and Clinton], we had tackled disarmament and the elimination of strategic weapons. Now it's going down the drain ... This is a gross blunder of American diplomacy and by Clinton, a gross blunder.¹⁰³

As Yeltsin's statement indicates, the Russian government was outraged by NATO's lack of sensitivity and consultation. The Russians immediate response was for its armed forces to break off all ties with NATO, and the Russian Duma passed a resolution at an emergency session calling for Yeltsin to recall the draft law ratifying the START II Treaty with the United States.¹⁰⁴ The Russians also dispatched an intelligence-gathering vessel to the Adriatic Sea to monitor NATO's military operation closely.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Umberto Morelli, *Italy: The Reluctant Ally* in Tony Weymouth & Stanley Henig, *The Kosovo Crisis*, 2001, p.64.

¹⁰² Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 2000, p.206.

¹⁰³ Boris Yeltsin in 'The Fall of Milosevic Part 2: War', *BBC Discovery Channel* through *SBS Television*, Australia, 2002.

¹⁰⁴ 'Russian Duma Condemns NATO', *BBC News*, 27 March 1999, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/305762.stm>>.

¹⁰⁵ 'Russian Ship Heads For Adriatic', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc*, 2 April 1999, <<http://www.b-info.com/tools/miva/newsview.mv?url=places/Bulgaria/news/99-04/apr02a.rfe>>.

Boris Yeltsin, throughout the NATO bombing campaign, issued various strongly-worded statements that could be described as sabre-rattling, and which brought Russia and NATO to the brink of conflict. Yeltsin stated during the early stages of NATO's campaign: "I told NATO, the Americans, the Germans, don't push us towards military action. Otherwise there will be a European war for sure and possibly world war"¹⁰⁶ President Milosevic, for his part, attempted to use Russia's political, cultural and strategic interest in Yugoslavia to his advantage. Russian mediation between the Serbs and the West had on many occasions proven to be useful, especially since the Serbs trusted the Russians as much as they possibly could. Through their mediation role, the Russians were able to demonstrate to the West that they were still a power to be reckoned with and that they were able to, with the aid of their important political influence, influence Belgrade effectively in the process.¹⁰⁷ So desperate was Milosevic in his need of Russian help to deter the NATO attacks, he put forward a motion in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly for approval, for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to formally join the Russian Federation – Belarus Political Union.¹⁰⁸

That move by Milosevic¹⁰⁹, although not directly accepted by Russia and Belarus, firmly entrenched the Russians further diplomatically and politically into the Kosovo crisis. The Russian people were strongly supportive of the Serbs against NATO; some former soldiers volunteering, in their hundreds, to fight on behalf of Yugoslavia

¹⁰⁶ 'Russian Duma Condemns NATO', *BBC News*, 27 March 1999.

¹⁰⁷ Chris Harrigan, 'Yeltsin Says Milosevic Seeking Entry to Russian – Belarus Union', *CNN*, 8 April 1999, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/09/kosovo.diplomacy.01/>>.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ On 8 April 1999, when the NATO air war against Yugoslavia was in full swing, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, announced the diplomatic maneuver by Yugoslavia. Milosevic had made the formal request for Yugoslavia to join the political union of the Russian Federation and Belarus during a visit to Belgrade by Russia's Parliamentary speaker, Gennady Seleznyov.

against NATO.¹¹⁰ However, the Russian government, even if it did have the political will to fight against NATO over the very sensitive issue of Kosovo, did not intervene militarily. By its own admission, the core reason for this was that the country's armed forces were not sufficient to allow Russia to fight a war in any capacity.¹¹¹ Some of Russia's top military leaders, were, it should be noted, not impressed with the attitude of the Russian government to the whole crisis. Indeed, some of them were willing to lead groups of volunteers to fight against NATO forces in Kosovo.¹¹² One retired officer, Lt. Col. Stanislav Terekhov of the Russian Officers' Union, made the rather blunt comment that: "When Comrade Stalin was still alive, neither Truman nor Roosevelt would ever think of bombing a Soviet Union ally"¹¹³

Terekhov, of course, was absolutely correct. Such an attack, by NATO against an ally of the Soviet Union, would have previously been unthinkable. That they were sidelined during the NATO campaign in Kosovo contributed to the bruised pride the Russians felt. It was, for that reason among others that Russia began to play a more active role in the crisis. The more assertive Russian role attempted to demonstrate to the West that Russia was not to be sidelined when its interests were threatened.

Russian anger towards the West began to build up after the Clinton Administration in the United States, decided to bombard Iraq in December 1998, only three months before NATO bombed Yugoslavia, without consulting the Russians who were against the United States bombing of Iraq. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that the Russians were sidelined on a major international crisis, and the Russians did

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Chris Harrigan, 'Can't Afford Military Involvement', *CNN*, 8 April 1999, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/09/kosovo.diplomacy.01/>>.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Chris Harrigan, 'Russia Wants to Play a Role', *CNN*, 8 April 1999, <<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/09/kosovo.diplomacy.01/>>.

not forget it. Yeltsin, who had risen to power on the back of Russian nationalism as well as the most dynamic link to Western governments, was now being treated as a leader of a third world country with no real influence. This incident, still fresh when NATO's air campaign started in Yugoslavia, was partly responsible in Russia's Kosovo policy during the crisis. Yeltsin was adamant he would teach the West, particularly NATO, a lesson in its dealings with the Russian Federation.¹¹⁴

The senior military was particularly disgruntled [about US actions in Iraq]. It was this Russian mood, carefully read by Slobodan Milosevic, which led him to conclude that it was the appropriate time to challenge the West in Kosovo. It was clear to Milosevic that the Russians would not permit themselves to be humiliated a second time. He was right. When the war broke out, the Russians were not only furious again, but provided open political support to Serbia.¹¹⁵

Therefore the Russians would provide political support to the Serbs. For its part, NATO would tolerate the bellicose threats of Yeltsin on the possibilities of war in Europe, but NATO would not tolerate any material support the Russians might provide to the Yugoslav Armed Forces.¹¹⁶ According to Ignatieff, had the Russians provided the Serbs with modern anti-aircraft missile technology, NATO may have faced more casualties.¹¹⁷ The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott confirmed that:

the US 'repeatedly and excitedly' warned Russia not to provide Yugoslavia with any military assistance – materiel, know-how, personnel ... Any Russian assistance which increased risk to US pilots would have had a 'devastating' effect on the future of US-Russian relations."¹¹⁸

In the meantime, the air campaign was dragging on week by week, with NATO beginning to demonstrate, at least implicitly, deep concern that the air war was not

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ 'NATO Goads Russian Bear', *STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update, Weekly Analysis* 14 June 1999, <<http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/sbear.htm>>.

¹¹⁶ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, 2000, p.109.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

enough to bring the Serbs into line.¹¹⁹ So the organisation began to seek an alternative path that would end the conflict by appealing to the Russians to use their political clout in Belgrade on NATO's behalf.¹²⁰ The Russians were, however, most reluctant to negotiate, especially on behalf of the US-led NATO. If the Russians were to become involved as mediators, they were going to set a few ground rules that would satisfy their interests:

The two most important elements of the G8 agreement were unwritten, but they were at the heart of the agreement. The first was that Russia was to be treated as a great power by NATO, and not as its messenger boy. The second was that any settlement that was reached had to be viewed as a compromise and not as a NATO victory. This was not only for Milosevic's sake, but it was also for Yeltsin's.¹²¹

Having to balance Russian policy on Kosovo between NATO and Yugoslavia, the Russian government was aware that NATO was militarily in command of the situation on the ground. Russia was trapped politically, since it had ostensibly demonstrated its stance against NATO's intervention, yet had very few options available to it. For its part, NATO wanted the Russians onboard to lend credibility (especially with the Serbs) to the negotiations leading to a political settlement. The role as a mediator extended Russia an opportunity to save face as a power with significant influence in the region; something NATO was willing to cultivate as long as it did not impinge on the basic expectations NATO had of Milosevic regarding Kosovo.

The Russians, within the context of the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting in May 1999,¹²² managed to engineer an agreement that satisfied the key interests of all parties concerned in the conflict. NATO would have its two key demands met; a Yugoslav

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp.138-143.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.109.

¹²¹ 'NATO Goads Russian Bear', *STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update*, 14 June 1999.

¹²² The G8 Foreign Ministers meeting on 6 May 1999 was held at Bonn's Petersburg Centre, Germany.

military withdrawal from Kosovo, and their replacement by a NATO-led force, which would be responsible for security in the province. Amongst these troops, NATO and Russia would comprise the bulk of the deployment, the Russians were primarily concerned with protecting the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, as well as ensuring that the KLA was effectively disarmed. Yugoslavia was to retain formal sovereignty over the province, which satisfied the key demands and interests of the Serbs. Essentially, the Russians and the Europeans felt it was an agreement the Russians could present to Milosevic and, ultimately, pressure him to accept its implementation.

The seven key principles to the G8 agreement, reached by the meeting of Foreign Ministers were:

- 1) Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 2) Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 3) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; 4) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; 5) The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations; 6) A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; 7) [A] Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.¹²³

The first five points in the statement made by the Chair of the G8 meeting were conditions that NATO had placed on Milosevic in order for the bombing campaign to

¹²³ 'Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersburg Centre (Bonn)', United States Institute of Peace Library, 6 May 1999, <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/adddoc/kosovo_unsc1244.html>.

come to an end and therefore were acceptable to NATO. The agreement also considered the basic position of the FRY (the 'principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'¹²⁴) should be respected. The G8 agreement was significant, since it made no reference to a future referendum by Kosovo Albanians on independence, as was the case in the Rambouillet agreement. The non-prospect of a referendum was a small victory for Milosevic, although Yugoslavia would retain formal sovereignty through the G8 agreement, effective control of the province would be lost to NATO and the UN.

President Ahtisaari of Finland and Russian Special Envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, were dispatched to Belgrade, knowing that they would be able pressure Milosevic to agree to the G8 agreement to end the crisis. Unbeknown to most diplomats and observers at the time, including Russian government ministers, was the role Yeltsin wanted Russia to play in post-conflict Kosovo.¹²⁵ On 12 June 1999, NATO had suspended its bombing campaign, Serbian and Yugoslav forces had almost completed their withdrawal from Kosovo. A Russian unit of two hundred men, attached to SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were ordered to cross the Drina river and secure Pristina airport in Kosovo.¹²⁶ The Russians were the first foreign troops to arrive in Kosovo after the Serb withdrawal, and did so to the great applause and delight of the Kosovo Serb population, who lined the streets to greet them.¹²⁷

This news was received with dismay in NATO capitals, and particularly so in Washington. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces,

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ 'The Fall of Milosevic, Part 2: War', *BBC Discovery Channel*, 2002.

¹²⁶ 'Russian Troops Camp in Pristina', *BBC News: Europe*, June 12 1999, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/367490.stm>>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

was particularly outraged, authorizing the British General, Sir Mike Jackson, to take the airport, however Jackson refused to lead his 500 British and French paratroopers into battle against the Russians, as this might threaten to “... start the Third World War”.¹²⁸ The Russians’ operation that secured Pristina airport, were part of a greater plan that was to involve the rapid deployment of thousands of Russian troops.¹²⁹ These troops were already prepared to set off from selected airbases in Russia, in order to secure control of a Russian sector in Kosovo.¹³⁰ That sector, it was hoped, could be where a Serbian majority would reside, outside of NATO’s command. NATO officials, in order to prevent such a strategic and diplomatic defeat, employed one of the most formidable weapons in their arsenal, the telephone.¹³¹ NATO officials were constantly in touch with Bulgarian, Romanian, and Ukrainian governments (all of which were NATO membership aspirants) to deny the Russians access to their airspace. Hungary, a recent addition to NATO, had initially approved the Russian flights, but was urged by the organisation to close its airspace to Russian planes. So, with no method of re-supplying its troops in Kosovo, the Russian plan to airlift more troops and secure a sector in Kosovo as a *fait accompli* was thwarted: “The Russians had gambled, and lost.”¹³²

This meant that if Russia wanted to participate with troops in the region, it would be under NATO command.¹³³ This was yet another blow to Russian foreign and strategic policy from the West. Russia suffered yet another humiliation by NATO, an alliance the Russians had helped save face for through their mediation with Milosevic. NATO,

¹²⁸ ‘Confrontation Over Pristina Airport’, *BBC2 Documentary*, March 9 2000, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/671495.stm>>.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ ‘The Fall of Milosevic, Part 2: War’, *BBC Discovery Channel*, 2002.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

however, came out of the air campaign against Yugoslavia as the pre-eminent security alliance, demonstrated its resolve (even though cracks did appear within the alliance). NATO also ensured that the Kosovo issue was settled in accordance with the criteria it had originally set out, with Yugoslav forces withdrawing and NATO forces entering the province. The terms of Yugoslavia's military withdrawal and NATO's deployment into Kosovo were agreed to by both parties prior to the end of the war.

Termination of Operation Allied Force: The Military Technical Agreement between NATO and FRY

The conclusion of NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was regulated by the Military Technical Agreement (MTA), a document signed by both parties as a result of the G8 Agreement. The Agreement set out a timeline for the end of hostilities as well as for the phased withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. The agreement also set out the precise nature and conditions for the entry of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Military Technical Agreement was approved by the Serbian Parliament and Federal Yugoslav government on 3 June 1999 after Presidents Ahtisaari and Milosevic agreed to the G8 Agreement. Article I (2) of the Military Technical agreement states:

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy following the adoption of the Security Council resolution ... and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ *The Military Technical Agreement*, Article I (2), 9 June 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm>>.

The MTA was the equivalent of a formal surrender by Yugoslavia to NATO forces. However, Yugoslavia did manage to negotiate some of the terms of the MTA to its benefit. So NATO, under pressure from the G8 and the United Nations, was persuaded to concede that the international force to be deployed in Kosovo should be officially under the auspices of the United Nations.¹³⁵ This was a major demand of the Yugoslav government and was accepted officially by NATO. However, NATO would retain effective control of the mission in Kosovo.

In addition to the removal of all Yugoslav and Serbian forces from Kosovo, Article I of the MTA established an air safety zone (ASZ) which was defined as 25 km airspace zone that extended beyond the province into the surrounding Yugoslav territory.¹³⁶ In addition to the (ASZ), a ground safety zone (GSZ) defined as a 5 km zone extending from the Kosovo border into Yugoslav territory. The purpose of the (ASZ) and (GSZ), according to Article I section 4 (a), was to:

To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the ground safety zone and the air safety zone ... without the prior express consent of the international security force (KFOR) commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.¹³⁷

It is clear that the limitations placed on Yugoslav and Serbian security within their own territory was a violation of their recognised sovereign rights. However, as if to placate the Serbs the MTA also stated that: “the above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian personnel.”¹³⁸ However,

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid Article I(3), (d) and (e).

¹³⁷ Ibid Article I (4), (a), 1999.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

the negotiated return of Yugoslav and Serbian units to Kosovo has yet to be implemented.

Article II of the Military Technical Agreement also defined the terms of both the Yugoslav and Serbian security forces withdrawal and the phased entry of NATO's KFOR into Kosovo. It clearly stipulated that Yugoslav forces would cease "hostile or provocative acts of any type".¹³⁹ Essentially, committing the Yugoslav Army to cease any further military acts against the KLA and vice versa. Even hostile or provocative protests were not allowed as part of the agreement.¹⁴⁰ The withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was to follow a predetermined phased operation that was outlined in Article II of the Military Technical agreement. As part of the withdrawal process, the agreement required Yugoslav forces to identify and/or remove any mines, booby traps, obstacles and charges.¹⁴¹ For the phased withdrawal, Kosovo was divided into three different zones of operations.

Zone 3 was designated as the area of Kosovo adjacent to neighbouring areas of Serbia proper, and covered the northern section that included the major centre of Podujevo. It was also the location of 4 designated 'exit points' from which all Yugoslav forces would evacuate the province.¹⁴² It was envisioned by Entry into Force (EIF) + 1 day that all Federal Yugoslav forces would have vacated from this area via the designated exit points. The first phase of the withdrawal of all forces from Zone 3 was verified by NATO reconnaissance. That verification resulted in the suspension of NATO's aerial

¹³⁹ Ibid Article II, (1), 1999.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² 'The Withdrawal from Kosovo', *ReliefWeb* Balkan Region Maps, 1999, <http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/eur_bal/reg/kosovowithdrawal.html>.

bombardment of targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, hence ending NATO's military campaign.¹⁴³

Map 6: Yugoslav Forces Phased Withdrawal from Kosovo

NOTE: This map is included on page 256 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: BBC Broadcasting Corporation, June 10 1999 in ReliefWeb Balkan Region Maps, <http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/eur_bal/reg/kosovowithdrawal.html>

Zone 1 was designated as the southern most areas of the Kosovo province that included borders with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania and Montenegro. Pristina was also part of this Zone.¹⁴⁴ Article II section 2 (b) stipulated that all Federal Yugoslav forces would vacate this zone by EIF + 6 days.

Zone 2 was designated as the central areas of Kosovo. That zone shared a border with FYROM and Montenegro and included the major centres of Pec and Prizren.¹⁴⁵ It was the last zone to be vacated by Yugoslav forces on EIF + 11 days. On the completion of the Yugoslav withdrawal from this sector, the Commander of the Federal Yugoslav forces responsible for the redeployment, was to confirm in writing to the KFOR Commander that they had complied and completed their withdrawal. As of that

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

moment “The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces as provided under article II. The international security force (KFOR) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this agreement”.¹⁴⁶

Perhaps the definitive aspect of the MTA was embodied in Article V. That section demonstrated the true nature of the agreement, specifically, that NATO KFOR commander would be responsible for interpretation of the MTA on the ground:

The international security force (KFOR) commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations binding on all Parties and persons.¹⁴⁷

Article V of the MTA would act as a guarantee that NATO would be in control of the situation in Kosovo after Yugoslav forces withdrew. KFOR also reserved the right to implement the agreement as it saw fit, without any interference from Yugoslavia. All had been prepared for KFOR’s entry into Kosovo to begin its mission, to stabilize the province and provide a peaceful environment.

The Insertion of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its Role in Kosovo

NATO defined KFOR as an

international force responsible for establishing a security presence in Kosovo. This peace-enforcement force entered Kosovo on 12th June 1999 under a UN mandate, two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244). In doing so, the international community showed its determination to resolve a grave humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and to provide for the safe return of all refugees and displaced people in the

¹⁴⁶ *Military Technical Agreement*, Article II, 2(e), 1999.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid* Article V, 1999.

region.¹⁴⁸

The UN had the responsibility for the deployed international civil and security presence in Kosovo, the Secretary General's representative controls the civil implementation process while the Commander of KFOR is head of the security forces in the peace operation.¹⁴⁹

Troops from 28 countries, 42,500 in all, were deployed in Kosovo and another 7,500 provided rear support from their bases in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Greece.¹⁵⁰ The KFOR contingent was originally divided into five multinational brigades that were responsible for the areas in which they were deployed, but remained under a single chain of command that was led by the Commander of KFOR. The multinational brigades ensured that all national contingents pursue the same objective "to maintain a secure environment in Kosovo. They did so with professionalism and in an even-handed manner towards all ethnic groups."¹⁵¹ The five multinational brigades were originally the Multinational Brigade Centre (MNB(C)), Multinational Brigade East (MNB(E)), Multinational Brigade West (MNB(W)), Multinational Brigade North (MNB(N)) and Multinational Brigade South (MNB(S)).

Multinational Brigade Central was deployed in the north-eastern and central regions of the Kosovo province. The area accounts for around 634,000 people, including the majority Albanian population, Serbs and Gorans. This zone also shares a border with Serbia proper with three border crossings. Its headquarters were located in Pristina and

¹⁴⁸ 'KFOR Information', About KFOR, Kosovo Force, *NATO Online*, June 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm>>.

¹⁴⁹ *KFOR Structure*, Kosovo Force, NATO Online, 2006, <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm>>.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

included the regional centres of Podujevo, Kosovo Polje, Lipljan and Stimilje. The mission of the British-led Multinational brigade was to: “establish and maintain a secure environment and to assist UNMIK’s mission in order to promote peace and stability in Kosovo. This includes the monitoring and enforcement of the Military Technical Agreement.”¹⁵² Multinational Brigade Central still exists, but has been expanded in size and is patrolled by a broader range of countries than the initial structure.¹⁵³

Map 7: NATO Sectors in Kosovo in 1999

NOTE: This map is included on page 259 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: CNN News: Timetable for Kosovo Transition, 9 June 1999,
<<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/09/kosovo.plan.01/>>

Multinational Brigade East is the area in the south-eastern region of Kosovo occupying around 2000 square kilometres, with diverse geographic and demographic features.¹⁵⁴

This region has communities that are mixed and non-mixed with up to five ethnic groups reside in the area including Albanians, Serbs, Romas, and Turks.¹⁵⁵ That ethnic

¹⁵² ‘Multinational Brigade East’, *KFOR Online*, 2000,
<http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/mnb_east.htm>.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ ‘Multinational Brigade East’, *KFOR Online*, 2000,
<http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/mnb_east.htm>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

mix provided a huge challenge to the KFOR soldiers involved in patrolling that particular multinational brigade, originally commanded by the United States. The Eastern brigade's mission was four-fold. It was to:

Monitor, verify, and enforce as necessary the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement in order to create a safe and secure environment; Provide humanitarian assistance in support of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) efforts; Enforce basic law and order until this function is fully transferred to the appropriately designated agency; To establish and support resumption of core civil functions. Some of the brigade's activities in support of these missions have been the establishment of Information Operations Centres ... rebuilding schools, and providing assistance to numerous humanitarian and projects.¹⁵⁶

Multinational Brigade North, before its reshaping into the Multinational Brigade Northeast,¹⁵⁷ was where the first element of the KFOR force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. It began as an exclusively French operation, but later included many contingents, including non-NATO forces.¹⁵⁸ That area was the scene of terrible violence during the KLA uprising against the Serbs, with international verification teams counting more than 80 execution sites and mass graves.¹⁵⁹ It is also the zone where the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica is located. Ethnic tensions in Mitrovica would demonstrate to NATO forces deployed in the area that their entry into Kosovo was not going to be as smooth as the IFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The broad nature of the MNB(N)'s mission included:

Sharing its mission of security force with the International United Nations Police (UNMIK Police) ... to create, in total impartiality, a normalized, safe and secure environment. This strategy results concretely in a clever balance of actions of security, repression and accompaniment ... On the security field, the brigade multiplies patrols, check-points, escorts, intelligence ... on

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ 'Multinational Brigade Northeast', *Kosovo Force*, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_northeast.htm>.

¹⁵⁸ 'Multinational Brigade North', *KFOR Online*, 2000, <http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/mnb_north.htm>.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

the civilian – military actions field, the brigade acts in close co-operation with international and non governmental organisations.¹⁶⁰

Multinational Brigade West integrated into Multinational Brigade South.¹⁶¹ The area was initially controlled by the Italian KFOR command. The set operational tasks of MNB(W) were: “... peace agreement implementation, border control, law and order, and maintain freedom of movement for KFOR and civilians”¹⁶² while humanitarian tasks included assistance for reconstruction and other forms of humanitarian assistance.¹⁶³ Multinational Brigade South, before its merger with MNB(W)¹⁶⁴ was deployed in the south of Kosovo. The area borders the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. The majority of the inhabitants of the region under MNW(S) command are Albanian, with smaller numbers of Serbs, Turks and Gorans.¹⁶⁵ This sector was the scene of some of the most intensive fighting between the KLA and Serbian security forces.¹⁶⁶ The mission of MNB (S) was: “to monitor and enforce the Military Technical Agreement and the Undertaking within the brigade’s AOR [area of responsibility], to establish basic law and order and to provide humanitarian assistance in support of UNHCR.”¹⁶⁷

In addition to the original Multinational Brigades’ deployed into Kosovo, the Multinational Specialised Unit (MNSU) was created. The MNSU was a police force with military status and it generally contributed to the effective policing of Kosovo,

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ ‘Multinational Brigade West’, *KFOR Online*, 2000, <http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/mnb_west.htm>.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ ‘Multinational Brigade Southwest’, *Kosovo Force*, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_southwest.htm>.

¹⁶⁵ ‘Multinational Brigade South’, *KFOR Online*, 2000, <http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/mnb_south.htm>.

¹⁶⁶ The MNB(S), as is the newer MNB (SW), was commanded by the German forces and its area of responsibility was Prizren, Dragas, Suva Reka and Orahovac.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

alongside the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and local authorities.¹⁶⁸ The MNSU claimed to have several strengths, including much experience in combating terrorism and organized crime.¹⁶⁹

The Unit's strength also lay in its investigative human resources. These resources were used in order to prevent subversive or other criminal behaviour that would be detrimental to maintaining peace and stability in the region.¹⁷⁰ The MNSU usually conducted patrols alongside KFOR units, allowing them to undertake their necessary operations within KFOR's Area of Operation (AOR). In addition, the MNSU would interact with the local communities, learning and understanding the security and social environment of Kosovo and facilitating in the formation of better equipped local units to assist in policing matters.¹⁷¹ According to NATO, the MSNU's primary tasks included:

Maintenance of a secure environment, Law enforcement in close cooperation with UNMIK, Info gathering, Presence patrol, Civil disturbance operations, Counter terrorism, Criminal intelligence on organized crime, VIP escort operations, Special Police Operations, Crimes related to Military Security.¹⁷²

Although the number of countries that have contributed to the MNB zones had been dynamic since 1999, the original structure of KFOR and its deployment, more or less, remained. An important aspect regarding the initial deployment of NATO troops and the allocation of regional commands to NATO countries within Kosovo was designed

¹⁶⁸ 'Multinational Specialized Unit', *Kosovo Force*, 2006, <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/msu.htm>>.

¹⁶⁹ This is particularly important since 11 September 2001, where it was feared that both Bosnia and Kosovo were possible bases of operations for extremist terrorist groups who found their way into the Balkans during and after the conflicts of the past decade.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

to prevent the Russian KFOR contingent from acquiring their own sector in Kosovo.¹⁷³ Instead, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy all controlled their own sectors whilst the Russians were forced to serve within these.¹⁷⁴

The establishment of a Russian security sector in Kosovo was thwarted by NATO. This prevented the Serbs from acquiring an exclusive sector in Kosovo under Russian protection. NATO feared that this would possibly lead to the eventual partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines. However, this did not eventuate because the Serbs of Kosovo who did not feel safe under the protection of KFOR troops after also being denied the reassurance of a Russian controlled zone fled Kosovo in their tens of thousands.¹⁷⁵ As will be discussed below, although NATO stopped the conflict in Kosovo and brought back the Kosovo Albanian refugees, it could not prevent the exodus of the Kosovo Serb population and that would prove to be the least successful aspect of NATO's intervention in Kosovo.

The Aftermath of NATO Bombing: A Reversal of Fortunes

The period immediately following the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia saw an ironic situation unfold in Kosovo. The hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians who had either fled or were forcibly removed from their homes in Kosovo rapidly returned under KFOR instruction and supervision, barely allowing the Yugoslav and Serbian military personnel to withdraw before them. In response, most of the two hundred and fifty thousand ethnic Serbs in Kosovo fled along with their military, feeling that NATO protection would not suffice.¹⁷⁶ The Kosovo Albanians return to Kosovo was

¹⁷³ KFOR Structure, Kosovo Force, *NATO Online*, 2006, <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm>>.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Rachel Coen, 'After the Humanitarian War: TV learns to accept Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo', Nov/Dec 1999, <<http://www.fair.org/extra/9911/kosovo.html>>.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

marred by the sheer destruction that had been unleashed throughout the province, with most abandoned homes either torched or taking direct artillery hits, leaving them barely inhabitable.¹⁷⁷ The rage of the Kosovo Albanians was overt, and attacks against the fifty thousand Kosovo Serbs estimated to have remained in the province, were vicious.

Although NATO originally intervened to protect the Kosovo Albanians from the Yugoslav Army, in a reverse of fortunes, it was the remaining Kosovo Serbs that needed NATO's protection against a very hostile Kosovo Albanian population seeking retribution for their own suffering under Milosevic.¹⁷⁸ So, although NATO suppressed the main fighting between the KLA and the Yugoslav Army, KFOR struggled to maintain a safe, multi-ethnic Kosovo for all its inhabitants.¹⁷⁹

Although NATO provided the military force needed to bring the Kosovo conflict to an end, the consequences of their military action in 1999 had some undesired effects. In addition to NATO, the OSCE had been providing the province, in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), services to assist in democratization of the province as well as the development of the institutions needed in that process. Part of the OSCE Mission Statement for Kosovo was as follows:

All communities have a rightful place in Kosovo. Ensuring a dignified future for all ethnic communities in Kosovo is a goal of the OSCE-led Institution-Building Pillar, as an integral part of UNMIK. To underline and promote this unequivocal message, the OSCE will work closely with community leaders to further the idea of an integrated and inclusive society

¹⁷⁷ 'As Seen As Told Part II', OSCE Background Paper, 1999, <<http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/>>.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

founded on democratic principles.¹⁸⁰

The reality was that although the OSCE intended to carry out its mission to encourage ethnic harmony, the opposite had happened.¹⁸¹ The Serbs of Kosovo and their sympathizers began to flee in large numbers. The problem became so acute that General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of NATO operations in Kosovo declared “The world has too many refugees already. I beg you not to make the number any greater. Stay at home, we will look after you.”¹⁸² The Yugoslav and Serbian government officials had fled the province, a Serb resistance leader, Momcilo Trajkovic, described the situation: “Many Kosovo officials are no longer in Kosovo now, when they are most needed by the Serbian people.”¹⁸³

The words by Trajkovic demonstrated the feeling of neglect being felt by Kosovo Serbs, not just from NATO, but from their own government as well. Their feeling of betrayal was largely pointed at President Milosevic, who gained so much by exploiting the plight of the Kosovo Serbs during his rise to power. All his rhetoric and hyper-nationalist statements and promises in relation to Kosovo were, now that NATO was in control of the province, of no use to the Kosovo Serbs who needed protection.

Rachel Coen explains the result of NATO’s entry into Kosovo only after ten weeks into the mission:

But by the end of August, about ten weeks after NATO stopped bombing Yugoslavia and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) took charge of Kosovo, only about 20,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo out of a pre-war

¹⁸⁰ ‘Mission Statement’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2002,

<http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/factsheet/general/communities_statement.PDF>.

¹⁸¹ Rachel Coen, ‘After the Humanitarian War: TV learns to accept Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo’, Nov/Dec 1999, <<http://www.fair.org/extra/9911/kosovo.html>>.

¹⁸² ‘Serbs Exodus Unabated’, *BBC News*, 18 June 1999,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_372000/372159.stm>.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

population of 200,000 (AP, 8/30/99). In other words, 90 per cent of Kosovar Serbs had fled their homes and become refugees since the peace agreement went into effect.¹⁸⁴

The OSCE report detailing series of events from 14 June 1999 through to 31 October 1999 explained the situation after NATO entered the province, which concurred with Coen's statement:

The desire for revenge has been the primary motive for the vast majority of human rights violations that have taken place. Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Muslim Slavs and others who are perceived to have collaborated actively or passively with the Serb security forces, have been targeted for killing, expulsion, harassment, intimidation, house-burning and abduction. This has led to an exodus of these communities from Kosovo.¹⁸⁵

The US State Department also concurred with the OSCE Report:

This continued violence [after NATO campaign] has affected both sides, but proportionally the Serbs and other minorities have suffered most heavily. Serbs have been subjected to kidnapping, murder, arson, grenade attacks, shootings, and a variety of other intimidation tactics, including bombing places of worship.¹⁸⁶

Both the OSCE and US State Department reports clearly provided evidence to demonstrate that NATO, specifically KFOR, was unable to completely guarantee the safety of the Kosovo Serb community. As indicated in the reports, it was not only the Serbs who were victims of execution, rape, abduction and expulsion.¹⁸⁷ The indiscriminate attacks against the Kosovo Serbs the KLA and their sympathisers proceeded with under NATO's supposed supervision were very similar to NATO's passive policy relating to the torching of the Bosnian Serb suburbs of Sarajevo.¹⁸⁸ In

¹⁸⁴ Rachel Coen, 'After the Humanitarian War: TV learns to accept Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo', Nov/Dec 1999, <<http://www.fair.org/extra/9911/kosovo.html>>.

¹⁸⁵ 'As Seen As Told Part II', OSCE Background Paper, 1999, <<http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/>>.

¹⁸⁶ 'Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting', *US State Department Report*, Dec 1999, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/missing.html>.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ As demonstrated in Chapter 5.

addition to the acts of retribution by Kosovo Albanians carried out against other minorities in the province, the OSCE Background Report found that many Kosovo Albanians felt their basic human rights were significantly restricted by groups within their own community:

Rights of Kosovo Albanians to freedom of association, expression, thought and religion have all been challenged by other Kosovo Albanians. The report reveals that opposition to the self-styled municipal administrations, often dominated by the (former) UCK, has sometimes led to intimidation and harassment.¹⁸⁹

The Serbian Orthodox Church, the only real Serbian institution still partially functioning in post-NATO-patrolled Kosovo, was also extremely critical of the situation ordinary Kosovo Serbs had found themselves in.¹⁹⁰ The Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, one of the cornerstones of Serbian Orthodoxy, summed up its position relating to the treatment of Kosovo Serbs in the following statement:

At the beginning of the New Millennium Kosovo Serbs are the only people in Europe killed because of their language, religion and ethnicity, completely deprived of freedom of life, movement and work. Crimes against Serb civilians and their culture are being committed by Albanian extremists not in the time of war but in the presence of 40.000 NATO troops and the UN mission.¹⁹¹

The main concern of the Serbs who remained in Kosovo, as well as the thousands of Serb refugees who fled Kosovo after NATO's intervention, was simply their safety. According to the Federal Committee for gathering information on crimes against humanity and violations of international law in Belgrade, the number of Serbs in Kosovo killed or abducted by Kosovo Albanians in the province between June 1999 and February 2002 was 3,276 persons; a similar figure to the number of Kosovo

¹⁸⁹ 'As Seen As Told Part II', OSCE Background Paper, 1999.

¹⁹⁰ 'The Suffering of Kosovo Serbs and their Church Continuing', Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, 2002, <<http://www.kosovo.com/default2.html>>.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Albanians killed during the Serbian crackdown in the province.¹⁹² The plight of the Kosovo Serbs, ironically under the protection of NATO, was one of the fundamental problems of the KFOR mission. NATO's promise to protect all people of Kosovo and to maintain its multi-ethnic character was in danger of not succeeding. Although enclaves of Serbs remained in Kosovo, co-existence was understandably difficult to achieve so soon after the conflict. UNMIK, KFOR and the OSCE, however, did not give up on the idea of convincing the Serbs who fled Kosovo to return, since their return was crucial in allowing KFOR to accomplish the basic objective of its mission to retain a multi-ethnic Kosovo.

The Displaced Refugees: Three Years On

According to the Coordination Centre of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, over 280,000 internally-displaced persons found their way into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from UNMIK and NATO-administered Kosovo.¹⁹³ These displaced were only a portion of the 800,000 refugees that had suffered dislocation throughout the former Yugoslavia during the turbulent years of 1990 through to 2000.¹⁹⁴ The difference with the internally-displaced from Kosovo was that this current refugee problem (examined in this section, occurred under the control of NATO's KFOR. This raises the issue of what policies KFOR and UNMIK pursued in order to reverse the refugee crisis.

¹⁹² *Radio Television Serbia*, Belgrade, 20 February 2002, <<http://www.kosovo.com/default2.html>>.

¹⁹³ See Table 11.

¹⁹⁴ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.286.

Table 11: Internally Displaced Persons According to Region of Origin

NOTE: This table is included on page 269 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Coordination Centre of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, 2002

Table 11 indicates that of the total 242,381 internally displaced persons since NATO's entry into Kosovo, most were from the provincial capital, Pristina. Almost 96,000 people fled the provincial capital.¹⁹⁵ Pristina was the largest Serbian population centre in Kosovo and this explains the high number of Serbian refugees from the town.¹⁹⁶ Serbia proper took in 88,000 of these refugees, whilst Montenegro received a far more modest 8,000 of them.¹⁹⁷ The town of Pec, traditional home of the Serbian Orthodox Church, saw an exodus of over 63,000 people.¹⁹⁸ The Serbian Patriarch and other Serb Orthodox Clergy also fled and left scores of Monasteries and Churches unattended. These religious sites became vulnerable to Kosovo Albanian retribution. The remaining 83,000 displaced were from other former Kosovo Serb strongholds of Gnjilane, Mitrovica and Prizren.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ See Table 11.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

Table 12: Internally Displaced Persons According to Ethnic Group

NOTE: This table is included on page 270 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Coordination Centre of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, 2002

Table 12 clearly indicates the trend since NATO's entry into Kosovo province in June 1999. The majority of people involved in the exodus from Kosovo were ethnic Serbs, with 208,000 fleeing to Serbia proper and 19,000 to Montenegro.²⁰⁰ Many of those 226,000 Serbs were actually refugees from the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus were on the move twice in less than six years.²⁰¹ Apart from the ethnic Serbs, the Roma of Kosovo also suffered recrimination by the returning Kosovo Albanians, who viewed the Roma as Serbian collaborators *en masse*.²⁰² According to the above Table 12, 37,000 Roma fled the province into the safety of Serbia and Montenegro, indicating that it was not only the Serbs who felt insecure under the administration and protection of the NATO/UNMIK combination. It is important to note that the number of registered Internally Displaced People (IDP) in Table 11 includes only the individuals who had applied personally for registration, and it had been estimated that there were nearly 50,000 IDP²⁰³ living in Serbia and Montenegro, who had not been officially registered.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ See Table 12.

²⁰¹ *Serbian Refugees of Yugoslavia*, Coordination Centre of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, 2002.

²⁰² Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2000, p.287.

²⁰³ See Table 12.

²⁰⁴ 'Principles of the program for the Return of Internally Displaced People from Kosovo and Metohija', Serbian Government Website, <http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/coordination_centre/index.html>

The Serbian and Yugoslav governments had been highly critical about not only the exodus of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo, but the lack of progress NATO and UNMIK had made in building up the confidence of Kosovo Serbs in order for them to return to the province. Nebosja Covic, Head of the Coordinating Centre for Kosovo – Metohija and Yugoslav Minister for South Serbian Affairs, stated the following on the pace of the foreseen return of displaced persons from Kosovo:

the return should begin as soon as possible, it would be best if it began immediately. If 800,000 Albanians returned in two months, and 200 to 300 thousand Serbs did not manage to do it in three years, the international community should help Serbs and other nationalities from Kosovo-Metohija to come back and live at their homeland.²⁰⁵

What Covic highlighted above was the discrepancy in the speed of return for the Kosovo Albanians post-NATO intervention and the very slow process of encouraging Kosovo Serbs to return. That NATO was quite willing to use military force in order to allow the Kosovo Albanians to return by the hundreds of thousands within weeks, whilst the Serb exodus occurred as a result of the NATO operation, was something the Yugoslav government found difficult to accept.²⁰⁶ After three years of KFOR's presence in Kosovo, Serbs were still not convinced it was safe to return.

The OSCE Ninth Minority Report in relation to Kosovo covering the period September 2001 to August 2002 conceded that the feeling amongst the Serbian refugees who wished to return to Kosovo that not enough had been done by KFOR and UNMIK to encourage them to return was reasonable. However, the report also suggested that unprecedented steps and programs had been activated in order to encourage a small

²⁰⁵ 'Kosovo Serbs do not trust KFOR and UNMIK', Serbian Government Website, 10 June 2002, <<http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2002-06/10/324616.html>>.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

number of Serb refugees to return to Kosovo under heavy security arrangements.²⁰⁷ The report highlighted the efforts of the OSCE, UNMIK, UNHCR and NATO, to convince ethnic Serbs who had fled Kosovo to return home. Unfortunately, previous attempts (for example in 2001) by these organisations to encourage Serbs to return met with limited success, especially since Kosovo Serbs were still falling victim to Kosovo Albanian revenge and hate attacks.²⁰⁸

According to the report, the level of security needed to support the return of a larger number of Serb refugees to Kosovo was unsustainable even in the short-term. This was partially the result of the poorly organised infrastructure of the political, legal and law enforcement institutions within the province.²⁰⁹ In relation to the return of refugees, the report concluded that substantial progress was required in the areas of freedom of movement, security, right of return, political pluralism, and inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding.²¹⁰ Overall, the report pointed out that unless the conditions in Kosovo changed so that ethnic minorities felt that they had the freedom to traverse the length and breadth of the province in safety, as well as the freedom to participate effectively in the political, economic and cultural future of the region, there was little option for the refugees but to remain outside of Kosovo.²¹¹

The Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) that were established in Kosovo not long after KFOR and UNMIK took control of the province, were also criticised in the Ninth Assessment of Situation of Minorities in Kosovo report.

²⁰⁷ 'Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo', OSCE & UNHCR Report, September 2001 – April 2002, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_09_eng.pdf>.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ 'Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo', OSCE & UNHCR Report, September 2001 – April 2002, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_09_eng.pdf>.

²¹¹ Ibid.

Specifically, the report asserted that the PISG needed to actively engage and participate in (both with active and moral support) the process of returning refugees into the province, which is a requirement of the Constitutional Framework of the PISG.²¹² KFOR and UNMIK needed to more effectively get behind the process of encouraging the PISG to take on part of the responsibility of healing the divisions that existed in Kosovo, in order to facilitate the secure and successful return of all refugees.

If the Serb refugees did not return to Kosovo, then NATO and the UN would not have fully succeeded in delivering on their commitment to establish a multi-ethnic Kosovo. So even if they had succeeded in promoting a democratic and peaceful Kosovo for all of its remaining citizens, without reversing the refugee trend, KFOR would have overseen the change of Kosovo from a Serb dominated province, to an Albanian one. The dislodgement of the Kosovo Serbs was not one of the aims of NATO when it intervened in 1999, even if the establishment of substantial autonomy for the Kosovo Albanians through the Rambouillet Accord was.²¹³

The specific situation of minority communities was covered in a detailed conclusion of the OSCE/UNHCR report. That section was one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the situation on the ground in Kosovo at the time. The report made it clear that the application of the term ‘minority’ in the case of Kosovo could include all ethnic groups within Kosovo, including the Albanians, who in the northern regions of the province, still constitute a minority. The Kosovo Serbs constitute a majority in the municipalities of Strpce, Mitrovica, Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok. Throughout

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ ‘Rambouillet Accords’, Article I, (4), 1999 in ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo’, Kosovo and Yugoslavia: Law and Crisis, *Jurist – The Law Professors Network*, 23 February 1999, <<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm#Frame>>.

the rest of Kosovo they are very much a minority, and unfortunately, have to resort to living in heavily-protected enclaves or in isolation for their own safety:

Kosovo Serbs remain the primary targets of ethnically motivated violent attacks. As a result, physical security remains the overriding issue of concern for those Kosovo Serbs who live in a minority situation, as it not only affects their lives and fundamental freedoms (such as freedom of movement) but also the enjoyment of a multitude of life-sustaining economic and social rights.²¹⁴

The dangerous environment the remaining Kosovo Serbs lived in was often demonstrated by acts of violence and terror by ethnic Albanians in the province against the former.²¹⁵ In the early stages of KFOR's mission in mid-1999 and 2000, many crimes were committed. Although significantly decreasing through 2001 and 2002, there were still many examples of hate crimes that have been perpetrated in the province under the watchful eye of KFOR and UNMIK police.²¹⁶ The OSCE specifically cited the following examples as evidence that the environment within Kosovo was not yet entirely secure:

The precarious environment that still confronts Kosovo Serbs is underlined by incidents such as the 21st October 2001, shooting of a Kosovo Serb man through the window of his house at night, in Devet Jugovica, causing serious injuries; the firing of five rounds from a pistol towards a group of Kosovo Serb children waiting for public transportation in Plementin village on 30 January 2002; and the arrest of two Kosovo Albanian males in Vitina municipality on 27 January 2002 for allegedly attempting to kill a Kosovo Serb male while he was walking home.²¹⁷

In addition to Kosovo Serbs' restriction of their freedom of movement rights, and their physical security concerns, they were also victims of the violation of their property rights. These violations included coercion to sell their property, destruction and

²¹⁴ 'Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo', OSCE & UNHCR Report, September 2001 – April 2002, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_09_eng.pdf>.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

attacks on Kosovo Serb property and religious monuments including Churches and Monasteries as well as the desecration of cemeteries.²¹⁸ It was the responsibility of KFOR and UNMIK to prevent these attacks, but their frequency and focus proved disturbing. For its part, KFOR had persisted in attempting to continuously adapt to the volatile security environment in Kosovo. Some of the changes to KFOR security measures over the 2001 – 2002 period, resulted in the increased mobility of ethnic minorities.²¹⁹ Specifically, the reduction or dismantling of some static checkpoints in favour of mobile and spontaneous equivalents were the main reason for the increased mobility of some minorities in certain areas.²²⁰

On the whole, however, the trend was towards increased mobility. For example in Gjilan/Gnjilane town and the Viti/Vitina area, Kosovo Serbs enjoyed incremental increases in mobility concurrent with specific efforts on the part of KFOR to increase area security. Thus, Kosovo Serbs are increasingly seen walking the streets, accessing some shops and public services, and driving motor vehicles Increased mobility in Gjilan/Gnjilane has been positively influenced by the facilitation of transport services from surrounding areas into the town for market day three times a week.²²¹

The fact that Kosovo Serbs were driving automobiles with Yugoslav registration plates on selected roads was a sign that there was a rising confidence amongst Kosovo Serbs to exhibit Serbian symbols. The improved living conditions for the remaining Kosovo Serbs, was an indication that KFOR took its responsibility seriously and was making a dedicated effort to stabilise the environment for all the ethnic groups of Kosovo.

²¹⁸ 'Crucified Kosovo: Catalogue of Destroyed and Desecrated Churches', *The Voice of Kosovo and Metohija*, 1999, <http://www.kosovo.net/crucified/default.htm#_catalog>.

²¹⁹ 'Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo', OSCE & UNHCR Report, September 2001 – April 2002, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_09_eng.pdf>.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

Clearly, the OSCE and the UNHCR through the Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo identified conditions for the Kosovo Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats and Gorani as having been poor, and that the exercising of basic human rights was not being respected by a resentful Kosovo Albanian majority.²²² However, the continued presence of these minorities in Kosovo has been vital in allowing the multi-ethnic nature of the province to successfully develop in the way that NATO foresaw before its bombing campaign in March 1999. The conditions of the Kosovo Albanians post-NATO intervention have improved markedly. They are no longer an oppressed ethnic group within the province.

KFOR had managed, as indicated, to minimise the attacks against minority groups within the province by 2002, but 2003 would bring the worst inter-ethnic violence Kosovo had seen since the Yugoslav military and the KLA were fighting in 1999.²²³ That concern was noted in the letter written by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 2 September 2003 to the UN Security Council President. Specifically, the letter addressed the violence that erupted in Kosovo through the period 1-31 July 2003. That month was significant because there was an increase in the ethnic attacks against Kosovo Serbs by Albanians, and it was suspected that one of the main reasons for this was the Llap Zone trial in July 2003.²²⁴ That trial was where four former KLA members were convicted of war crimes by a court in Pristina, presided over by selected international judges.²²⁵ This decision created much anger amongst the Kosovo Albanian population. Statements against the judgment were made by high profile

²²² Ibid.

²²³ *Monthly report to the UN on the operations of the Kosovo Force*, S/2003/855, 2 September 2003, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/9b600dca423f89bec1256d9c004a3322?OpenDocument>>.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

figures including members of the Kosovo Assembly and the Kosovo Protection Corps, which regarded the charges as “absurd” and an “insult to all Kosovars.”²²⁶

Also, the Secretary General of the UN also criticised the Kosovo Protection Corps in his report, stating that it was not administered efficiently and that it did not meet the minimum standards needed to be effective as a police force.²²⁷ Damning statistics that damaged the credibility of the KPC included a reported fifteen non-compliant cases against it in July 2003, with 56 previous acts to be dealt with, and another 41 cases closed.²²⁸ In addition, a coalition of Kosovo Albanian political parties represented in the Kosovo Assembly, as well as Bosniak and Turkish minority parties, issued a statement discouraging any Kosovo Albanian from selling any property in the northern Mitrovica enclave to Kosovo Serbs, or the Serbian government.²²⁹ That statement was issued so that the Kosovo Serbs could not, through the purchase of Kosovo Albanian land, strengthen their case for partition of Kosovo in the future. Positively, however, prominent Albanian figures did also issue a statement encouraging the return of minorities, of which, 24 Kosovo Serb families returned to the province in July 2003.²³⁰

The worst violence since the insertion of KFOR and UNMIK into Kosovo started on 17 March 2004 when Kosovo Albanians attacked Serbian Orthodox Churches throughout the province.²³¹ UN sources indicated that 31 people, both Serb and Albanian, were killed and 500 wounded, (including 55 KFOR troops), in the clashes, with KFOR and its 18,500 troops initially appearing overstretched and incapable of

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ ‘Kosovo Death Toll Rises to 31’, *China Daily*, 19 March 2004, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/19/content_316186.htm>.

protecting property throughout the province.²³² In response to the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence throughout Kosovo, KFOR mission's German commander, General Holger Kammerhoff, told reporters in Pristina: "The thousands of ethnic Albanians that attacked KFOR, the police, Serb enclaves and churches should be aware of robust reserve forces."²³³

True to his word in order to immediately halt the violent incidents, the KFOR commander ordered reinforcements back into Kosovo, with 150 extra US troops, 80 Italian carabinieri and 750 British troops were made available to bolster KFOR numbers in Kosovo.²³⁴ Serbs were evacuated from Pristina and other major centres to Serbia as fears spread that a major Kosovo Albanian attack would take place.²³⁵ However, the additional NATO forces helped put a dampener on the situation, with the major violence easing off as KFOR took control of the situation again.²³⁶ Overall, 16 Serbian Orthodox Churches were destroyed in the two days of violence, while 110 Serbian homes were also burnt down.²³⁷

These incidence of violence, almost five years after NATO's bombing campaign began, demonstrated to the people of Kosovo that NATO was not able to prevent all violence in the province. This had been clear from the outset of its presence in Kosovo. However, it also demonstrated that KFOR was able to quickly calm the situation and that it did not allow the violence to spiral out of control. NATO's commitment and

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ 'Kosovo Situation Calming Down After Extra Troops Deployed, Says UN Mission', GlobalSecurity.org, *UN News Service*, 19 March 2004,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040319-unnews01.htm>>.

²³⁷ Ibid.

capability in reinforcing KFOR forces when they were required most, was a success. That reinforcement capacity led to the re-establishment of calm in Kosovo.

Ultimately, the security situation in Kosovo was fluid, with longer periods of relative stability and shorter periods where targeted violence increased. The level of violence depended, to a certain extent, on the level of protection KFOR had deployed in a certain area at any given time.²³⁸ However, both UNMIK and KFOR had been eager to encourage increased participation by Kosovo Serbs in the local government institutions they established for Kosovo (as demonstrated below), as a way of increasing security and prosperity for the entire population. The political structure of autonomous Kosovo and its democratisation process had also been a crucial part of UNMIK, OSCE and KFOR's strategy in getting the ethnic groups to air their grievances through peaceful, democratic means, rather than through acts of violence.

NATO's Peace-building and Democratisation of Kosovo: The Election Process since the Insertion of UNMIK and NATO

After a decade of political instability, UNMIK and KFOR saw the need to establish a process of democratic change in Kosovo. The province had turbulent experiences relating to elections, with ethnic Albanians boycotting Serbian elections and Kosovo Serbs boycotting illegal Kosovo elections between 1989 and 1999.²³⁹ With the insertion of NATO forces, the United Nations and the OSCE into the province, one of their priorities was to establish democratic political institutions that were considered legitimate by all Kosovars.²⁴⁰ That could only be achieved if the people of Kosovo had a say in the running of their day-to-day affairs. Democratic, free and fair elections,

²³⁸ 'Ninth Assessment of the Situation of Minorities in Kosovo', OSCE & UNHCR Report, September 2001 – April 2002, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min_rep_09_eng.pdf>.

²³⁹ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 1998.

²⁴⁰ 'Building Democracy', UNMIK at Two, October 2000, <<http://www.unmikonline.org/2ndyear/unmik2p7.htm>>.

therefore, were seen as the best way to achieve this outcome and to promote self-governance in the province.²⁴¹

The first elections that took place under the UNMIK/NATO administration of Kosovo were the Municipal elections of 28 October 2000, over a year and two months after KFOR entered Kosovo. A total of 39 political parties and one million eligible voters took part in the process, of which 13 won certified council mandates.²⁴² These elections were organised and administered by a OSCE/UN Civil Administration Joint Task Force, and it was agreed that the Municipal elections model would also be used for the highly anticipated Kosovo Assembly elections the following year.²⁴³ Voter turnout for the municipal elections was 80 per cent,²⁴⁴ and although the Kosovo Albanians were actively involved, the Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian government were not.²⁴⁵

Safety concerns for the remaining 80,000 Kosovo Serbs, and lack of facilities for those who fled to Serbia to vote, contributed to the shortage of Serb engagement in the electoral process, of which only 1,000 Serbs registered to vote as opposed to 900,000 Albanians.²⁴⁶ Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica stated that Kosovo was still a Serbian province and the elections were unacceptable because they only served one

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ 'Rivals Each Claim Lead in Elections', *CNN News*, Europe, 29 October 2000, <<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/10/29/kosovo.count/index.html>>.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

nation.²⁴⁷ However, the OSCE and UNMIK claimed they had learnt from these mistakes and would rectify the situation for the 2001 Assembly elections:²⁴⁸

UNMIK is committed this time to ensuring that members of all national communities take part. This means reaching out to the maximum number of people registering, some 100,000 inside Kosovo, so that they have the opportunity to vote. OSCE itself is organizing voter registration teams to visit minority enclaves where potential voters lack freedom of movement ... While encouraging all groups to exercise their suffrage, UNMIK and the international community are making intense efforts especially to convince the Kosovo Serb community to engage in the political process. The Institution Building Pillar DSRSG visited both Belgrade and Kosovo Serb communities calling on Kosovo Serbs (who boycotted the 2000 election) to register themselves and their parties. An information campaign carries a clear message that registration can be disassociated from an election itself since it leaves the option of voting open. In line with that, FRY President Kostunica himself now urges Kosovo Serbs to register.²⁴⁹

With the sensitivities and limitations discovered from the October 2000 Municipal election, UNMIK and the OSCE, in addition to the Yugoslav government, were now doing all they could to urge full participation of Kosovo Serbs in the election of the new assembly. The elections for the newly-established Kosovo Assembly were held on 19 November 2001.²⁵⁰ After two and a half years of international administration, the Kosovo Albanians moved away from the extremist politics of the KLA and its political leadership, instead, turning back to Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The LDK's dominance in Kosovo's first democratic legislative election process was an interesting result, given that the KLA actually fought to liberate Kosovo from the Serbs, as opposed to the LDK who followed a policy of passive resistance during the years of Serbian control, ultimately achieving little. Nevertheless,

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ 'Building Democracy', UNMIK at Two, 2000.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ 'Legislative Elections in Kosovo', *NATO Update*, 22 November 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1112/e1117a.htm>>.

it was an indication that the Kosovo Albanians were moving away from the extremist political parties.²⁵¹

The November 2001 Assembly elections included a total electorate of 1,249,987 people. Of those 64.3 per cent voted, totalling 883,796 votes, with 788,303 votes certified as valid.²⁵² The Kuvendi/Skuptina (Assembly) had one hundred and twenty members, one hundred members elected by proportional representation, and twenty members representing national minorities, ten Serbian, four Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian, three Bosniak, two Turkish and one Gorani seat. The results for first Kosovo Assembly were:

Table 13: Kosovo Assembly Election, November 2001

PARTY	VOTES	PER CENT	SEATS
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)	359,851	45.65	47
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)	202,622	25.70	26
Coalition Returning – Serb Party (KP)	89,388	11.34	22
Alliance for the Future Kosovo (AAK)	61,688	7.83	8
Motherland (VATAN)	9,030	1.15	4
Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (KDTP)	7,879	1.00	3
Initiative for a Democratic Kosovo (IRDK)	3,976	0.50	2
Christian – Democratic Albanian Party of Kosovo (PDASHK)	3,411	0.43	2

Source: OSCE Mission in Kosovo; Elections 2001 & Electionworld.org

Table 13 indicated that the election was a success for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), winning forty seven seats in the new assembly, with nearly 46 per cent of the vote.²⁵³ That was considered an important victory for the LDK, and for NATO and the UN, who were encouraging the electorate to vote for the moderate candidates.²⁵⁴ Rugova was considered moderate when compared to the more militant

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² 'Elections', OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001.

²⁵³ See Table 13.

²⁵⁴ 'Kosovo: Short History', *International Crisis Group*, August 2004,

and separatist Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which was comprised of members of the former KLA.²⁵⁵ The PDK won around 21 per cent less of the vote than the LDK, making it the second largest party in the new assembly.²⁵⁶ The election results confirmed that both the LDK and the PDK would emerge as the dominant political parties in Kosovo, striking a balance between moderate and extremist policy, but both parties fully committed to Kosovo's independence from Serbia.²⁵⁷

The Coalition Returning Party (CRP) of the remaining Serb minority in Kosovo did well in the elections winning 89,398 votes, and those of most ethnic Serbs who voted in the November elections.²⁵⁸ With only 11.3 per cent of the total vote the CRP managed to capture twenty two seats;²⁵⁹ only four seats behind their bitter rivals, the PDK. Due to the special minority conditions established to protect the Serbs, Roma, Turks and Gorani, the electoral system for twenty seats (of the one hundred and twenty seats in the assembly) were allocated by a proportional representation system. Therefore, explaining the discrepancy between the number of seats won by the Kosovo Albanian parties as opposed to those won by Kosovo Serbs.²⁶⁰

The only other party to emerge as a relative winner in the elections was the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, with eight seats and nearly eight per cent of the total vote.²⁶¹

The Motherland Party won four seats, the Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party a total of

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=58>.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ See Table 13.

²⁵⁷ 'Kosovo: Short History', *International Crisis Group*, August 2004,

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=58>.

²⁵⁸ See Table 13.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ 'Building Democracy', UNMIK at Two, 2000.

²⁶¹ See Table 13.

three seats. A succession of twenty other minor parties received two seats or fewer.²⁶² The high number of political parties present in Kosovo, and their active participation in the assembly elections, was a positive indication that the people of Kosovo were embracing the democratic process. Around 64 per cent of eligible voters turned out to participate in the elections, thus ensuring that the result was considered legitimate.²⁶³

In March 2002, LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova also won the Presidency. The Presidency was the post that Rugova held since 1992 in the “parallel state of the Republic of Kosovo” under Serbian control.²⁶⁴ The Prime Ministership was given to Bajram Rexhepi, a PDK member, indicating that both rival parties would have to work closely together in government.²⁶⁵ The acting High Representative of UNMIK, Michael Steiner, held his position since his office was not effected by the democratic election process. In addition to the LDK and PDK parties being represented in government, both the Kosovo Albanian parties of the AAK and VATAN were also given a share in the broad-based coalition government.²⁶⁶ Interestingly however, no minority groups were given a share in the government. This raised serious doubts as to how representative democracy in Kosovo was developing given the unwillingness of the Kosovo Albanians to share power with the Serbs and other minorities.

By October 2003, a considerable number of ‘non-reserved’ functions of government were transferred by UNMIK to the new Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Of the identified non-reserved functions by the transfer council, nineteen had already

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ ‘Elections’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2001.

²⁶⁴ ‘Ibrahim Rugova, President of Kosovo’, *Southeast European Times*, March 2002, <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/infoBios/setimes/resource_centre/bios/rugova_ibrahim>.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

been transferred to the competence of the PISG by October 2003, with twenty-five more also allocated for transfer by the end of 2003. In addition to the non-reserved competencies, the Prime Minister of Kosovo submitted a proposal to UNMIK, in order to secure a number of reserved competencies, which were untaken by United Nations Special Representative in Kosovo. Some of these proposals were favourably examined, and decisions would continue to be made in relation to the transference of power from UNMIK to the PISG.²⁶⁷ The transfer of powers from the UNMIK and KFOR to the PISG was a further indication that confidence was growing in the local political institutions and in their ability to take on more of the responsibility of governance.

However, the democratic development of Kosovo took a step backward in the general elections of October 2004. As in the November 2001 process, the October 2004 election was to select the new members of the legislative assembly in Kosovo. But, unlike the 2001 assembly election, the October 2004 vote was to determine the formation of a government that would negotiate 'final status' talks with Belgrade on independence.²⁶⁸ Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, not wanting to lend further legitimacy to any movement toward formal independence for the province, urged Kosovo Serbs to completely boycott the assembly elections.²⁶⁹ With Belgrade urging a boycott, the eligible 107,000 Serb voters in Kosovo stayed away, with only 14,000 Serbs registering to vote, with only 1,000 of those casting a vote at the election.²⁷⁰ That was a major blow to continuing development of representative democracy in Kosovo, leaving the largest minority out of the legislative mechanisms at

²⁶⁷ *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo*, S/2003/996, October 2003, <<http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/562/93/IMG/N0356293.pdf?OpenElement>>.

²⁶⁸ Daniel Williams, 'Serbs Boycott Kosovo Elections', *Washington Post*, October 24 2004, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57465-2004Oct23.html>>.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

the crucial period of preparing for the final status talks to determine the future of Kosovo.

Table 14: Kosovo Assembly Election, October 2004

NOTE: This table is included on page 286 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: OSCE/UNMIK Press Release, 3 November 2004: 'Central election Commission Approves Final Results of Kosovo Assembly Election'.

The LDK was again clearly the victorious party, and the PDK marginally improved on its 2001 election performance.²⁷¹ Serbian representation in the assembly was negligible due to the Serbian government urging the boycott of these elections. The LDK, as the largest party, refused to govern with the PDK again due to tensions arising from their last coalition experience, and opted for an alliance with the AAK instead.²⁷² The 2004 election was an indication that the political institutions of Kosovo were taking shape. However the Serbian boycott, more a political protest directed from Belgrade rather than dissatisfaction relating to the function of the PISG, took away from the overall success of the democratisation process in the province under the guidance of NATO, UN and OSCE. With the democratic development of Kosovo progressing and more responsibility being passed over by UNMIK to the local government institutions, KFOR had to begin reassessing whether its continued presence in the province was still necessary.

²⁷¹ See Table 14.

²⁷² Daniel Williams, 'Serbs Boycott Kosovo Elections', *Washington Post*, October 24 2004, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57465-2004Oct23.html>>.

The Downsizing of KFOR: Successful Enterprise or Premature Exit?

KFOR, not unlike its equivalent in Bosnia, SFOR, had undergone continuous restructuring since its deployment in June 1999. At the time of its deployment, KFOR had over 50,000 mainly NATO troops under its command.²⁷³ NATO's requirement for such a large number of troops in the region was indicative of the substantial task the organisation anticipated in order to provide security to Kosovo. As expected by NATO, the mission to secure Kosovo was difficult, and KFOR was often stretched for resources at the initial stages of its mission.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, by mid-2003, only 22,487 troops remained in KFOR, and of those, 3,936 of them were from non-NATO contributing countries, indicating that there were less than 20,000 NATO troops left in Kosovo.²⁷⁵ Further reductions in KFOR were evident, and by mid-2005 the number of troops still deployed in Kosovo was around 17,000; this being around one third of the original number deployed after NATO's air campaign.²⁷⁶

The continuous reduction and reshaping of KFOR had been a clear sign that NATO felt confident enough to scale back its operation in Kosovo due to an improved security environment.²⁷⁷ To KFOR's credit, its presence prevented the committing of more potential murders and destruction of property since its deployment. As demonstrated above, the level of violence had dramatically reduced when measured against the levels of 1999 and 2000, and where violence did flare up, KFOR effectively intervened to stop it from spiralling out of control.²⁷⁸ Also, with the

²⁷³ 'Military Operations', *European Defence*, 2005, <<http://www.european-defence.co.uk/militaryops.html>>.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *Monthly report to the UN on the operations of the Kosovo Force*, S/2003/855, 2 September 2003, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/9b600dca423f89bec1256d9c004a3322?OpenDocument>>.

²⁷⁶ 'Military Operations', *European Defence*, 2005.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ 'Kosovo Situation Calming Down After Extra Troops Deployed, Says UN Mission', *GlobalSecurity.org*, *UN News Service*, 19 March 2004,

development of political institutions and elections, the democratisation of Kosovo allowed the people of the province to express their ideas through the ballot box, not with the use of weapons.

For the Kosovo Albanian majority, the security and political environment in Kosovo has tilted to their advantage.²⁷⁹ That has been in part due to UNMIK administration of Kosovo, which has tended to favour an independent Kosovo from Serbia. For the Kosovo Serbs, though, ever since the withdrawal of the Serb forces, their community's continued presence in Kosovo remains under threat. Although the security situation has improved, the future for the Kosovo Serbs appears less certain.²⁸⁰

NATO has yet to decide on a final timetable to end its mission in Kosovo.²⁸¹ Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO feels the current conditions are far from ideal for a projected end to its peace operation in the province.²⁸² There is still much healing to carry out between all the ethnic groups within Kosovo, and more importantly, the final status of Kosovo has yet to be negotiated by the involved parties.²⁸³ Therefore, the presence of KFOR will continue to be vital in upholding a secure environment for the further enhancement of the democratic political institutions that are evolving in the Kosovo, whether it becomes independent or remains part of Serbia.

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040319-unnews01.htm>>.

²⁷⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, pp.235 – 243.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ 'No Quick Reduction of Kosovo Troop Levels', *NATO Online*, 17 November 2006,

<http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/November_19/2.html>.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

Chapter Eight

The Last Conflict in the Balkans: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and NATO Intervention

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia can be highlighted as the best example of NATO intervention in the Balkans; more so than in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO was able to move more effectively to prevent a full-scale war in FYROM. NATO, after intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo, as this chapter will demonstrate, had finally found a formula to prevent another large-scale conflict in the Balkans.¹ The relative effectiveness of NATO's mission preventing conflict, without resorting to the use of armed force will be examined. NATO's intervention was required in FYROM after elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who were supposedly disarmed during the NATO peace operation in Kosovo, managed to filter their way through the NATO-controlled border between Kosovo and FYROM to establish a presence in the latter.² Underlying ethnic Albanian resentment from alleged discrimination and lack of recognition of their ethnic identity by Slav Macedonians, led to the ethnic Albanians of FYROM supporting an armed insurrection by the National Liberation Army (NLA), the FYROM equivalent of the KLA, which was very popular amongst the ethnic Albanians.³ The outbreak of limited fighting between the NLA and FYROM security forces throughout 2001 threatened to disrupt the uneasy peace the country had managed to maintain since the collapse of

¹ Operation Essential Harvest, 'NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', 9 Dec 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm>>.

² Julie Kim, 'Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict', *CRS Report for Congress*, 7 November 2001, <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30900.pdf>>.

³ Timothy Garton Ash, *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches From Europe in the 1990s*, 1999, p.327.

Yugoslavia a decade earlier. Once again, NATO found itself playing a crucial role in supporting the end of hostilities and the return to stability.

NATO Enters FYROM: Operation Essential Harvest

Operation 'Essential Harvest' was launched on 22 August 2001, but it did not get underway until 27 August 2001.⁴ The projected accomplishment of the mission was initially set to 30 days. NATO's Operation Essential Harvest involved the sending of approximately 3,500 NATO troops, with logistical support, to disarm ethnic Albanian groups, particularly the NLA and destroy their weapons.⁵ That operation was carried out by NATO troops as a mechanism to facilitate an overall peace agreement between the FYROM government and the NLA. Operation Essential Harvest was carried out after a NATO brokered cease-fire held between the FYROM security forces and the NLA rebels.⁶ The operation was a result of a request by the President of FYROM, Boris Trajkovski, for NATO to help disarm and collect the weapons of the NLA rebels. NATO responded to the Presidential request for intervention:

The Alliance is prepared to provide assistance, on condition that the political dialogue between the different parties has 'a successful outcome' and a cease-fire is implemented. At this moment, and this moment only, NATO will send troops with 'strong and precise rules of engagement', to collect weapons from the ethnic Albanian extremists.⁷

Following the request for NATO's intervention by Trajkovski, Operation Essential Harvest was started, but work in disarming the NLA would not be complete by the 30 day deadline.⁸ Therefore, an extension of the Operation's timeframe and scope was

⁴ Operation Essential Harvest, 'NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', 9 Dec 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm>>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ 'Skopje Requests NATO Assistance', *NATO Update*, 20 June 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0618/e0620a.htm>>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 'Operation Amber Fox/Task Force Fox', 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>>.

needed. In the meantime, as NATO had requested of them, the FYROM government and the ethnic Albanian community had agreed to a political settlement to their conflict. Known as the Framework Agreement, it outlined Constitutional change for FYROM in line with a greater political role for the ethnic Albanian community in the country.⁹ This was achieved in the launching of the next phase, 'Operation Amber Fox'. NATO authorised its activation on 26 September 2001, and the stated mission was:

to contribute to the protection of international monitors who will oversee the implementation of the peace plan in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mission will be deployed under German leadership with the participation of other NATO nations and will consist of some 700 troops, if necessary together with 300 troops already in the country. The duration of Operation Amber Fox will be three months with the option to consider a prolongation depending on the situation in the country.¹⁰

NATO's role in the FYROM evidently differed from the role the alliance played in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Its role in FYROM did not involve unilateral military intervention to separate the belligerents. Rather, it accepted a task that had been requested of it by the legitimate authorities of the republic. The FYROM authorities, in a complete contradiction to the tactics used by Milosevic's government in Yugoslavia to crush the KLA, welcomed the intervention of NATO.¹¹ That political manoeuvre ensured NATO's support of the FYROM government against the NLA, which had hoped to secure similar levels of sympathy and support the KLA managed after the brutality of Milosevic's campaign.¹² NATO's position, however, was clear. Its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of FYROM was beyond doubt,

⁹ Julie Kim, 'Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict', *CRS Report for Congress*, 7 November 2001, <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30900.pdf>>.

¹⁰ 'Operation Amber Fox/Task Force Fox', 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>>.

¹¹ 'Skopje Requests NATO Assistance', *NATO Update*, 20 June 2001.

¹² 'Viewpoint: They Want Us to Leave', *BBC News*, 26 June 2001, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1408861.stm>>.

but it felt that the ethnic Albanians had genuine issues of concern that needed to be addressed.¹³

NATO's support to the FYROM government was evident in the task they undertook through Operation Essential Harvest. Unlike NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, where NATO used heavy military force under the banner of 'humanitarian intervention' for the sake of hundreds of thousands of people oppressed by their own state, Operation Essential Harvest regarded FYROM as the victim of an insurrection, but qualified that the rebels had some legitimate grievances. NATO's official position regarding the conflict in FYROM was:

NATO remains actively engaged to end the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in cooperation with other international players. There is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the crisis by political means. The resumption of fighting and pursuit of a military option would lead to a disaster. NATO opposes firmly any material or moral support given to extremist groups. KFOR has significantly stepped up its presence along the border between Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the aim to interdict logistic support to the so-called NLA and its operations. Since the beginning of June, KFOR has seized over 3,300 weapons and 73,000 rounds of ammunitions. In addition to this, during the same period KFOR has detained 385 illegal border trespassers and suspected members of the so-called NLA.¹⁴

NATO had undertaken to demonstrate its position regarding the instability in FYROM through official policy statements relating to developments in the country. These statements were delivered with the intent to not encourage the NLA to undertake what the KLA had done in Kosovo:

NATO firmly supports the sovereignty, stability and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO fully backs the democratically elected, broad-based coalition government in the former

¹³ 'Macedonia Peace Process', *BBC News*, 21 November 2001, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1331772.stm>>.

¹⁴ 'Operation Essential Harvest – Key Facts', *NATO Fact Sheets*, 17 August 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/ff-macedonia.htm>>.

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹⁵

In addition to NATO officially throwing their support behind the FYROM government, NATO stipulated that the support was conditional on the protection and inclusion of all minority groups within the country. NATO was, therefore, also lending some measured support to the plight of the ethnic Albanians, Turks, Serbs and Vlachs in the country:

We [NATO] condemn extremist violence and reject any attempts to change borders by force. We call on all parties in the region to speak out against violent extremism. NATO opposes firmly any material or moral support given to extremist groups. It is important to address the legitimate aspirations of the ethnic Albanian population as such, which will in turn ensure the isolation of extremist groups. NATO encourages local level programmes and confidence building measures that promote multi-ethnic co-operation and work to develop consensus against violence. It is also important to address the concern of other ethnic communities, including Turks, Serbs, Vlachs and Romans, who have chosen to pursue their rights through the legitimate institutions in the country.¹⁶

NATO's position on FYROM was similar to the policy they pursued toward Kosovo. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, minority rights and the denunciation of terrorist activities were all key components of NATO's policy in relation to Kosovo.¹⁷ To that end, NATO invested considerable time and resources in preventing a full-scale war that would alter the status quo in FYROM in any significant way.¹⁸ NATO's Secretary General, Lord Robertson responded to invitations from the FYROM government for assistance by extending NATO's moral and political support.¹⁹ NATO's appointment of a Senior Civilian Representative in Skopje, Ambassador Hansjorg Eiff,²⁰ was a

¹⁵ 'Operation Essential Harvest – NATO's Policy', *NATO Fact Sheets*, 17 August 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/ff-macedonia.htm>>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ 'Operation Essential Harvest – Political Measures', *NATO Fact Sheets*, 17 August 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/ff-macedonia.htm>>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

concrete political action of support to ensure that it was able to liaise closely with the FYROM leadership as well act as a mechanism to keep NATO informed on any potential developments in the country.

Along with its concerted effort in remaining involved at the political level in the developments which were unfolding in FYROM from August 2001 onward, NATO's presence in Kosovo allowed the organisation to carry out effective military measures, which were designed to reduce the pressure on FYROM's security forces.²¹ Operation Eagle was launched by KFOR in an attempt to increase aerial and ground patrols along the Kosovo-FYROM border.²² It was also designed to prevent the NLA from being supplied through this route and to prevent Kosovo being used as a logistical base of operations by the NLA.²³ The use of KFOR's Multinational Brigade East and Multinational Brigade South for the purpose of intercepting weapons smugglers to FYROM, weapons intended for the NLA rebel group, further strengthened NATO's commitment to establishing a peaceful environment where the Slavic majority and ethnic Albanian minority would be required to resolve their differences through political dialogue, not through insurrection. The military cooperation between NATO and FYROM was further strengthened with surveillance and intelligence data being shared by KFOR through the NATO Cooperation and Coordination Cell (NCCC), giving the FYROM government greater flexibility in their fight against the NLA.²⁴

²¹ 'Operation Essential Harvest – Operation Eagle', *NATO Fact Sheets*, 17 August 2001, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/ff-macedonia.htm>>.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

The Framework Agreement: Constitutional Reform in FYROM

NATO was keen to establish a formal agreement between the FYROM government and the ethnic Albanian minority that would institutionalise reforms that would satisfy both sides without jeopardising the sovereignty and integrity of the state. To that end, the FYROM government and the NLA negotiated a Constitutional reform package called the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which was signed in August 2001. NATO would act as the guarantor of the agreement to ensure its successful implementation.

The Framework Agreement was:

An agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.²⁵

The FYROM government, under pressure from the increasing insurgent activities and losses of large swathes of territory, caved in and agreed to Constitutional changes that would result in a more representative republic where ethnic Albanians would be given cultural, ethnic and political rights.²⁶ The recognition of those rights by the FYROM government was seen as essential by NATO and considered the bare minimum requirement for the NLA to consider a cessation of hostilities. The agreement's 'Basic Principles' stressed the need to find a solution peacefully, without having to resort to arms again or threaten the territorial integrity of the Republic.²⁷ All that met the central demands of the FYROM government, but the Basic Principles also stated:

The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society must be preserved and reflected in public life ... A modern democratic state in its natural course of

²⁵ *Framework Agreement*, Ministry of Information, Republic of Macedonia, 18 August 2001, <<http://www.sinf.gov.mk/PressRoomEN/2001/07/n0815.htm>>.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

development and maturation must continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports with the highest international standards, which themselves continue to evolve ... The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities.²⁸

The mention of self-government for local areas was a crucial concession by the FYROM government to the ethnic Albanians, who in many areas of North-western FYROM constituted a clear majority.²⁹ Establishing more representative local government in areas such as the predominantly ethnic Albanian city of Tetevo, had effectively given them governance over their own affairs.³⁰ The cessation of hostilities, which was also a significant aim of the Basic Principles, established precisely how the ceasefire and disarmament process would be carried out.³¹ A crucial part of the agreement was that the NLA agreed to their complete disbandment and the immediate cessation of hostilities by their side.³² NATO, by agreement of all parties, was to play a major role in this process:

They [all the parties] acknowledge that a decision by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems of this country, a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO forces will operate.³³

Therefore, NATO was to become for the third time in seven years the institution to enforce the peace in the former Yugoslavia. Its operational status was different to its role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In FYROM NATO was not involved militarily in halting the fighting, but was actively involved in disarmament of the NLA

²⁸ 'Basic Principles Articles 1.3, 1.4 & 1.5', *Framework Agreement*, Ministry of Information, Republic of Macedonia, 18 August 2001, <<http://www.sinf.gov.mk/PressRoomEN/2001/07/n0815.htm>>.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid Article 2 & 2.1, Basic Principles, *Framework Agreement*, 2001.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid Article 2.1, 'Basic Principles', *Framework Agreement*, 2001.

and supervising the ceasefire in order to enforce the Agreement.³⁴ Ultimately, NATO was the guarantor of the Framework Agreement, once again demonstrating that NATO had managed to carve a role for itself in peace operations in the Balkans. The success of NATO's committed to its peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo was why the FYROM government sought NATO's intervention and guarantee of the peace process.³⁵

The development of a decentralised government also was a prominent feature of the Basic Principles part of the Agreement. In particular, a revised law was to be introduced which not only reinforced their powers, but enhanced the scope of the newly-established local authorities to EU standards. Specifically:

Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfil all of their responsibilities.³⁶

The introduction of enhanced local government would benefit the ethnic Albanians who constitute large minorities, or even the majority of the communal population in many parts of North-western FYROM.³⁷ The amendments to the Constitution made by the Framework Agreement empowered the regional governments in important policy areas, including those of economy, culture, education and health care; a very broad range of responsibilities to take on. Social welfare, health care and

³⁴ This was because NATO did not use military force to intervene in FYROM, it persuaded both sides to accept conditions leading to a ceasefire before entering the country. That was in contrast to Bosnia and Kosovo where NATO launched military operations to halt the fighting.

³⁵ 'Skopje Requests NATO Assistance', *NATO Update*, 20 June 2001.

³⁶ 'Basic Principles Articles 3.1', *Framework Agreement*, Ministry of Information, Republic of Macedonia, 18 August 2001, <<http://www.sinf.gov.mk/PressRoomEN/2001/07/n0815.htm>>.

³⁷ Kevin Adamson & Dejan Jovic, 'The Macedonian-Albanian Political Frontier: The Re-articulation of post-Yugoslav Identities', *Nations and Nationalism* 10 (3) 2004, <<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00168.x?cookieSet=1>>.

environmental protection, although are often tackled by regional governments, are not generally the domain of municipalities, indicating the number of concessions won by the ethnic Albanians in reshaping the new Constitution of FYROM.

Article 6 of the Basic Principles dealt with the use of language in the education system. Native languages such as Albanian were to be made available at primary, secondary and tertiary levels.³⁸ At university level, native languages were only to be used for ethnic minorities that comprise 20 per cent of the overall population of FYROM, with the state to provide the funding relating to the establishment and maintenance of that service.³⁹ The concession by the FYROM government to allow education in the Albanian language was a major one and useful for the reconciliation process since similar demands by Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Syria for example are met with stiff resistance from their respective governments.⁴⁰

In addition to the concessions relating to the use of language, the freedom to express cultural identity was also an important aspect of the Framework Agreement, covered under the Basic Principles.⁴¹ Specifically, the article goes far beyond what most other states would even allow in return for reconciliation:

With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and usages.⁴²

³⁸ Article 6, 'Basic Principles', *Framework Agreement*, 2001.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Joseph Stroupe, 'Northern Iraq – Calm Like a Bomb', *Asia Times*, 9 June 2004, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FF09Ak03.html>.

⁴¹ Article 7.1, 'Basic Principles', *Framework Agreement*, 2001.

⁴² *Ibid.*

The Ohrid Agreement allowed the display of the red and black flag of the Albanian republic in the areas of FYROM that were primarily Albanian in character, as well as the usage of the Albanian double-headed eagle as an official symbol of the ethnic Albanians of FYROM.⁴³ To allow a minority freedom to express such symbolism, especially displaying the flag of a rival neighbouring state in the Balkans, is usually a very sensitive issue. Greece has been very sensitive about FYROM using the Star of Vergina, considered an ancient Greek symbol, on its national flag, to a point where FYROM was obliged to remove it.⁴⁴ Turkey also does not allow Kurdish symbols to be displayed either.⁴⁵ Allowing the Albanian double-headed eagle to fly was a significant gesture. Had NATO not been brokering and supporting the negotiations between the FYROM government and the ethnic Albanian political parties, such clauses in an agreement would had not be obtainable.

Ultimately, the Framework Agreement formulated by the FYROM government and the ethnic Albanian representatives under the auspices of NATO provided for the shifting emphasis of FYROM from a republic dominated by the majority ethnic Macedonians to one which afforded the ethnic Albanian minority proportional political, economic and social rights. Its ratification by the FYROM parliament, and its acceptance by both the political and rebel movements of the ethnic Albanians, made the deal one which all sides could express hope in.

The next phase of the process was to implement some confidence-building measures between the two sides in order to create the climate necessary for the Framework

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ 'When Archaeology Gets Bent', *BBC News*, 8 January 2004, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3372117.stm>>.

⁴⁵ 'Turkey Wary as Iraqi Kurds Hoist Kurdish Flag', *Turkish Daily News*, 17 September 2006, <<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=54110&mailtofriend=1>>.

Agreement to work. On 7 March 2002, the amnesty law for criminal acts in the 2001 conflict was debated and ratified in the national parliament of FYROM, as part of the overall Constitutional reform package. The gradual ratification and implementation of the Framework Agreement was a milestone for FYROM, with the country taking eleven years after gaining its independence from the SFRY to formally recognise the important place of its ethnic Albanian minority. The next day, in honour of that occasion, NATO's Secretary General, George Robertson, issued the following statement:

Last night, the Parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia adopted by a significant majority an amnesty law for criminal acts related to the 2001 conflict in FYROM. This law is another critical step in the implementation of the Framework Agreement signed in Ohrid in August 2001 by all political parties in FYROM. I congratulate the government and the parliamentarians for their vision and courage in voting for this law. Their vote demonstrates their unwavering commitment to peace and stability in FYROM and lays the ground for reconciliation of all ethnic groups in the country.⁴⁶

Lord Robertson's statement reflected the courageous steps taken by both communities. For the Macedonians to accept an amnesty law that overlooked the crimes of the NLA in their fight against their security and police forces was a huge leap of faith in the interests of peace.⁴⁷ Also, for those who lost relatives during the brief conflict, it was anticipated that they would not be so forgiving. NATO, and its Secretary General, had every reason to be proud of the people of FYROM and their commitment to upholding the Framework agreement as the surest path to peaceful co-existence, even though the scars of conflict were so fresh.⁴⁸ NATO could also claim much of the credit because of its efforts in the facilitation and implementation of that successful peace process, one

⁴⁶ George Robertson, 'Statement by Secretary General of NATO', 8 March 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-033e.htm>>.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

that presented far less problems to NATO than Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.⁴⁹ As with both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, NATO provided the conditions necessary to establish a democratic election process that would determine the composition of the future multi-ethnic government.

FYROM Elections 2002: Rejection of Hardline Government

After pulling back from the brink of full-scale war in 2001 following the strong support of NATO, the successful process of democratic, free and fair elections was carried out in FYROM's legislative election in September 2002. For the Macedonian majority, the election was an opportunity to evict the hardline nationalist party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VRMO) of Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, in favour of the more moderate Social Democrats led by Branko Crvenkovski, an experienced politician who had been Prime Minister for six years previously.⁵⁰ The election of a less-nationalist prime minister, only a year after ethnic conflict ended, was a positive signal sent by the Macedonian majority that they were ready to move forward from nationalist politics.⁵¹ The ethnic Albanians, on the other hand, utterly rejected their more moderate representatives in the Parliament, with Ali Ahmeti's Democratic Union for Integration, a former NLA rebel, winning over the Democratic Party of Albanians that was in coalition with VRMO.

⁴⁹ See Chapter 5, 6 and 7.

⁵⁰ Alix Kroeger, 'Peace Wins in Macedonia Poll', *BBC News*, 16 September 2002, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2262175.stm>>.

⁵¹ Kole Casule, *Reuters*, 15 September 2002, <http://www.reuters.com/news_article.jhtml?type=worldnews&StoryID=1450982>.

Table 15: FYROM Legislative Election: September 2002

NOTE: This table is included on page 302 of the print copy of the thesis held in the University of Adelaide Library.

Source: Exit - Poll by Washington-based International Republican Institute

Although the ethnic Albanians turned to the 'hero' of their cause in the former NLA fighter Ali Ahmeti and his party, the Macedonians' shift toward the Social Democrats was an extremely pleasing development as far as the international community were concerned. Kole Casule wrote:

The election, free of inter-ethnic violence, looked like a dream result for Western powers which have laboured to stabilize the volatile Balkan republic over the past 18 months ... Western powers which brokered last year's peace deal to end the Albanian rebellion expressed relief that the election passed off without the organized violence they had feared.⁵²

Branko Crvenkovski, a moderate and former Communist, campaigned, in part, on the promise that he and his party, the Social Democratic League of Macedonia, broadly supported the Ohrid Framework Agreement.⁵³ That position was in stark contrast to VRMO's Ljubco Georgevski, a nationalist, who only grudgingly accepted the Ohrid Framework Agreement under pressure from NATO.⁵⁴

A large OSCE election observation team was present to monitor the election process and there were only a few isolated incidents during the 12-hour election period.⁵⁵ The fact that there was restraint on both sides and no orchestrated violence from the official

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Alix Kroeger, 'Peace Wins in Macedonia Poll', *BBC News*, 16 September 2002, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2262175.stm>>.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Kole Casule, 2002.

parties, was considered a successful result by NATO.⁵⁶ A spokesman for NATO stated halfway through the election period: “All indications so far are that the citizens of Macedonia have capitalized on this opportunity for free, democratic and peaceful elections.”⁵⁷

Crucially, all the political parties, of both the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian communities, accepted the results and the spirit in which the election was run. That was required in order to maintain hope that lasting peace would take hold after the tumult of 2000 and 2001. For its part, NATO was optimistic about the results of the election process, with NATO’s Secretary General, George Robertson’s stating in relation to the poll:

The people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia voted yesterday in free and democratic legislative elections. These elections, held in a generally peaceful environment, were largely conducted in accordance with international standards. Across the whole country, large numbers of citizens from all ethnic communities voted. In doing so, they strongly expressed their will to take an active part in shaping their common future ... The people of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and their political leaders have demonstrated political maturity and have set an example for the region as a whole. They have given themselves the power to build a dynamic, prosperous and peaceful society.⁵⁸

Generally optimistic, Lord Robertson also cautioned that the work ahead for peace and stability was not yet over, and that much more needed to be achieved in that regard.⁵⁹ He did, however, acknowledge that the September 2002 polls were a significant and decisive step in that direction.⁶⁰ Robertson interpreted the large numbers who turned out to participate in the elections as a message delivered by the people of FYROM that

⁵⁶ George Robertson, ‘Statement on FYROM Elections’, *NATO Online*, 16 September 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-105e.htm>>.

⁵⁷ Kole Casule, 2002.

⁵⁸ George Robertson, ‘Statement on FYROM Elections’, *NATO Online*, 16 September 2002, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-105e.htm>>.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

they want to live in a multi-ethnic and democratic society. The election result also indicated that the people of FYROM had turned their back on the violence and recognised that their future lay within the Euro-Atlantic community. Lord Robertson concluded with a strong assurance designed to ease the remaining anxieties within the country:

I want to assure the people and political leaders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: NATO and the international community will stand by your side and will continue supporting the consolidation of peace and stability in the country.⁶¹

As indicated by Robertson's statement, NATO had a vested interest to see the political democratic process work in FYROM. Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the first direct elections conducted after NATO's intervention resulted in the hard-line parties of all ethnic groups being swept into power, the result in FYROM, similar to the first legislative elections in Kosovo, demonstrated that the extremist party on the Macedonian side had been rejected.⁶² The ethnic Albanians voted for the political wing of the NLA, whose political platform was integration, formally renouncing violence and separatism. The election in FYROM, therefore, proved to be a good result for the country. It was a process that could not have succeeded without the decisive and timely intervention of NATO, who had managed to succeed in its mission of preventing conflict and encouraging the evolution of a more multi-ethnic state in FYROM.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² See Table 15.

NATO Turns Over Responsibility to the EU

These positive developments in FYROM were vindicated by NATO's decision to formally transfer the mandate of its mission, Operation Allied Harmony, to the European Union on 31 March 2003. The decision to transfer the mission by NATO to the European Union was made by the North Atlantic Council on 17 March 2003.⁶³ It was an efficient transfer and was made possible by NATO allowing the European Union access to the collective assets of NATO member-states. At the handing over ceremony, Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson stated:

By taking on its first military mission, the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defence Policy has come of age. Based on new institutional ties with NATO, the EU can now even more effectively bring to bear its full range of political, economic and military tools.⁶⁴

Robertson's statement poured praise on the European Union's continued efforts to develop a military and security role in Europe⁶⁵, an aspect the EU was keen to add to its already successful economic and political institutions.⁶⁶ NATO's operations in FYROM⁶⁷ had achieved their aims of stabilising the country and retrieving many weapons from the NLA. NATO's role had come to an end with the European Union taking over responsibility of ensuring the continued implementation of the Framework

⁶³ George Robertson, 'Operation Allied Harmony Ends', 31 March 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0331a.htm>>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ The European Union, through its establishment of the Euro-Army, was seeking an increasingly significant role in European security. However, NATO was more capable to handle the more difficult situations.

⁶⁷ NATO's role in FYROM began with Operation Essential Harvest in August 2001 in order to disarm the NLA rebels and stabilize the country. The mandate and scope of that operation was extended when in September it was changed to Task Force Amber Fox, which stayed in place until December 2002. Task Force Amber Fox remained in the country to oversee the implementation of certain reforms the government of FYROM agreed to under the Ohrid Framework Agreement in order to get the disarming of the rebels. The final NATO mission in FYROM was Operation Allied Harmony, a further extension of Task Force Amber Fox, ended on 1 January 2004, when the EU took over the operation bringing to an end the shortest and most successful NATO involvement in the Balkans since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Agreement. Operation Concordia, as the mission was named, was the European Security and Defence Policy's (ESDP) first venture into the field of security, especially peace-keeping.⁶⁸ The operation consisted of 350 personnel, originally comprised of personnel from thirteen EU member-states and fourteen non-EU states.⁶⁹ The force used NATO assets and capabilities, further indication that NATO has been the organisation best placed and resourced to handle security operations in the Balkan sphere. However, the main advantage in NATO transferring the mission to the ESDP was that the operation expenses were to be covered by the EU, largely on the "costs lie where they fall" principle:⁷⁰

The core aim of the operation is, at the explicit request of the government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to contribute further to a stable secure environment to allow the FYROM government to implement the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operation is a contribution to the efforts to achieve a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed.⁷¹

The aim of Operation Concordia was to ensure that what NATO had achieved in FYROM would continue after its withdrawal from the country and to give the ESDP an opportunity to also contribute to the process. Although the most successful NATO operation in the Balkan region, the situation in FYROM still requires the limited presence of EU troops to keep all parties within the republic committed to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. However, the situation in FYROM is far more stable than Kosovo or even Bosnia, where NATO's presence has been longer and far more costly.

⁶⁸ Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, 'ESDP Operations', *Institute for Security Studies*, <<http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>>.

⁶⁹ 'EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', March 2003, <<http://ue.eu.int/arym/index.asp?lang=EN>>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Conclusion

NATO's Pre-eminence after the Cold War Established and Success in the Balkans Confirmed

The West stopped the killing in Bosnia three years too late, after 100,000 or more victims were already dead. In Kosovo, an attempt was made to learn from the past, and to act sooner rather than later. It is a tough decision to take, but one that could not and should not be dodged. Or should we watch from afar as the victims wail with grief on our television screens, and then a year or so later - when the dead have long been buried and memories have blurred - decide that maybe all those screaming foreigners were just trying to fool us after all?¹⁰¹²

The core hypothesis of this thesis was that NATO emerged as the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War. With its Cold War role at an end, NATO continued to retain relevance by expanding its membership eastward to Russia's borders and enhanced its military credibility through its interventions to suppress ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the FYROM. Although both NATO's expansion and its peace operations proved problematic, both have, judged as a whole, been a success, both in defining NATO's post-Cold War role and in ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Although successful, this thesis argues that NATO also made some mistakes in its handling of its peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, but that it had learnt from those mistakes and succeeded fully in its role in FYROM.

Overall, this thesis has argued that NATO has developed itself from a Cold War relic, unsure about its future, to an organisation that has not only maintained relevance with its expansion into the former Eastern Bloc countries, but also by proving itself to be

¹⁰¹² Julian Borger, 'The Last Indignity of these Sufferers is to be Disbelieved', *Bosnia Report* 19/20, The Bosnian Institute, October – December 2000.

the only viable security organisation to tackle the ethnic conflicts of the former Yugoslavia. In the words of the former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson: “NATO is the world’s most effective military organisation. It will not be in the lead in every crisis. But it has a vital role –in my view the vital role- to play in multinational crisis prevention and crisis management.”¹⁰¹³ NATO evolved into the most active military alliance since the end of the Cold War. It took on the role of peace enforcer and peace builder in the Balkans, inserting itself into Europe’s trouble spots, providing the military strength required to end the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and to remove Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Significantly, NATO also was able to prevent another ethnic conflict from fully developing in FYROM, pre-emptively acting to save lives. Clearly, without NATO’s intervention in these conflicts, they would have been prolonged, with more casualties being the result.

This thesis provided three separate case studies to demonstrate NATO’s significant role in peace enforcement and peace building, all three were quite different but ultimately signified NATO’s commitment to peace in the Balkan region. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO was intervening to stop a multi-dimensioned, multi-ethnic conflict that was not only fuelled by the previous Serbo-Croatian war in 1991-1992 but by ethnic tensions that stretched back hundreds of years. The complexity and brutality of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had already harmed the credibility of the United Nations and NATO was keen to avoid a similar fate. The United Nations No-Fly Zones that were established throughout Bosnia and patrolled by NATO forces were a limited success.

¹⁰¹³ Lord Robertson, ‘Speech on NATO’s Transatlantic Links’, Sälen, Sweden, 21 January 2000.

The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica, though, showed the ineffectiveness of the United Nations and the NATO alliance, with the latter burdened with interference in its scope of military operations by the former, making effective air-cover of civilians in Sarajevo impossible to achieve while the United Nations was in control of the process. Although NATO took limited military action against the Bosnian Serb army attacking Srebrenica, it was inadequate. The massacre of civilians in Srebrenica during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a defining moment for NATO. It was at that time that NATO decided to control its own forces independently of the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to ensure that such a situation would not happen again under its supervision.

The decisiveness of NATO's military campaign against Bosnian Serb targets in 1995 ultimately shifted the balance of power on the ground in favour of the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats. With Bosnian Serb military facilities such as command and control centres, airbases, barracks and power stations being damaged or destroyed by NATO bombing, the Bosnian Serb political leadership faced potentially losing the war, thus finally agreeing to negotiate an end to the conflict. The role of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not end after the negotiated political settlement, with the alliance being chosen as the best equipped organisation to provide security throughout the country during the implementation stage of the Dayton Accords.

The deployment of NATO's IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina not only provided physical security to the country but also established an environment that allowed the political institutions of the Dayton Accords to take shape. Elections were conducted, despite the ethnic tensions that resulted from the conflict, in a peaceful

atmosphere. In addition, NATO was tasked with locating and apprehending people who were indicted for war crimes by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, managing to arrest some high profile suspects who were forwarded onto the ICJ for trial. By providing the assets required to apprehend war crimes suspects, NATO was also contributing to the peace building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Importantly, NATO would use the experience it gained from its peace enforcement and peace building role in Bosnia and Herzegovina during its intervention in the conflict in Kosovo.

The second case study was that of NATO's role in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Not wanting to allow the conflict in the province to replicate the long and bloody one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO acted with a greater degree of decisiveness to stop the war. Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the United Nations took the leading role in mediating the conflict until late in the conflict, in Kosovo NATO was in control of the international community's response to the conflict in the early stages. NATO was eager to avoid another massacre like Srebrenica from occurring again. When OSCE observers discovered a few dozen bodies in the Kosovo town of Racak, NATO acted decisively.

The military option was employed against the Yugoslav army with devastating results. Many targets were destroyed during the 78 day campaign, including military bases, civilian infrastructure such as television stations, bridges, government offices and factories. The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO ultimately convinced Yugoslavia to end the conflict and withdraw its forces from the province. The far-reaching military action was employed because NATO's experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated that unless NATO was willing to fully commit to the situation, it could

prolong the conflict just as in Bosnia. Just as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO deployed forces on the ground to enforce the peace and contribute to the peace building effort. This resulted in establishing an environment that was stable enough to conduct elections and begin the very long process of institution-building in Kosovo.

The third case study examined was that of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Again, NATO utilised the experience it had gained in its peace enforcement and peace building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and applied the lessons learnt from those missions to its operation in FYROM. Unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO did not allow the conflict in FYROM to seriously escalate, intervening before loss of life became heavy. Another key deviation from NATO's experience in Bosnia and Kosovo was that in FYROM, NATO did not have to use military force to bring the ethnic Albanians of FYROM and the FYROM government to an agreement.

However, it is recognized that under the circumstances of war throughout the former Yugoslavia, where historic ethnic rivalry ran deep, it was difficult to expect NATO's interventions and subsequent implementation of artificial agreements, such as the Dayton Accord, to be entirely successful without incident. The problems that arose from the inaction of IFOR during the Bosnian Serb handover of Ilidza and Grbavica were serious, people were dislocated, but the issue re-enforced NATO's commitment to not allowing that kind of crisis to happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina again under its supervision. Another mistake NATO made was the killing of civilians during its 78 day military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although certainly not intentional, the death of civilians as a result of a humanitarian intervention had been a difficult mistake to explain. The exodus of the Serb population from Kosovo, although not directly NATO's fault, was something that should not have happened given NATO's commitment to a multi-ethnic province. Again, NATO demonstrated a

strong determination to provide the secure environment in Kosovo needed to encourage the Serb refugees back to their homes, with some success. NATO had made some mistakes in its missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, but given the violent and complex history of the Balkan region, to have expected NATO not to have made any mistakes at all would be unreasonable.

Therefore, although not perfect, NATO's role as the pre-eminent security alliance in Europe and its presence in the Balkan region as peace enforcer has been one of relative stability. Without its presence, the already acute problems in dealing with confidence-building between hostile ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia would have been resolved only with further conflict. NATO's active engagement in the Balkans promoted the self-determination of the Bosnian Muslims and the Kosovo Albanians with physical and material support, ultimately giving both the opportunity to govern their own affairs in peace. In addition, the strong NATO military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo discouraged further violence and managed to succeed in preventing these conflicts from flaring up again, by far the most significant achievement in establishing itself as the peace-enforcement institution in the Balkans. NATO's mission in Kosovo is still required because the circumstances there are more difficult, its presence will persist until the final status of the province has been decided. However, that has not been the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM, where NATO managed to achieve peace, stability and assisted in the establishment of democratic institutions, therefore allowing the alliance a viable exit strategy for both missions, both of which can be considered highly successful.

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