

Advertiser 19<sup>th</sup> April '07

Register 20<sup>th</sup> April 1907

### PIANO AND VIOLONCELLO RECITAL.

An invitation concert was given at the Elder Conservatorium on Thursday evening in the presence of a large audience. The principal items were pianoforte and violoncello recitals by Miss Elsie Jefferis, A.R.C.M., who is supplying the place of Mr. B. Treharne during his absence, and Mr. Harold Parsons, the newly-appointed teacher of the violoncello. The programme was carefully arranged, and served well to illustrate the powers of execution of both performers, and each item was given with a mastery of style and finish which won expressions of satisfaction. The first movement (allegro) of sonata for violoncello and piano, op. 69 (Beethoven) was presented tastefully, and the subtle charm of the great master's composition was evidently appreciated by both artists. In the pianoforte solo, "Sonata in E flat," op. 31, No. 13 (Beethoven) Miss Jefferis was impressive. Her treatment no less than her technique was admirable. The opening movement, "Scherzo," with its pleasing rhythms, was skilfully performed, and the "Minuetto" and "Presto con fuoco" were appropriately interpreted. Nice feeling was imparted to the former, and good full tone was sustained throughout the latter. In a bracket of "Intermezzo" (Brahms), "Impromptu in F sharp" (Chopin), and "Ballade in G minor" (Chopin), Miss Jefferis displayed fine talent, the treatment of the beautiful "Impromptu" being particularly enjoyable. Mr. Parsons, who had not previously been publicly heard since his return from Europe, was accorded a good reception, and the marked improvement in his playing was decidedly pleasing. He handled his instrument with ease, and in bowing and fingering alike showed that he had applied himself diligently to his studies during the time he had been away. A group of three items, "Minuetto" (Becker), "Adagio," from 'Cello Concerto (Schumann) and "Scherzo" (Van Goens) he quite won the audience. Good firm tone and well-phrased periods, with clear, clean enunciation, made the number thoroughly enjoyable. A sonata by Valentine afforded scope for the display of skill, and the young artist availed himself of the opportunity. With a dignified and stately opening he passed easily into a sprightly vein in the "Allegro." Full of suggestion was his reading of the "Largo," and his display of technique in the final "Allegro" was very meritorious. The Conservatorium authorities have abundant cause for congratulation in having on the teaching staff a young musician, who received his training during the most important years of formative art in the institution, and who gives such promise as Mr. Parsons. Miss C. Jurs acted as accompanist to the 'cello solos. Vocal items were capably rendered by Miss Marion Kemp, A.M.U.A., who sang with feeling and taste "Nobil signor," from "Gli Ugonotti" (Meyerbeer), "I love thee" (Greig), and "My love is like a red, red rose" (Brandreis). Miss G. Hack was her accompanist.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

### PROFESSOR MITCHELL'S NEW BOOK.

"Structure and Growth of the Mind," by W. Mitchell, Hughes Professor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide; Macmillan and Co., Limited, London.—This is one of the most interesting and illuminating book with which we have met in recent philosophical literature. A volume such as this presumably focuses the results of many years of study in philosophy and psychology, and it is particularly interesting to know somewhat of the attitude which the Professor of Philosophy at the University takes towards these great themes; for, apart altogether from the value of the contribution here made to the literature of the subject, the influence of the Chair of Philosophy is considerable upon university life. If its area be restricted, within that area its influence is deep and far-reaching, for its subject matter bears directly upon life's ultimate values and ideals. The philosopher, like the prophet in the corrupt days of history, has again and again been the conservator of the highest wisdom, even when the church herself has sunk to the level of the times. Who does not remember one's first introduction to the serious study of philosophy—how it affected one's whole mental atmosphere, outlook, and attitude to life? So that there is a peculiar interest in having placed into the hands of the general public this volume by the professor of the local University. The subject matter of the work is "experience," and the method of approach is psychological. The object the writer has in view is that of furnishing a text book in order to meet the needs of students, who, having "gone as far as their book," will be enabled to give more attention to aspects of the subject which demand time and serious consideration. Whether the "general reader," as Professor Mitchell says, "will find no difficulty," even "if he is not very anxious to run as he reads," is decidedly doubtful; for while there is much excellent illustration of the points discussed the entire treatment presupposes some serious acquaintance not only with the history of philosophy but also with modern psychology. At the same time despite the calls which the book makes upon abstract and precise thinking as compared with that of (say) Kant's Critique or Green's Prolegomena, or the great subtleties of Hegel, it is happily much more readable and understandable.

#### —Explanatory Theories.—

The first part of the book is concerned with certain theories explanatory of experience and the mind, and these conclude in the fifth lecture with the direct explanation. Very trenchant is the author's criticism of monism. Accepting tentatively the assumption of monism that there is a brain process for every process of experience, yet that the relation between the two is not casual because the physical energy remains constant—the scientific monist affirming that these two aspects of interior substance related to one another, much as the colour of an orange is related to the taste—Professor Mitchell shows that its assumption leads to direct Dualism, and is but an ideal; while the reality predicated of which the brain and mind are expressions being unknown, cannot properly be regarded as an object of knowledge. It reveals the fallacy underlying the notion of qualities as inhering in some substratum out and beyond the organization of experience. "The stores of your knowledge when you are not thinking have no existence as ideas, any more than your skill exists as skill when you are not doing anything, or the sun is bright when there is no eye to see it." Interesting, too, is the author's analysis of the relation between mind and brain. He accepts the position that there is "a complete coincidence," a definite change in the brain for all the changes of experience. At the same time, he denies that the mind is a function of the brain. Indeed, in the old usage of the term, materialism is dead. Haeckel, it is true, in his "Riddle of the Universe," uses language which seemingly spiritualizes matter—as though he were conscious of the weakness of materialism; yet, when analysed, his assumption of "cell souls" does not conceal the truth that to him the mind is but a function of the brain, and his world is self-contained.

#### —Neurology and Biology.—

Professor Mitchell, while giving due value to the brain, and recognising the standpoint of Neurology and the end it seeks, does not ignore the fact of gaps which Neurology from its side is not likely to fill; rather, on the other hand, he realizes that these gaps Psychology must fill, and that experience is more than that which can be dealt with in terms of Biology. "We have first to read the brain as correlate of the mind, and only then can we read the mind as correlate of the brain; whatever is possible to the mind is possible to the brain; that is the assumption. It is very different from one that would limit the power of the mind by what we can somehow assume to be the capacity of the brain." And, again, as indicating the author's attitude, "it is essential to remember that the inference is never from what the brain can be and do, but always first the opposite." Whereas Biology, regarded as having a particular province, is concerned with the brain, and its action as related to a healthy physical life, Professor Mitchell would recognise also its having a wider meaning, and so regard psychology as an important feature in it—that is, treated from a Biological standpoint. "Instead of taking the mind as an organ of the body, and mental life as a means to a successful physical life, the body is taken for an organ of the mind, and physical life as means for a successful mental life. The environment of the mind comprises all that affects it, whether knowingly or not. It includes even the body. . . . The success of the life is in the appreciation of all this world in thought, feeling, and action. There is not the mere question of accommodating itself to this world, still less to the merely physical world. Hence, if the psychology of mental function is said to take a biological view of experience, it is in view of a mental life." These quotations are emphatic enough, and indicate on this question, concerning which so much controversy has been waged, the general attitude of the author. The age-long controversy regarding the connection between mind and brain has now practically resolved itself into the adjustment almost of two positions which, if taken separately, might be accepted, but viewed together seem contradictory—(1) that the changes in consciousness necessitate specific modifications of the brain cells; and (2) that experience is of value. With the latter of the two positions the direct explanation of experience is concerned. With this the author deals in his fifth lecture.

#### —Growth of the Mind.—

The "objective," it must be remembered, in the Direct Explanation is to deal with experience in terms of mind, as against the indirect psychological explanation. Professor Mitchell shows that the mind grows through "use." "Apart from a certain growth without learning. . . . the mind grows by its own working, and its way of working reveals its organization. . . . We explain every experience as due to the reaction of our mind on an occasion." The mental action consequent on such an occasion always "develops the occasion. . . . We turn sensation, for example, into knowledge of an object, have fear of the object, and take steps to be quit of it. Or the occasion is something we happen to remember, and we develop thought, feeling, or will about it." While, however, we are familiar with the direct explanation day by day, it is not the simple thing we are disposed to imagine. The author points out that the popular division into mental faculties regards them as physical—that is, as being in a sense specific duplicates of the brain, whereas, in the direct explanation of experience the notion of the anatomy of the brain as being a picture of the mind, having specific corresponding faculties, must be precluded altogether. "If we confine ourselves to the direct explanation we have to do without any picture." The same necessity, in fact, exists in dealing with the structure and development of the mind to get away from the popular classifications, as in the case of physics in relation to the current notions as to the properties of matter. To show the direct explanation of experience in terms of mind and its faculties, the author proceeds to trace the growth of experience, first dealing with it in relation to the sympathetic and aesthetic intelligence, and then the general development of intelligence, particularly with regard to knowledge and conduct. From the Direct Explanation thus given along general lines, Professor Mitchell continues to show how this necessitates variety of enquiry regarding the growth of the mind. Differences in natural ability require further investigation, the results of which the Direct Explanation must embrace.

Register 20<sup>th</sup> April '07

Professor Horace Lamb, M.A., the eminent mathematician of Owens College, Victoria University, Manchester, has forwarded his photograph to the Board of Governors of the Public Library of South Australia, at the request of that body. For some years prior to 1885 the professor held the chair of mathematics at the University of Adelaide, and was one of the members of the first appointed Public Library Board. Accompanying the photograph came a letter in which Prof. Lamb said he had many pleasant recollections of the time. Lately the Public Library Board has been collecting portraits of those who have been among its members, and Prof. Lamb's was a welcome addition to the album.

Reg 20<sup>th</sup> April 07.

Professor Jethro Brown, who has been elected by the University to fill the vacancy on the Board of Governors of the Public Library, Museum, and Art Gallery (caused by the death of the late Dr. Paton), was on Friday afternoon made a member of the library and the fine arts committees.