India and the ‘Anglosphere’:

A Postcolonial Genealogy

Alexander E. Davis, BA (Hons), MPhil

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Abstract

Policy-makers and commentators across the English-speaking world have recently become immensely enthusiastic about India. India has become known as ‘the world’s largest democracy’, a ‘natural ally’, the ‘democratic counterweight’ to China, a trading partner of ‘massive economic potential’, and sometimes as part of the ‘Anglosphere’. Much of this has been animated by deeply problematic colonial assumptions about India. This thesis mounts a three-fold argument. First, I argue that IR theory and the English-speaking world share the same ‘India Problem’, as both have consistently interpreted India on the basis of colonial assumptions. Second, I suggest that historically there have been two broad approaches to the idea of English-speaking unity: a racialized, exclusive narrative and a pluralist-yet-hierarchical narrative. Finally, I argue through four case studies on ideational politics between India and Anglosphere states, that India rejects outright the racialized narrative of English-speaking unity and resists the hierarchy inherent in the pluralist narrative.

Thesis Declaration

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List of Abbreviations:

BJP = Bharartiya Janata Party

BSL = Barr-Smith Library

CTBT = Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

ICS = Indian Civil Service

INC = Indian National Congress

LAC = Library and Archives Canada

MEA = Ministry of External Affairs

NAA = National Archives of Australia

NAI = National Archives of India

NDA = National Democratic Alliance

NMML = Nehru Memorial Museum and Library

NPT – Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty

NSG = Nuclear Suppliers Group

UKNA = United Kingdom National Archives

UPA = United Progressive Alliance

WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO = World Trade Organisation

Introduction: The 'India Problem'

Over the past decade, commentators and politicians across the English-speaking world have become immensely enthusiastic about India. India has become known as 'the world's largest democracy',[1] a 'natural ally' (in the war on terror and elsewhere),[2] the possible 'democratic counterweight' to China[3] and a trading partner of 'massive economic potential'.[4] In each case, the relationships are narrated as finally emerging from decades of disappointment. India, it seems, has never quite lived up to the high expectations of English-speaking states. This is the 'India problem': India does not fit the English-speaking world's expectations of international behaviour or its ideas of international politics. And yet, simultaneously India shares many of the English-speaking world's distinctive features: language, liberalism, and democracy. As a result, India has both confounded and beguiled the English-speaking world, by engaging with Russia, refusing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), testing a 'peaceful' nuclear device, and arguing against hegemonic forms of international order, all whilst rebuffing calls for new, closer relationships. In this thesis, I argue that India's ambivalence towards the English-speaking world, as both an idea and a collection of states, has long defined its position in international affairs. The India problem can be seen in the way India is talked about in mainstream Eurocentric IR theory, the foreign policy discourse of the Anglosphere states, but it is at its clearest in discourse which proclaims English-speaking unity. This is most certainly not India's problem. Rather, the problem belongs to the English-speaking world. As will be argued in Chapter Two, the idea of the unity of the English-speaking world has arisen repeatedly since Britain's colonial expansions. In the mid-2000s, the idea of English-speaking unity arose again, in the form of the Anglosphere. Simultaneously, the Anglosphere states have again become obsessed with India, but still in deeply problematic ways. How, then, does India relate to the English-speaking world? In this thesis, I examine the ways in which India has been approached by the English-speaking world, how it has been understood and misunderstood, and the ways in

[1] Tony Abbott, 'Speech introducing Narendra Modi', (2014) at http://australianconservative.com/2014/11/long-overdue-for-an-indian-prime-minister-to-address-our-parliament-abbott-says/, accessed March 24, 2015.
[2] Rory Medcalf, 'It's a Natural Alliance', (2010) at http://m.lowyinstitute.org/publications/its-natural-alliance, accessed March 24, 2015.
[3] Arthur Rubinoff, 'Incompatible Objectives and Short-sighted Policies: US strategies toward India', in Sumit Ganguly *et al.* (eds), *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation Into the 21st Century: More Than Words* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 43.
[4] Daniel Twining, 'How America Can Unleash India's Massive Economic Potential', (2015) at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/27/how-america-can-unleash-indias-massive-economic-potential/ accessed March 24, 2015. For similar discourse, see: David Cameron, 'Speech to Unilever, Mumbai', at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-speech-at-unilever-offices-in-mumbai, accessed 24 March 2015.

which this shapes the ambivalent relationships India has had with the US, the UK, Canada and Australia.

The India problem is a complex and multifaceted problematic and takes various forms. In each case, though, the problem lies in the English-speaking world's understanding of India. It can be seen in the foreign policy discourse of the English-speaking states and the idea of English-speaking unity as well as the way India is talked about IR theory and IR as a discipline. In foreign policy discourse, seeing India as 'just like us', sharing 'our' values or 'part of the Anglosphere' neglects the different experiences India had with colonialism to the English-speaking world. Seeing India as Other, as an outsider who is fundamentally unlike us, reflects another side of the same problem. This places India as unlike the English-speaking world, emphasizing colonial and racialized ideas of India's Otherness. This has now largely disappeared from foreign policy discourse, but was common after Indian independence, in which India was seen as an unknowable, mysterious agent in international politics. Excluding India from the idea of the English-speaking world reflects its exclusive, racialized identity discussed by Srdjan Vucetic,[5] and ignores that India shares much of what makes the English-speaking world. Including India in a superior Anglosphere, however, highlights only the positives of India's colonial experience - an equally unacceptable proposition.

In IR theory, this problem relates more to the way we theorize international behaviour and where India foreign policy fits within this. Much Eurocentric IR theory fails to interpret India's foreign policy interests as it excludes race, decolonization and colonial histories from the agenda in IR. Thus, scholars working from a realist perspective tend to dismiss India's foreign policy, particularly its Nehruvian influence, instead seeing India as 'abnormal' or an outlier. Similarly, neoliberal institutionalism, fails to understand the limits on India-Anglosphere relationships by India's postcolonial identity and its colonial history. From this perspective, India becomes just another liberal democracy, but one that is not acting the way it is supposed to. By seeing India-Anglosphere as emerging out of a solely Cold War induced torpor, and ignoring decolonization and postcolonial issues, much scholarship has become extremely enthusiastic for the future of India-Anglosphere relationships. In this case, the expulsion of colonial history, race, racism and decolonization from IR leads to the

[5] Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

assumption that India and the Anglosphere states share democracy and liberalism, and therefore *should* have closer relations. In each example, the ignoring of colonialism, its divisive history and the ways in which its racialized discourses constituted the modern states system, profoundly shapes the discipline's India problem.

India, as part of the former 'liberal empire' and with a massive population, democracy, nuclear capabilities and a growing economy, has been central to world affairs since its independence and its importance has only grown. And yet, IR's knowledge of India is still shaped by colonial discourse. This is due to IR's amnesia concerning race, racism and colonialism, which is only now being addressed.[6] In IR, Indian foreign policy is often seen through an 'idealist' and 'realist' dichotomy. Realist IR theory has failed to interpret India's continued non-alignment, whereas neoliberal institutionalist IR has failed to account for the ongoing frailty of the various India-Anglosphere relationships. Within this ideational complex, India cannot be thought about outside of representation. Even a fairly benign factual statement such as 'India is the world's largest democracy', a commonly used label in the English-speaking world's foreign policy discourse, is loaded with assumptions about the nature of India's democracy and how democracies are supposed to act in world politics.[7] More importantly, as Chengxin Pan points out with regard to China, no IR analyst or policy maker can build a career, let alone a foreign policy, out of such basic commentary.[8] Rather, they cannot help but make assumptions about what India is, what its intentions are, and the extent to which its 'rise' might be a threat to an established world order or present new opportunities. These same issues have arisen in the foreign policy of the Anglosphere states. After independence, western diplomats often dismissed Indian foreign policy as irrational: needlessly concerned with colonialism elsewhere, which, to their mind, did not affect India directly. Today, India is seen as a natural ally and the world's largest democracy, a reflection of the Anglosphere's liberal-democratic self. This reveals that India, despite its independence, is still central to 'Anglo-Saxon' desires about world politics.

[6] See Alexander Anievas *et al* (eds), *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line* (London: Routledge, 2014).
[7] Atul Mishra, 'India's Non-liberal Democracy and the Discourse of Democracy Promotion', *South Asian Survey*, 19, 1 (2012), pp. 33-59.
[8] Chengxin Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012).

What is the 'Anglosphere'?

Defining the Anglosphere has proven a task fraught with danger for most authors who have advanced the concept. The various attempts that have been made reveal to us the persistence of the colonial hierarchy within the idea of English-speaking unity. For most of its proponents, such as James Bennett, Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Hannan and Robert Conquest, it consists of the English-speaking, democratic, 'law-and-liberty countries'[9] and is based on British derived culture and values. Broadly speaking, in arguing that this grouping will continue to dominate world politics, these authors all suggest that these states are culturally, politically and economically superior to the rest of the world. Srdjan Vucetic has performed what is comfortably the most significant academic work on the Anglosphere. Vucetic argues that the relationships between these Anglosphere states are not based on culture or shared liberal values, but have long been, and remain, underpinned by racialized identity of Anglo-Saxonism.

In this thesis, I treat the Anglosphere not as something that materially exists, or as a superior collection of states and/or peoples, but as an identity narrative that is most often evoked at times of international anxiety. Although the idea has come to prominence recently, Anglosphere narratives are nothing new. The rise of the concept in the mid-2000s is certainly not an historical accident. Rather, I argue, the idea is fundamentally influenced by its colonial genealogy, and this is at its clearest with regards to India. In this thesis, I identify here three key waves of discourse on English-speaking unity: first, the idea of Greater Britain in the 19th and early 20th century, in which the position of India was heavily debated; second, the idea of the English-speaking peoples in the 1940s and 1950s that led to the formation of the British Commonwealth; third, the mid-2000s Anglosphere revival most associated with Bennett and Hannan. These authors have mostly treated the Anglosphere as a means of declaring a shared exceptionalism of the English-speaking states and their values. This work was careful to announce that the space was not based on race, but on immutable liberal values and a sense of community and familiarity.[10] A study of the position of India in the concept, however, reveals the serious weakness of this argument. Dismissing India from the space, even though it shares

[9] Robert Conquest, *The Dragons of Expectation: Reality and Delusion in World History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 225.
[10] See, in particular, James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English Speaking Peoples Will lead the Way in the 21st Century* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Daniel Hannan, *Inventing Freedom: How the English-Speaking Peoples Made the Modern World* (Northampton: Broadside Books, 2013); Conquest, *Dragons of Expectation*.

the English language, liberalism and a democratic political system is very clearly exclusionary on the basis of at best culture, and at worst, race. India shares to some degree all the things that Anglospherist authors have argued make the Anglosphere exceptional. At the same time, as will be seen, placing India as a central part of this space and suggesting the space is exceptional is an equally undesirable proposition.[11]

In terming the Anglosphere a narrative, however, I do not seek to deny the material world's importance. Rather, I see a complex engagement between ideational discourses, their histories, and the material world with each shaping the other. While I see the Anglosphere as an idea with no inherent material existence, there are important historical and discursive limits on how the idea can be evoked. Only states marked sufficiently by the transnational circulation of institutions, ideas and the use of the English language associated with British imperialism could conceivably fit within its identity and hierarchy. This pattern could conceivably take in any other of the 50 postcolonial states shaped by the British empire, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Guyana, or Barbados to name a few. It is particularly telling, then, that India has become so often associated with the concept in a way these other states have not. It is certainly not accidental that India, a vast, powerful and non-white part of the former liberal empire, has been chosen by Anglospherist authors as an object of hope and desire.

Why India and the 'Anglosphere'?

At first glance, it may seem that India has nothing to do with the Anglosphere. Indeed, it may well be that the word 'Anglosphere' has never passed the lips of an Indian prime minister or foreign minister. However, as Nossal has argued regarding Canada's vision of its place in the world, the state-as-actor model in IR has clouded our ability to see states' perception of the world outside of simple bilateral relationships.[12] The process of identity construction, though, is more complicated than the states system. National identities, transnational concepts, language groups and cultural groups all shape identity in ways that transcend the state. And so, more important than the lack of the term 'Anglosphere' from Indian foreign policy discourse is the consistency with which India has described the US, the

[11] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*. For another example, see: Roger Kimball, 'The Anglosphere & the Future of Liberty: an Introduction', *The New Criterion*, 29, 5 (2011), pp. 1-6.
[12] Kim Richard Nossal, 'Defending the "Realm": Canadian strategic culture revisited', *International Journal*, 59, 3 (2004), p. 504.

UK, Canada and Australia with very similar language and has had similarly difficult relationships with all four of them. The same is true of the western-Anglosphere states and the ways in which they have described India. In this sense, India's relationships with the US, the UK, Canada and Australia are shaped as a group, making India-Anglosphere relations a useful mode of inquiry.

Despite India's centrality to the concept, very little work has been done on India in relation to the Anglosphere. Most of what has been written has debated whether or not India is a part of the Anglosphere. No work has yet focused on the implications of our inability to answer this question - that India has an ambivalent relationship with the Anglosphere.[13] As Vucetic points out, the Anglosphere has come in for little analysis in IR due to its association with race.[14] As most work that has been done on the concept has been aimed at advancing it, and India lies outside its central racialized identity, India has seldom been paid serious attention. Hannan has argued that India is a crucial part of the Anglosphere, and that India's relationship with these states is the central question for world order. His approach, however, relies on a narrative of India's colonization by the British as overwhelmingly positive.[15] Hannan only considers the positive elements of India's colonial interactions with the British. Placing India inside the Anglosphere, then, relies on the silencing of colonial violence. India even appears in his text as part of the English-speaking peoples, but 'exotic' within it: a self-evidently orientalist approach.[16] Bennett has argued for a tiered hierarchy of the Anglosphere in which 'educated', and English-speaking Indians are included, but failed to elaborate precisely what this means for India or for the concept.[17] As I examine in detail in Chapter Two, each of these ideas of the Anglosphere has, in different ways, produced a very pure form of the India problem.

Perhaps most important, though, has been a shift from India's foreign policy discourse towards the construction of a shared identity with the Anglosphere in particular contexts, as

[13] Elsewhere I have sought to problematize the inclusion of India in the Anglosphere, See; Alexander E. Davis, 'The Identity Politics of the India-US Nuclear Deal: Problematizing India as Part of the Anglosphere', *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 10, 1 (2014), pp. 81-96.
[14] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, p. 7.
[15] Daniel Hannan, 'India's relationship with the Anglosphere will define the Twenty-First Century', September 25, 2010, at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100055331/indias-relationship-with-the-anglosphere-will-define-the-twenty-first-century/, accessed September 20, 2013.
[16] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, pp. 299-300.
[17] Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge.*

well as the western-Anglosphere states identifying India this way. This was most notable in 2005, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh argued in a speech at Oxford University, that:

> It used to be said that the sun never sets on the British Empire. I am afraid we were partly responsible for sending that adage out of fashion! But, if there is one phenomenon on which the sun cannot set, it is the world of the English speaking people, in which the people of Indian origin are the single largest component.[18]

This speech certainly received a mixed reaction within India, provoking sharp criticism from, among others, Arundhati Roy, who argued that Singh had 'officially declare[d] himself an apologist for the British Empire'.[19] Indeed, by referring to sending the adage that 'the sun never sets on the British Empire', out of fashion, Singh implied a note of caution in his use of identifying India with the English-speaking world. More importantly, by arguing that India was its largest single component, Singh performed a significant reimagining of what 'English-speaking peoples' means, as it has historically meant *white* English-speaking peoples. Here, the English-speaking world was made Indian, and not the other way around. As will be seen, there are ambivalences within India's shared identity with the Anglosphere, which I argue, limits the relationship. By taking up the Anglosphere as a critical analytical perspective, which encompasses a postcolonial-critical constructivist approach, we can understand the ideational ambivalence that prevents deep India-Anglosphere engagement.

While a significant amount of academic work has been produced in IR on Indian foreign policy over the past decade, particularly focused on India's 'rise', almost none of it has considered India's relationship with the English-speaking world. An Indian liberal scholar, Madhav Das Nalapat has made a similar argument to Singh, suggesting that India should be thought of as part of an Anglosphere based on the 'blood of the mind' rather than the 'blood of the body'.[20] This is a post-racial, liberal internationalist vision of the Anglosphere. He suggests India's only quibble with the idea of an Anglosphere is with the racist discourse with which it is synonymous. He goes as far as to argue that, had the British not been so obsessed by racial differences between India and the settler colonies, 'the five-

[18] Manmohan Singh, 'Speech at Oxford College', (2005) at http://www.hindu.com/nic/0046/pmspeech.htm, accessed December 13, 2013.
[19] Arundhati Roy, 'If Bush Is So Acceptable To Manmohan And The Congress, Why Lose Sleep Over Modi?', (2005) at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/if-bush-is-so-acceptable-to-manmohan-and-the-congress-why-lose-sleep-over-modi/228347 accessed December 13, 2013.
[20] Madhav D. Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', *The New Criterion*, 29 (2011), pp. 23-28.

plus decades of separation that ensued between India and the classic Anglosphere would not have taken place'.[21]

In a definitive analysis, Vucetic argues that the Anglosphere's close relationships are based on a racialized identity. Vucetic suggests that this identity has shifted from explicitly racist to explicitly anti-racist, even though the identity remains implicitly racialized.[22] I do not seek to disagree that a racialized identity underpins such relationships. However, I further argue that this same racialized identity underpins ambivalent relationships between these so-called 'core' states of the Anglosphere and India (its so-called periphery). Given that Vucetic defines the Anglosphere as based on a racialized identity, India is implicitly excluded. Here, I seek to add a postcolonial analysis and critique to the idea of the Anglosphere. The story is more complicated than India simply being outside of the Anglosphere. As I will argue in Chapter Two, India has always been central to visions of English-speaking unity, going back to the idea of 'Greater Britain' and the Churchillian 'English-speaking peoples'. These relationships are all seen as familial. An examination of the place of India in discourse on the Anglosphere similarly reveals India's centrality to the contemporary concept. The switch from racist to anti-racist makes India's inclusion in the Anglosphere more common and more likely. Despite this, the colonial hierarchy implicit in Anglosphere discourse suggests that, rather than a post-racial liberal space of inclusion, then, the Anglosphere narratives remain trapped in a racialized ideological complex. The western-Anglosphere states are now seeking to incorporate their primary colonial Other.

In suggesting that the Anglosphere is a narrative, I am acutely aware that language is a central site of identity politics. For the sake of simplicity, when I refer to 'India-Anglosphere relations', I refer solely to India's relationships the US, the UK, Canada and Australia. When I refer to the 'western-Anglosphere', I do so as shorthand for these four states.

Structure and Argument

This thesis mounts a three-fold argument. First, I argue that IR theory and the English-speaking world share the same 'India problem', as both have consistently interpreted India on the basis of colonial and Eurocentric assumptions while dismissing colonial

[21] Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', p. 25.
[22] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*.

histories, colonial violence, race and racism from their analysis. Second, I suggest that historically there have been two broad approaches to the idea of English-speaking unity: a racialized, exclusive narrative and a pluralist-yet-hierarchical narrative. Finally, I argue that India rejects outright the racialized narrative and resists the hierarchy inherent in the pluralist narrative. India's response to the racialized narrative is examined through a case study of India-Australia relations in Chapter Three. India's relationship with the pluralist narrative is the most complex, and is considered through case studies in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Throughout these arguments, the central theme of this thesis is India's ambivalences with the Anglosphere: simultaneously on the inside and out, somewhere between familiarity and estrangement. These arguments are developed theoretically in the first instance, and then, with regards to four different attempts of the Anglosphere states to engage India at times when the idea of English-speaking unity was prominent in global political discourse.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters map out theory and methodology and consider the different narratives that have shaped the idea of English-speaking unity. Chapter One considers the way in which India has been talked about in IR, investigating the discipline's India problem, while arguing for a postcolonial-critical constructivist approach to considering Indian foreign policy. Within this approach, I utilize a genealogical method, which examines the construction of identity in India and across the Anglosphere as shaping these relationships. In particular, in engaging with identity, I argue that race, racism and racialized identity need to be considered as part of IR. My goal here is to use the 'Anglosphere', fully aware of its colonial overtones and connotations, in order to consider the ways in which the colonial construction of world order manifests itself in contemporary patterns of state behaviour. Or, as Vucetic puts it:

> For all its political, logical and other ambiguities, when approached as an arena of critical analysis, an Anglosphere perspective can indeed help us comprehend the development and general patterns of the racialized world order.[23]

In utilizing such a racialized concept as an analytical lens, I seek also to make an anti-racist intervention in IR. In Chapter Two I argue that there are two narratives of the Anglosphere: pluralist-yet-hierarchical and an exclusive racialized 'Anglo-Saxon' narrative through a broader genealogy of the deployment and construction of the idea. This is also performed so as to utilize the Anglosphere as a critical analytical perspective that allows us a new

[23] Srdjan Vucetic, 'Anglobal Governance?', *Cambridge Review of International Studies*, 23, 3 (2010), p. 455.

perspective on India and its foreign policy. Each of these narratives shapes the other, and the pluralist narrative has gradually become more prominent, though is still shaped by the older, more explicitly racialized version.

Each wave of discourse has been slightly different, as in each case, it has been animated by different fears: 'Greater Britain' was tied to the possible loss of the liberal empire and settler-colonies; the rise of the USSR and Cold War shaped the idea of the English-speaking peoples; the idea of the Anglosphere arose due to anxiety over the 'rise' of China, the idea of the 'Asian century' and political Islam. As Indian independence was a crucial rupture, with India able to run its international affairs free of British constraints, I focus my case studies on the second two waves of discourse. At these moments of anxiety, the western-Anglosphere states have reached out amongst themselves and to others they believe may share their anxieties.

Chapters Three and Four of this thesis examine the divergent paths that India-Australia and India-Canada relationships took immediately after Indian independence as both these states identified strongly with the two narratives of the English-speaking world outlined in Chapter Two. In these chapters I focus on the divergent paths these relationships took during the second wave of discourse on English-speaking unity – the idea of the English-speaking peoples and the creation of the Commonwealth. These relationships diverged within the historical context of decolonization, the end of empire and the start of Cold War. In Chapter Three, I consider India-Australia relations, to find that the racialized narrative inhibited India-Australia, as Australia sought ideational security through its US alliance, while its White Australia policy was offensive to India. In Chapter Four I consider Canada's liberal internationalism and examine the ways in which different forms of internationalism exhibited by India and Canada overlapped, and how this shaped the relationship. Canada's expectations of Indian behaviour were based on assumptions that India's behaviour, as a former British colony, would be in concert with Canada's own approach. This disrupted their hopes for a 'special relationship'.

From India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 to 2001, India-Anglosphere relations were largely obscured by the Cold War, India's tilt towards the Soviet Union, the US tilt to Pakistan and disagreement over the discriminatory nature of the nuclear proliferation regimes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), was set up just one year after India's nuclear

test, and prevented uranium sales to India by structuring 'legitimate' nuclear states including the US and the UK. Similarly, the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) legitimized the special rights of the US, the UK, China, Russia and France. This led India to denounce the new global nuclear order as a colonial order of governance through the label 'nuclear apartheid' and further fractured India-Anglosphere relations.[24] The symmetry between the four relationships in question throughout this stagnant period again underlines the symmetry of India-Anglosphere relations. Ryan Touhey argues that this period of India-Canada relations as a marked by 'bilateral indifference'.[25] Development assistance and immigration were the only surviving relics of the so-called 'special relationship'. Andrew Rotter argues that India-US relations were defined by the stereotypes through which the two states saw one another, the Indians finding the US to be arrogant, materialistic and violent; whereas the American saw the Indians as unclean, treacherous and superstitious.[26] While India-Australia relations had briefly flourished under Whitlam and Indira Gandhi, this was ended by Whitlam's dismissal and, more importantly, India's 1974 nuclear test.[27]

The idea of English-speaking unity remerged in the mid-2000s as 'the Anglosphere'. At the same time, the western-Anglosphere states all sought new and deeper relationships with India. On this basis, I draw my final two case studies from this period. Chapters Five and Six consider India's engagements with the US and the UK, as the Anglosphere was again defined against its Others: China and political Islam. Bennett defined the idea as critique of the idea of the 'Asian century', suggesting that the 21st century would be dominated instead by the English-speaking peoples. This discourse arose also after September 11, 2001, and was animated by the Other of Islamic extremism. In Chapter Five, I consider India's response to the US-UK war on terror, to examine the ways in which India responded to the Anglosphere's call for allies. At first glance one might expect the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to reject outright the assertion of English-speaking cultural superiority. Instead, I argue that the colonial origins of Hindu nationalism have given Hindutva's narrative of Indian

[24] Shane J. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). See also Shampa Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid" as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 26, 4 (2001), pp. 485-521. See also Himadeep Muppidi, 'Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance', in Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds), 'Power in Global Governance' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 273-293.
[25] Ryan Touhey, 'Canada and India at 60: Moving Beyond History?', *International Journal*, (2007), p. 742.
[26] Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India: 1947-1964* (Cornell: Cornell University Press: 2001).
[27] Nihal H. Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace Versus Military Alignment and War* (Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2004).

identity its own ambivalences with the idea of the Anglosphere. In this case, however, the BJP government ultimately aligned with the US and the UK war on terror narrative in the face of an Islamist Other.

In Chapter Six, I consider the identity politics of the India-US nuclear deal. The deal was deeply controversial in India. When this deal was announced in the US, it was wrapped in discourse on what India and the US had in common, including allying with a 'common lexicon'.[28] In subsequent debate in India, however, the Indian National Congress (INC) under Manmohan supported the change, arguing not just for a deeper relationship with the US, but that unfair and discriminatory restrictions against India had been removed. Here, the pluralist-yet-hierarchical narrative of the Anglosphere has some overlap with India, though India clearly sought to reject the global nuclear hierarchy, whereas the US has tended to assume it is unproblematic. This was also diluted by India's domestic political discourse, with this deal, and others, being defined as dismantling unfair discrimination against India's nuclear program and justified on the basis of non-alignment and independence.

This thesis concludes with a brief reconsideration and reiteration of its three primary arguments. I consider also the likelihood of deeper engagement between India and the Anglosphere states in the future. The Modi government in India has sought closer relations with the western-Anglosphere states, but has again done so again in problematic and ambivalent ways. As the following chapters will show, India has long had a complex, convoluted and difficult relationship with both the idea of English-speaking unity and the western-Anglosphere states that have advanced it.

[28] George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh, 'President, Indian Prime Minister Singh Exchange Toasts', (2005) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2005/49766.htm, accessed July 3, 2013.

Chapter One: The India Problem in IR

In this chapter I argue that IR has the same India problem as the western-Anglosphere states and the idea of the Anglosphere. I show this first through a review of literature on Indian foreign policy and by arguing that the Eurocentric origins of IR theory have led to the continued prominence of colonial assumptions about India in scholarship. This is due to the persistent neglect of colonialism and its after-effects in mainstream IR theory. I build this argument by tracing the narrative presented by these approaches of India's foreign policy after its independence. India's postcolonial identity has frequently been identified as making India 'abnormal', 'unusual' or simply as obstructing good 'hard-power' or 'liberal' foreign policy. As a result, this work is underpinned by colonial assumptions of Indian 'irrationality' on the basis of IR's theorizing that states are supposed to act in particular ways. This same problem can also be seen in our understanding of India's bilateral relationships with the western-Anglosphere states. These relationships are narrated as not being as strong 'as they should be', despite being seen as 'natural' relationships. Following my mapping of this problem in IR, I go on to outline my own theoretical and methodological approach to solving it so as to study India and the Anglosphere. By tracing the ways in which discursive changes shift historically, and the meaning attached to different concepts we can begin to understand the ways in which India identifies within the context of an 'English-speaking world'.

The India Problem in IR

The India problem in IR is most clearly seen in the narrative presented of India's foreign policy after independence. To put it simply, India's foreign policy choices and the discourse that underpins them have not fitted with realist, liberal and some constructivist approaches to IR. As a result, India is consistently talked about as 'abnormal' or an 'outlier'. In each case, this is due to the omission of colonial history from IR. I argue here that thinking about Indian foreign policy without an emphasis on identity that is at least sympathetic to postcolonial issues, while excising colonial history from the discipline's agenda, leads to accepting in some form, colonial assumptions about India and Indian society and creates IR's India problem.

The conventional realist narrative of Indian foreign policy has been to suggest that India's postcolonial identity no longer affects its foreign policy, and tends to date this change at India's nuclear test in 1998. Much of this scholarship emphasizes Indian identity as having

prevented India from creating a practical, materialist, 'hard-power' foreign policy: a position that is seen as 'normal' in international affairs. The problem lies, then, in how India's non-alignment and the nature of its anti-colonial foreign policy discourse after independence is talked about by theorists influenced by this approach. These narratives present Indian foreign policy as having gradually become more realistic and more pragmatic as its idealistic, anti-colonial streak faded. Here, India's identity is treated as a possible impediment to 'good' realist or liberal foreign policy, rather than as a constitutive element of foreign policy making. A key part of this narrative relies not on identity, but a realist-idealist binary, in which India is seen as having been guided by Nehru's anti-colonialism.[1] This 'idealism' is sometimes used synonymously with liberal internationalism. The Indian liberals, however, were largely pro-British during the independence struggle, a very different vision to that of Nehru. Given that liberalism was a crucial element of colonial ideologies in the 19th and 20th centuries, terming Nehru as a liberal idealist neglects the anti-liberal, anti-colonial elements of his thought.

In most academic narratives, the key shift comes somewhere between the end of the Cold War and the 1998 nuclear test, when India, we are told, began to act more like a 'normal' international actor. Ashok Kapur has argued that since the nuclear tests in 1998, Indian foreign policy is no longer guided by Nehruvian idealism.[2] Similarly, Sumit Ganguly has argued that in the post-Cold War era, Indian foreign policy is finally 'growing up' and shedding its 'ideological burden'.[3] Terming ideology as a burden suggests it is simply an element of a bad foreign policy. C. Raja Mohan has argued that India 'crossed the Rubicon' in 1998 and became just like any other power in the international system: driven by its interests rather than its ideologies (those of Nehru, Gandhi and their contemporaries).[4] Despite this, he has elsewhere argued that India would ultimately side with the US and Australia over other Asian powers in the Indo-Pacific, due to these states having 'inherited the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law and a maritime orientation.'[5] Within this narrative, Indian foreign policy has gradually become more interested in the 'hard-power' game of

[1] For a critique of the realist-idealist binary in Indian foreign policy, see Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1-16.
[2] Ashok Kapur, *India: From Regional to World Power* (New York: Psychology Press, 2006).
[3] Sumit Ganguly, 'Indian Foreign Policy Grows Up', *World Policy Journal*, 20 (2003/4), pp. 41-46.
[4] C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: the Shaping of India's new Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[5] C. Raja Mohan, 'Indo-Pacific naval partnership open to Delhi and Canberra', (2011) at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indo-pacific-naval-partnership-open-to-delhi-and-canberra/story-e6frg6ux-1226182949825, accessed June 14, 2015.

international politics, perhaps even more western. Despite the obvious weakness of this approach as an explanatory tool, little attempt is made to consider why India did not follow this realist vision of foreign policy in the first place.

Harsh V. Pant has taken this argument in a different direction, suggesting that India still does not behave the way a rising power should and criticizing its ongoing ambivalence towards power. Indian foreign policy discourse still tends to simultaneously desire power, while continually disavowing its use in international politics. Pant regards this as a foolish hangover of Nehruvian internationalism on contemporary Indian foreign policy.[6] For Pant, India's poor foreign policy is not yet over. He is correct in the sense that India's foreign policy discourse still tends to use very different language: that of nonalignment and Nehruvian internationalism remain prominent. Again, however, he does not seek to explain these continuities; rather, he seeks to condemn them.

Nayer and Paul argue that India's foreign policy discourse of civilizational exceptionalism, non-alignment and opposition to imperialism, was hollow rhetoric.[7] They argue that India utilized this strategy in the 20th century, simply because it lacked the 'hard power' capability to do anything else.[8] India was not so much idealistic, but had such limited capabilities that it had to create a discourse of exceptionalism to mask its weaknesses. Since India has now improved its capabilities, and is in fact now the largest purchaser of arms of any state in the world, the persistence of this internationalist and anti-imperialist discourse is perplexing from this perspective.[9]

Most of this work seeks only to dismiss Indian foreign policy in the early period, without seeking to explain the causes of India's activity. India's postcolonial nature and particularly its preparedness to fight racial discrimination, then, are written off as the irrationalities of the postcolonial state: nice rhetoric, bad foreign policy. Ganguly's account of India's foreign policy 'growing up' creates a lasting image: narrating postcolonial India as an idealistic child, finally realising it had to accept the 'hard power' realities of the world as an

[6] Harsh V. Pant, 'A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy', *Orbis*, 53, 2 (2009), pp. 250-254.
[7] Baldev R. Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 251.
[8] Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*.
[9] Pant argues that this too is 'devoid of a strategic orientation'. See: Harsh V. Pant, 'India's Arms Acquisitions: Devoid of a Strategic Orientation' in Andrew T. H. Tan (ed.), *The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 65-77.

adult. Under the BJP, this finally 'matured' in the form of five nuclear explosions. This may be an evocative story, yet the narrative is deeply condescending to India's independence leaders on the basis of a narrow conception of inherent national interest. It similarly fails to account for why they acted in such a 'childish' manner because it does not seriously consider the postcolonial influences on Indian foreign policy.

The trouble with this narrative is that India's 'moralizing' under Jawaharlal Nehru was far more than impractical idealism or an impediment to proper, materialist foreign policy. Manu Bhagavan has shown convincingly through historical detail (as opposed to over-emphasis on abstract theorizing) that India's efforts to resist racial discrimination were more than mere 'moralizing', and was central to the creation of a multi-racial international order.[10] Similarly, Vineet Thakur has shown the ways in which India played a creative role in world affairs under Nehru, providing important and original ideas in dealing with international conflicts.[11] After so many years of racist subjugation, this was most certainly in India's national interest. Ultimately, the realist conceptualization of national interest fails to take account of the needs of postcolonial states because it excises colonial history from IR's agenda.

Various other approaches to Indian foreign policy are certainly kinder to Indian identity yet still present certain problems. Stephen Cohen has argued that India's idealism originated with Nehru, and defines him as a liberal internationalist.[12] While Nehru's thought was no doubt inflected by British liberalism, looking at Nehru in the context of Indian thought at the time reveals he was far more radical than the Indian liberals, many of whom were far more cautious about breaking with Britain as irrevocably as the Indian National Congress (INC) argued for.[13] The label of 'liberal internationalist', one taken up very strongly by Canada while Nehru was in power, does not fit comfortably with Nehru. This argument will be further developed in Chapter Four when I consider Nehru's ambivalent engagement with Canada's own liberal internationalism.

[10] Manu Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
[11] Vineet Thakur, 'India's Diplomatic Entrepreneurism: Revisiting India's Role in the Korean Crisis, 1950–52', *China Report*, 49, 3 (2013), pp. 273-298.
[12] Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
[13] On the Indian Liberals, see: Vineet Thakur, 'The Indian Liberals and the Cape Town Agreement of 1927', Conference Paper presented at ISA Global South Caucus, Singapore, 2015.

Kanti Bajpai argues that India's foreign policy is driven by a 'modified structuralism'.[14] Bajpai argues that this is caused partly by India's 'deficiencies in national power', and its conventions, based on norms against the 'untrammelled pursuit of power and exercise of coercion.'[15] Here, the ideational discourse of India's foreign policy is seen as interwoven with the lack of material power. Bajpai further argues that ideational influences have gradually given way to structural constraints. This essentially mirrors the realist narrative of ideational factors gradually subsiding, with India becoming focused on 'hard' power.

This work, though it adds more nuances to our understanding of Indian foreign policy, still relies on a realist-idealist binary and presents a particular narrative of Indian foreign policy. We can draw some important lessons from this perception of India and its history. First, the idea that materialist, 'hard' power policy is the 'natural state of affairs' in international politics needs to be rejected. This vision discredits Nehruvian policy and silences the role India played in combating the racialized, colonial world order. The excision of colonialism from its record has led IR to understand postcolonial India as irrational, as India failing to act in the manner it was 'supposed to' as an agent in international affairs. This assumption cannot properly account for Indian foreign policy, as it fails to explain India's approach to the world after its independence. More troublingly, it presents postcolonial India as simply having a 'bad' foreign policy without considering the benefits of resisting racism and colonialism in international affairs

When we look at Indian foreign policy through studies of India-Anglosphere bilateral relationships, we find a different manifestation of this same problem. Most accounts suggest weak relations in the early period, but assume strong relationships will form in the future. Within this scholarship, the idea that liberal values, democracy and free trade will assist India's foreign policy and will create new relationships between India and the various Anglosphere powers is commonplace.[16] The narrative, then, is not that India has become

[14] Kanti Bajpai, 'India: Modified Structuralism', in Muthia Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 157-158.
[15] Bajpai, 'India: Modified Structuralism', p. 158.
[16] This comes despite the fact that there have been very few studies focused on Indian foreign policy written from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective. For an example, see Ramesh Thakur, 'India after Nonalignment', (1992) at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47767/ramesh-thakur/india-after-nonalignment, accessed July 17, 2015.

more 'realist', but has gradually become more 'like us'. This relies on a similar excision of colonial histories from IR.

As will be seen in Chapter Two, this narrative is also a key factor in the rise of the Anglosphere. Neoliberal institutionalist IR theorists emphasize multilateral institutions, democracy, and free trade and argue that economic interdependence mitigates anarchy and promotes more peaceful relations between states.[17] Within this approach, identities remain fixed or given, but with an added liberal-authoritarian binary. Despite the lack of liberal approaches to Indian foreign policy, a liberal reading of identity has recently become dominant in the study of the various India-Anglosphere bilateral relationships. Much US scholarship suggests that shared values underpin the US-India relationship, and will continue to lead to a strengthening of the relationship in the future.[18] Writing about India and Australia, C. Raja Mohan and Rory Medcalf make the same claim.[19] Delvoie has done the same for Canada,[20] as have Johnson and Kumar for India-UK relations.[21]

This progressive narrative of India-Anglosphere relations, however, presents its own set of problems. For these scholars, the various India-Anglosphere relationships meet the neoliberal criteria for mutually beneficial relationships and therefore should be stronger than they presently are. Ultimately, though, this approach relies on a similar mistreatment of Indian identity. These relationships have repeatedly failed to achieve the depth of those between the western-Anglosphere states. Indeed, much of the work performed from this perspective expresses disappointment with the relationship in question, yet still argues the relationships will 'naturally' grow. This approach is deeply flawed. First, India's vision of

[17] Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', *Review of International Studies* 25, 2 (1999), pp. 179-196, Micheal W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', in Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds), *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 10th edition (Boston: Pearson, 2010), pp. 114-126 and Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?', *Foreign Policy*, 110, Special Issue (1998), p. 86.
[18] Daniel Twining and Richard Fontaine, 'The Ties that Bind? U.S.–Indian Values-based Cooperation', *The Washington Quarterly*, 34, 2 (2011), pp. 193-205
[19] Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, 'Responding to Indo-Pacific rivalry: Australia, India and middle power coalitions', (2014) at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-to-Indo-Pacific-rivalry, accessed December 3, 2014.
[20] See Louis. A. Delvoie, 'Canada and India: A new beginning?', *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 87, 345 (1998), pp. 51-64, Ramesh C. Kumar and Nigmendra Narain, 'Re-Engaging India: Upgrading the Canada-India Bazaar Relationship', in Andrew F. Cooper, Dane Rowlands, *Canada Among Nations, 2005: Splitting Images* (Ottawa: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), pp. 169-184 and Arthur G. Rubinoff, 'Canada's Re-Engagement with India', *Asian Survey*, 42, 6 (2002), p. 840.
[21] Jo Johnson and Rajiv Kumar, *Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership* (Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2011).

free trade continues to differ from that of neoliberal institutionalism. As Amritar Narlikar has pointed out, despite its increasing openness to investment, India continues to side with coalitions within economic institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that argue against the western hegemonic structure of the global economy.[22] US Vice President Joe Biden called on India during a visit in 2013 to further liberalize its markets so as to allow new investment. India's 'licence raj' still tends to discourage investment. These elements of India's postcolonial *swadeshi* (self-sufficiency) policies are yet to shift to the extent desired by the western-Anglosphere.

As for the economic elements of liberalism, India has a history of regarding free trade as exploitative. Prior to independence, the nationalist movement fought hard to end an exploitative economic relationship, dressed up as Victorian-era free trade. The *swadeshi* movement was a crucial element of the independence movement, encouraging economic nationalism and self-reliance. This was exemplified by Gandhi's Salt March, showing the Indian people that British modes of economic domination could be subverted. This element of India's postcoloniality was performed through its economic policy until 1991. Nehru tended to favour a mixed economy using elements of capitalist and socialist models, using state control and a series of Five Year Plans to develop India's economy. In 1989 and 1991, India began to wind back its state controls of economic policy and liberalize its market due to a shift in thinking amongst its political and bureaucratic elite, which included taking an IMF-funded bailout.[23] Latha Varadarajan argues that India's acceptance of neoliberal economic ideology played a role in India's 1998 nuclear test, an idea that will be examined in further detail in Chapters Five and Six.[24]

From realist and liberal perspectives, India and the Anglosphere appear to have a lot to offer one another: resources and trade on the one hand, democracy and liberalism on the other. India and the Anglosphere tend to view the rise of authoritarian China as a threat, and both feel threatened by Islamic extremism. Why, then, are these states not engaging with one another in the manner that might be expected by neoliberal theories? I argue that the answer lies in what I would term the fundamental ambivalence of India-Anglosphere relations today:

[22] Amritar Narlikar, 'India: A Responsible Great Power?', *Third World Quarterly*, 32, 9 (2011), p. 1610.
[23] See Rahul Mukherji, 'India and Economic Globalization', in Bhumitra Chakma (ed.), *South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security* (Chennai: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 91-109.
[24] Latha Varadarajan, 'Constructivism, Identity and neoliberal (in)security', *Review of International Studies* 30, 3 (2004), pp. 319-341.

that which these states have in common, shared language, Westminster politics, heritage, history, were constructed hierarchically through racist imperial discourses and as a result, are perceived differently by different actors within the Anglosphere's hierarchy.

This troubling narrative of Indian foreign policy is applied frequently, with India's recent alliances with Australia and the US being seen as the 'end of nonalignment' amidst the rise of a more pragmatic 'Modi doctrine'.[25] And yet, given the history of Indian foreign policy, we cannot abandon postcolonial critique or ideational analysis as Indian foreign policy discourse subtly shifts away from overt condemnations of colonialism, or allies itself with the western-Anglosphere states. In order to avoid the deep flaws in realist analysis of Indian foreign policy, we need to understand the ideational forces at play in India's foreign policy in its contemporary willingness to align itself with its former colonizers. Within this, India's postcolonial ambivalence is the central theme, rather than the 'end of nonalignment'. As will be seen throughout this thesis, India's postcolonial ambivalence always had the ability to animate the limited type of cooperation seen today with the western-Anglosphere. This may have failed to create much cooperation during the Cold War, but these same postcolonial ambivalences are now creating new, albeit limited, relationships between India and the Anglosphere in the face of new and different ideational threats.

Postcolonialism and Constructivism

A more promising strand of thought on Indian foreign policy, which I draw upon here, has been the melding of postcolonial approaches to IR with constructivist insights into world order and identity. Such approaches have in recent years become a challenge to the way in which Indian foreign policy has been discussed. Only a few constructivist analyses of Indian foreign policy have been performed though most postcolonial work has been heavily influenced by constructivist insights. While there are some tensions between a postcolonial critique of IR and constructivism as an explanatory theory,[26] in terms of Indian foreign policy, the two approaches have very much been synthesized. Postcolonialism has offered both an important critique of western IR theory, as well as a useful rubric for the analysis of postcolonial states' identity.

[25] Harsh V. Pant, 'Out With Non-Alignment, In With a 'Modi Doctrine', (2014) at http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/out-with-non-alignment-in-with-a-modi-doctrine/, accessed March 12, 2015.
[26] For the first intervention in IR, see: Sankaran Krishna, 'The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 18, 3 (1993), pp. 385-417.

There has been some important debate between postcolonial theorists precisely when India ceased to be 'postcolonial', or, if indeed, this has happened. Some of this work leans on the same narrative of Indian foreign policy, seeing India's postcolonial identity ending in 1998. For Itty Abraham, India's 1998 nuclear test meant that India had accepted fully the norms of an anarchic international system.[27] For Latha Varadarajan, however, this is insufficient. She views India's ambivalence towards the global economy as a continued element of its postcolonial identity. She argues that India's liberalization of its economy to accept IMF loans disrupted a long-standing plank of India's postcolonial identity.[28] By examining the Hindu nationalist narratives of the 1998 test, she finds that a different form of postcolonial identity shaped the discourse around these tests. Similarly, Priya Chacko argues that the founding Nehruvian discourse of Indian foreign policy is still central, as the BJP could not fully escape it in their time in power from 1998-2004. Similarly to Varadarajan, Chacko also suggests that India's 1974 and 1998 nuclear tests need to be understood through the racially gendered discourse of the BJP's view of Indian history.[29]

We need to see the ideational influence on India's foreign policy not as having ended, but as having adapted to new international and domestic contexts. If we see interests and identities as mutually constituted, the idea of an identity ceasing to matter in foreign policy becomes untenable. The extent to which the label 'postcolonial' still applies to Indian identity looms as a more valuable matter of debate.[30] I argue here that India's continued ambivalence plays a key role in its recent engagements with the western-Anglosphere. This may well be a different form of postcolonial ambivalence, and one less open to Nehru's attack on racial discrimination and efforts to support decolonization. Rather, India's ideational ambivalence has shifted towards identifying India's colonial history as having certain positive elements that have allowed it to ally with the western-Anglosphere powers. The exact nature of India's ideational shifts from the context of second and third waves of Anglosphere discourse will be considered in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. Despite some rhetorical shifts, the end of India's postcolonial identity cannot simply mean alliances with the neoliberal western-Anglosphere, or behaving solely according to the dictates of realism. Certainly, as will be

[27] Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (New Delhi: Zed Books, 1998).
[28] Varadajan, 'Neoliberal Insecurity'.
[29] Priya Chacko, 'The search for a Scientific Temper: Nuclear Technology and the Ambivalence of India's Postcolonial Modernity', *Review of International Studies*, 37, 1 (2011), pp. 185-208.
[30] See, for example, Jean-Luc Racine, 'Post-Post-Colonial India: From Regional Power to Global Player', *Politique étrangère*, 5 (2008), pp. 65-78.

argued in Chapter Five, the rise of Hindu nationalism and proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be seen as the end of India's postcolonial identity. The more salient point for my approach here, however, is that the India problem manifests itself in IR primarily in Eurocentric theories. Approaches that engage both postcolonialism and constructivism are able to engage with India's colonial history as shaping its foreign policy and are not so burdened.

Theoretical Approach and Methods

Here, I map out my own postcolonial-critical constructivist theoretical approach and genealogical method to understanding India-Anglosphere relations. To begin, though, some of the difficulties with understanding Indian foreign policy that I have identified above are still present in some forms of constructivist theory. For conventional constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, state identities are produced through international interaction with one another. This is an element of Wendt's emphasis on the 'state as actor' in IR. Wendt argues on this basis that a 'theory of the states system need no more explain the existence of states than one of society need explain that of people'.[31] The emphasis on the state as actor renders this approach open to postcolonial critique. Seeing state identity in the international system as only shaped by their experience of that system, cannot allow us an understanding of India's foreign policy after its independence and its resistance to race discrimination and colonization. As outlined by Weldes, a critical constructivist approach sees states as having a well-developed understanding of the world prior to entering the international system, shaped by their own historical context.[32] As L.H.M. Ling suggests, a postcolonial approach to IR is one that relies on a constructivist approach to world order and postcolonial analysis.[33] In the case of India, a critical constructivist approach allows for a deeper consideration of identity as being shaped by its colonial experience, making it more compatible with postcolonial analysis.

Perhaps the primary contribution of postcolonialism to IR thus far has been its critique of the Eurocentric origins of the discipline. As Robbie Shilliam has succinctly put it, modernity is 'congenitally' related to colonialism, and much of IR theory has neglected this,

[31] Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *The American Political Science Review*, 88, 2 (1994), pp. 384-396.
[32] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis,* (Minneapolis: Univesrity of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[33] L. H. M. Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and West*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 61.

often wilfully.[34] John Hobson, though not working from an explicitly postcolonial perspective, has shown in detail the colonial origins of IR's key concepts.[35] Post-WWII IR theorizing, however, has been premised on neglecting the colonial constitution of the contemporary world order.[36] IR theory has generally failed to acknowledge the connections between modernity and colonialism and has, as Sabaratnam suggests, treated western ideas and concepts as 'the only serious site of world politics'.[37] Postcolonial interpretation of international politics seeks to reveal the continuations and after-effects of colonial control and hierarchy over world politics.

The Anglosphere is one such form of hierarchy, expressed through identity. As I argued above, IR needs to conceptualize identity in a manner sympathetic to postcolonial issues. In the context of India and the Anglosphere, this means considering the identity of both colonizer (Anglosphere) and colonized (India) as 'postcolonial'. In identifying my specific approach within this framework, I look here also at the approach taken to the Anglosphere as a racialized identity, and tie this approach to ongoing debate about race and racism in IR. Following this, I outline my own genealogical method for understanding India's historically constructed ideational ambivalences with the English-speaking world.

The Anglosphere as Racialized Identity

Here, I seek to build the theoretical position that sees the Anglosphere as an identity narrative. In doing so, I draw on postcolonial approaches to world politics, as well as Vucetic's approach to the Anglosphere. These issues with Eurocentric IR theory are evident in the ways in which Indian foreign policy has been treated by the discipline – this is the origin of the India problem in IR. Here, postcolonialism offers not only an important critique of IR's Eurocentric construction, but a useful analytical perspective for considering India's ideational ambivalence with the Anglosphere. Specifically, I am influenced by Edward Said's approach to Othering taken in *Orientalism*.[38] Here, the construction of Self and Other in

[34] Robbie Shilliam, 'Intervention and Colonial-Modernity: Decolonising the Italy/Ethiopia Conflict through Psalms 68: 31', *Review of International Studies*, 39, 5 (2013), p. 1133.
[35] John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[36] Nicholas Guilot, 'Imperial Realism: Post-War IR Theory and Decolonisation', *The International History Review*, 36, 4 (2014), pp. 698-720.
[37] Meera Sabaratnam, 'Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace', *Security Dialogue*, 44, 3 (2013), pp. 259-278.
[38] Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (New York: Penguin Classics, 2007).

discourse on India and the Anglosphere can be seen as central to the construction of a racialized and hierarchical political narrative.

Vucetic has provided a critique of the idea of the Anglosphere in IR, arguing that the relationships are based on a shared, racialized identity. This work follows from Vucetic: if the Anglosphere is a racialized identity, how does this shape the grouping's relationship with postcolonial, English-speaking states that lie outside of the racialized identity, but ultimately fit within most definitions of the concept? Key to Vucetic's argument is that the 'Anglosphere' has shifted from explicitly racist (emphasizing 'Saxondom', for example) to explicitly 'anti-racist'. Within this switch, however, there remains an emphasis on a sense of cultural superiority underpinning the relationships amongst the western-Anglosphere.[39] This shift makes more likely India's inclusion in the space, though I would also suggest that the belief in cultural superiority has resulted also in India's neglect in some discourse on the Anglosphere. India fits the definitions of Anglosphere that have been discussed here and will be considered further in Chapter Two, yet has been ignored or undervalued in all such works, with the exception of Vucetic. In arguing for the superiority of their preferred civilization, they unsurprisingly ignore another civilization. This is even more problematic when India shares to varying degrees the cultural traits that it is argued are 'superior'. The regularity of the omission of India reveals the definition of Vucetic to be the strongest: the Anglosphere is, at present, in terms of academic discourse and the political space it defines, based partially on an exclusionary, racialized identity, which still currently functions. And yet, the recent inclusion of India by some authors has important parallels in earlier imaginations of English-speaking unity. I will return to this theme in detail in Chapter Two.

The relationship between the construction of Britishness and colonial projects has a longer history even than this, however. 'Britishness' has long involved the Scots and Welsh subordinating their identity to the English, in a far older colonial project than the subjugation of India. In Australia, the expression 'Anglo-Celtic' has been used, as a means of acknowledging Irish and Scottish influences. Identifying the 'Anglo' has long been a site of

[39] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, pp. 1-21.

ethnic and racial contestation and subjugation.[40] Such racialized categories have been culturally questionable from the beginning.

As I pointed to in the introduction, I see the Anglosphere as a political identity narrative profoundly shaped by its colonial history. Those calling for a 'Greater Britain' wrote to safeguard the empire they felt might slip through their fingers. Winston Churchill called for greater English-speaking unity in his famous 'Iron Curtain' Speech, as the USSR consolidated its hold on Eastern Europe.[41] Bennett wrote to counter the perspective that the 'Asian century' might end the dominance of the English-speaking world, instead arguing that the 'English-speaking Nations [would] dominate' as they had previously. Because Bennett writes in the context of the 'Asian Century', India is particularly ambivalent: it is both within his Anglosphere, albeit on the periphery, and one of the Others through which it is produced.[42] In a brief update to the concept for the *Heritage Foundation* in 2007, Bennett was far more careful to include postcolonial states, arguing that they had begun to embrace the English language and their shared heritage with their former colonial masters.[43] The Anglosphere had, to his mind, expanded from Churchill's day to include India. A similar anxiety marks Hannan's otherwise deeply optimistic vision of the Anglosphere, this time due to 'leftist politicians' such as Barack Obama. As he put it, '…we risk losing the institutions that have served to make [the Anglosphere] what it is.'[44] These moments of anxiety, which rise and recede with the international context, grant us the opportunity to see where India lies in the concept, how its position changes, how it stays the same and how postcolonial identity shapes India's relationships with those on the top of the Anglosphere's racialized hierarchy.

Within the colonial imaginary, different social groups were constantly classified and reclassified as civilized/uncivilized, teachable/unteachable and placed into a hierarchy.[45] Within this, India was subordinate, but was high enough within the racial hierarchy to be seen

[40] Carol Johnson, 'The dilemmas of ethnic privilege: A comparison of constructions of "British", "English" and "Anglo-Celtic" identity in contemporary British and Australian political discourse', *Ethnicities*, 2, 2 (2002), pp. 163-188.
[41] Winston S. Churchill, 'An Iron Curtain has Descended', in Winston S. Churchill (ed.), *Never Give In!: The best of Winston Churchill's Speeches* (Sydney: Hachette Books, 2004), pp. 414-423.
[42] Bennett, *The Anglosphere*.
[43] See James C. Bennett, *The Third Anglosphere Century: The English-Speaking World in an Era of Transition* (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2007), pp. 1-5.
[44] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, p. 342.
[45] This took the form of martial races in India. See, for example, Heather Streets, *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). On gender and this hierarchy, see Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).

as a part of the 'liberal empire'. It was therefore seen as above African and South-East Asian societies. Here, I see hierarchy primarily in ideational terms. [46] The Anglosphere narrative is one example: an ideational hierarchy that is racialized. The old colonial powers certainly are not able to dictate to their former colonies, especially one as globally important as India. This is an important point that should not be forgotten. However, the colonial hierarchy has continued in psychological and ideational terms. Postcolonial states, which have long been told that they are inferior, have sought to move up the hierarchy or to resist and deny its foundation outright. In the form the Anglosphere has taken, the states on top of the hierarchy tend to assume that their liberal values are untouched by colonial violence and believe them to be universal.

The form of identity that emphasizes English-speaking unity in particular arises at times of anxiety as the Anglosphere states reach out to one another and those they most feel comfortable with. The Anglosphere's political narrative is evoked at times of stress to both tie its 'core' states together as well as to reach out to its 'peripheries'. The concept of the Anglosphere in contemporary discourse also assists in making the 'exotic' less threatening and more knowable. This is done in the context of the rise of Asia and relative decline of the West. This can be seen in John Howard and Tony Abbott's commentary on India, feeling reassured by listening in on Indian court proceedings in English and by the shared interest in cricket.[47] Here, the idea of India in the Anglosphere is linked to the broader rise of Asia and the 'Asian century'.

Race, Identity and IR

Race and international politics have recently been an area of debate and controversy within the discipline.[48] This is a recent and important development, as, for the most part, IR

[46] For approaches to hierarchy in IR, see: John M. Hobson and Jason C. Sharman, 'The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 1 (2005), pp. 63-98, Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), William Clapton, *Risk and Hierarchy in International Society: Liberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and Jason C. Sharman, 'International hierarchies and contemporary imperial governance: A tale of three kingdoms', *European Journal of International Relations*, 19, 2 (2013), pp. 189-207.
[47] Tony Abbott, 'Address to Indian Chambers of Commerce Lunch, New Delhi, India', (2014) at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-05/address-indian-chambers-commerce-lunch-new-delhi-india, accessed July 17, 2015.
[48] For recent collections, Sheila Nair and Geeta Chowdhury (eds), *Power Postcolonialism and International relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class* (New York: Routledge, 2002) and Shilliam *et al*. (eds), *Race and Racism.*

has ignored what W.E.B du Bois described as the 'global color line'.[49] Indeed, IR has been predicated upon, as Sankaran Krishna describes it, 'a systematic politics of forgetting, a wilful amnesia on the question of race'.[50] As Nicholas Guilhot has shown historically, race and decolonization were part of the discipline's founding agenda, but were intentionally written out of its foundations in the 1940s.[51] Prior to the 1940s, the discipline was actually obsessed with race, and generally saw the world through scientific racist lenses.[52] Despite IR's amnesia for colonialism and racial discrimination, scholars have periodically pointed out IR's blindness to racial issues, such as R.J. Walker in 1981, Roxanne Doty in 1993 and Sankaran Krishna in 2001.[53] The idea of the 'global colour line' has been reinserted into the discipline by Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds' examination of the construction of global racism, and has been taken as a key starting point for analysis.[54]

IR's desire not to acknowledge race is, in some ways, understandable. Granting agency to race in IR is on first glance a problematic proposition.[55] And yet, that race is socially constructed, as opposed to biological, is largely accepted. The more important issue falls between eliminativist and anti-eliminativist approaches. Put simply, debate centres on whether or not eliminating race from political discourse will solve the problems that it has constructed. In IR, broadly speaking, these eliminiativist approaches have tended to dominate, as race has simply not been talked about. The problem with this approach is that, as Vucetic argues, by erasing race, we lose 'the philosophical and theoretical basis for anti-racist politics that is supposed to motivate scholarship in the first place'.[56]

Here, we also run into the question of whether or not race and racism still matter, and whether or not they remain a serious area of analysis. An example comes from Lake and Reynolds' celebrated *Drawing the Global Colour Line*. In their conclusion, the authors express considerable confidence that, following the death of Jan Smuts, the world had moved

[49] W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Fawcett, 1961), p. 23.
[50] Sankaran Krishna, 'Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 26, 4 (2001), pp. 401-424.
[51] Guilhot, 'Imperial Realism'.
[52] Srdjan Vucetic, 'Black banker, White banker: Philosophies of the Global Colour line', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26, 1 (2013), pp. 27-48.
[53] Krishna, 'Race, Amnesia'.
[54] Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[55] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, p. 7.
[56] Srdjan Vucetic, 'Against Race Taboos: The Global Colour Line in Philosophical Discourse' in Alexander Anievas *e.t al* (eds), *Race and Racism*, pp. 98-114.

gradually towards universal human rights. They present Apartheid as the last form of colonial-era racism, and close with Mandela's rise to power as the end of 'the last bastion of white supremacy'.[57] As historians dealing with a past racism, Lake and Reynolds' work is excellent. However, while it is fair to point out that racial discrimination in 'white men's countries' in the legalistic manner has largely been disbanded, they close with a misplaced confidence in what is ultimately a progressive vision of history. As Alastair Bonnett puts it, we must not rest now that 'white' has been replaced with 'western'. Rather, 'the term "Western" remained and remains racially coded, burdened with the expectations that the world will never be "free", "open" and "democratic" until it is Europeanised.'[58] Legal equality across the Anglosphere may have been, to a certain extent, achieved. However, minorities are treated poorly and identity narratives, such as ANZAC and American exceptionalism, tend to emphasize war, whiteness and masculinity. Imprisonment amongst African Americans in the US is greater than it was in for Black Africans under Apartheid in South Africa.[59] Equating the end of racism with the rise of liberal universalism ignores the biggest contemporary issue: that liberalism itself was more than just complicit in the construction of the 'global colour line' that Lake and Reynolds are so expert in critiquing historically.

Making race and with it, racism, taboo in IR has sadly not proved an effective means of dealing with the issue. This is partly due to the limitations of eliminativist approaches to race already identified, but has been exacerbated by the historical specifics of the erasure of race from IR. Vitalis shows how American IR has ignored African American voices, and failed to question white supremacy.[60] Similarly, Guilhot shows that race and decolonization were excised from realism as international issues as part of constructing a replacement ideology for imperialism.[61] The original excision of race from the discipline was not an idealistic eliminativist attempt to end racial discrimination. Rather, it was an effort to justify the continued domination of IR's predominantly Anglo-American white, male elite.

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[57] Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, p. 356.
[58] Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 34.
[59] Michelle Alexander, 'The new Jim Crow: mass Incarceration in the age of Colorblindness', in Keith O. Lawrence (ed.), 'Race, Crime and Punishment: Breaking the Connection in America' (2011), p. 28 available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Race-Crime-Punishment.pdf, accessed July 17, 2015.
[60] Robert Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29, 2 (2000), pp. 331-356.
[61] Guilhot, 'Imperial Realism'.

The problem with eliminativist arguments can be seen very clearly amongst Anglospherist authors. All have emphasized that their chosen concept is not based on race or racism, but on culture and ideals. Bennett argues that he is not basing his idea on race.[62] And yet, racialized identities are implicit, and occasionally explicit, amongst authors advancing the concept. By emphasizing culture, class or superior values in defining international politics in place of race, precisely the same hierarchy as the colonial-era racial hierarchy is constructed. There is thus a considerable continuity of ideas despite the demise of scientific racist terms. More worryingly, white, male elites primarily benefit from the making of race and gender a taboo subject in contemporary political discourse. Most importantly, however, a look at IR and international politics today, reveals the stubborn continuation the global colour line.[63] In engaging with race and IR, I reject the notion that eliminating race from discourse and as a concept will solve the world's racial problems. Rather, I treat race as 'racialized identity', a social construct that exists because people believe it exists, not due to its biology. This rejects inherent characteristics so often ascribed to particular groups as well as rejecting a hierarchy of races, while allowing for the study of racialized identity and racism in contemporary and historical IR.

Methodology

Within this thesis, genealogy is the specific constructivist method through which I perform postcolonial analysis.[64] Genealogy is primarily associated with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, and has been used explicitly in only a limited number of studies in IR.[65] It has been most often used as a tool for historical analysis, however, originating with the works of Foucault. Foucault focused on concepts such as madness, disease and normality, crime and punishment and sexuality, in order to destabilise and denaturalise. Genealogy at its best is able to write histories of the present, showing how contemporary concepts have been constructed through long-term historical shifts in discourse.

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[62] James C. Bennett, 'An Anglosphere Primer', pp. 3-4, (2001) at http://explorersfoundation.org/archive/anglosphere_primer.pdf, accessed July 17, 2015.
[63] For an analysis of the level of global inequality, and the way in which it has been stripped of politics, see: Jan N. Pieterse, 'Global Inequality: Bringing Politics back in', *Third World Quarterly*, 23, 6 (2002), pp. 1023-1046.
[64] Audie Klotz and Cecilia M. Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (Armanok: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 30-36.
[65] For a discussion of genealogy's place in constructivism, see Christian Reus-Smit, 'Imagining society: constructivism and the English School', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, 3 (2002), pp. 487-509.

In IR, genealogy has mostly been used to examine certain regimes and concepts, how they developed historically in order to denaturalize. Little of what has been done, however, relates to the colonial genealogy of these concepts. James Der Derian's *On Diplomacy* showed how several different forms of diplomacy became normal in international politics. His analysis of how diplomacy became normal across Europe, though effective at revealing the instabilities of the idea, fails to take into account the colonial context within which the idea developed. Apart from some brief consideration given to how the Other of Islam shaped the West, the development of diplomacy in the colonial context is extremely limited.[66] Theoretically, however, the treatment of the West developing diplomacy as its own construct independent of much of the rest of the world is a limitation. Some consideration of how the concept of diplomacy spread to the rest of the world through colonial processes, and how it was accepted and reshaped through this process looms as a more important question.

Similarly, Jens Bartleson's genealogy of sovereignty looks at the concept's development from the classical period, the renaissance and the enlightenment. It does not, however, consider the spread of the concept globally, the final case study ending with continental enlightenment philosophers.[67] Short of some brief consideration of Spanish interactions with Mesoamerican societies, imperialist projects lie outside Bartleson's vision of sovereignty. To examine the concept of sovereignty's development in continental philosophy to destabilize the term is an admirable pursuit. But by doing so out of the context of the colonial period, when many of the thinkers discussed held deeply problematic visions of world order (for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 'noble savage'). The idea of the sovereign state was formed so as to deny sovereignty to the non-west. As Spivak put it in her criticism of Foucault, 'to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperial project'.[68]

Elsewhere, genealogy has touched on notions of civilizational hierarchies and colonialism without engaging with postcolonial analysis explicitly. Richard Price's genealogy of the taboo against the use of chemical weapons, although not explicitly postcolonial, shows this method's potential for postcolonial analysis. Even as the idea that 'civilized states' should not use chemical weapons against one another was developing, Italy used chemical

[66] James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford, 1987).
[67] Jens Bartleson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[68] Gayatri C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in Nelson, Cary and Grossberg, Lawrence (eds) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (University of Illinois Press: Champaign 1988), p. 86.

weapons against Ethiopia, claiming the Ethiopians were not 'civilized' enough for the norm to apply.[69] Price's analysis goes further when he notes the idea that chemical weapons are 'the weapon of the weak', noting that the norm against proliferation and use of such weapons was used to limit the non-western world's access to potentially powerful weapons on the basis of a civilizational hierarchy.[70] Patrick Jackson touches on a similar point, considering civilizational discourses without explicitly taking into account civilizational hierarchy or a postcolonial perspective.[71] Jackson examines how a discourse of 'western civilization' enabled the US to construct a shared identity with West Germany.[72]

Sankaran Krishna, in his excellent critique of 1990s-era critical IR theory (including work by Der Derian), argued much of this work held 'a narrowly circumscribed view of the "West"'. This not only impoverishes their own historicist analysis, it replicates many of the hierarchies and silences they so effectively critique in modernist approaches.'[73] This is less a call for IR theory to abandon critical theory, but for work inspired by poststructuralist critique not to be blinded by the colonial histories of IR's key concepts. This leads to what has so far been a limitation of genealogy in IR: no genealogy at present has sought to explicitly work through postcolonial theory. Given the 'state-as-actor' model in IR at play in realism, liberalism and Wendtian constructivism, much of IR is uninterested in colonial histories. That genealogical studies like that of Der Derian and Bartleson do not work with postcolonial theory, or acknowledge that their case studies come from the colonial period, let alone consider non-western states' perception of these concepts within their genealogy is a deep limitation of their studies. The colonial genealogy of contemporary international politics has been pointed to by a few,[74] but genealogy as a method has yet to be used by postcolonial IR. This origin of this failing lies perhaps in poststructuralist philosophy's initial reluctance to consider postcolonial issues. Foucault and Derrida were strangely unwilling to consider the spread of colonialism around the world, focusing instead on the development of western states.[75] Despite these weaknesses, I would argue that one of the key benefits of a

[69] Richard Price, 'A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo', *International Organization*, 49, 1 (1995), pp. 73-103.
[70] Price, 'The Chemical Weapons Taboo', p. 100.
[71] Patrick T. Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 73-78.
[72] Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, pp. 73-78.
[73] Krishna, 'The Importance of Being Ironic', pp. 385-417.
[74] For a detailed analysis see Himadeep Muppidi, *The Colonial Signs of International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[75] Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', p. 291.

genealogical approach is the method's ability to accept histories of postcolonial states' understanding of the international order, which allow us to overcome IR's limited temporality. This approach grants agency to colonial India and its anti-colonial movements and allows us a far stronger understanding of the colonial manifestations of contemporary postcolonial international politics. As a result, a genealogical method with postcolonial analysis resolves the India problem in IR.

By genealogically mapping the ways in which discourses have shifted historically, we can understand the ways in which India's ambivalence has shaped its relationship with the English-speaking world. For Indian foreign policy, genealogy provides the opportunity to examine the history of Indian foreign policy before sovereignty. Narratives of India's foreign policy that were central after its independence were gradually created prior to 1947. Viewing independence and Partition as a moment of pure rupture, in which India suddenly created a foreign policy from nowhere places unnecessary limits on our understanding of Indian foreign policy. Rather, narratives of Indian foreign policy were crafted by groups such as the Indian liberals who took part in debates on India's position within the empire, the Indian princes who acted as diplomats,[76] and the Indian nationalist movements, where people such as Gandhi, Nehru, Sardar Patel, Tagore and Sarvakar debated India's history and its place in the world. As a result, throughout my genealogy, I refer back to these key thinkers, as these older narratives later played out in debates on India's independent foreign policy.[77]

One of the principle proponents of genealogy as a method in IR has been Vucetic. For Vucetic, while pure induction is impossible,[78] genealogy can still make causal claims.[79] It simply is aware of its own limitations in proving them. Through this approach, genealogy can be put better into dialogue with mainstream international relations and social science, though it ultimately challenges the epistemological assumptions of positivism. Although I see the primary strengths of genealogy as lying elsewhere, I similarly seek to use it to make causal claims, without an interest in proving them. To borrow from Vucetic's example, the

[76] Priya Naik, 'The case of the "Other India" and Indian IR Scholarship', *Third World Quarterly*, 35, 8 (2014), pp. 1496-1508.
[77] Vineet Thakur, 'Discourses of Foreign Policy in India (1946-56) and South Africa (1994-2004): A Postcolonial Reading' (Unpublished PHD thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2014).
[78] Srdjan Vucetic, 'Why Canada Sat out the Iraq War: One Constructivist Analysis', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 13, 1 (2006), p. 136.
[79] Srdjan Vucetic, 'Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 37, 3 (2011), pp. 1295-1312.

statement 'X identity leads to Y result', or even 'X identity makes Y result more likely' are themselves causal claims.[80] I argue throughout this thesis that 'racist-Anglosphere identities inhibit close relations with India', and that 'pluralist-Anglosphere identities animate ambivalent relationships with India'. The second claim is the most contested and the most ambivalent, and becomes the key area of examination in the final three case studies of the thesis. Such claims imply causality. In this sense, I depart slightly from Foucault's usage of the genealogical method.[81] I do so intentionally. As Price and Reus-Smit argue, the strength of constructivist research is that its knowledge claims are always 'self-consciously contingent… made specifically in relation to particular phenomena, at a particular time, based on particular evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations'.[82] I see the key strength of genealogy in this case to be its ability to problematize the contemporary Anglosphere, reveal the Anglosphere's instability and colonial heritage, and its ability to hold the multiple narratives within the idea of India in the English-speaking world over the long historical period across different geographic locations.

Genealogy, Empiricism and the National Archives of India (NAI)

One crucial challenge for any genealogical study is the selection of appropriate source material.[83] Genealogies utilize a wide variety of sources, and genealogists are encouraged to read as much as possible, as I have sought to do here. However, with regard to India, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the National Archives of India (NAI) present researchers with two interrelated challenges. First, much historical material remains classified by the MEA and is inaccessible. Second, the NAI has a reputation for dysfunction. This is particularly felt by foreign researchers accustomed to the mechanical efficiency of the UK National Archives at Kew, or even their equivalents at Ottawa and Canberra. This material circulation of paperwork, coupled with contemporary archival practices is partly complicit in creating historiographical issues that I address in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. When writing histories, empirically or otherwise, we need to scour the archive not just for material, but also for its structure and the narrative it presents to researchers.[84]

[80] Vucetic, 'Genealogy as a research tool', p. 1310.
[81] Vucetic, 'Genealogy as a research tool', p. 1297.
[82] Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, 'Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 3 (1998), p. 272.
[83] Lynch, *Strategies for Research*, pp. 30-36.
[84] See Anne L. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

The perusal of the original MEA indexes from the 1940s and 1950s provides a list of each file produced by the Indian High Commission in Australia and Canada. From my own experience, only about 10 per cent of the documents listed in these indexes are available to researchers. Several files which are available have a 'destroy after x date' written on their cover, which was subsequently crossed out, and the files ultimately kept. It is not presently possible to piece together which files have been destroyed, which simply remain classified, or which have been lost. Several documents that have been listed by the MEA and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis as available were also not provided to me upon request, and may have been misplaced or misfiled.[85]

The difficulty in accessing sufficient archival material is unfortunate, as the analysis of the private musings of foreign diplomats working in Australia, Canada and India provide outstanding results for seeing how they perceived their colleagues and the foreign policies of their respective hosts. Public statements, newspaper reports and diplomatic personal narratives are useful sources, but they do not replace the private thoughts of diplomats at the time. For example, the private dispatches of Australian diplomat Walter Crocker discuss India in very different ways to his public writings on Nehru, a point I develop further in Chapter Three. The limits placed on source material would be a serious issue for an empiricist diplomatic historian, but are less of a problem for a genealogical analysis. I am confident that, outside of any files that are available but were not found upon my request, I have read every available file at the NAI. At Ottawa and Canberra, the documentation is far superior, and I do claim to have read everything.[86] This brings me to my critique of the work done in India's relationships with the western-Anglosphere states, particularly those by non-Indian researchers. Studies of these bilateral relationships tend to emphasize the sources of the colonizer over the colonised. Unsurprisingly, many then simply end up agreeing with the weight of empirical evidence presented to them.[87] There is sufficient archival evidence on the Indian side of these relationships for a genealogical analysis of the relationships, but not one acceptable to an empiricist historian. A genealogical approach enables me to sidestep this

[85] For a full list of which files are declassified at by the MEA, and open at the NAI, see: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 'List of declassified files of the Ministry of External Affairs from 1903-1972' (no date given), at http://www.idsa.in/resources/ListofdeclassifiedfilesoftheMinistryofExternalAffairsfrom19031972.html, accessed November 5, 2014.

[86] In saying this I am influenced by Carolyn Steadman's argument that the historian never fully feels they have read everything, due to their affliction with 'archive fever'. See Carolyn Steadman, *Dust: The Archive and Cultural History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).

[87] This will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three.

issue and produce a less one-sided analysis of each of these bilateral relationships. I have added to this set of sources with newspaper sources, public speeches, diplomat's personal narratives and the excellent and detailed collection of Nehru's works produced by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).[88] These are particularly important for the Indian side of these relationships, due to the lack of archival material available. As a matter of necessity, my selection of sources varies considerably from Chapters Three and Four of this thesis to the more contemporary case studies in Chapters Five and Six. Archival material is of course impossible to access for the contemporary period, and my analysis moves on to public statements, speeches, newspaper reports, commentary and publicly available material. Although the sample of material is necessarily different, the approach and the methodology remains the same.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have mapped the India problem in IR and argued for a postcolonial-constructivist approach which seeks to deal with race and identity as part of IR. I have argued that the narratives presented of Indian foreign policy in IR discourse have constructed the discipline's 'India problem' through the erasure of colonial history from IR. India is seen as an outlier in IR theory, which is finally becoming more 'normal', more knowable. Ultimately, these approaches fail to illuminate Indian foreign policy as well as revealing the flaws of IR's mainstream approaches. This is due to the Eurocentric origins of IR theory and the manner in which 'hard power' issues have been promoted while issues of race, colonial history, the process of decolonization and anti-colonial forms of foreign policy have been silenced or dismissed. In order to understand India's ambivalences with the Anglosphere, an approach sympathetic to postcolonial issues and racialized identity is necessary. This can be only achieved through a constructivist vision of world politics, coupled with postcolonial analysis of identity. In the next chapter, I further develop the second key argument of this thesis: that racialized and pluralist ideas of the Anglosphere have long mingled and coexisted, through a broad historical genealogy of India's place in the idea of English-speaking unity.

[88] I am referring to the series *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, produced by the NMML.

Chapter Two: The Idea of English-Speaking Unity and India

Introduction

In Chapter One of this thesis, I argued that India's relationships with the western-Anglosphere states have been narrated in particular ways in contemporary international politics, with India being identified and emphasized as 'democratic', having 'liberal values', 'English-speaking', and shared political systems as an argument for deeper India-Anglosphere engagements. Each of these relationships has followed very similar trajectories and been framed through very similar discourses. At the same time, a new discourse arose which places India inside of the Anglosphere. The term 'Anglosphere' was first coined in Neal Stephenson's 1995 post-cyberpunk novel *The Diamond Age*, and from this inauspicious beginning it has become a relatively common feature of international political discourse. Stephenson's depiction of the Anglosphere was primarily 'Anglo-Saxon', but the grouping accepted Indians and Africans who identified with the culture.[1] The contemporary idea of the Anglosphere, however, has a much longer history, with its roots in England's colonial expansion, the forming of its settler-colonial societies and, as is most important here, the practice of subjugating colonised peoples. In this sense, the contemporary idea of the Anglosphere is a recent expression of an idea with a much longer history.

In this chapter I build the second central argument of this thesis – that there are multiple narratives of the English-speaking world: an exclusive, racialized Anglo-Saxon centred vision and a pluralist-yet-hierarchical narrative that can encompass English-speaking, non-white colonies and most often India. This second narrative includes India, but places it lower down on its hierarchy. Both narratives, though, are deeply intertwined. I do so through a broad genealogy of the idea of the English-speaking world, where India and Indians place within it. I do so with the primary goal of developing the concept as an analytical perspective and a postcolonial resource. I examine the idea of the Anglosphere, its multiple definitions, and the discourses that have been emphasized in the many attempts to construct the space. This is done so as to contextualize more specific case studies of India-Anglosphere relations. I examine contemporary authors' visions of the Anglosphere in the context of their intellectual forerunners, with a particular focus on the treatment of India within attempts to define the English-speaking world and examination of the 'cultural values' these authors and policy-makers have argued define the Anglosphere. I argue first in considering the

[1] Neal Stephenson, *The Diamond Age: Or, A Young Lady's Illustrated Primer* (New York: Penguin, 1995).

Anglosphere's genealogy, that in its most common forms, it is a reimagining of the colonial hierarchy.

In order to achieve this, I first look at historical debates on India's position within other narrations of India's place in visions of English-speaking unity, most notably the 'Greater Britain' debates in the late 19th century and the post-World War Two idea of the unified 'English-speaking peoples' and the Commonwealth. Finally, I consider debate and discussion on the position of India in contemporary definitions of the Anglosphere. I further argue that there have long been two competing visions of English-speaking unity – a racialized vision dependent on ideas of whiteness and Anglo-Saxonism, and another more pluralist vision encompassing other parts of the former British empire, which still emphasizes the superiority of its ideas and institutions. Both visions of the Anglosphere can be seen in contemporary political discourse, as well as in older debates about the nature and future of the English-speaking world's unity. Here, my analysis focuses often on white, English-speaking men. This is unavoidable, as the Anglosphere has a strong association with conservative politics in the imperial capital and the settler-colonies. Still, this allows us to look at the narratives evoked by the idea of the English-speaking peoples. In each case, though, I also examine how Indians engaging with or dismissing the concept have made crucial interventions, which often seek to dismantle the hierarchical narrative created by the idea, or rejecting it outright.

As I suggested in Chapter One, each wave of discourse has been a response to some Anglo-Saxon anxiety about the future of world order: over the possible disintegration of the empire, the rise of the USSR and the Cold War and finally, the 'Asian century', the rise of China and the 'war on terror'. On each occasion, the idea is constructed as a familial relationship – the imperial family,[2] the Commonwealth family,[3] and familial nature of the Anglosphere.[4] India's consistent marginalization within these ideas, though, suggests very much its estrangement from what is actually a deeply dysfunctional family.

[2] See Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 148.
[3] The Commonwealth describes itself this way. The Commonwealth, 'Commonwealth Directory', (no date given) at http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth-directory/, accessed February 4, 2015.
[4] On this metaphor, see Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, p. 34.

Imposing the Anglosphere on India

Before considering the ways in which India has been imagined in the idea of English-speaking unity through to the contemporary Anglosphere, I find it necessary to acknowledge my own subjectivity and position. The Anglosphere is primarily, but certainly not exclusively, discussed and defined by the conservative side of domestic and international politics across its 'core' states. If the genealogy presented in this chapter most frequently emphasizes such sources, it is due to the close association with the idea with English-speaking conservatism. The same is true also of its forerunners, the 'English-speaking peoples/races' and 'Greater Britain'. This is an identity that has long been imposed on India from the outside. In each example, however, Indian thinkers have engaged with the idea and made crucial interventions.

The term 'Anglosphere' is yet to enter Indian political discourse as it has in Australia, Canada, the US and the UK. This is not surprising; the neologism is too overtly neocolonial to be accepted uncritically.[5] Indeed, I do not expect the concept to become common in India. By co-opting India into this space, Anglospherists narrate India as a neoliberal power which could/should act in concert with these powers. Within this narrative, India is seen as having primarily benefitted from its colonization. India has been appropriated into a space in which it is perceived as both civilized and teachable, and which emphasizes the benefits of India's colonization. The occasional discussion of the Anglosphere from Indian voices, however, has tended to recreate the idea in very different forms.

'Greater Britain', the 'English-Speaking Peoples' and the 'Anglosphere'

The origins of contemporary debate on the Anglosphere lie in late 19th and early 20th century discussions on the role India might play in 'Greater Britain'. In the mid to late 19th century, the concept of 'Greater Britain' rose to considerable prominence as debate on what future form the empire might take.[6] British colonial unionists argued that England and its colonies should become unified in a single, world state, which they termed 'Greater Britain'. Duncan Bell argues that that the idea of 'Greater Britain' meant different things to different people, which resulted in both its 'wide appeal' as well as being 'one of its chief weakness(es)'.[7] This description is equally apt for the contemporary idea of an Anglosphere.

[5] One Indian scholar has identified India with the space. See Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', pp. 23-28.
[6] For an authoritative history, see Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*.
[7] Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, p. 7.

For Bell, these thinkers fell into three main camps. For some, it meant the totality of the British empire, including all settler-colonies along with its colonized peoples. Within this vision, India becomes crucial for its size, prestige and material power, though it had to remain subjugated. For others, it meant just the UK and the settler colonies, which in 1870 were growing in population and power. This led to concern that such colonies might disperse, and eventually shed their British identities. For others still, it meant the 'English-speaking' and 'Anglo-Saxon' people, thereby including Britain's settler colonies and, more importantly, extending to the United States. My genealogy as it focuses on India and visions of English-speaking unity, however, finds a slightly different vision. Although the recent rediscovery of the Anglosphere by Bennett has emphasized the postcoloniality of the concept and sought to make it more inclusive, I find that India had been included in some early visions in a similarly marginalized manner, suggesting multiple narratives of English-speaking unity existed prior to the mid-2000s Anglosphere revival.

India and Greater Britain

Unsurprisingly, discourse on race pervaded most, if not all visions of 'Greater Britain'. In all versions, however, the position of colonial India was a crucial element of the concept. Different ideas of the concept included India, but subjugated it; others rejected India, believing that the space had to be racially pure. Sir Charles Dilke, initially used the term Greater Britain as a shorthand for the British empire as a whole, and argued that 'if two small islands are by courtesy called 'Great', America, Australia, India form a Greater Britain.'[8] Dilke was inspired to write about what future the British empire might have, and was concerned that the British might lose control of its settler colonies. His travelogue, in which he coined the term 'Greater Britain' included America, Australia and Canada, where the British colonized supposedly empty spaces, as well as India, where they ruled other peoples. He referred to the collective culture of these British peoples as 'Saxondom', believing it needed to be defended.[9] He later argued that it should only be considered the 'English-speaking, white-inhabited, and self-governed lands'.[10]

Another well respected historian in the period, John R. Seeley, took up the idea of 'Greater Britain', beginning his definition of the concept in *The Expansion of England* as

[8] Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1880), p. vii.
[9] Dilke, *Greater Britain*, p. vii. See also, Pheroze Vasunia, *The Classics and Colonial India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 132-134.
[10] Dilke, *Greater Britain*, p. 149.

including the territories of the Crown inhabited by British people, and included India in this definition.[11] However, in the same book he later argued that Greater Britain could not include India as it needed to be racially homogenous.[12] He later went on to argue that India was like a separate 'Greater Britain' - which was the opposite of his racially superior one - stating that 'India is all past and, I may almost say, has no future'.[13] Given his deeply pessimistic vision of India, Seeley was unsure precisely where to place it. While holding such a vast swath of territory and peoples, no matter how impoverished it may be, was a source of great prestige. India was used as evidence for the supposed superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking peoples. And yet, at the same time, he clearly believed without the British, India was doomed to failure. India, he believed, was not ready for self-rule, and would not be until the Indians had learned to speak English and accepted English ways. For Pheroze Vasunia, Dilke's anxiety over the fall of the British empire, and the possibility of independence for Australia, Canada and India was tempered by the achievement in the dispersion of Saxon culture around the world.[14] The idea of Greater Britain, though, led to the idea of imperial federation, which was further diluted through the formation of the eventual British Commonwealth.

Edward Freeman, an English historian and liberal politician, argued that 'imperial federation' was impossible, as without India, the federation would no more be imperial. With India, it could not be a federation (as it would have to be racially harmonious).[15] Henry Strangways, a former South Australian premier, argued at the Royal Colonial Institute that an imperial federation without India would be 'like *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out'.[16] India was both essential to the empire, and with it any post-imperial federation. There was an impulse to include India, due to its size, population, power and prestige. At the same time, there was disdain on the basis of the colonial racial and cultural hierarchy, in which India was viewed as ultimately too hopeless to be included. This led to a debate on the position of India in a discourse that was heavily dependent on race. Within this discourse, India could not be thought of as an equal to Britain.

[11] John R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (New York: Kessinger Publishing, 2009), p. 176.
[12] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 176.
[13] Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 176.
[14] Vasunia, *Classics and Colonial India*, p. 134.
[15] Quoted in Sri Ram Mehrotra, 'Imperial federation and India, 1868–1917', *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, 1, 1 (1961), p. 31.
[16] Quoted in Mehrotra, 'Imperial federation and India', p. 31.

The possibility of allowing a small, token number of Indians to serve in an envisaged Imperial parliament was advanced by Lionel Curtis, a senior British official and imperial thinker, believing that this would assuage fears they were not being represented, and was an appropriate liberal gesture.[17] There were a handful of efforts by British imperialists to argue that India should be included in the imperial federation or 'Greater Britain'. These did not become popularized until WWI, in which Indian soldiers played a crucial role in defending the Empire.[18] The effort of Indian soldiers in WWI raised Indian esteem in the UK and was a turning point in India's diplomatic history.[19] While some have argued India became less important in imperial networks of governance after WWI,[20] the Indianization of India's bureaucracy allowed for Indian voices to influence India's position within the British empire.[21] Visions of a possible Commonwealth became a reality in the 1940s and 50s, with India and Pakistan agreeing to remain inside the Commonwealth, with India insisting on becoming a Republic.

Anti-federationists marshalled India as their first argument against the idea of Greater Britain.[22] To them, the inclusion of India made the concept impossible. Were the UK to be federated with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, India would need to remain colonized until its independence, when it was declared 'ready for home rule'. Within this much-debated hierarchy, assumptions about race pervade all the authors' consideration of the concept. While the general feeling was India could never be on equal footing with Britain, its inclusion in an imperial federation added greatly to the prestige of the idea. Throughout the discussion, India was ridiculed as useless, declared absolutely crucial, and, on occasion, completely ignored.

Some parts of India's independence movement welcomed the idea of an Imperial federation after World War One, but demanded home rule as part of the idea. Indians, too,

[17] Mehrotra, 'Imperial federation and India', pp. 29-40.
[18] Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, p. 10.
[19] Vineet Thakur, 'The Colonial Origins of Indian Foreign Policymaking', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XIIX, 32, pp. 58-64.
[20] Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) and Robert J. Blyth, *The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
[21] Thakur, 'India's First Diplomats'.
[22] Mehrotra, 'Imperial federation and India', p. 31.

took part in this debate.[23] Nehru rejected the idea of federation, and up to independence rejected even the idea of the Commonwealth.[24] The Indian liberals were prepared to identify India with imperial federation and a 'Greater Britain'.[25] Indian liberals have been somewhat neglected in Indian historiography. This is partly due to their willingness to identify India with the empire, and to 'collaborate' with the British.[26] In an excellent analysis, Theodore Kodisheck argues that despite their willingness to be associated with Greater Britain, the racial hierarchy of the idea still shocked and dismayed them.[27] Kodisheck considers a series of thinkers based in Calcutta who engaged with the idea of Greater Britain and saw India as lying within it.[28] In particular, being told by Anglo-Indian communities in 1849 that the Magna Carta, a sacred document for liberals identifying with British tradition, could never be applied to Indians was particularly shocking for Indian liberals.[29]

R. C. Dutt, an Indian historian working in the UK, believed that Indians were in fact the most instinctively loyal to the British, even more so than the Anglo-Saxon colonies, arguing that, while the Australians and Canadians might go their own way in search of self-interest: '[Indians] have cast their lot with Great Britain; they have identified with British rule; they honestly desire that rule to last. But they do not desire the administration to last in its present absolute and exclusive form.'[30] Dutt was comfortable with British rule in India, seeing the intermingling of British liberalism with Indian thought to be positive for both sides. While the Indian liberals would join with such a grouping if it were on equal terms, the INC sought to distance India from it. In each case, however, the Indians were seeking to level the colonial hierarchy, either by joining the highest tier or by dismantling it entirely. Though some were less radical than others, each example is defined by the desire to reject the racialized hierarchy of the concept.

[23] Theodore Koditschek, *Liberalism, Imperialism, and the Historical Imagination: Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 263-313.
[24] Y. Rafeek Ahmed, 'India's membership of the Commonwealth: Nehru's Role', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 52, 1 (1991), pp. 43-53.
[25] Koditschek, *Visions of a Greater Britain*.
[26] Thakur, 'India's First Diplomats'.
[27] Koditschek, *Visions of a Greater Britain*, pp. 263-313.
[28] In particular, he examines Keshub Chandra Sen, Brahmo Samaja, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Surendranath Banerjea, Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt. See Koditschek, *Visions of a Greater Britain*, pp. 263-313.
[29] Koditschek, *Visions of a Greater Britain*, p. 266.
[30] R. C. Dutt, quoted in Koditschek, *Visions of a Greater Britain*, p. 310.

Winston Churchill, the Commonwealth and the 'English-speaking Peoples'

The proponents of the Anglosphere, examined below, do not cite the work of Seeley, Dilke or the debates on imperial federation. The link between Greater Britain and the contemporary Anglosphere is Winston Churchill. A young Winston Churchill took part in the debate on imperial federation and was absolutely crucial to the idea of the English-speaking world as part of world politics during the 1940s and 1950s. Churchill, as a historian and a politician, has been a direct influence on other Anglospherists, such as Bennett, Hannan, Christopher Hitchens, Andrew Roberts, John Howard, Tony Abbott and a contemporary Indian liberal scholar, Madhav das Nalapat.

The term 'English-speaking peoples' was common in political discourse throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Churchill is associated with the idea, but an examination of media discourse from the period reveals how commonly the terminology was used.[31] How, then, did Churchill position India within his English-speaking world? Much work on Churchill's understanding of India falls into two distinct camps: English historians who love and defend him,[32] and Indian historians seeking to personally blame him for the greater crimes of the Raj under his rule, particularly the Bengal Famine, and understandably pointing to his racist comments towards Indians.[33] Though he was unimportant as a statesman at the time of the imperial federation debates, Churchill was certainly influenced by and held an opinion on it. Towards the end of the 19th century, Churchill spent much of his time in India. It was in these years that some of his more notoriously racist comments regarding India and Indians were made.[34] Churchill believed the empire should be divided into two halves: on one side Canada and Australia must join Britain in an imperial federation. The second half meant the non-white colonies. As he argued elsewhere, 'East of Suez, Democratic reins are impossible… India must be governed on old principles'.[35]

Churchill's *History of the English Speaking Peoples* is a very personal work, selecting the events that he believed to be most important. His political opponent Clement Atlee went

[31] I base this comment on a search on the National Library of Australia's Trove database of digitised Australian newspapers. See: nla.trove.gov.au.
[32] See, for example, Arthur Herman, *Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age* (London: Bantam, 2009).
[33] For an important example, see: Madhusree Mukerjee, *Churchill's Secret War*: *The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
[34] For an analysis sympathetic to Churchill, see Hermann, *Gandhi and Churchill.*
[35] Quoted in Herman, *Gandhi and Churchill,* p. 99.

as far as to say it should have been called *Things in History which Interested Me*.[36] Churchill, perhaps due to his American mother, has absolutely no hesitation in including the US in his 'English-speaking peoples'. Very little of his history of the 'English-speaking Peoples' discusses Indian people. In his narrative of India's colonization by Britain under Clive of India, no Indians receive significant attention. Telling in assessing his perception of Indians in the English-speaking World, also, are his depictions of the Indian Rebellion. Here, Churchill refers to only one Indian by name (Nana Sahib) and another only by title (the 'King of Delhi').[37] The event is primarily remembered for the role it played in the consolidation of the Crown's rule in India, which he viewed as a positive development and allowed for far better administration. Clearly, India and Indians are not subjects of enquiry in Churchill's history of 'English-speaking peoples'. While this would be unlikely to surprise historians of Churchill, he clearly did not regard Indians as fitting his idea of the English-speaking peoples, or grant them a great deal of importance. What little is included is a history of the English in India.

Racialized ideas were a part of Churchill's thought in the 1940s. As he said during WWII, as reported by the shocked progressive US Vice President Henry Wallace, a drunken Churchill made an argument for Anglo-Saxon superiority:

> [Churchill said] 'why be apologetic about Anglos-Saxon superiority', that we were superior, that we had the common heritage which had been worked out over the centuries... he felt that he was called on as a result too serve the function of the two great Anglo-Saxon civilizations in order to confer the benefit of freedom on the rest of the world.[38]

Wallace questioned how this was different from 'Saxondom *Über Alles',* which he reportedly dismissed immediately.[39]

Rather than preach the postcolonial nature of the concept, Churchill used the idea of the English-speaking peoples to further suggest India's inferiority. Nevertheless, India's place in his English-speaking people is rather more complicated than this. Further evidence for his perception of India inside his concept of the English-speaking peoples comes from his

[36] Anon, 'HESP Reconsidered', (2013), at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/support/the-churchill-centre/publications/chartwell-bulletin/2013/63-sep/2500-hesp-reconsidered, accessed November 12, 2015.
[37] Winston S. Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: Volume Four: The Great Democracies* (London, 1958), pp. 67-68.
[38] Henry Wallace, quoted in Richard Holmes, *In the Footsteps of Churchill: A Study in Character* (London: Basic Books, 2005), p. 255.
[39] Wallace, *Footsteps of Churchill*, p. 255.

political speeches after WWII. Churchill used the term frequently to praise the UK and the US in the same breath. When no longer Prime Minister, he frequently called on the US and the Commonwealth and the British empire to ally together, giving the UK a particularly special place in the world. In his 1946 'Iron Curtain' Speech, he argued that:

> Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.[40]

This was a common means of using the concept in Australia as well. Multiple commentators used the phrase when tying the US and newly independent British colonies.

When Churchill returned to the Prime Ministership in 1951, Victor Courtney argued in an opinion piece for the *Sunday Times* of Perth that Churchill would not return to find the empire had dissipated without him. He suggested that Churchill may find the new India, Australia, South Africa and Ireland difficult to comprehend, he would also find that: 'all the best things that came about in the development of that Empire endured in the greater scope and power of the English-speaking family in which America is so important a member'.[41] John Story, an Australian industrialist, argued that Australia had a tendency 'towards the English-speaking peoples', but could also engage Asia. His preferred mechanism for this, though, was the Colombo Plan, which centred only on former British colonies.[42] Similarly, The National Bank of Australia Chairman H. D. Giddy argued that beyond the 'English-speaking Peoples', that Australia's best chances for investment were the 'outer sections' (India and Pakistan amongst them).[43]

Churchill's vision of the English-speaking peoples was an amalgamation. Very clearly the US and the UK lie at the top of his hierarchy. Canada and Australia fit comfortably within his English-speaking World. This is adequately shown by his hope that they would join Britain during the imperial federation debates of the 1890s and his history of the English-speaking peoples. Throughout, however, India was too unimportant to be discussed. His vision of imperial federation and English-speaking peoples did include the non-white colonies, but he was careful to keep them separate in some other, ill-defined

[40] Winston S. Churchill, 'Iron Curtain Speech', in Churchill (ed.), *Never Give In!*, pp. 344-352.
[41] Victor Courtney, quoted in *Sunday Times* (Perth), November 4, 1951, p. 6.
[42] John Story, quoted in *Maryborough Chronicle*, June 5, 1954, p. 4.
[43] H. D. Giddy, quoted in *Queensland Times* (Ipswich), November 30, 1954, p. 2.

organization still under the auspices of the Britain. This vision of post-imperial hierarchy was fundamental to the broader idea of 'English-speaking peoples'.

In 1948, Churchill argued at the Conservative Party Conference that the UK belonged to three spheres of influence: 'There are three circles which are linked together: the circle of the Brit[ish] Empire and Commonwealth, the circle of the English-speaking World and the circle of United Europe'.[44] The separation here of English-speaking world and British empire as separate circles is telling: the British empire is connected to, but not the same as, the English-speaking world. Churchill's vision is somewhat murky, given his unwillingness to discreetly define his vision of the English-speaking world. And yet, clearly India is at best severely subjugated within it, and at worst left out entirely. His vision of imperial federation in the late 1800s included India, but kept it subservient. His opposition to independence lasted until it was finally made redundant in 1947. Rather than India being fully outside of his English-speaking peoples, then, Churchill's fervent belief in the colonial hierarchy and the value of Britain's colonial rule to colonized peoples ensured they could be included. Even though India lies within his vision of English-speaking peoples it was well down on its hierarchy to the extent of being nearly invisible.

Churchill's vision of the English-speaking peoples was contested in visions of forming the new British Commonwealth. In this debate, these same two ideas arose: the contest between a narrow but closely-knit 'All-White Commonwealth', favoured by then-Opposition leader in Australia, Robert Menzies and the broader post-imperial, multi-racial body that eventuated at the urging of Canadian, Indian and British leaders.[45]

Nehru was well aware of the nature of the Commonwealth, having argued at a Lahore session of the INC that 'India could never be an equal member of the Commonwealth unless imperialism and all that it implies is discarded'.[46] He was concerned, equally, though, that it would become just a 'Whiteman's club' whose members commonly practised racial

[44] Winston S. Churchill, 'Speech notes for WSC's speech', at Churchill Archive, CHUR 5/25A-E:01 Apr 1949 - 28 May 1949, p. 14.
[45] Robert Menzies, quoted in Anon, 'India's Status: "Mystery", says Menzies', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 29, 1949, p. 1.
[46] Ahmed, 'India's membership of the Commonwealth', pp. 43-53.

discrimination.[47] Here, there is a contest between two narratives of the idea: a more 'cohesive' all white body and a more pluralist multi-racial organization.

The idea of the unified English-speaking peoples was a part of global discourse at the time of Indian independence. It was animated by the rise of the USSR and the beginning of decolonization. The construction of the Commonwealth was based on the idea that these states shared colonial heritage, institutional and judicial structures, systems of governance and education and should therefore have an international network for future cooperation and engagement. There were, however, crucial divisions of perception as to what this grouping should look like. Lester Pearson of Canada and Nehru were excited by the prospects of a multi-racial, open Commonwealth, taking a post-racial vision of the prospects for cooperation between these states with shared language, judicial and legislative heritage, etc. Others, such as Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, believed a diverse Commonwealth which included India as a Republic might not be unified enough to be 'meaningful'.[48]

By joining the Commonwealth and insisting on doing so as a Republic, however, Nehru's India disrupted the idea of the Commonwealth as small, unified and with just white opinions under the British Crown. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four, Nehru and his diplomats went on to regularly use the Commonwealth as a forum for fighting racial discrimination.[49] By joining the Commonwealth as an equal member, India was able to disrupt the racial nature of colonial hierarchy, as becoming part of it fundamentally reshaped the nature of the institution.

India and the 'Anglosphere'

Where does India lie, then, in the mid-2000s revival of the Anglosphere? The Oxford English dictionary defines 'Anglosphere' as 'the group of countries where English is the main native language".[50] Merriam-Webster defines it as "the countries of the world in which the English language and cultural values predominate'.[51] A part of this debate is the extent to

[47] Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Michael Edwards, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 352.
[48] Robert Menzies, quoted in 'India's Status'.
[49] This was very much the case in South Africa as well. For a comparative analysis, see: Alexander E. Davis and Vineet Thakur, 'Strategic Thought, but not as IR Knows it: India's Anti-Racist Diplomacy in Australia, Canada and South Africa, 1946-1954', paper presented at ISA Convention, New Orleans, 2015.
[50] 'Anglosphere', *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*.
[51] 'Anglosphere', *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*.

which language, culture and/or values constitute the Anglosphere. This debate is further reflected in the mixed usages of the term and the invocation of the concept in academic and political discourse. The debate is made more complicated by some of the racialized elements of the Anglosphere, as examined excellently by Vucetic,[52] and made even more important when attempting to 'locate' India within this political space.

In arguing for the likely continued superiority of the Anglosphere over the immediate future, James Bennett provides a tiered definition, writing that the 'densest nodes of the Anglosphere are found in the United States and the United Kingdom'.[53] He follows, arguing that other 'significant elements' include English-speaking Canada and Australia. For Bennett, to be part of the Anglosphere implies not just English language, but sharing of fundamental customs and values at the core of English-speaking cultures: 'individualism; rule of law; honouring of covenants... and the emphasis on freedom as a political and cultural value'.[54] His visualization of the Anglosphere relates to 'concentric spheres marked by differing degrees of sharing the core Anglosphere characteristics'.[55] He continues:

> The innermost spheres are in the nations populated by native or assimilated-immigrant English speakers speaking the language at home, at work and in government and naturally immersed in English-language media. The nations where all these elements are present are at the heart of the Anglosphere. Where any are present, the people are part of the Anglosphere.[56]

For Bennett, the Anglosphere has a distinct hierarchy. At the top are the US and the UK; below them, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. Lower down, are *educated* elements of 'Africa' and India, and English-speaking parts of the Caribbean and Oceania. India is on the 'outer' of the Anglosphere: which he calls 'English using states of other civilizations'.[57] Bennett's definition is also identical to the British colonial hierarchy: colonizers on the top, settler-colonial societies in the middle, and colonized peoples on the bottom. Although Bennett claims to be writing about culture rather than 'race', the ideational instinct remains the same: his work reconstructs the colonial hierarchy for the 21st century.

[52] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*.
[53] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*, p. 80.
[54] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*, pp. 79-80.
[55] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*, pp. 79-80.
[56] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*, pp. 79-80.
[57] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*, p. 80.

If we define the Anglosphere related to the superiority of a global US-UK culture, then it is implicitly related to the inferiority of other cultures. The hierarchy is continuous despite the removal of racial terms. His work must be read in the context of what many other scholars and governments have called the 'Asian century'. Bennett argues that the values of the Anglosphere will make the 21st century another Anglosphere century and bases this argument on the technical benefits of speaking English. In arguing that it will instead be an Anglosphere century, he is actually constructing the Anglosphere *against* India and China. To include India as a major part of his definition, or his discussion, would undermine the original premise of his work. Bennett's approach to the Anglosphere is underpinned by an extremely positive reading of liberal political, economic and cultural values. Here, Bennett presents a deeply hierarchical Anglosphere, in which India is included, but well down in the concept's hierarchy.

Going back beyond Bennett's work, conservative British historian Robert Conquest called for an official form of Anglosphere, imagining a broad alliance with its headquarters in Bermuda, considering possibilities for a voting system, and penning a possible 'declaration of interdependence'.[58] Despite his defining the space as based on a history, tradition and the culture of 'law-and-liberty countries',[59] India is not discussed as potential member. What keeps India outside of this space is not made obvious. This is essentially an update to an earlier work calling for a unification of the US, the UK, Canada Australia, New Zealand Ireland, the nations of the Caribbean and 'perhaps others'. India is not specifically mentioned at all, although the inclusion of the Caribbean suggests predominantly non-white places are potentially included.[60]

Christopher Hitchens responded to the work of Bennett and Conquest, taking up the term 'Anglosphere' to mean 'that historic arc of law, tradition and individual liberty that extends from Scotland to Australia and takes in the two largest multicultural democracies on the planet – the US and India', while arguing that 'what we now refer to as Anglosphere has a future as well as a past'.[61] The use of the concept 'tradition' is perhaps a more problematic definition, as will be seen in discussion of Indian conceptions of the Anglosphere. One

[58] Conquest, *Dragons of Expectation*, p. 224.
[59] Conquest, *Dragons of Expectation*, p. 244.
[60] Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), pp. 267-281.
[61] Christopher Hitchens, 'An Anglosphere Future', (2007) at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_4_anglosphere.html, accessed July 12, 2013.

difference between Hitchens and the other scholars discussed here is his use of the space as a means of fighting Islamic extremism, a fight that India is most certainly engaged with. We can see here, that the Anglosphere is constructed to some extent on the Other of Islamic extremism, which has placed India more firmly in the space. After all, if the Anglosphere is not constructed *against* Islam, then why are Pakistan and Bangladesh, other countries that fundamentally share India's colonial development and, albeit to a perhaps more limited extent, English language, not even considered as possible inclusions?

Hitchens' attempt to define Anglosphere as a more inclusive space, albeit largely on the basis of fighting another cultural group, is not helped by conservative British academic Andrew Roberts' writings on the English-speaking peoples and the Anglosphere. His *History of the English Speaking Peoples Since 1900* presents a historical narrative that argues that the English-speaking peoples are 'the last, best hope for Mankind',[62] due to the force of their political values of freedom and liberty.[63] His narrative focuses solely on the group of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Roberts wrote in this text that the 'English-speaking World' is united not by shared race or ethnicity, but by shared values. Because of his definition of the English-speaking world, India is only within his narrative when it comes to the period of British rule, and even then, focused on those ruling India. India is covered by little more than a single paragraph post-Partition, which only comments on the prevalence of English-language daily newspapers. India is covered almost solely in context to the British people living there.[64] Clearly, to be English-speaking in this work, one also has to be Anglo-Saxon. It is troubling enough, to think one can cover Indian history as a small subset of British history. However, his approach is to India's colonial subjugation, in particular his defence of General Reginald Dyer's 1919 massacre at Amritsar's (otherwise) peaceful Jallianwala Bagh, is racist. He excuses the massacre by providing a long, calm, narrative 'context' to the event, arguing Dyer had no choice, suggesting it may have been 'unpleasant, but necessary' – had unrest spread, the consequences might have been far worse.[65] He cites only the British estimate of

[62] Andrew Roberts, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900* (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), p. 8.
[63] Roberts, *English-Speaking Peoples*, p. 8.
[64] Roberts, *English-Speaking Peoples*, p. 575. There is one other mention of India, in which Roberts laments the removal of British statues post-Partition. See p. 470. This analysis is based partly on a reading of the index to the volume.
[65] Roberts, *English-Speaking Peoples*, pp. 148-153.

the death toll at 359.[66] He argues that the park was not a fully enclosed space, as at sections the walls were 5 foot high. 20,000 panicked people cannot evacuate a park with such limited exits. As the description of the massacre at park itself says (part of what Roberts calls Indian nationalist propaganda) some did escape by climbing the walls, but many were pulled off the walls while trying to escape by others attempting the same. Moreover, at most parts of the park, the walls tower above 5 feet, and were utterly impossible to climb.

Roberts calls the incident a 'propaganda god-send' for Indian nationalists, criticizing 'propagandists' for trashing Dyer's reputation.[67] Within this narrative, Dyer needs protecting from the Indian nationalists. Clearly, within Roberts' 'English-speaking peoples', there is no room for cultural difference – never mind that many of Dyer's victims at Amritsar were English-speaking. Roberts critiques the Indian nationalists for perverting understandings of his 'true' history, even within his own nakedly nationalist narrative and despite his own selective use of evidence. In doing so, he produces an orientalist narrative in which only the western observer speaks 'truth' and the Indian only speaks 'propaganda'. Indian victims are then further dehumanized, which is particularly problematic as people of Indian origin can be considered (as Manmohan Singh has suggested) as the English-speaking world's largest single component.[68]

Roger Kimball points to India's inclusion in his definition as proof of the Anglosphere's post-colonial, post-racial nature.[69] Interestingly, Roberts has argued elsewhere that the inclusion of India in the Anglosphere proves that it is an inclusive space defined by shared values rather than race or ethnicity.[70] Yet, clearly from analysis of his work on the English-speaking peoples, Roberts' denial of racism is undermined by his defence of the worst of Britain's imperial crimes, one that even the British government under Conservative leadership has denounced as 'deeply shameful'.[71] And yet, while Manmohan Singh may have emphasised India's English-speaking heritage on occasion the term is yet to be uttered by any

[66] The INC gave the death toll at well over 1000. See Sankar Ghose, *The Indian National Congress, its History and Heritage* (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1975), p. 57.
[67] Roberts, *English-Speaking Peoples*, p. 149.
[68] Manmohan Singh, 'Speech at Oxford University'.
[69] Kimball, 'The Anglosphere' pp. 1-6.
[70] This is according to Roger Kimball, though no reference is provided. He is most likely referring to 'A History of the English-Speaking Peoples', though the term 'Anglosphere' does not appear in this book, outside of references to Bennett's work. See Kimball, 'The Anglosphere', p. 5.
[71] BBC News, 'David Cameron marks British 1919 Amritsar massacre', (2013) at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21515360, accessed September 20, 2013.

Indian policy-maker. While Indian policy makers may have used this style of rhetoric, even a cursory analysis of Indian foreign policy discourse reveals that this is simply one limited element of India's postcolonial identity.

Several Anglospherists have made a connection between India's economic development and its inclusion in the Anglosphere. Daniel Hannan, a British writer, journalist and conservative Member of European Parliament for South East England, has become the UK's leading advocate for the Anglosphere in foreign policy. He has argued that whether or not India aligns itself with the Anglosphere or as an 'Asian super-power' 'may be the single most important geopolitical question of our age'.[72] Where Bennett is neglectful, Hannan's 2013 reimagination of the Anglosphere is emphatic that India is within the concept. He writes that Delhi '*feels* more familiar, less foreign, than it did a decade ago' on the basis that 'the Indian middle class is ballooning' and partly because 'the English language is more widespread'.[73] Hannan seeks to return India to his sense of imperial familiarity, on the basis of language and economic prosperity. Throughout his historical narrative, British colonial administration is praised, with its negatives (famine, racism, etc…) underplayed, as democracy and the English language ultimately prove India's colonial experience was positive.[74] For Hannan, acceptance of liberal economic norms, and indeed economic growth, draws India closer to his understanding of 'Anglosphere'. When it does well, India is part of the Anglosphere, when it fails economically, it is outside. India's poor, who arguably have been let down by these same economic policies, are considered as outside of the Anglosphere as, for Hannan, '[T]here are lakhs of Indian villages where Jet Airways and the Internet are as remote as the Moon'.[75] Here, Hannan accounts for India's shift away from the Anglosphere after independence, equating the end of India's postcolonial identity with its economic boom and realignment with the Anglosphere:

> Every newly independent state goes through a phase of exaggerating… the things that make it different from the former colonial power. In the end days after the end of the British Raj, this distancing took the form of embracing supposedly traditional economic policies… swaraj and swadeshi. But… as the economy booms, India no longer has anything to prove.[76]

[72] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, p. 290.
[73] Hannan, 'India's relationship with the Anglosphere'. My emphasis.
[74] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, pp. 290-300.
[75] Hannan, 'India's Relationship with the Anglosphere'.
[76] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, pp. 299-300.

Here, alignment with the Anglosphere is tied to the end of India's postcoloniality. He concludes, 'The Anglosphere is based on a common affinity, a sense of unifying identity. Like almost all Britons, I feel such an affinity in India in a way that I don't in Europe'.[77] India only started to feel more familiar to Hannan once it had become successful economically. This is tied to the size and Anglophone nature of the Indian diaspora. He recalls: 'On my last visit to Madras, I asked directions from an exotic-looking woman in a gorgeous sari. "Ohh, I dunno, love", she replied in broad Cockney. Like me, she was a tourist'. [78]

The theme of India being within the Anglosphere, but still 'exotic' is repeated elsewhere. For Kimball, the Anglosphere's mix of 'values' and economics means that 'the ideas in play are so potent, in fact, that they allow India, *exotic India*, to emerge as an equal partner with Britain and the United States'.[79] If India is exotic, it is constructed as Other even as it is given equal billing with Britain and the US. Kimball thus spectacularly undermines his own argument before even completing its first sentence. He further ties the English language to rationality, stating that 'there seems to be some deep connection between the English language and that most uncommon virtue, common sense.'[80]

'Liberal values' have become central to the contemporary anti-racist strain seen in Bennett's work. These values relate particularly to neoliberal economic discourse. In Hannan's work particularly, the UK's fiscal conservatism takes it further away from European socialism. There are clear elements of neoliberal economic ideology attached to the idea of the Anglosphere. Bennett's text is arguing for the primacy of the Anglosphere on the basis of its ability to monopolize international business, as English is the language in which the global financial system has been constructed.[81] Bennett writes to counter the idea that there has been an 'irresistible' shift in power to Asia and that we are heading towards a 'convergence'.[82] In this context, India has become seen as an economic counterweight to China as well as a security one. Similarly, English language and economic success have been

[77] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, p. 300.
[78] Hannan, *Inventing Freedom*, pp. 299-300.
[79] My emphasis. Kimball, 'The Anglosphere & the Future of Liberty', p. 4.
[80] Kimball, 'Future of Liberty', p. 4.
[81] Bennett, *Anglosphere Challenge*.
[82] Kishore Mahbubani, *The New Asian hemisphere: The Irresistible shift of Global Power to the East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008) and Michael Spence, *The next Convergence: The future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed world* (New York: Picador, 2011).

tied together in India, with a study by Azam, Chin, and Prakash finding that fluency in English 'increases the hourly wages of men by 34%'.[83] This study is used by Baru to suggest that the English language will tie India and Britain together well into the future. Baru asserts that India's movement towards the English-speaking world is specifically a response to a perceived growing unity of China and the Islamic world.[84]

John Howard, former Australian Prime Minister, has also discussed India's position within the Anglosphere when delivering the Margaret Thatcher Freedom Lecture to the Heritage Foundation. Howard opened his remarks by quoting a private comment from Manmohan Singh's that had stayed with him: 'Prime Minster, India and Australia are two countries that have a lot in common, but we haven't had much to do with each other'.[85] This comment hints at India's ambivalence with the Anglosphere: Australia and India have many shared histories and some shared elements in their respective identities, yet historically very little has come of this in the international relationship. The same could be said of India-Anglosphere relations more generally. Howard focused his lecture on the qualities of the Anglosphere, perhaps primarily to enable him to praise Australia and the US in the same breath, but first said of India: 'it's fair to say that India would not identify herself unconditionally as a member of the Anglosphere'.[86] Here, Howard is aware of India's ambivalence. But, at the same time, he expresses his surprise at the suggestion from Manmohan Singh that India might be connected to the Anglosphere. Howard was speaking of the qualities of the Anglosphere, but was uncertain as to whether or not India was part of it, and thus, unsure if India was superior. Howard was aware of the uncertainty over India's position, but his strong assertion of English-speaking superiority tempered his willingness to associate India with the space.

Conservative Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has also written of the importance of the Anglosphere to Australia's place in the world and by extension, its foreign policy. In writing his argument in favour of the Anglosphere, and its contribution to, and

[83] Mehtabul Azam, Aimee Chin, and Nishith Prakash, 'The return to English language skills in India', (2011) at http://www.uh.edu/~achin/research/azam_chin_prakash.pdf, accessed July 9 2013, p. 1.
[84] Sanjaya Baru, 'India, Britain and the language of partnership', in Jo Johnson, & Rajiv Kumar (eds), *Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership* (Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2011), pp. 54–66.
[85] John Howard, quoting Manmohan Singh, at 'The Anglosphere and the Advance of Freedom', (2011), at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2011/01/the-anglosphere-and-the-advance-of-freedom, accessed, March 12, 2013.
[86] Howard, 'The Advance of Freedom'.

indeed, its construction of the modern world, Abbott praised India's inclusion in the space: 'Western culture, especially its English-speaking version, is pervasive. Overwhelmingly, the modern world is one that's been made in English'.[87] Clearly the use of English is central to Abbott's approach to the Anglosphere, but here also he is discussing the Anglosphere as the dominant form of 'western' culture.

The use of the English as the language of international business, the internet and international politics is seen here as central to a state's ability to adapt to the modern world. It is here that he relates to India; 'A key development is likely to be the rise of countries where English is nearly everyone's second language... The rise of English shouldn't be a problem for India, but it could be for China'.[88] Abbott regards the space as an inclusive one, continuing, 'These days, the books being discussed in New York or in London are as likely to have been written by an Indian or an Australian as by an American or a Briton'.[89] Here, India's literature in English gives him a sense of familiarity with India, making the Other feel more understandable.

For all his idealistic talk of an inclusive Anglosphere in which anyone can have their work discussed internationally through a unifying English language, India is still not afforded a full seat in the Anglosphere family. Abbott continues: 'Despite its caste system, India has some key advantages – democracy and the rule of law besides the English language – and already looks as though it *will become* an important member of the Anglosphere'.[90] Here, India is clearly within Abbott's Anglosphere, but it is not yet important. Moreover, there is a sense here that India's advantages in the international system were given to it by its colonization, which ties into older conservative notions of the benefits of empire. Though Abbott is being complimentary, it is wrapped in paternalistic discourse, especially when taken with his comment above on 'western values'. He feels more comfortable with India because of its perceived westernization, and the only element that he criticizes in Indian society is *its* caste system. This reflects the orientalist stereotype in which dynamism belongs

[87] Tony Abbott, *Battlelines* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press: 2009), p. 161. For a similar narrative of world history, see Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2003).
[88] Abbott, *Battlelines*, p. 160.
[89] Abbott, *Battlelines*, p. 159.
[90] Abbott, *Battlelines*, p. 160. My emphasis.

to the Occident: therefore, when the East is dynamic, it is displaying 'western' characteristics.[91]

Abbott's talk of Anglosphere led to a public battle over foreign policy, as Australia's Foreign Minister Bob Carr attacked Abbott's use of the Anglosphere in September of 2012. 'Talking about the [A]nglosphere is sending a message that – forget Africa, forget the Caribbean, forget above all Asia; Australia's more comfortable with its old friends: New Zealand, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom'.[92] It is not entirely clear where India sits within this statement, though commenting 'forget above all Asia' suggests he is viewing India as Asia, not Anglosphere. Placing this comment in context, it is likely that he placed India, and indeed the Caribbean and South Africa, as outside of the Anglosphere because he was intentionally defining it as colonial in order to attack Abbott's position. This is, to an extent, a misrepresentation of Abbott's view of the Anglosphere as Abbott regards India as within the Anglosphere, but not as an 'important member'. Carr went further when telling reporters in New York that '(Abbott) keeps returning to this concept of the Anglosphere ... like an infant reaching for its mother's skirts. And you've got to see what he said recently ... in the context of that longing for an old colonial relationship where Australia thinks only of its great and powerful friends'.[93] Carr's use of the term 'colonial' is more telling, tying the concept of Anglosphere to Australia's own colonial construction. The position of India in the idea of Anglosphere is clear; it can be included but subjugated, accepted through orientalist and imperialist discourse, or ignored entirely.

Indian Visions of the Anglosphere

As suggested above, only a few Indian scholars and politicians have engaged specifically with the idea of India as part of the English-speaking world. Unlike the idea of imperial federation, India and Indians were not involved in the idea of Churchill's 'English-speaking world', this debate did very much play out in India's decision to join the Commonwealth. Madhav Das Nalapat has performed the only work of any academic substance on India and the Anglosphere. As discussed briefly in the introduction, however,

[91] John Macleod, *Beginning Postcolonialism* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 44.
[92] Robert Carr, 'Lateline - Interview with Tony Jones' (2012), at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2012/bc_tr_120725.html, accessed September 25, 2013.
[93] Robert Carr, quoted in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'Abbott fixated with "Anglosphere": Carr', (2012) http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/abbott-fixated-with-anglosphere-carr-20120924-26htj.html, accessed September 25, 2013.

Manmohan Singh has previously picked up on the idea of the 'English-speaking peoples' in 2005, and placed India within his vision of it.

Nalapat argues for an Anglosphere that includes India at the top of its hierarchy, concluding that 'India… together with the United States and the United Kingdom… forms the core of the 21st century Anglosphere'.[94] He suggests that the concept has previously been based on 'the 'blood of the body', and needs to be replaced, or has been replaced with 'the blood of the mind'.[95] In defining the space, he writes:

> If we define the Anglosphere as not simply a geographic or even a linguistic entity, but as an entity that encapsulates the type of thought and behaviour that led to Magna Carta, to the movement for the abolition of slavery, to the Industrial Revolution, and to the war against the Nazis' attempt to conquer continental Europe, then it is a fact that such minds exist not only within the geographical spaces visualized in a Churchillian Anglosphere, but also much farther afield.[96]

Nalapat argues for a post-racial, liberal Anglosphere. His work is normative, though, rather than descriptive, as he argues that constructing an Anglosphere with India at its centre would be ideal for India, the US and the UK. The definition provided differs from that of Bennett as it is more strongly post-racial and is animated by ideas and ethos rather than a sense of cultural superiority. Still, by including India, Nalapat argues for a pluralist Anglosphere based on ideas and values, and places India at the top of it. This is still a hierarchical idea, which relies on a sense of post-imperial superiority, but India is elevated within it.

Nalapat suggests that had the British not been so obsessed with the 'blood of the body', the India-Anglosphere split would not have occurred with the Indian nationalist movement with the force that it did.[97] A narrative of postcolonial India's engagement with the Anglosphere in which India accepts the ideals espoused by the colonizer by removing the racial discrimination is too simplistic. It seems highly unlikely that India's postcolonial independence can lead it back to an unconditional acceptance of the liberal values of its colonizers.

[94] Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere'. See also: Madhav D. Nalapat, 'The Anglosphere can lead the world', (2010) at http://thediplomat.com/2010/10/the-anglosphere-can-lead-the-world/?allpages=yes, accessed February 4, 2015.
[95] Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', p. 23.
[96] Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', p. 23.
[97] Nalapat, 'India and the Anglosphere', p. 23.

Perhaps the most complimentary leader India has had in its relations with Anglosphere actors, Manmohan Singh, expressed his approach when speaking at Oxford University when accepting an honorary degree. He argued that English, alongside the modern school system was the most important legacy of the Raj: 'In indigenising English, as so many people have done in so many nations across the world, we have made the language our own... Today, English in India is seen as just another Indian language'.[98] By emphasizing the indigenization of English, Singh is able to tie India and England together on the basis of a common language and experiences. Thus, from this perspective at least, a postcolonial India must be one that can comfortably share links with its former colonizers unproblematically.

Singh continued in the same vein, '...if there is one phenomenon on which the sun cannot set, it is the world of the English-speaking peoples, in which the people of the Indian origin are the single largest component'.[99] This comment evokes a late 19th century concept of the sun never setting on the British empire, emphasising India's importance to the English-speaking world. Singh affirmed amongst these historical connections a commitment to assist the British, in the wake of the 2005 bombings on London's public transport system, arguing that 'all of us who believe in democracy and the rule of law must stand together and affirm our commitment to fight this scourge resolutely and unitedly'.[100] The issue of radical Islamist terrorism is clearly a part of the contemporary move towards a more accommodating approach towards India as part of the Anglosphere. This threat as animating the idea of English-speaking unity fits far better with contemporary Indian identity than the rise of Communism or the possible loss of empire.

Within this same speech, Singh emphasized the role of the European enlightenment in the writing and shaping of India's constitution, describing it as 'a testimony to the enduring interplay between what is essentially Indian and what is very British in our intellectual heritage',[101] expressing once again the dualism in Indian identity of British, or Western, versus Indian elements of India. This was no doubt pleasing to hear for an English audience. Most importantly, though, Singh argued that the Indians in the English-speaking world were its largest single component. Whether or not this is accurate, depends on how well one must speak English to be counted as 'English-speaking'. By identifying India with the space, Singh

[98] Singh, 'Speech at Oxford University'.
[99] Singh, 'Speech at Oxford University'.
[100] Singh, 'Speech at Oxford University'.
[101] Singh, 'Speech at Oxford University'.

also fundamentally reshaped the hierarchy long at the core of the idea of English-speaking unity.

Conclusion: India's Postcolonial Estrangement

Whenever assertions of English-speaking unity have come to the fore in international politics, India has had a similar response: to resist the international and racial hierarchy constructed by the idea. When the Indian liberals engaged with Greater Britain, they believed India should be equal with the British. The pre-independence INC, however, rejected the idea outright. When Nehru argued India should join the Commonwealth, he insisted on doing so as a Republic, which fundamentally changed the concept at a time when the idea was likely to be an all-white old-boys club. As will be seen in Chapters Three and Four, joining this space then made it easier to fight racial discrimination in the British empire's settler colonies. When Manmohan Singh placed India on the inside of the 'English-speaking world', he insisted India was also its largest single component. In each case, these Indian statesmen sought to fundamentally reshape the idea of English-speaking unity by joining it. India's recent engagement with Australia, the US, the UK and Canada should be seen not as evidence for India becoming more realist, more liberal, or joining the Anglosphere. Rather, it should be seen as part of India's long quest since its colonization to level the remnants of colonial hierarchy in international politics.

The repeated emphasis of terms such as 'common values', 'rule of law' and 'multi-ethnic democracy', 'freedom' and 'free trade', are today associated with both discourse on Anglosphere *and* Anglosphere discourse on India. The Anglosphere as a concept is used today to suggest the superiority of these concepts in an attempt to tie together the broader 'English-speaking peoples'. Attempts to transcend older racialized conceptions of this idea, however, have been limited by the use of India as a token of inclusivity, when only accepting India through deeply problematic depictions. It is particularly problematic also, though, to view the Anglosphere as 'cultural', or account for its perceived 'superiority' as a cultural value. The cultural explanation of the concept is exemplified by Bennett relies on a contextually specific reading of Self as superior, and is thus offensive to other cultures.

In the third wave of discourse, India has become more frequently perceived as being within this political space, although it remains marginalized. This marginalization relies on a belief in the cultural superiority of 'English-speaking peoples'. In an afterword to a second

edition of *The Anglosphere Challenge*, Bennett mentions his regret at not having examined India more deeply, realizing its importance to his 'network Commonwealth'.[102] The example is instructive: India had been an afterthought for Anglospherist politicians and academics, something seen briefly as a source of hope and opportunity, but not seriously considered or followed up on. It is this perception, I argue, that accounts for the weakness in India's relationships, and the limited, ambivalent strengthening of these relationships since 1998. The difficulties of this discursive 'balancing act' are shown in the limited success of India-Anglosphere relationships. India's original rejection of Anglo-Saxon cultural superiority on the basis of its postcolonial identity-logic can still be seen in its commitment to non-alignment. Moreover, the embrace of India from Anglosphere sources is still constructed through, even animated by, orientalist discourse on India, particularly through its newfound economic dynamism meaning India is seen as 'acting western'. This is exemplified by discourse on 'exotic' India as part of the Anglosphere. Hannan's work, though emphatic in its inclusion of India in the Anglosphere, is only able to include India through a narrative of British colonization as predominantly positive. Today, including India in even a liberal, multiracial Anglosphere comes loaded with colonial baggage. Excluding it, however, creates an idea based on a racialized identity. The idea, though, in each narrative, reflects particular understandings of world order. India can be thought of as inside and outside of the English-speaking world. This ambivalence guides the remainder of this thesis.

[102] See: Bennett, *The Third Anglosphere Century*.

Chapter Three: (White) Australia and India

Introduction

As I have argued in the previous chapter, India has a complex and ambivalent relationship with the idea of the Anglosphere. In the following four case studies, I develop the third key argument of this thesis, by considering how India responds to the different narratives of the English-speaking world in the context of foreign policy. To begin, I consider Australia's racialized identity and the ways in which this shaped its relationship with India. I investigate in detail how India related to the racialized narrative of the English-speaking world through a detailed analysis of the identity politics between India and Australia immediately after Indian independence. I consider the juxtaposition of India's postcolonial identity and Australia's racialized identity at play in India-Australia relations after Indian independence. As will be seen, these identities inhibited the formation of a close relationship and reveal a clash over colonial/postcolonial hierarchies in world politics. Australia's approach to India reflected a particular form of the India problem. Australia saw India, Indian people and Indian foreign policy as unknowable, irrational and unnecessarily concerned with colonialism – impossible to understand. Australian identity discourse in this period reflected a racialized and hierarchical vision of world order – preferring to ally with the US and the UK while preventing non-white immigration. Indian identity, however, was set against precisely this hierarchy. My approach also adds a new understanding to current scholarship on India-Australia relations, which has to this point neglected issues of race, decolonization and colonial histories. In IR, this is due to the excision of race and racism from the discipline. In historical studies, this is due to the overemphasis on Australian sources over the more difficult to access and 'incomplete' Indian source material.

Given my emphasis on Indian source material, and my genealogical method, I do not attempt to sketch a 'complete' historical analysis of the period; rather, I focus on the ideational relationship between the two states.[1] I begin by considering the historiography of the India and Australia relationship and then consider briefly the particular role the Anglosphere plays in Australian identity, suggesting that Australia's proximity to Asia caused the racialized narrative to harden in a way that did not happen in Canada. Following this, I consider the ideational projects of the prime ministers of India and Australia in this period: Robert Menzies and Ben Chifley and Jawaharlal Nehru. Australia's leaders had

[1] For a detailed analysis see, Meg Gurry, *Australia and India: Mapping the Journey: 1944-2014* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015).

different visions of the racialized world order, with Menzies emphasising links to Britain and white superiority and Chifley emphasizing what Jayasuriya has called an 'egalitarian racism' which supported decolonization globally but did not extend to the creation of multicultural societies.[2] Nehru, however, as shown by Chacko, attempted to create a more ethical modernity and sought to undermine international hierarchies. India's approach did not complement either Australian vision of international hierarchy. In order to show how these identities disrupted the relationship, I then move on to examine three Indian high commissioners to Australia: Ragunath Paranjpye, Daya Singh Bedi and Kodandera Cariappa. I complement this with a brief analysis of the Australia High Commission under Iven Mackay and Herbert Gollan.[3] I consciously focus on the Indian high commissioners, as this material has come in for considerably less analysis. In particular, however, I offer a reinterpretation of Crocker's time in India, who served as Australia's high commissioner in Delhi from 1952 to 1955 and again from 1958 to 1962. Throughout, I consider the framing of issues ranging from India's position in the Commonwealth, the meaning and intent of the White Australia policy and Australia's holding of New Guinea as a colonial possession in order to consider the ways in which different perceptions of the racialized hierarchy in world order shaped the relationship.

The Historiography of India-Australia relations

The connection between colonialism and the early stages of India's relationships with Australia and Canada has been under-examined. While I regard much of the work on India-Australia relations as making valuable contributions, there have been, as yet, few studies of the relationship in IR, and very few by postcolonial approaches.[4] Outside of IR, diplomatic historians have made some important contributions.[5] Work by Julie Suares, Christopher Waters and Meg Gurry has examined Australia's relationship with Asia more broadly,

[2] Kanishka Jayasuriya, 'Building Citizens: Empire, Asia and the Australian Settlement', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 45, 1 (2010), pp. 29-43.
[3] Although he uses a different method of reading source material, this period is covered well in, Eric Meadows, '"He no doubt felt insulted": the White Australia Policy and Australia's relations with India, 1944-1964, in Joan Beaumont and Matthew Jordan (eds), *Australia and the world: a festschrift for Neville Meaney*, (Sydney, 2013), pp. 81-98.
[4] For my own take on the period, see Alexander E. Davis, 'A Shared History?: Postcolonial Identity and India-Australia Relations: 1947-1955', *Pacific Affairs*, 88, 4 (2015), pp. 849-869.
[5] Archival research has in particular been performed by Meadows, Meg Gurry and Nihal Kurrupu. See: Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace*; Meg Gurry, *India: Australia's Neglected Neighbour* (Brisbane, 1996); Meadows, 'India and White Australia'.

touching on India.[6] The period under examination here has often been referred to as the source of the disappointing relationship, with various accounts proposed for the weak relationship. Nihal Kurrupu suggest Australia's embrace of the 'realist orthodoxy'[7] of the Cold War period, suggesting that 'realism was embedded in the structured bureaucracy of the Department of External Affairs'.[8] By contrast, he perceived Indian foreign policy as driven more by the 'idealism' of Nehru. This relies heavily on the realism-idealism binary, critiqued in Chapter One.[9] Fedor Mediansky has suggested that the differences in this period relate primarily to security policy.[10] Contemporary strategic thought echoes this, with Medcalf and Raja Mohan attributing India and Australia's mediocre relationship solely to the Cold War.[11] Gurry has considered as central to this relationship the roles played by Menzies and Nehru. In particular, she looks at the relationship between India and Australia through Menzies and Nehru's personal relationship, combined with their competing worldviews, arguing simultaneously that leadership is crucial in determining bilateral outcomes. She points out that Menzies had no interest in India and found it to be too perplexing to bother understanding. [12] Crocker noted that Menzies showed no interest in India when he was there, and did not want to see the sights nor did he ask any questions.[13] Gurry's study provides a thorough account of these two statesmen's inability to communicate effectively. For Gurry, also, different perceptions of the Commonwealth were important, with Menzies wishing for a unified, 'white' Commonwealth, whereas Nehru saw the advantages of a multi-racial, open forum for discussion of international ideas.[14] This is just seen as a policy difference, however, and not an ideational one.

Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones have performed a realist critique of the scholarship on Menzies' foreign policy, referring to the previous work as a 'left-Labor' myth.[15] They argue that the position which they define as the scholarly orthodoxy regarding

[6] Christopher Waters, 'After Decolonization: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement in Asia, 1954–55', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12, 2 (2001), p. 171.
[7] Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace*, p. 35.
[8] Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace*, p. 34.
[9] Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace*.
[10] Fedor A. Mediansky, 'Australia's Relations with India 1947–64, with Special Reference to Diplomatic Exchanges' PhD thesis (1971), University of Sydney, Sydney.
[11] Medcalf and Raja Mohan, 'Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry'.
[12] Meg Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations: Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949-1964', *Pacific Affairs*, 65, 4 (1992-1993), p. 513.
[13] Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations', p. 513.
[14] Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations', p. 515.
[15] Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, 'Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13, 4 (2011), pp. 57-58.

Menzies' engagements with Asia is based in the contemporary concerns of authors like Gurry and Waters. Benvenuti and Jones argue that this work is driven by an ideological and partisan political concern which prevents a clear, 'objective' vision of Australian history. Benvenuti and Jones argue that alliances with Singapore and Malaya in this period reveal that Menzies was an 'Australian realist', rather than anti-Asian.[16] To suggest that Australia did not have a racialized identity in this period is untenable given its race-based system of immigration. Thus, Benvenuti and Jones' argument is based in realist assumptions about state behaviour in which identity has no agency in foreign policy. In their assessment, Menzies treated Asia as a security threat because it *was* a security threat. Menzies no doubt *felt* that his foreign policy was based in response to threats faced by Australia. The keyword in 'Australian realist', then, becomes *Australian*. Menzies stated in his memoirs that India was too confusing a place for any 'occidental' to understand: a classic colonial stereotype.[17] Fears that even small numbers of Asian migration would destroy Australia's way of life though, can hardly be considered rational. Given his reliance on stereotypes in assessing India, Menzies' realism should be viewed as constructed on the basis of other agents' perceived irrationality. This is not a defensible, nor even a 'realist', proposition. Furthermore, Chifley's policy towards Asia, as shown convincingly by Suares, was considerably different, which suggests strongly that Menzies' perception of world affairs was not the only view possible, or the authoritative, 'objective' vision. Assuming that these threats were purely 'structural' rather than constructed or perceived also assumes Australia's anxieties over its place in the world as 'natural' and thus reaffirms them.[18]

Elsewhere, Benvenuti has argued that structural factors determined Australia's relationship with India during the period in question here, viewing their differing positions on the Cold War as central.[19] This is framed as a dismissal of Waters' assertion that decolonization was the key factor.[20] This assertion is made without consulting Indian archival sources, and although it cites more easily available Indian sources, it remains focused primarily on Australian diplomatic opinion. And, indeed, Australian diplomats writing privately did tend to perceive the relationship as held back by Cold War politics. However,

[16] Benvenuti and Jones, 'Myth and Misrepresentation', pp. 57-58.
[17] Robert Menzies, *Afternoon Light: Some Memoirs of Men and Events* (Adelaide: Cassell, 1969), p. 92.
[18] For an authoritative study of regional fears, see Anthony Burke, *In Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Annandale: Pluto Press Australia, 2001).
[19] Andrea Benvenuti, 'Difficult Partners: Indo-Australian Relations at the Height of the Cold War, 1949-1964', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 57, 1 (2011), pp. 53-67.
[20] Benvenuti, 'Difficult Partners'.

Indian diplomats, including Nehru, placed more importance on decolonization as a global issue in this period than they did the Cold War in their private dispatches on Australia. Ultimately, an analysis of Indian archival sources alongside Australian ones would have revealed the difference of perception of world affairs generally to be more important than differences over the Cold War. The failure to properly examine Indian opinion ultimately renders this a deeply one-sided account of the period.

While much of this work has provided a basis from which to proceed, it has, broadly speaking, failed to take into account sufficiently the role of both postcolonial issues in limiting the relationship and the role of identity and perception in keeping these two states apart. In particular, the failure to consider sufficient Indian sources or to engage with constructivist or postcolonial theory has led to certain omissions. It is telling particularly for IR that what work has been done has generally relied on theories which have excised colonialism from the discipline, as outlined in Chapter One.

Colonial connections and India-Anglosphere Relations

Another matter that has yet to be considered in this relationship is the centrality of colonial histories as shaping these relationships. This can be seen in the leaders and diplomats sent between Australia, Canada and India. Within India, many jobs in the Ministry of External Affairs were given to people who had served in the Indian Civil Service under the British, and had been educated through British institutions.[21] Much of the MEA was made up of former Indian Civil Service (ICS) members, including its secretary general Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai. A good example is Jawaharlal Nehru himself, born to an affluent family, educated at Harrow and Cambridge. Nehru has frequently been described as an 'Anglophile' in reminiscences on his life.[22] He famously (reportedly) once remarked that he was the 'last Englishman to rule India'. Nehru was also, however, deeply ambivalent about his Englishness, being influenced also by his Indian nationalism, and thinkers such as Marx, Tagore and Gandhi. Indeed, most key diplomats, Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of these states were involved in various forms of colonial networks, had met previously during the colonial period and its administration. As a result, their perceptions of the world were deeply influenced by their experiences of colonialism. General Kodandera Cariappa was

[21] Thakur, 'Discourses of Foreign Policy', pp. 124-127.
[22] See, for example, Shashi Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003), p. 124.

asked by Nehru to be high commissioner to Australia almost immediately after his retirement after his many years of service in the Indian Army. His role in the Indian Army led him to feel deeply idealistic about the Commonwealth. The same can be said of India's relationship with Canada, as will be seen in Chapter Four. For Sardar H. S. Malik, service in the Indian Army and the Indian Civil Service qualified him to India's first high commissioner to Canada. He quickly established friendly relations, in part due to his previous experience fighting in World War One, where he served with Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson. His successor, Santandas Kirpalani wrote his autobiography focusing on his fifty years working with the British in the Indian Civil Service.[23] For Richard Casey, working as Governor of Bengal from 1944 to 1946 qualified him to be Australia's Minister of External affairs very quickly after his election to parliament in 1949. Casey later went from the MEA to a peerage at the House of Lords and then became the Governor General of Australia. Walter Crocker,[24] once a colonial administrator in Nigeria, after fighting in World War Two with British army, went on to be high commissioner to India twice, amongst a host of other countries. In order to be qualified in international politics, it seems, one first had to be qualified in imperialism.

Another striking element of the archival record of this period is the way in which Canadian, Australian and British diplomats worked together in New Delhi through this period. Escott Reid's near-obsessive note-taking of his time in India, and his donation of all such material to the Canadian archives reveals that he met frequently with his counterparts from the Anglosphere to swap notes. This was particularly notable when the US took the decision to begin selling arms to Pakistan, a decision considered questionable by Canada, the UK and Australia. In this case, Reid met frequently with Walter Crocker and Alexander Clutterbuck to discuss the situation, believing the US decision endangered all of their respective states relationships with India.[25] As shown by Lake and Reynolds, the question of racialized immigration policies was interconnected across the English-speaking world, with each state looking to the others as examples of how to manage non-white immigration.[26]

[23] Santdas K. Kirpalani, *Fifty Years with the British* (Bombay: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 1993).
[24] Upon his death at 100, an Obituary described him as having 'a deep attachment to England and a high regard for the Empire' The Telegraph, 'Sir Walter Crocker', (2002) at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1415115/Sir-Walter-Crocker.html, accessed March 3, 2014. Ramachandra Guha, 'Foreword', in Walter Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate* (Delhi: Random House India, 2008), p. ix.
[25] The Escott Reid papers at Library and Archives Canada (LAC) total several hundred documents. For this period, see: LAC, MG31E46, vols 6, 7 and 8.
[26] Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*.

The Anglosphere in Australian identity

Australia's fears of its Asian neighbours and its place in the world have been considered in both history and IR. Anthony Burke has argued that racialized fears have dominated Australian understanding of 'security'.[27] The psychology of Australian settlement needs emphasis here: Australia as a vast 'empty' island continent, situated geographically within touching distance of 'overpopulated' Asia.[28] This, combined with colonial discourses, led Australia to fear deeply for its borders with Asia. The term 'Asia' is important, particularly in the time period in question, as Australian discourse at the time was focused largely on 'big picture' issues of national identity: fears, for example, that 'Asiatic' immigration might destroy Australia's cultural identity. The term occurs frequently in Australian discourse on its place in the world, defined as a security threat. In the period examined here, Australia's Anglosphere identity was securitized by its geographical position within Asia.

This is Australia's postcolonial ambivalence regarding its region: it can regard itself as both part of Asia and Europe, but can never identify entirely with either, due to the materiality of its geography and strength of its Anglosphere identity. For Australian identity, Burke and Vucetic's work makes the same argument in opposite ways: the trust for the UK and the US on one hand and the fear of Asia on the other. Fear plays a similar constitutive role in broader Australia-Asia relations as trust does in Australia-Anglosphere relations.[29]

Historian David Walker has examined Australian anxieties over Asia, as it grew from disparate colonies to a united nation-state.[30] As Walker and Sobocinska have argued, Australian representations of Asia are frequently overdramatised as floods and storms or, for Alison Broinowski, as encounters with mysterious and dangerous creatures.[31] Asia's 'rise' is seen falsely as 'unprecedented', and, ironically, has generally been regarded as such since

[27] Burke, *In Fear of Security*, pp. 1-34.
[28] Jayasuriya, 'Building Citizens', pp. 29-43.
[29] For a similar argument with regards to Indonesia specifically, see Simon Philpott, 'Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination', *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 20, 46 (2001), p. 381.
[30] David Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939* (1999, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press).
[31] Alison Broinowski, *The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Australia's inception.[32] Thus, Australia's 'Asian encounter' is constantly looming: imbued with a sense of urgency that is not necessarily met with foreign policy initiatives to engage the region. Rather, Australia has constantly needed to (re)engage and/or (re)discover its region,[33] repeatedly finding political events in Asia to be 'unprecedented'.[34] Australia's relationship with India needs to be seen in the context of this much larger struggle over national identity and foreign policy.

In the period examined here, much of the world, including several states in South East Asia passed through decolonization to the postcolonial period. India and Australia took vastly different approaches to international issues of the Cold War and decolonization. Where India defined its identity through non-alignment and opposition to race discrimination after independence, Australia was extremely comfortable with its colonial identity as exemplified by Menzies' belief that he was 'British to the bootstraps'. Indian foreign policy was particularly focused on opposing colonialism and creating the non-aligned movement. Furthermore, Australian policy-makers and diplomats in New Delhi often expressed outright racism. As will be seen, Australia still viewed the colonial 'burden' in a largely positive light, where India saw it as racial discrimination and imperialism. I will argue that these ideational issues were the key factor constructing the relationship, in opposition to approaches to taken by other scholars in examining this period of India-Australia relations.

Jawaharlal Nehru, White Australia and Non-Alignment

The matter of India's response to White Australia has tended to be defined by Nehru's relative silence. Under Nehru, Indian foreign policy was defined through non-alignment and Panchsheel. Panchsheel was outlined in the 1954 treaty with China. It comprised of five principles of peaceful coexistence, including mutual non-aggression and mutual non-interference. The concept was further extended at the 1955 Afro-Asia conference in Bandung, into ten principles, and largely became the basis for the Non-Aligned movement, which suggested that postcolonial states had a special role to play in international affairs. Nehru

[32] David Walker and Agnieszka Sobocinska, Introduction: Australia's Asia', in David Walker and Agnieszka Sobocinska (eds), 'Australia's Asia: From Yellow Peril to Asian Century' (Crawley: University of Western Australia Publishing, 2012).
[33] Sally P. Wood and Michael Leach, '"Rediscovery", "reinvigoration", and "Redefinition" in perpetuity: Australian Engagement with India 1983-2011', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 57, 4 (2011), pp. 526-542.
[34] Walker and Sobocinska use this term, referring back to extremely similar comments by PMs Andrew Fisher and Julia Gillard on the 'unprecedented' rise of Asia. Walker and Sobocinska, 'Australia's Asia', pp. 1-3.

believed that Panchsheel represented 'the challenge of Asia to the rest of the world… and each country will have to give a straight answer to this question'.[35] Panchsheel, though it was certainly defined through opposition to colonial control, interference and racialism, but was ultimately defined through peaceful co-existence and non-interference in one another's domestic affairs. Nehru rarely commented on the White Australia policy, and avoided denouncing it. Outright attack on a policy that they found offensive or unpleasant would not likely have changed Australia's stance and would have done further harm to the relationship. Furthermore, meddling in domestic affairs would have run counter to the concept of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in domestic affairs.

After independence, the MEA and the Indian High Commission in Australia debated whether or not it was appropriate to keep track of Australia's immigration policy. It was concluded that, while it was not their place to complain, it was within their remit to report on the policy.[36] While it is certainly significant that India did not raise official concern over Australia's restrictive immigration tactics, we can draw a useful comparison here with Canada. Canada and India did negotiate over the ending of Canada's restrictions on Indian migration, and did so openly. This official discussion was based on Canadian hints in 1947 that they would be open to doing so in order to remove the matter as a roadblock to close relations. As a result, Girija Bajpai, relayed to Canadian diplomat John Kearney that he believed it would be impossible for India to remain part of the Commonwealth as a dominion. It would be possible, however, to remain as a Republic, but it was politically difficult. Or, as Kearney reported their meeting back to Ottawa:

> There are certain obstacles which if not removed, might make even this latter arrangement impossible, the chief of which is the immigration policy of some of the other Commonwealth nations, more particularly Australia and Canada.[37]

The Indian position on non-interference with white-settler colonial states practising discrimination was not set in stone, and could clearly have been changed had Australia hinted they would not be offended by such discussion. Canada eventually agreed to accept 150

[35] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'India and World Affairs', *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 28, second series, p. 315.
[36] See National Archives of India (NAI), 'White Australia Policy', Progs., Nos. 269-IANZ, 1949 and NAI, "Immigration policy regarding Australia High Court`s decision referred to in the fortnightly report of H.E. the H.C. for India in Australia dt. 31.3.49 Request for", Progs., Nos. 291-I.A.N.Z, 1949.
[37] John D. Kearney, 'Dispatch to Ministry for External Affairs', May 27 1948 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, file 127, part 1, p. 2.

Indian immigrants per year.[38] This choice removed an impediment to building closer relations with India. Ultimately, however, the miniscule size of the quota and its administration still went on to irritate some sections of the Indian MEA.[39]

Despite the lack of official outcry, many Australian diplomats believed the White Australia policy offended India, but they were aware that India would not generally raise the matter formally. Crocker during a home briefing in 1963 argued that the White Australia Policy was 'resented by all Asians, especially Indians'.[40] Similarly, Peter Heydon, for example, who worked as a diplomat in India and was later involved in dismantling the White Australia policy, believed that 'Nehru would not admit to being insulted… but it was always in the background'.[41] The Australians were also well aware that any time they would speak in India, the first question would always be on Immigration policy. The policy was also regularly attacked in the Indian press. This expression of Australia's racialized Anglo-Saxon identity clearly offended India and Indians more broadly, and played a key role in Menzies' and Nehru's disaffection for one another.

This silence aside, there was one occasion when Nehru did specifically comment on the White Australia policy. When asked in 1949 if he thought there was a place for a 'White Australia in Asia'.[42] he responded that Australia could justify the policy in the short term, provided it was only done on an economic and not on a racial basis. He added that in the long term '…it is difficult to see in the world today how far it is possible to keep a vast continent undeveloped'.[43] He went on to say that 'Australia should not discriminate against the rights and privileges of Asians living there'.[44] Nehru had only lightly attacked the policy, but the critique was obvious: the policy had been justified on racial grounds, as wealthy people of Asian backgrounds were not allowed to emigrate while poor Europeans were. The naming of

[38] Ramji R. Saksena, a more strongly anti-colonial diplomat made this point to the Canadians by. See, Ramji R. Saksena to Laval Fortier, July 6, 1953 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part. 2 no. 152-HC/53, p. 2.
[39] Saksena took issue with several administrative matters to do with the quota system, which reflect his general disappointment. See: Ramji R. Saksena to Harris, February 2, 1953 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part 2, no. 16-HC/53, pp. 1-5.
[40] DEA, 'Policy Intelligence Bulletin' undated (c.1963), NAA: A1383, 169/10 part 6, cited in Meadows, 'India and White Australia', p. 97.
[41] Mel Pratt, interview with Sir Peter Heydon, December, 2 1970, National Library of Australia, Oral history program, cited in Meadows, 'India and White Australia', p. 98.
[42] Anonymous, quoted in *Cairns Post*, January 24, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', File No. 208(2) – I.A.N.Z, p. 19.
[43] Jawaharlal Nehru, Quoted in Anon, 'Nehru Warns Us that Racial Policies are Out', *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), January 25, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', File No. 208(2) – I.A.N.Z, p. 19.
[44] Nehru, 'Racial Policies are Out', p. 19.

the policy as 'White Australia' and the refusal to take any Asian migrants whatsoever obviously implied that the policy was discriminatory on the basis of colour. As Australian high commissioner to India, Mackay had earlier argued when suggesting amending the White Australia policy to a quota system, 'there [is] no other way to explain why Australia would refuse to take… a small number of Westernized Indian professionals'.[45]

Tensions over the policy arose publicly only very occasionally. This occurred after Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert 'Doc' Evatt was pressed as to whether or not Nehru's comments on the White Australia policy had received negative press coverage. Evatt replied in parliament, as was reported back to Delhi, 'So far from the Prime Minister of India has criticized the White Australia Policy, he supports it. That is my reading of Mr. Nehru's statement and I think that is quite clear'.[46] Evatt's comment rests a reading of the White Australia policy as not being based on race but on economics: to protect Australia's budding egalitarian society. Evatt's comments were attacked, even mocked, in the Indian press. *The Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta considered Evatt's logic, wondering 'if it was a telepathic process - the Australian minister's mind actioned on the mind of the distant Indian Prime Minister through emotional influence and he perceived that his precious policy found an echo in the mind of Pandit Nehru.'[47] *The Search Light* of Patna, similarly mocked the argument, stating that 'One cannot help rubbing one's eyes in amazement at the statement of Dr. Evatt…'[48] *The Free Press Journal* of Bombay argued that 'not even Pandit Nehru can protest against every act of racial imperialism that is perpetuated in the world, today…'. Nehru's decision not to actively fight the policy did not indicate support.[49]

Nehru responded to Evatt's comments, and the coverage in the Indian press, putting forward his most aggressive public critique of the White Australia policy. He stated that:

> It is not quite clear what Dr. Evatt meant by the report attributed to him… In the course of an interview with an Australian Newspaper correspondent some time ago I stated that I could understand an immigration policy based on

[45] Iven Mackay to Herbert V. Evatt, 'Dispatch 52/46', December 22, 1946, in W. J. Hudson and Wendy Way (eds), *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, vol. 10, July- December 1946, (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 1993), p. 534.
[46] 'Telegram from Hicomind, Canberra to Foreign, New Delhi', February 15, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', p. 27.
[47] Anon, *Amrita Bazar Parika* (Calcutta), February 14, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', p. 28.
[48] Anon, *Search Light* (Patna), February 13, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', p. 29.
[49] Anon, *Free Press Journal* (Bombay), February 11, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', p. 32. For further details of press attacks on Evatt's statement, see NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', pp. 28-45.

> economic considerations with a view to maintain certain standards and ways of living, but that I thought a racial policy was wrong and to be deprecated.[50]

Kurrupu has argued that the White Australia policy was offensive to a nonaligned nation and points out that after its dismantling, Gough Whitlam was able to improve the relationship with Indira Gandhi.[51] However, I would suggest that the matter was a little more complicated. India's nonaligned stance is somewhat ambivalent with regards to the White Australia policy. One the one hand, the policy was framed as opposition to imperialism worldwide. As a result, very little was said openly by diplomats, though it features in much of their private communication and shaped the approach of using their diplomatic presence for the purpose of education. Nonalignment was also, however, targeted at non-interference in domestic affairs. The White Australia policy, while directly a result of Australia's colonial history, was not international imperialism. When considering India's position on racial discrimination at an address to a press conference in Switzerland in May, 1949, Nehru argued that India was committed to two policies: that 'each country should be free. There should be no colonial exploitation…' and that 'the world must recognise that there must be no racial discrimination'. [52]

Throughout this time, a broader battle against racism was happening at the UN, fought partly between India and South Africa. India's representative Vijayalaxmi Pandit argued at the UN in 1946 that 'India holds that the independence of all colonial peoples is the vital concern of freedom-loving peoples everywhere.'[53] Pandit pressed a motion at the UN to condemn South Africa for its racial practices in 1946 and 1947, but it failed to pass on both occasions.[54] In 1963 the Afro-Asian block at the UN was able to pass the 'Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination'.[55] India's role in these fights at the UN reveals clearly the role anti-colonialism played in India's diplomacy.[56]

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[50] Anon, *Indian News Chronicle*, Delhi, February 21, 1949 at NAI, 'White Policy of Australia', p. 32.
[51] Kurrupu, *Non-Alignment and Peace*, pp. 283-325.
[52] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Colonial Exploitation and Racial Discrimination' *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 11, second series, p. 401.
[53] Vijayalakshmi Pandit, 'Text of the Speech delivered by Vijayalakshmi Pandit' (1946), at https://www.saadigitalarchive.org/item/20141107-3939, accessed June 12, 2015, p. 4.
[54] Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers*, p. 74.
[55] Lake and Reynolds, *The Global Colour Line*, p. 349. For the resolution, see: 'United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', at http://www.un-documents.net/a18r1904.htm, accessed July 17, 2015.
[56] For a detailed analysis, see Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers*.

In the case of a domestic form of discrimination, however, non-aligned India sought to avoid openly interfering with the exception of South Africa. When referring to South Africa's presence in the Commonwealth, Nehru commented in the Rajya Sabha 'many of us laid stress on the incompatibility of any country being in the Commonwealth which followed racial policies'.[57] Nehru's comments on India's opposition to colonialism, initially referencing events in South Africa, turned to problems of racialism throughout world affairs more broadly. His statement perfectly summarizes his personal approach to White Australia:

> The problem of racialism and racial separation may become more dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face… They hurt us. Simply because we cannot do anything effective, and we do not want to cheapen ourselves by mere shouting, we remain quiet. But the thing has gone deep down into our minds and hearts. We feel it strongly.[58]

Nehru believed that these matters might prove more important for world affairs than the Cold War. Nehru clearly opposed racial discrimination worldwide. He saw, however, that his ability to effect change was limited, and was unwilling to cheapen himself by 'mere shouting'. Instead, Nehru and his diplomats saved their most vocal condemnations for South Africa.[59] But this silence should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in opposing racial discrimination elsewhere. Here, through its discourse on racial discrimination and its actions at the UN, India's opposition to the racialized hierarchy in world order is made very clear.

Nehru's perceptions of Australia and its place in this racialized hierarchy can further be viewed in his commentary on Australia's position in Asia. He commented on this in a speech titled 'Asia and Africa Awake' at the Bandung conference, stating that:

> I would like Australia and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia. I would welcome them because I do not want what we say or do to be based on racial prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere.[60]

Aside from the White Australia, Nehru emphasized what Australia and India shared through the Commonwealth when sending a message to Australia in, 1948, stating that:

> We stand, as I believe Australia does, for democratic freedom, for human rights and for the ending of the political domination or economic exploitation

[57] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'South Africa Leaves the Commonwealth' in, Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, vol. 4 (New Delhi: NMML, 1964), p. 339.
[58] Nehru, 'India and World Affairs', p. 314.
[59] See Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers*.
[60] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Asia and Africa Awake' in *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, vol. 3 (New Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 1983), pp. 288-291.

> of one nation or group of another. We should cooperate, therefore, for the extension of freedom, equality and social justice.[61]

Here, Nehru expresses a non-hierarchical narrative of the Anglosphere through the shared values of the Commonwealth, as tying India and Australia together. By evoking British 'values' of freedom and democracy, Nehru sought to critique the racial discrimination practised by Australia. And therein lies the ambivalence: colonialism connected Australia and India but simultaneously kept them separate. Whereas previously these values had been restricted to white imperial Britons, Nehru used them to attack racism elsewhere.

Nehru was known, however, for finding Menzies difficult to deal with, believing that, as Christopher Waters put it, he did not belong to the 20th century.[62] The key point here is not that India and Australia actively disliked one another, or sought poor relationships, but saw the world in different ways as shaped through colonial histories and postcolonial identities. Communication and understanding was made more difficult by the differing perceptions of the decolonizing world.

Australia generally managed to raise the ire of Nehru over the issue of Kashmir as well. While UN negotiations were attempting to resolve the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, Nehru found Australia's position to be particularly irritating. Casey and Menzies had argued that an international force, perhaps from Commonwealth countries, should be sent to Kashmir, should a UN resolution be agreed to. Nehru, however, saw a planned international intervention, as evidence of Australia's lack of understanding of India. Nehru wrote to Krishna Menon regarding Australia's stance, stating that 'it seemed to me that the statements made on behalf of Australia in the Security Council and outside were more hostile to India than the statements of any other member of the Security Council'.[63] His frustration was greater due to Australia's membership of the Commonwealth as 'For any country that would have distressed us, but for a Commonwealth country to do so was even more distressing.'[64] Nehru also regarded the comments as pointless, given that Casey 'knew very

[61] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Message to Australia', March 19, 1948, in, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 5, second series, p. 547.
[62] Christopher Waters, 'Diplomacy in Easy Chairs: Casey, Pearson and Australian-Canadian Relations, 1951-7' in Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie (eds), *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), pp. 207-228.
[63] Jawaharlal Nehru to Krishna Menon, April 12, 1957 in *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 37, second series, pp. 435-36.
[64] Nehru to Menon, April 12, 1957, p. 435.

well that India not only did not agree, but entirely objected to it. Why then was he going on saying these things which angered our people?'[65] While Nehru saw this idea as the recolonization of Kashmir, the Australians saw intervention as a means of defusing an international conflict. This reflects the different perceptions of international hierarchy between the two states.

The Paranjpyes and the construction of India-Australia relations

Given Nehru's silence on the matter, it is worth moving on from the leaders of India and Australia to examine senior diplomats who ran India-Australia relations on a day-to-day basis. The first Indian high commissioner to Australia was Ragunath Paranjpye. Paranjpye travelled with his adult, educated daughter Shakuntala. Both published memoirs regarding their time in Australia.[66] Ragunath held the post prior to independence, and served only during the Chifley government. Sadly, only limited information is available from Indian archives on this period, but in his memoirs, he took as his starting point that 'there were no intricate political questions between the countries' during his time in Australia.[67] In his mind, this meant that 'the main function of the high commissioner and his Office was to make India better known to Australia'.[68] This being the case, the main struggle for Ragunath was the White Australia policy, which he believed 'naturally [caused] a great deal of heart-burning and resentment among non-white people', and particularly offended Indians.[69]

Ragunath emphasized also, that while this was offensive to India, it was not the place of the High Commission to actively attack a domestic policy position. He believed that changing this policy would require 'a change of public opinion in the country concerned, and this can best be brought about by a better understanding among different nations'.[70] Thus, education about India was again his focus as he travelled around Australia in an attempt to dispel stereotypes and misperceptions of India in Australia. This became an important approach echoed by others senior Indian diplomats in Australia. He also makes the point that

[65] Nehru to Menon, April 12, 1957.
[66] Shakuntala Paranjpye, *Three Years in Australia* (Poona: Self Published, 1953).
[67] Ragunath P. Paranjpye, *Eighty-Four Not Out* (Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 1961), p. 131.
[68] Paranjpye, *Eighty-Four Not Out*, p. 131.
[69] Paranjpye, *Eighty-Four Not Out*, p. 131.
[70] Paranjpye, *Eighty-Four Not Out*, p. 131.

this would not be in any sense a way to deal with India's own overpopulation – Australia accepted only 50,000 immigrants of any background per year.[71]

Chifley, Calwell and Australian Immigration policy

Chifley's apparent creativity and dynamism in engaging with Asia was limited by the vocal and extreme rhetoric of his immigration minister, Arthur Calwell, whose more bombastic statements received considerable negative press coverage in India.[72] Chifley's Labor government, although it supported decolonization and situated Australian foreign policy more firmly as part of Asia, still had a racialized narrative of Australian identity. This 'egalitarian racism' was based on a citizenship regime that emphasized 'independent and self-reliant males'.[73] This sense of egalitarianism may have meant support for Indian independence, but did not extend to Indians becoming Australian citizens.

Daya Singh Bedi, India's second high commissioner to Australia, served during the transition from Chifley to Menzies. For Bedi, Australia's positioning within Asia was limited by the vocal and extreme rhetoric of Calwell.[74] Bedi wrote to New Delhi to comment on the policy shifts likely with the defeat of the Chifley government and the incoming Menzies administration. He suggested that '[t]he present government is likely to depart considerably from the international policy of "rugged individualism" followed by Dr. Evatt', concluding that Australia would:

> go in for a closer association between London, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and the United States of America… In fact, their foreign policy will, more or less be dictated by London and they are all out to have the friendliest of relations with the United States of America.[75]

Bedi expected the departure of Calwell as Immigration Minister to improve relations, however, as he was, according to Bedi 'not only unpopular abroad but became so in his own

[71] Paranjpye, *Eighty-Four Not Out*, p. 131.
[72] For multiple examples, see NAA, A1838: 169/10/8/3/1 'India – Relations with Australia – Migration to Australia – Asiatics'.
[73] Jayasuriya, 'Building Citizens', pp. 29-43.
[74] For a collection of multiple articles in the Indian press, see National Archives of Australia (NAA), A1838: 169/10/8/3/1 'India – Relations with Australia – Migration to Australia – Asiatics'.
[75] Daya Singh Bedi to Y. D. Gundevia, December 31, 1949 at NAI, 'Australia's Attitude Towards India', 105 I.A.N.Z/50, p. 16.

country.'[76] He went so far as to express the hope with Calwell's departure 'the international atmosphere in the Pacific Area will improve'.[77]

Bedi's commentary on Menzies was largely hopeful in tone, stating that the Menzies government had 'a great regard for India' and that it had the belief that 'if India and Australia understood each other better, they could do a lot of good in South East Asia.'[78] However, despite these pleasantries, there was a sense that Australia would be moved quickly towards closer alignment with the US and the UK, as opposed to Chifley's efforts in attending the Asia conferences of 1947 and 1949. He continued: 'this government is more concerned regarding Asiatic countries than European because of the communist danger'.[79] For Bedi, it was not so much the Cold War that kept Australia and India apart, but the Australian obsession with the Cold War. This is an interesting counterpoint to Crocker, who similarly believed that the Indian obsession with racial discrimination held back the relationship. These earliest Indian diplomats in Australia appreciated Chifley's approach, even though they also found Calwell's aggressive rhetoric to be concerning. They were equally concerned that Menzies would take Australia even further away from engagement with Asia. Chifley and Calwell's India problem lay in their racialized egalitarianism, in which an Indian could never become an Australian citizen.

Like Paranjpye, Bedi was keen to raise the profile of India in Australia by travelling. He reported to the MEA on a visit to Queensland 'although there is no racial discrimination, particularly in the common man, there is that racial prejudice which is inherent in the white man and it will take time before that is finally eradicated'.[80] This led him to argue that 'they will be inclined to adhere to the tradition of following in the wake of the British and to an extent the United States of America', as Australia was 'very much concerned to save [its] "white democracy" in the southern hemisphere…'.[81] These first two Indian diplomats to Australia both perceived Australia's close ties with the US and the UK and Australia's racial prejudices as stifling its ability to engage with India.

[76] Bedi to Gundevia, December 31, 1949, p. 16.
[77] Bedi to Gundevia, December 31, 1949, p. 16.
[78] Bedi to Gundevia, December 31, 1949, p. 16.
[79] Bedi to Gundevia, December 31, 1949, p. 16.
[80] Daya Singh Bedi, Annual Report from Australia – 1950' at NAI 'Annual Report from Australia', File No. 3 (3) R&I, pp. 6-7.
[81] Bedi, 'Annual Report', pp. 6-7.

Defining a multi-racial Commonwealth

The Commonwealth was formed in 1931, comprising just the white dominions: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Here, I will briefly consider the split in Australian politics on the issue of whether or not to expand the organisation, and how this shows the ambivalence in Australian identity. India's aim to remain in the Commonwealth but to become a Republic drew a debate on whether on how closely knit the Commonwealth should be. While the white dominions were happy to maintain the British Monarch as Head of State, the possible loss of India and Pakistan would make this a much less important body. Australia under Chifley, along with Canada, supported India's position. The debate within the white Commonwealth centred on the extent to which it would be worth keeping India on the inside at risk of damaging the cohesiveness of the association. New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser gave an example of the argument against India joining, though he voted for the eventual compromise. Fraser suggested that it might be better for the Commonwealth to lose India than for 'our British peoples to lose faith in the reality and integrity of their Commonwealth'.[82] Menzies made the same argument from opposition, stating that:

> To people like myself, it will remain completely mysterious as to how a nation can become a Republic by abolishing the Crown and the allegiance to the Crown, and at the same time retain a full membership of a united Commonwealth, which is and must be basically a Crown Commonwealth.[83]

Australia, under Chifley and Evatt, backed the London Declaration of 1949, which allowed India to remain in the Commonwealth as a Republic. As Suares has shown, Chifley pursued an independent and creative vision of Australian foreign policy until his electoral defeat in 1949. Under Chifley's leadership, Australia supported Indian independence and went on to support its position within the Commonwealth as a Republic. Similarly, India and Australia's lock step response to quell Dutch aggression in Indonesia in 1949 and its positive response to the Macmahon Ball mission of 1948 suggested that this creative narrative in which Australia was part of Asia *could* bring about a productive relationship between the two states.[84] This was undermined, however, by Chifley's racialized egalitarianism.

[82] This language comes from William Hare, UK ambassador to Australia and New Zealand, describing Fraser's position. See William Hare, 'India's Foreign Policy and her Relations to the Commonwealth' at UKNA, DO 35/2250, 'India's relations with the Commonwealth: negotiations to permit India to remain in the Commonwealth after Independence', p. 2.
[83] Robert Menzies, quoted in 'India's Status'.
[84] Suares, 'Engaging with Asia'.

Krishna Menon suggested to the British during the negotiations on immigration and citizenship, that the Indian parliament was about to pass a law making 'Indian nationals Commonwealth citizens, and the nationals of any Commonwealth country citizens when they are in India'.[85] Any person from the Commonwealth residing in India would be granted citizenship. He suggested that 'this would have to be a reciprocal arrangement'.[86] The implication that this would be a reciprocal arrangement strongly suggests India was attempting to make all Indians in Australia, Canada and South Africa full citizens. The British considered the proposal to be 'vague', and were not sure if they could accept it.[87] Evatt also reacted rather positively to the possibility of Commonwealth citizenship, although was keen to ensure that it would not undermine Australia's immigration policy.[88]

The Indian Constituent Assembly, though it ultimately voted for joining the Commonwealth as a Republic at the urging of Nehru, did debate the matter. The primary argument against joining was, as relayed by 'differences with other Commonwealth nations on matters of colonial and racial policy. Each of them instance in particular the White Australia policy, the India-South Africa dispute'.[89] I will return to the extent to which the decision to remain in the Commonwealth was tied to race discrimination in Chapter Four. The key point, though, was that India would be unwilling to join an organization that maintained racial discrimination, perhaps unless doing so would give it the opportunity to further oppose it. In this sense, India's joining of the Commonwealth should read as resisting and negating the hierarchy of the post-imperial Commonwealth, rather than an acceptance of it.

With the election of Menzies, however, Australia's position on the make-up of the Commonwealth changed. Though the London Declaration had already passed, Menzies went

[85] Krisha Menon, 'Memorandum, 11 December 1949' quoted in UKNA, DO 35/2249 'India's relations with the Commonwealth: setting up of Commonwealth Relations Official Committee, 1949: question of India remaining in the Commonwealth', p. 13.
[86] Menon, 'Memorandum'.
[87] Gilbert Laithwaite, 'Untitled' February 3, 1949 at UKNA, DO 35/2249, 'India's relations with the Commonwealth: setting up of Commonwealth Relations Official Committee, 1949: question of India remaining in the Commonwealth', p. 13.
[88] Anon, 'Note of a discussion at the Hotel Vendome', November 17, 1948 at UKNA, DO 35/2250, 'India's relations with the Commonwealth: negotiations to permit India to remain in the Commonwealth after Independence', p. 5.
[89] Anon, 'India and the Commonwealth', May 12, 1949 at UKNA, DO 133/91, 'Relations between the British Commonwealth and the governments of India and Pakistan'.

on to frustrate Nehru at numerous Commonwealth conferences.[90] Menzies, unlike his Canadian counterparts, as will be seen in Chapter Four, was cool on Nehru in all of his autobiographical writing. As Gurry points out, Menzies often referred to 'my distinguished friend Mr. Nehru'. This was a term he used for friends as often as he did enemies.[91] The issue of what form of body the Commonwealth should be, rose again over South Africa's racial policies, which became far more explicit with the fall of Jan Smuts. Here, Menzies' perception of the matter placed Australia at odds with India. The divide between Menzies and Nehru on South Africa was massive. South African Prime Minister Malan praised Menzies' adherence to the White Australia policy as defending civilization. Placing Australia and South Africa together in the Indian Ocean rim, he warned that having 'the White Man… quit Africa', would be to 'let India in'.[92] Menzies, for his part, reportedly praised South Africa and its policies, believing it to be a friend to Australia, while refusing to name India as being a threat.[93] Menzies, along with his New Zealand and UK counterparts, supported keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth in 1960. He argued that it was not the role of the Commonwealth to act on the internal matters of a member state.[94] After South Africa had dropped out, Menzies felt 'very distressed [that] a vital principle of Commonwealth association had been abandoned'.[95] Menzies was attacked in the press for supporting South Africa. Calwell accused Menzies of comparing Apartheid to Australia's own immigration policy. Labor more broadly claimed he had cost Australia's relations with the Afro-Asian bloc.[96]

Walter Crocker and the Indian 'Preoccupation' with Race Discrimination

Given that Nehru and his early diplomats tended towards viewing Australia as a racist, fearful colonial outpost in need of education about India, it becomes crucial to consider how Australian diplomats and leaders viewed India. Menzies stated in his memoirs that India was too confusing a place for any 'occidental' to understand: a classic colonial stereotype.[97]

[90] On this matter, see Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations'.
[91] Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations', p. 520.
[92] John H. Le Rougetel, 'Visit of Mr R G. Menzies' at UKNA, DO 201/04, 'Correspondence respecting Commonwealth Relations: volume IV. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Irish Republic', pp. 120-121.
[93] Le Rougetel, 'Visit of Mr R G. Menzies'.
[94] Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations', p. 521.
[95] Menzies, *Afternoon Light*, p. 214.
[96] Le Rougetel, 'Visit of Mr R G. Menzies', pp. 120-121.
[97] Menzies, *Afternoon Light*, p. 92.

Menzies' lack of interest is telling in itself, but richer and as yet unexplored material is found in Crocker's dispatch during his many years as high commissioner.

Australia's first high commissioner to India was General Iven Mackay. Mackay was sent to India in 1943, and predominantly dealt with military matters until the end of World War Two. He retired from the military in 1946 but completed his term as high commissioner, focusing on promoting trade and allowing Indian students to study in Australia.[98] Herbert Gollan replaced Mackay in 1952. Gollan was primarily focused on trade, having served as Australia's trade commissioner in India under Mackay.[99] Throughout both men's time in India, they repeatedly argued for allowing a small number of Indians to immigrate to Australia.[100]

Crocker replaced Gollan in 1952. He had formerly served as a colonial administrator in Nigeria, after fighting in World War Two with the British army. He went on to be high commissioner to India twice, from 1952–1955 and again from 1958–1962. Crocker's role in India and elsewhere has generally received considerable praise in Australian scholarship. James Cotton has considered Crocker's role as a scholar-diplomat, as he went on to become Australian first IR professor, taking up a post at the Australian National University.[101] Although Cotton suggests that Crocker felt Australia's colonial inheritance was 'more a liability than an asset', he was cautious in his approach to decolonization in Asia and Africa.[102] Cotton credits Crocker as noting how important the Afro-Asian grouping was to international affairs in the 1950s. This is an important point, however. Crocker's interest in this bloc was partly about the destabilizing influence it may have. He concluded that in Africa, for example 'it would have been better for most Africans if the colonial powers had carried on their work for another generation or two'.[103] In this sense, he saw Australia's colonial inheritance as partly a burden, because decolonization was happening too quickly. Despite his concern for the way that the White Australia policy shaped Asian perceptions of Australia, racial ideas were central to his thinking. Aside from his commentary on Indians

[98] Jeffrey Grey, 'Mackay, Sir Iven Giffard (1882–1966)' *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Volume 15, (2000) at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mackay-sir-iven-giffard-10977, accessed February 11, 2015.
[99] Anon, 'Mr H. R. Gollan in Transit', *The Straits Times* (Singapore), October 27, 1948, p. 9.
[100] Meadows, 'India and White Australia', pp. 83-89.
[101] James Cotton, *The Australian School of International Relations* (Canberra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 209-236.
[102] Cotton, *The Australian School*, p. 201.
[103] Crocker, quoted in Cotton, *The Australian School*, p. 218.

below, Crocker saw different racial groups as having inherent characteristics, for example, believing that Indonesians 'lack stamina'.[104] His bleak outlook in international affairs stemmed partly from his fear that the US and the UK could not properly control world order.[105]

Crocker, though, was fascinated with India and particularly Nehru, of whom he published what is generally taken to be a sound and insightful biography, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*.[106] Nehru reportedly said of Crocker that he was 'a good man with clever ideas, unlike the Government he serves'.[107] In his foreword to a recent edition, Ramachandra Guha argued that this was the strongest short portrait of Nehru ever to be written. Guha regards Crocker's writings as the best summation of Nehru in scholarship he has ever read.[108] It was not without controversy in India, however, with one review calling it 'misleading, superficial, unoriginal, condescending and patronizing'.[109]

Crocker, as Mackay and Gollan had previously, advocated allowing a token number of Indians into Australia, as Canada had done, so as to remove an impediment to the relationship.[110] Crocker's public material was respectful. His private dispatches, however, were sometimes tinged with racial stereotypes. Australia had hoped India might be a useful ally in the Cold War, given India's governmental structures and their Commonwealth ties. In 1952, however, Crocker authored a report on 'Indian feelings on race relations', which suggested India's 'preoccupation' with race in international affairs might make Communism attractive to Indians. Crocker found that India's opposition to any forms of racism made it difficult to work with as an ally in international politics because it predisposes them 'as it predisposes American negroes, to see some good in Communism just because Communism (or so they believe) abolishes race differences'.[111] Crocker's frustration with Indian foreign policy reappeared in his second term as high commissioner, leading him to describe Indians

[104] Crocker, quoted in Cotton, *The Australian School*, p. 225.
[105] Cotton, *The Australian School*, pp. 217-220.
[106] Walter Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate* (New Delhi: Random House India, 2012).
[107] Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Ramachandra Guha, 'Foreword', in Crocker, *Nehru*: ix.
[108] Guha, 'Foreword', xv.
[109] Guha, 'Foreword', xi.
[110] Meg Gurry and Gwenda Tavan, '"Too Soft and Long-Haired"? The Department of External Affairs and the White Australia Policy, 1946–66', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59, 1 (2004), pp. 133-134.
[111] Walter Crocker, 'Indian Feelings on Race Relations' (1952) at NAA: A462: 618/2/6 'India – International relations policy'.

as 'irrational' and 'unteachable' over Australia's position in New Guinea.[112] The assumption here, just as is the case in much contemporary IR theory, is that racial discrimination is not 'real' IR, and the focus should be on 'hard power' matters such as the Cold War. This demonstrates very clearly Australia's form of the India problem in this period: seeing India's foreign policy as irrational because it was unnecessarily concerned with imperialism.

In 1953, Crocker sent a dispatch considering the threat of Communism in India. He argued that an emerging ethos in India that poverty, famine, drought and disease were no longer an acceptable part of life might lead India towards turning Communist.[113] The report went on: 'poverty (as distinguished from starvation) is no longer considered an ideal but an evil.'[114] Indeed, colonial stereotypes pervade nearly all descriptions of the Indian people in Crocker's language, such as colonial tropes of native effeminacy and irrationality. They are based at least partly on perceptions of race: the 'new' India was prone to violence and 'mob intervention.'[115] There was a new 'proneness to violence', Crocker argued, that is 'more significant as it refers to a people who by tradition, and perhaps by nature, have been both gentle and resigned'.[116] An increase in violence in India, of course, reflected the chaos that Partition had left India. The connection between Partition and communal violence is not made here.

The Indian approach to their colonization by the British was further mocked with regard to Nehru's attitude to education: 'Nehru and his fellow nationalists... it was a terrible thing that under the wicked British only 15 per cent of the population was literate'.[117] As a result of this policy, states in India were burdened with trying to raise the literacy rate, which did not prove simple. Seeming to take some delight in the difficulties in modernizing India, particularly following Nehru's criticism of the British for failing to educate Indians, Crocker's use of the term 'wicked' suggests that the Indians did not recognize the good that the British had done for them through their colonization.

[112] Walter Crocker, 'India's attitude to Australian New Guinea' (1961) at NAA: A452: 1961/3163.
[113] Walter Crocker, 'The Long-Term Prospects for Communism in India' (1953) at NAA: A462: 211/1/25: 'Communism in India', p. 1.
[114] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 1.
[115] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 1.
[116] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 1.
[117] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 5.

The report was more hopeful with regard to the Indian peasantry, believing that they would not follow Communism, arguing that 'the Indian has a strong strain of religion' and prefers 'to be left alone and to doze in the sun' as long as they are 'given two meals a day'.[118] The Indian religious traditions, however, were also considered threatening: 'the Indians are... religious by nature; yet they are losing their old Hindu religion. Communism could supply a religion in place of it'.[119] The implications here are somewhat paradoxical: Indians are 'naturally' religious, but are simultaneously losing their Hindu religion. Crocker's perceptions of India were tinged with racial stereotypes, which emphasised Indian irrationality. There is a strong sense of frustration in these dispatches. Crocker wished the relationship to move forward and believed that an immigration agreement between India and would assist this. Clearly, though, the difference of perception in world affairs was not just a matter of geopolitics. Whereas Crocker saw Communism as virulent and inherently threatening, India's non-alignment and tendency towards socialist economic *swadeshi* placed it on a different path.[120] This led Crocker to argue that the Indians' anti-colonial thought blinded them to geopolitical realities. The disagreement over the Cold War, then, as outlined by Benvenuti and Mohan and Medcalf, was not just geopolitical but also ideational. The trope of a 'realist', 'idealist' dichotomy masks the racial ideas that were central to the construction of a weak relationship between India and Australia. Crocker's belief that India was not behaving 'rationally' was the basis of Australia's India's problem: Australia found Indian foreign policy impossible to comprehend in the decolonizing world order due to its racialized identity.

General Cariappa and the White Australia Policy

India's third high commissioner to Australia was General Kodandera M. Cariappa. He was a decorated general when he was pulled from a brief retirement at the request of Nehru to serve as India's high commissioner in Australia. He was not known for having a diplomat's temperament, but he was deeply respected across India and deeply idealistic towards the Commonwealth. Cariappa became best known in Australia, however, for his comments in opposition to the White Australia policy. While David Walker has provided an excellent historical account of this event, I seek to consider it in the context of the perceptions of Other

[118] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 7.
[119] Crocker, 'Prospects for Communism', p. 11.
[120] Varadarajan, 'Neoliberal (In)security'.

at play in this narrative.[121] Cariappa mentioned to the press his opposition to the White Australia policy, arguing during a visit to Brisbane that it was bad for Australia's broader relationship with Asia. He was quoted as saying in the *Courier Mail* 'what you people are doing is driving the people of India and Pakistan away from the British Commonwealth *and into the arms of Communism*'.[122] Cariappa wrote to Nehru, requesting to be sent home. Ratan K. Nehru, cousin of Jawaharlal and foreign secretary of the MEA, responded that 'I have shown your letter to the PM. This was just a storm in a tea cup and shows how jittery the Australians are about their immigration policy'.[123]

Cariappa's comments were widely attacked in the Australian press. An editorial in *The Argus* expressed the hope that the intensity of the debate would die down so that a conversation could take place about the White Australia policy as shaping Australia's international relationships without 'wanting to fling off our coats and punch General Cariappa and other critics on the nose'.[124] The editorial continued that 'it is about time that Australians, like any family which is doing something to irritate the near neighbours, took a good look at the White Australia policy in the light of today's realities'.[125]

In an effort to end the controversy, Cariappa clarified his position by trying to appeal to Commonwealth and military solidarity in an interview with *Reveille* (an official publication of the Australian Returned Services League).[126] His argument was focused on the Commonwealth, which, as an Indian Army general, he held in high regard. He wrote that 'Indians have shared in battles and shed their blood in protecting this precious heritage'.[127] For Cariappa, this means that Indians 'should not be denied a natural equality with other

[121] For a strong historical account of this matter, see David Walker, 'General Cariappa encounters 'White Australia'': Australia, India and the Commonwealth in the 1950s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 34, 3, (2006), pp. 389-406. Walker only cites material from the Cariappa collection, as opposed to his dispatches held in the MEA collection of the NAA.
[122] My emphasis. On the copy of the Indian Archives, General Cariappa has placed brackets over this part of the quote and written 'I did not say this' after it. Though I cannot confirm this, I find it highly unlikely that Cariappa would have made this comment. Kodandera M. Cariappa, quoted in *The Courier-Mail*, June 23 1954 at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, part 1, group 47, no. 2.
[123] Ratan K. Nehru to Kodandera M. Cariappa, July 7 1954 at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, Group 23, part 1 No. 40b, p. 265.
[124] Anon, 'White, or "Off-White" – It's Vital Now', in *The Argus* (Melbourne), July 2, 1954 at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, part 1, group 47, no. 1.
[125] "White, or 'Off-White", *The Argus.*
[126] Kodandera M. Cariappa, 'Report of Interview with Reveille' (1954) at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, Group 23, Part 1, no. 43, pp. 276-277.
[127] Cariappa, 'Interview with Reveille', pp. 276-277.

immigrants from countries of the British Commonwealth'.[128] His argument was also tied, perhaps due to its intended audience, to World War Two solidarity, as the offence of Indian servicemen is heightened as 'tens of thousands of Germans and Italians have been encouraged to emigrate to Australia'.[129]

Following the negative press commentary, Cariappa wrote to Ragunath Pillai, the Secretary General of the MEA. He complained first that Indians were not well treated in Australia, and were not given the rights that they should have as citizens:

> Having met a number of Indian settlers here and in New Zealand… I cannot help the feeling that the people of this country, although they profess to be very democratic, simple, friendly and all that, have a very poor opinion of Asians in regard to our standards of living and so on.[130]

He further wrote that he had tried to use the Commonwealth as a means of shifting opinions on Indians, but was always told that 'if we took you… what about the Chinese and the Japanese?'[131] He concluded: 'This is the way they think. They are scared stiff of Asians over-running their country if they relaxed their Immigration policy!!'[132] He felt that he was unable to leave immediately, though he ultimately wished to do so, instead changing his 'mission' in Australia to change the Australian people's mind with regard to Indians and Asia in general. As he put it, 'Self-respect demands that I must return at once, but my sense of duty to our people demands that I should stay here'.[133] Cariappa eventually settled on the same plan as Paranjpye and Bedi: to travel throughout Australia so as to disrupt in person Australia's stereotypical vision of India.

Cariappa further expressed his irritation at Australia's obsession with its economic and racial fears, though this time with regards to standards of living rather than immigration policy. His annual report of 1954:

> in everything they say or do, I frequently hear, to the extent of being tired of hearing, such expressions 'we must maintain our high standards of living and

[128] Cariappa, 'Interview with Reveille', pp. 276-277.
[129] Cariappa, 'Interview with Reveille', pp. 276-277.
[130] Kodandera M. Cariappa to N. Ragunath Pillai, July 7,1954 at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, group nine, part II, no. 17.
[131] Cariappa to Pillai, July 7,1954, p. 1.
[132] Cariappa to Pillai, July 7,1954, p. 2.
[133] Cariappa to Pillai, July 7, 1954, p. 2.

> therefore we must have only such people living with us who have our high standards.[134]

He continued: 'I have often asked Australians what exactly this means… no one has given me a satisfactory answer'.[135] Cariappa wrote without the diplomatic niceties of Paranjpye and Bedi. He went on to complain of Australia's crippling fear of Communism, writing that, as far as he could gather, Australia seemed to be obsessed with the fear that Communism was almost at her door-step and her security, therefore, was very gravely in danger.[136] A professional diplomat might never have voiced these concerns, due to the possibility of damaging the relationship. His complaints show a deep sense of frustration with Australia. Idealistic as he was about the Commonwealth, Australia's anxieties about Asia and Asian immigration led him to question these beliefs.

Cariappa eventually stayed in Australia and completed his full term as high commissioner. He was extremely generous in his farewell message to Australia, stating that he would miss the country and had enjoyed his many travels throughout it. His message of education aimed to disrupt stereotypes: 'India is not the land of snakes, mosquitoes, beggars and rope-tricksters only, as some imagine it to be, as Australia is not merely a land of Kangaroos and Koala Bears'.[137]

Cariappa's comments on the White Australia policy were considered in the Australian MEA, but not raised officially with India. Crocker was asked to keep track of the matter, but did not lodge an official protest. He avoided speaking with R.K Nehru regarding the issue, believing him to be 'fanatical about colour, race, etc'.[138] Rather, he concluded that Cariappa's 'standing with the powers-that-be here is weak" and that the MEA believed him to 'have failed in Australia'… 'due to his vanity.'[139] Crocker did, however, discuss the matter with the Commonwealth Secretary Dutt, who reportedly told him that India had 'no interest in

[134] Kodandera M. Cariappa, 'Annual Political Report for the year 1954' at NAI, 'Reports for 1954 in Respect of Australia', file No. 3 (31) R&I /55 (s), p. 2.
[135] Cariappa, 'Report for the year 1954', p. 3.
[136] Cariappa, 'Report for the year 1954', p. 1.
[137] Kodandera M. Cariappa, 'A Message to Australians by General K. M. Cariappa, on the Eve of his Departure from Australia to India', April 15, 1956 at NAI, General Cariappa Private Papers, part 1, group 47, no. 55A, pp. 310-311.
[138] Walter Crocker, 'Minute', July 12, 1954 at University of Adelaide Barr-Smith Library Special Collections (BSL), Crocker Papers, series 10, V2.2.
[139] Walter Crocker to Secretary, Dept of External Affairs, Canberra, August 25, 1954 at BSL, Crocker Papers, Series 10, V2.2.

Australian immigration policy'.[140] Crocker concluded that Dutt 'obviously thinks that Cariappa is not all there' in his failure to follow the government line.[141] Given that Cariappa stayed another three years in Australia, and travelled much of the country generating considerable press coverage, Crocker clearly misread the intentions of the MEA, and indeed, had missed the extremely high regard which Cariappa was held in throughout India. From the Australian press and Cariappa disagreeing over what was originally said, to Crocker's thinking Cariappa would be sent back to India, this affair is another example of India and Australia misunderstanding one another.

Cariappa's perception of Australia as overly fearful and the Australian press perceiving Cariappa as hypersensitive and meddling portray a very tense relationship between these two former colonies. Cariappa was clearly offended by Australia's racialized identity and the stereotyping of India he found there. Crocker and the broader Australian press through, perceived Cariappa through racialized tropes of the hypersensitive and irrational Indian. Cariappa's resistance to the White Australia, and his argument that it was clearly based on racial not economic grounds shows how this identity lowered Australia in the eyes of India. His attempt to improve Australian perceptions by mobilising the Commonwealth link – something he believed in deeply – to undermine this policy reveals the different understandings of racialized hierarchy at play in the relationship.

'Irrationality and Unteachableness': India and Australian New Guinea

Australia's holding of New Guinea as a colonial possession presents an opportunity to examine the differences between India and Australia over decolonization. Australia held New Guinea from 1920 until its peaceful independence in 1975. Periodically, however, the mandate would need renewal, leading to a UN vote on the issue. One such occasion occurred in 1962, when Australia lobbied new postcolonial states to ensure that the UN vote would go the way it wished. Samar Sen, high commissioner for India in Australia at the time, travelled to New Guinea to examine the conduct of the Australians in the colony. Sen later discussed the matter with Crocker, who was again Australian high commissioner to India.

[140] Crocker, 'Minute'.
[141] Walter Crocker to Secretary, Dept. External Affairs, Canberra, September 2, 1954 at BSL, Crocker Papers, Series 10, V2.2.

The discussion was apparently of a friendly nature, but Crocker was frustrated by what he perceived as the hypocritical position of India. He pressed Sen on the communal violence in India, drawing his attention to riots in Jabalpur and violence between Assamese and Bengalis in North East India. India was not a peaceful place, and not without racism, violence or forms of discrimination. Australian policy makers viewed India's position as 'emotional' and 'hypocritical'.[142] In private musings about the position of India, Crocker went further attacking elements of Indian society, as proof of India's hypocrisy with regard to racism:

> The strange thing is that this hyper-sensitiveness about racial colour and about slights, real or fancied, perpetuated by Europeans, is found in a people who have no equal for colour prejudice. Marriages in India are still arranged; matrimonial advertisements are therefore common. In the pages given to matrimonial advertisements in *The Hindustan Times* the majority of advertisements will demand, or will be vaunting, fairness in the girl.[143]

Crocker further argued that India's suppression of Naga nationalists in Assam could be used as means of revealing the Indian government's hypocrisy.[144] He lamented of Sen's views, '[He] sees New Guinea as little more than one relic of the European's, the white man's, unjustified domination of the world.'[145]

> Crocker carried on attacking the approach of Sen, extrapolating it to all Indians:
>
> It is symptomatic of the lack of understanding and appreciation we are likely to find in the U.N. Meetings, and it is symptomatic of what we will have to expect from the most powerful of the anti-colonial countries, namely India. It is, moreover, worse than just a case of lack of understanding and appreciation. We are up against an emotional attitude so strong as to blind Indians to reality, to say nothing of blinding them to the mote in their own eyes. It is irrational; it seems to be unteachable.[146]

'Unteachable' in particular taps into the imperial narratives of justifying colonialism as a struggle to educate and improve the lives of the colonized by bringing them western modernity. By constructing the issue as one of rationality against 'emotion', Crocker was so frustrated by the Indian position as to fall back on to stereotypes of the rational 'West', constructed off the irrational 'East'. He lays claim to an objective, rationalist view of

[142] Walter Crocker, 'India's attitude to Australian New Guinea' (1961) at NAA: A452: 1961/3163.
[143] Crocker, 'Australian New Guinea', p. 5.
[144] Crocker, 'Australian New Guinea', p. 2.
[145] Crocker, 'Australian New Guinea', p. 5.
[146] Crocker, 'Australian New Guinea', p. 4.

international 'reality' to which Indians are 'blind'.[147] There is an underlying assumption in Crocker's work that western values are universal and India's postcoloniality prevents them from seeing such values in their universal form. Crocker continued on in the same vein:

> To sum up, what Sen said about New Guinea might have been affected by some personal experience of his own in the past, but I believe that by and large it represents what Indians in control of India and Indian public opinion feel. Friendly as they are towards Australia in most respects, as regard New Guinea we can expect little except irrationality and unteachableness.[148]

For Crocker, India was irrationally and unteachably blind to their hypocrisy, and not behaving as a 'rational' agent in international politics should. Sadly, he had failed to take heed of Cariappa's call to end stereotypes. This shows the depth of Australia's India problem: unable to understand why India opposed the racialized hierarchy of world politics, Australia fell back on racialized stereotypes of colonial origin so as to account for India's foreign policy.

Conclusion: identity and India-Australia Encounters

A re-examination of India-Australia relations from a postcolonial-critical constructivist approach reveals a very tense relationship marked by miscommunication and misunderstanding, which were underpinned by different perceptions of the hierarchical and racialized world order. Australia and India were historically entangled through the British empire and their colonial histories. Their postcolonial identities, however, clearly divided the two states. Australia's racialized Anglosphere identity, as seen through its 'whites only' immigration policy, profoundly limited India-Australia relations throughout this period, as the two states had greatly different perceptions of the world and the Indian Ocean region that they shared. The relationship became one of ambivalence, with colonial heritage tying the two together as it also kept them separated. In this period, colonial heritage, seen through Nehru's attempt to construct a postcolonial Commonwealth (opposed by Menzies) could not tie India and Australia together due the overwhelming negative meanings of this history to India.

When we consider identity playing a constitutive role in foreign policy, Benvenuti and Jones' argument that Australian foreign policy under Menzies reflected a rationalist foreign policy masks the racial narratives central to Australia's troubled engagements with

[147] Said, *Orientalism*.
[148] Crocker, 'Australian New Guinea', p. 4.

India. While Australian diplomats might have felt they were acting rationally, which is reflected in here, they constructed their own rationality specifically constructed through depictions of India and Indians as irrational. For someone to be judged a realist, they must surely also assume rationality of all actors. Rather, Menzies and Crocker's, indeed Australia's, 'realism' was constructed through the perceived irrationality of postcolonial India. This also reveals Gurry and Kurrupu's emphasis on leadership, although it was clearly part of a broader problem, to be insufficient in explaining why India and Australia had such difficult relations throughout this period. This, alongside other geopolitical factors India and Australia clashed over, like the formation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization, conflicts in Suez, Vietnam, and Korea and the broader Cold War should all be thought of as part of a broader ideational clash over race and hierarchy in world order.

Interestingly, though, India occasionally used a narrative of shared identity to approach Australia, as seen in Cariappa's idealistic farewell and talk of the Commonwealth and Nehru's 'Message to Australia'. This was done so as to critique its racial discrimination. There was, then, at least the potential for the colonial connection to become a positive in the relationship. The racialized form of the idea of the Anglosphere clearly inhibited India-Anglosphere relations, because it differed violently from India's anti-colonial foreign policy. How, then, did Canada's liberal internationalism shape its relationship with India?

Chapter Four: Liberal Internationalism: India and Canada

Introduction: Canada and a post-racial Anglosphere

Given the ways in which Australia's racialized identity inhibited its relationship with India, comparing India's response to Canadian liberal internationalist identity can provide an important counterpoint. Canada exhibited a pluralist-yet-hierarchical approach to the Anglosphere, which briefly animated a productive relationship with India. Canada's relationship with India in the 1950s was, at least briefly, anomalous to the rest of the story of India-Anglosphere relations. At a time in which all other India-Anglosphere relationships were weak and struggled under the weight of the Cold War and decolonization, Canada and India were briefly able to develop what was thought of as a 'special relationship'. If Australia's relationship with India was held back by its racialized identity, what was it about Canada that enabled such a relationship to flourish? And, equally as importantly, why did it fall apart? Here, I examine Canada's attempt to engage India through its idealistic, liberal internationalist overtures for India to join it in a 'special relationship'. Canada's perception of India, though it was far kinder than that of Australia, still caused problems. India and Canada still clashed over the nature of international hierarchy.

The belief that two shared a 'special relationship' was Canada's form of the India problem: seeing India as sharing Canada's outlook neglects the different experiences of colonialism of the two states. In the first few years after Indian independence, the Canadian attempt to engage India was moderately successful, suggesting that postcolonial India was able to engage to some extent with a narrative of the Anglosphere, emphasizing openness, internationalism and multi-racialism. This assisted in encouraging India to the join the Commonwealth. However, as more challenging international issues arose for the relationship (such as Soviet aggression in Hungary, the Vietnam War and the discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order), ideational differences between India and Canada arose. I argue that Canada's liberal identity was rooted in colonial discourses of being a 'good international citizen' rather than explicitly about race, but racialized narratives were nevertheless crucial to this. Although this led to the relationship being framed differently, as it also created a discourse of enthusiasm for one another, a different notion of Anglosphere and a different notion of global politics led to differing construction of global political order.

These differences of perception were underpinned by different historical experiences of colonialism. As I argue here, the genealogy of Canada's liberal internationalism still lay very much in its colonial history, which differed greatly from India's anti-colonial internationalism. Nehruvian internationalism had a more complicated genealogy than just British liberalism. Reid's imagined 'special relationship' was impossible due to India and Canada's different perception of world order. Despite this, on the surface, these worldviews still made these two states look at one another as very attractive potential partners. The belief that India-Canada relations could be a 'special relationship' reflects Canada's perception of India. Canada's approach to the India problem in this case, then, was to see India as having an important role to play in world politics that only Canada could understand and that Canada had to translate to the rest of the world. This was an impossible mission, as it was undermined repeatedly because Canada's perception of itself was still fundamentally constructed through this history as a white dominion. Canada's belief in its own liberal internationalism and its 'good international citizenship' led it to believe India could be a special partner. The idea of 'good international citizenship', though, was still rooted in a colonial hierarchy and the perception of Self based on whiteness.

While the overwhelming focus of this chapter is on the period of Nehru's rule in India, some consideration is given to India and Canada's nuclear cooperation, which continued until India's 1974 nuclear test. Canada's furious (even more so than that of the US, the UK and Australia) response to India's peaceful nuclear explosion more firmly reveals India's resistance to norms of behaviour assumed of Anglosphere states, suggesting that while this narrative of Anglosphere enabled India's engagement, India's resistance to liberal norms ultimately trumped its willingness to engage with Canada. First, however, it is necessary to consider the previous approaches taken to India-Canada relations in IR and history.

The Historiography of India-Canada Relations

Within Australian scholarship, Canada has sometimes been used as an example of what the India-Australia relationship could have been, had Australia's leaders attempted to engage India more thoroughly.[1] Despite the scope for comparison, a substantial comparative analysis has yet to be performed. It is important, though, not to assume that India-Canada

[1] Gurry, 'Leadership and Bilateral Relations'.

relations were as happy and uncomplicated as they look in comparison to India-Australia relations. Indeed, Canada's liberal internationalism led it to have a complicated relationship with India. There were important differences between India and Canada that existed well before 1974 and India's peaceful nuclear explosion. Canadian history and identity is likewise saddled with postcolonial issues of settler-colonial violence, dispossession and the construction of cultural norms rooted in racialized identities.[2] As Mark Mazower has argued with regard to the UN, under post-imperial liberal internationalism, the only relationship between the white and the coloured peoples would be economic exploitation.[3] As will be seen in Chapter Four, matters of postcolonial identity and perception played an important part in keeping India and Canada apart, while simultaneously also creating a discourse of enthusiasm for one another rooted primarily in the misperception of one another's intentions.

As with India and Australia, the India-Canada relationship in this period has been the subject of some considerable scrutiny. Constructivist and postcolonial approaches, however, have not been taken to the India-Canada relationship. A group of Canadian studies has taken into account Indian diplomatic sources, particularly the work of Touhey and Campbell-Miller.[4] Debate has largely centred on the causes of the rise and fall of the India-Canada relationship. Key to discussion has been Escott Reid's assertion that there was a 'special relationship' between India and Canada before, during and shortly after his tenure. I take this assertion as a comparison to the US-UK 'special relationship', suggesting India and Canada shared a relationship worthy the Anglosphere. Recent historical work has questioned Reid's assertion. Diplomatic historian Ryan Touhey has performed the most detailed work. Touhey argues that scholarship on India-Canada relations has been misleading because scholars have overemphasized the sympathetic writings of former diplomats (such as Reid) while underemphasizing, or in the case of IR, failing to perform, appropriate archival research.[5] Touhey's is an exhaustive archival study. Indeed, the lack of archival research in India-

[2] See, for Baldwin, Cameron and Kobayashi, in their examination of the racial codings within Canada's identification as 'the great white north': Audrey Kobayashi, Laura Cameron, Andrew Baldwin, 'Introduction: Where is the Great White North? Spatializing History, Historicizing Whiteness', in Audrey Kobayashi, Laura Cameron, Andrew Baldwin, *Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), pp. 1-18.
[3] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The end of Empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 75.
[4] Jill M. S. Campbell-Miller, 'The Mind of Modernity: Canadian Bilateral Foreign Assistance to India', 1950-60, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo (2014) and Ryan M Touhey, 'Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957-1963', *Canadian Historical Review*, 92, 3 (2011), pp. 429-454.
[5] Touhey, 'Canada and India at 60', and Kumar and Narain, 'Re-engaging India'.

Canada relations seems to be less of an issue as in scholarship on India-Australia relations.[6] Within his narrative, both Canada and India felt aggrieved with one another over the breakdown of their relationship. Furthermore, he suggests that each side of the relationship expected the other to agree with their own vision of world politics, with both proven wrong.[7] In Touhey's useful analysis, Canadian diplomats initially felt that India would share Canada's interests and approach to world affairs, partly on the basis of shared colonial history and the English education of India's elite diplomats. This was undone by conflict over peacekeeping in Vietnam and the Indian refusal to sign the NPT, which in the 1960s severely worried Canada's leaders.[8]

Reid based his belief in an India-Canada special relationship on the development of a new multi-racial Commonwealth.[9] Alongside Touhey, Ramesh Kumar and Nigmendra Narain have attacked this approach, as has Arthur Rubinoff, suggesting that Reid had an idealistic or romantic vision of India and of his own time there. This has been seen as a facet of his own liberal internationalism, combined with a tendency towards arrogance. Rubinoff has argued that under Reid's tenure, the India-Canada relationship was in a gradual decline, with disagreements internationally over the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Cold War conflicts in Vietnam and Korea, not to mention the effort to balance relations with India and Pakistan during the struggle over Kashmir, over which disagreements lingered from 1947 onwards.[10] Rubinoff considers the expression 'special relationship' for India and Canada as 'a euphemism for self-delusion'.[11] Kumar and Narain argue that during this early period, so often cited as a period of great strength, relations were, in fact, 'cordial but uneventful'.[12] Donaghy argues, however, that Escott Reid, though his memoirs tend to exaggerate his achievements elsewhere, had managed genuine accomplishments in India.[13] Here, I argue that an ideational approach suggests that this was more than just a delusion, but an element of Canada's liberal internationalist identity.

[6] Campbell-Miller, 'The Mind of Modernity'.
[7] Touhey, 'Canada and India at 60', p. 735.
[8] Touhey, 'Canada and India at 60', p. 739 and Touhey, 'Dealing in Black and White'.
[9] Escott M. Reid, *Envoy to Nehru* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
[10] Rubinoff , 'Canada's Re-Engagement with India', p. 840. See also Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, Vol. 4469.
[11] Rubinoff , 'Canada's Re-Engagement with India'.
[12] Kumar and Narain, 'Re-engaging India', p. 172.
[13] Greg Donaghy, 'Escott Reid in India: 1952-57', in Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel (eds), *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 67-84.

The prominence of the idea of a 'special relationship' tells us more about the discourse on the relationship, than it does the level of interaction between the two states. Surely this cannot just be down to one egocentric diplomat. When Reid argued that there was an India-Canada 'special relationship', he was essentially equating the India-Canada relationship with that shared between the US and the UK. He saw India and Canada as able, for the particularities of their history and colonial construction, to 'bridge' east and west and become powerful allies for world peace. However, as will be seen, this is a paradoxical and difficult position to take. Within the genealogy of liberal internationalism lies liberal imperialism – and Canada's strain of liberal internationalism was still rooted in an imperialist hierarchy. Canadian and Nehruvian internationalism, then, although they held some similarities, were ultimately incompatible.

The interpretation of Nehru and Nehruvian foreign policy is central here. Just as IR theory has struggled to place Nehru, considering him an 'idealist', or simply neglecting material power and making bad foreign policy, or repurposing him as a realist,[14] Australian and Canadian leaders tended towards problematic conceptions. Chacko has argued Nehru's thought is best seen as 'internationalist nationalism', as he sought to create an ethical project underpinned by a reasoned morality.[15] Various Canadians thought of Nehru as an 'old Harrovian realist', an Anglophone liberal, or someone straddling British liberalism and Indian 'other-worldism'. As Chacko argues, however, reading Nehru as a liberal or a realist ignores his writing, which sought to unpick the Eurocentric narratives of world history that underpin both realist theory and liberal internationalism.[16] Indeed, as will be seen here, the tensions between Nehru's thought and liberal internationalism played out in India-Canada relations.

[14] C. Raja Mohan, 'Nehru's Realism', 'Nehru's Realism', (2014) at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-great-game-folio-34, accessed May 5, 2015.
[15] Priya Chacko, 'The Internationalist nationalist: Pursuing an Ethical Modernity with Jawaharlal Nehru', R. Shilliam, (ed.) *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*, (London: Routledge, 2011).
[16] Chacko, 'The Internationalist Nationalist'.

Canadian Identity and liberal internationalism

Canada has long seen itself as a 'good international citizen' and playing a creative role in international affairs.[17] Despite the desire to be a good international citizen, though, this identity is similarly rooted in Canada's colonial history. Although the racialized, Anglo-Saxon narrative hardened in Australia partly due to Australian's proximity to Asia, Canada had a very different experience.[18] Cohen argues that Canada was able to 'punch above its weight' in the 1950s and 1960s due to its commitment to its 'values'.[19] As shown by Lake and Reynolds, the question of racialized immigration policies was interconnected across the Anglosphere, with each state looking to the others as examples of how to manage non-white immigration.[20] Canada was able to unwind its racialized policies due to its distance, and thus, had less anxiety over decolonization in Asia.

This means that Canada was broadly in favour of decolonization and a multi-racial world order, the mission of the UN, and believed that that spreading democracy would also necessarily spread peace. Canada also saw itself as an activist, which, as Black shows, has been an element of its policy towards Africa. This was the essence of Canada's good international citizenship – as 'activism' for liberal ideals often leads to interventionism and (neo)colonial enterprises. In this sense, it may be compared to the approach of Gareth Evans in Australia in the 1990s, well known for his recent championing of the responsibility to protect.[21]

Different language groups have also shaped Canada's identity. For Nossal, English-speaking Canadians always saw their loyalty as something broader than just Canada.[22] Attachment to Great Britain, however, was rather more complex for French Canadians. Nossal usefully argues that Canadian foreign policy has been aimed at not just securing Canada but a broader 'realm' meaning: 'places and peoples that were (or are) defined as

[17] David R. Black, *Canada and Africa in the New Millennium: The Politics of Consistent Inconsistency*, (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2015), pp. 1-2. See also, Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2004).
[18] Alexander E. Davis, 'Rethinking Australia's International Past: Identity, Foreign Policy and India in the Australian Colonial Imagination', *Flinders Journal Of History and Politics*, 29 (2014), pp. 70-96.
[19] Cohen, *While Canada Slept*.
[20] Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*.
[21] For a postcolonial critique of R2P, see Navid Pourmokhtari, 'A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: the contradictory legacy of a "West-centric" discipline', *Third World Quarterly*, 34, 10 (2013), pp. 1767-1793.
[22] Nossal, 'Defending the "Realm"', pp. 505-506.

being "inside" rather than "outside"'.[23] The identity politics of this realm have, from time to time, shifted. From 1867 to 1918, this 'realm' included all of the British empire. After WWI, however, Canada turned isolationist, desperately hoping to avoid involvement in another European war.

This was, of course, made ambivalent due to the resistance of French Canadians, meaning 'realm' and 'Anglosphere' could not be the same thing. During the Cold War, however, Nossal's 'realm' meant the US and Western Europe. Within Nossal's idea of the realm, however, India was ambivalent: included within the British empire, but, for Nossal, not part of the Cold War. We can see in the thought of Escott Reid below, Canada's desire to be a 'good international citizen' led Reid to see India as offering a possible special relationship. Reid saw an anti-racist Canada as able to 'translate' India to the western world. I argue here that India fits ambivalently within Canada's identity discourse. Canada was not seeking to defend India, but it did see India as part of a colonial family, which can be seen in its attempt to have a 'special relationship' with it.

The Anglosphere in Canadian Identity

Given the centrality of the English language to defining the Anglosphere, there are some important matters regarding Canada's bilingual/bicultural nature that need to be considered. Contemporary constructions of Anglosphere in the context of the UK, at least, are aimed at taking the UK out of Europe, and implicitly, taking the UK away from France. It is also based on the English traditions and unwritten conventions of Westminster government, which Canada most certainly follows. In terms of the perception of the world, or the idea of the Anglosphere, Canada's bilingual nature may predispose it to seeing plurality in its international affairs, or give it some distance from the more exclusive visions of Commonwealth and Anglosphere as seen in Australia. Whereas in Australia, racialized identity hardened due to the proximity of Asia, Canada has for over a century had a serene relationship with its only neighbour: the US. In this sense, while for someone like Bennett, Canada's French-speaking regions may occupy a lower place in the Anglosphere, in terms of perceiving India, they force Canadian identity to be more open to pluralist visions of Self and Other.

[23] Nossal, 'Defending the "Realm"'.

The extent to which the *Québécois* present a 'check' on Canadian foreign policy, however, is murky and contested. While the point is made often that Quebec has certain influences over decision making, Massie *et al*. find that this supposedly 'undue' influence over Canadian foreign policy has been generally overstated, particularly where it is suggested that Quebec prevents Canada from pursuing a self-interested policy.[24] Escott Reid, however, has argued that Canadian foreign policy under Mackenzie King was shaped by a desire to have policies acceptable to 'substantial majorities in each important section of Canada'.[25] In this sense, if such fears drove decision-makers in Ottawa, it may say more about the ideational fears for unity of these decision-makers, rather than a specific influence of the *Québécois* on Canadian foreign policy. As such, *Québécois* identity is best viewed in this context as an element of a single, yet contested, Canadian state identity discourse. The influence of the *Québécois* leads David Haglund, viewing the Anglosphere as a set of military alignments, to argue that Canada cannot be part of 'Anglosphere-heavy' engagements, due to its plural identity, but can be seen as part of 'Anglosphere-lite' engagements.[26] This pluralism is limited however, as a bi-cultural Canada still fits within discourses of 'whiteness', just not strictly 'Anglo-Saxon' whiteness.

Establishing Postcolonial Relations

As with India-Australia relations, many of the key actors in constructing India-Canada relations were shaped by their previous experiences of the British empire. The liberal internationalist streak in Canadian foreign policy, I argue here, created certain expectations of Indian behaviour. In Canada's case, these expectations developed under Nehru on the assumption that he was an 'Anglophile' and India would therefore be understandable to Canada. Similarly, the Commonwealth created the expectation that India and Canada would be able to communicate effectively. When India's behaviour diverged from Canada's expectations, however, the relationship broke down. This demonstrates Canada's form of the India problem: belief in a 'special relationship' was based on impossible assumptions about India's British heritage and its foreign policy. Before examining specific issues between India and Canada, it is worthwhile examining the foundations of the relationship.

[24] Justin Massie et. al, 'Hijacking a Policy? Assessing Quebec's "Undue" Influence on Canada's Afghan Policy', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40, 2, (2010), pp. 259-275.
[25] Escott M. Reid, 'Canada and the threat of war: A discussion of Mr Mackenzie King's foreign policy', Jack L. Granatstein (ed.) *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings* (Ottawa: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986), pp. 118-119.
[26] David G. Haglund, 'Anglosphere: in, out, or indifferent?', (2005) at http://www.irpp.org/en/po/canada-in-the-world/canada-and-the-anglosphere-in-out-or-indifferent/, accessed April 1, 2014.

India's first high commissioner to Canada was Hardit Singh Malik, a well-respected Sikh diplomat with a history of cricketing prowess and service in the Indian Army. In his memoirs, Malik recalls being deeply touched by the reception he received from Canada's small Indian, and particularly Sikh, population upon his arrival in Canada, just days before India's independence was granted. Malik had arrived just before the chaos of Partition.[27] These people became his first priority in Canada and he recalls his finest successes in Canada to be the negotiation of full citizenship rights.[28] Old imperial connections between himself and Lester Pearson, who was minister for External Affairs while Malik was high commissioner, held him in good stead too. Pearson and Malik served together as officers in the Royal Flying Corps in World War One. Pearson regarded Malik as a friend and even authored a very favourable foreword for Malik's autobiography shortly before his death in 1972.[29]

Amongst his greatest achievements in Canada was negotiating full citizenship for Indians living in Canada, as will be discussed below. Malik's first priority however, was to consider the ways in which Canadians perceived India. His first report to Delhi in 1947 suggested that:

> Generally speaking, the sentiment of Canadians towards India is one of friendliness and this has been enhanced by the fact that India is now a dominion and so a member of 'the family'. This applies particularly to the English-speaking Canadians. As for French Canadians, the feeling there, too, is one of friendly interest and sympathy on account of India having attained her freedom.[30]

There is a sense here that the English-speaking Canadians have more interest and a marginally better understanding of India. At the same time, there is also the suggestion that French Canadians valued India's struggle against the British, due to their own experiences of subjugation under Anglophone Canada. Here, the Englishness played a different, more complex role in state formation in Canada than was the case in Australia. Whereas in Australia migrants were expected to learn English so as to conform to society, in Canada, bilingualism was expected and acceptable. The sense that India was part of 'the family' of the Commonwealth had made Canada more interested in India, which was reported by Malik to

[27] Hardit S. Malik, *A Little Work, A Little Play* (Delhi: Bookwise India, 2010), pp. v-vi.
[28] Malik, *A Little Work*, p. 231.
[29] Lester B. Pearson, 'Foreword' in Malik, *A Little Work*, pp. v-vi.
[30] Hardit S. Malik, 'Political Summary, October 1947', in 'High Commissioner for India in Canada, Monthly Reports for 1947' at NAI, F 20/47-05III.

be a positive in the relationship. In this sense, Malik thought that the French Canadians might not feel quite so 'familial' towards India as the English-speaking Canadians.

The importance of postcolonial networks to India's foundation of its relationships with Australia and Canada can be seen most clearly in the visit of Lord Mountbatten, the recent Viceroy of India, to Canada. Malik reacted particularly excitedly in August 1948 when Lord and Lady Mountbatten visited Ottawa, believing this to be a great opportunity and that 'their visit is the best possible thing that could happen at the present time for the furtherance of friendly relations between India and Canada'.[31] Here, Malik spoke more frankly to Nehru about the attitude towards Indians in Canada than in his official reports, stating that:

> The ignorance regarding us in Canada is, of course, abysmal and the process of education has to be a continuous one. The visit of the Mountbattens will certainly help enormously in this process.[32]

The emphasis on education echoes the approach taken to Australia by India's diplomats, a recurrence of the belief that education would be crucial to the forming of India's new relationships with these two settler-colonial societies.

Mountbatten was reportedly able to immediately change the mind of Mackenzie King and his cabinet regarding the sale of Canadian weapons to India, which had been blocked due to the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir.[33] King was known partly for being greatly cautious and pragmatic in his foreign policy, but was quickly turned around. Malik reported back to Nehru that King's approach to India had emphasized the Commonwealth:

> During the course of this speech, while praising Lord Mountbatten for his accomplishments in India, the Prime Minister referred to India in the most friendly terms, confessing that he and his Cabinet and the Canadian people generally had in the past been very ignorant about India but that they were all delighted that she had won her independence and had chosen for the time being to continue within the British Commonwealth of Nations.[34]

The admission here that Canada had been ignorant of India would likely have played well to Malik, given his comments later to Nehru on Canada's 'abysmal' ignorance towards India. Canada was at least, not ignorant of its ignorance. In Malik's eyes, the Canadians were aware of their ignorance of India. Menzies, by contrast, had no interest in India and did not make an

[31] Hardit S. Malik to Jawaharlal Nehru, August 26, 1948 at NAI, 'Letter from the high commissioner for India in Canada regarding Lord and Lady Mountbatten visits to Ottawa-Canada', Nos. 35(10)-AMS, 1949, p. 1.
[32] Malik, *A Little Work*, p.1.
[33] Malik, *A Little Work*, p.1.
[34] Malik, *A Little Work*, p.1.

effort to rectify this. This is a very different outlook on India, which was symptomatic of a Canada more open to the world than Australia. There is an awareness of previous ignorance, and an effort to overcome it. While ideally for a relationship, such ignorance would never have existed, but the level of self-awareness was no doubt pleasing to Indian diplomats.

India's second high commissioner to India, Santdas Kirpalani echoed the thoughts of Malik. Kirpalani had a history of working with the ICS under the British, and was the primary focus of his autobiography, *Fifty Years with the British*. Kirpalani picked up on Canada's initial confusion as to exactly what the postcolonial British empire might entail:

> …while Canada is a member of the Commonwealth, there seems to be a great uncertainty as to the exact nomenclature: some say Commonwealth, some say British Commonwealth and some say the Empire and yet other diehards continue to say British Empire.[35]

Overwhelmingly, the tone of the Indian diplomats in Canada was a positive one, and yet a sense of Canada not understanding India pervades many of the early reports. Kirpalani summed up the mood:

> Many responsible Canadians recognize India as the one politically sound and economically stable country of Asia and want to get closer with India. The desire is there but the approach and methodology has not yet acquired articulation.[36]

For the most part, as can be seen in these reports, India perceived Canada in this early period as generally willing to engage with India and as curious despite being largely ignorant of India's position in the world. Similar sentiments were echoed by Kirpalani's successor Ramji R. Saksena. Saksena reported in 1955 to New Delhi that:

> …there is a breadth of vision in the outlook of the Canadian statesmen towards the problems which the emergence of the erstwhile subjugated nations of Asia has created which is very refreshing and which may well exert a powerful influence in favour of the maintenance of peace in the world.[37]

In the eyes of the Indian diplomats, Canada's liberal internationalist identity had led to a perception that Canada might be more favourably disposed towards India than the other Anglosphere powers. Despite this, Saksena in particular would go on to alienate some Canadian diplomats.

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[35] Santdas K. Kirpalani, 'Political Report on Canada for the Year 1949', in 'Annual Report(s) on Canada' at NAI, File No. 3(13) – R&I/50, p. 11.
[36] Kirpalani, 'Political Report on Canada', p. 12.
[37] Ramji R. Saksena, 'Annual Report, 1953', NAI 'Annual Report from Canada – 1955', File no 17-RI, 1955, p. 1.

Crucial also in determining the ways in which Canada and India could interact over this period was Nehru's first visit Canada in 1949. He stayed only for a few days. The Canadians believed that there was a risk that Nehru would return from the US and Canada 'with a personal impression that the society of North America is grossly materialistic. Such an impression would probably be in accordance with his preconceived ideas'.[38] Nehru gave a speech to the Canadian parliament, in which he spoke of his efforts to end racial discrimination. He argued that Canada and India should be able to work together in this realm, stating that:

> India's championship of freedom and racial equality in Asia, as well as in Africa, is a natural urge of the facts of geography and history. India desires no leadership or dominion or authority over any other country… Canada, with her traditions of democracy, her sense of justice and her love of fair play, should understand our purpose and our motives and should use her growing wealth and power to extend the horizons of freedom.[39]

Here, Nehru suggested that Canada's liberal internationalism was not all unlike India's, and his own, form of internationalism. This speech was extremely well received by the Canadian press. *The Ottawa Morning Citizen* suggested that Nehru might have destroyed some stereotypes of India and 'the East', when stating that 'his closeness to the West and to Western ways of thinking' was astonishing.[40] The *Toronto Globe and Mail* stated that 'there was no trace of the "mysterious East"' about Nehru, and concluded that '…Asiatics, if we take Mr. Nehru as their spokesman, are looking for the same things as Westerners – peace, freedom and abundance'.[41]

> In a speech on his time in Ottawa, Nehru stated that his time in Canada had:
>
> made me feel how in many ways, in our outlook, in the way we considered many of our problems and many world problems, how near we were to each other. I felt a certain sense of affinity with the Canadian people and I went back from Ottawa with not only the pleasantest memories of my visit, but having drawn much nearer, not only so far as I was personally concerned, but if I may so, from our nation's point of view, having drawn much nearer to Canada and the Canadian people.[42]

[38] Humphrey Hume Wrong to Arnold Heeney at LAC, RG25-A-3-b, part 1, no. 9908-Y-2-40, pp. 1-2.
[39] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Speech to the Canadian House of Commons', October 24, 1949 at LAC, RG25-A-3-b, 9908-Y-2-40, vol. 2, pp. 1103-1106.
[40] Anon, *Ottawa Morning Citizen*, October 24, 1949 at LAC, RG25-A-3-b, vol. 2, no. 9908-Y-2-40.
[41] Anon, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, October 29, 1949 at LAC, RG25-A-3-b, vol. 2, no. 9908-Y-2-40.
[42] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Address at a civic reception at Vancouver', November 2, 1949, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 13, second series (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 410-411.

For Nehru, Canada's expansion westwards complicated the geography of 'East' and West', stating that 'we talk about the Orient and the Occident. But all these ideas of East and West get rather confused when we come to a place like Vancouver'.[43] Canada's assistance in having India remain in the Commonwealth as a Republic was also crucial to this relationship, something Nehru would mention many years later when speaking fondly of Canada.[44] He continued:

> in fact, it has been chiefly through the initiative of Canada that the Dominions have become independent nations, very friendly to each other, cooperating with each other, nevertheless completely independent in regard to their domestic or foreign policy. And therefore, it so happened that Canada could appreciate entirely our viewpoint. In this matter there is no difficulty at all about our understanding each other.[45]

At this point, India was just about to become a Republic and remain in the Commonwealth as well, something which Canada had strongly supported, as Australia had under Chifley and Evatt.[46]

In these early years, Nehru was impressed with the reception he received in Canada, and perhaps, more importantly, Canada's belief in a post-racial, pluralist Commonwealth: a clear avatar of Canada's liberal internationalism. Nehru believed Canada to be more open to India than the US and Australia. Canada's fear that Nehru might see Canada as shallow and materialistic had been allayed. Arnold Heeney, Canadian ambassador to the US, relayed back to Ottawa after discussing the matter with the Indian ambassador to the US that 'Mr Nehru had remarked that he had encountered a more stable and better-balanced outlook in Canada than in the United States during his visit'.[47] Nehru had created a set of expectations within Canada that the states had relatively compatible outlooks on the world and would be able to work together.

Canada went on to play a central role in allowing India to remain in the Commonwealth as a Republic. Nehru wrote of the Commonwealth conferences in a private

[43] Nehru, 'Civic reception at Vancouver', p. 411.
[44] See, for example, Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Speech at the Civic Reception to John George Diefenbaker at Diwan-i-Khas, Red Fort', November 19, 1958, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* vol. 45, second series, pp. 724-730.
[45] Nehru, 'Civic reception at Vancouver', p. 414.
[46] For details, see: UKNA, DO 35/2250, 'India's relations with the Commonwealth: negotiations to permit India to remain in the Commonwealth after Independence'.
[47] Arnold. D. P. Heeney, to Ministry of External Affairs, November 8, 1949 at LAC, RG25-A-3-b, part 2, no. 9908-Y-2-40, pp. 1-2.

letter to his chief ministers that '[i]n these conferences, Australia and New Zealand function very much in the orbit of the UK. South Africa goes many steps further, while Canada adopts an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Our position does not fit in with any of these'.[48] Here, Nehru sums up his approach to this collection of states: Canada's position was more compatible with India's, as it was not so thoroughly linked with the UK. Although Nehru was slightly more impressed with the Canadian position, he still did not fully repeat the enthusiasm of his public comments. He was impressed, however, more broadly with Canada's ability to maintain its independence from the US, stating that 'Canada inevitably is, to some extent, within [the sphere of the US] although it is strong enough and wise enough to continue to play a more or less independent role.'[49] Publicly, however, Nehru was more complimentary, stating with regard to the leadership of the Commonwealth that 'Canada, has been playing a very leading part also a progressively more important part, depending not so much on bigness or physical strength but for other reasons'.[50]

The Politics of Canada-India Immigration Agreement

As was seen in Chapter Three, the White Australia policy was a serious impediment to India-Australia engagement. In the case of Canada, however, a quota system was designed, allowing a small number of Indians to move to Canada each year. While the early India-Canada relationship was established relatively straightforwardly, the high mark for it was, perhaps, the immigration agreement that wound back Canada's own restrictive immigration practices. Upon closer inspection, however, this matter played a rather more complicated role in India-Canada relations. In 1947, when discussing the position of Indians in the British Commonwealth outside of India, Nehru stated that '[T]hat is an old subject and a painful subject… Something has been done in Canada, or elsewhere, but nothing substantial has yet been done.'[51] Canada had begun to do something, in allowing people of Indian origin to become citizens of Canada. Malik's willingness to accept the India-Canada immigration agreement revealed pragmatism on his behalf. Malik knew that the agreement was a token,

[48] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Participation in Commonwealth Economic Conference', July 24, 1952, *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 19, second series, p. 618.
[49] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Letters to Chief Ministers: IV', December, 1 1953, in *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. 24, second series, pp. 617-618.
[50] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'The Future of the Commonwealth', in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* vol. 38, second series, p. 600.
[51] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Foreign Policy of India', December 4, 1947, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* vol. 4, second series, p. 601.

which is acknowledged in his memoirs.[52] Similarly, his replacement Kirpalani was an extremely experienced member of the Indian Civil Service and likewise was content with the token agreement. There was, however, a split in the Indian MEA between more pragmatic diplomats and those who were more vocal in their opposition to imperialism worldwide. Saksena, unlike his predecessors, forcefully argued against race discrimination in Canada. It is here that India began to disrupt the expectations of behaviour that had been constructed through the supposedly 'Anglophile' Nehru.

Canada's willingness to allow Indian immigrants to come to Canada has often been cited as having enabled the relationship between the two states to develop.[53] As a result of the agreement to help with the status of Indians living in Canada, the perception of Canada in India had risen sharply. As Kearney put it,

> compared to fellow Commonwealth countries, however, such as South Africa and Australia, Canada in Indian eyes is regarded almost as a paragon of virtue, especially since the granting to Indians federal and provincial franchise.[54]

There were two issues of racial discrimination and immigration that shaped the relationship: internal discrimination against Indians already residing in Canada, and policies denying Indians the ability to immigrate. These groups, residing mostly in British Columbia, were not able to become Canadian citizens, and faced legal discrimination (a person of British origin would have been granted Canadian citizenship).[55] All Indians in Canada had been asked to report to the government in 1939, solely so that the government could gauge their population.[56] They were not deported, but were also denied any official status. After independence, the Indian government raised this matter with Canada, and negotiations followed quickly.

[52] Malik, *A Little Work.*
[53] For a largely progressive narrative of Indian immigration to Canada, see Jim W. Walker, 'A Jewel in the Mosaic: Indian in Canadian Immigration Policy and National Identity', in Christopher. S. Raj and Abdul Nafey (eds), *Canada's Global Engagements and Relations with India* (Delhi: Manak Publications, 2007), pp. 317-331.
[54] John D. Kearney, 'Dispatch to Ministry of External Affairs', October 26, 1948 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol.127, part 1, no. 9193-D-40, p. 1.
[55] Leslie Chance, 'Memorandum for Mr Pearson', March 26, 1947 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part 1, no. 6-1-16, p. 1.
[56] Chance, 'Memorandum for Mr Pearson', p. 1.

In 1949, Kirpalani stated in a dispatch to Delhi that informal discussions on an immigration agreement had been proposed.[57] That negotiation happened at all needs to be emphasized strongly here. In the case of Australia, the matter was not openly discussed, and so no negotiations ever took place. Bearing in mind the reluctance of India to comment on the immigration policy of Australia, this becomes a clear point of difference in the two relationships. It is clear that India's policy on discussing matters of immigration was contextual as opposed to ironclad. In the case of Canada, it was worth making such a request as doing so had some hope of success. As the cautionary tale of General Cariappa shows, however, any hint of an attack on Australia's racist policies would not result in a bringing together of the two states, rather it would set them back and end any hope of the 'education' India hoped to provide Australia. The reason that discussions occurred was due to Canadian diplomats in Delhi hinting informally, prior to partition, to Indian foreign affairs officials that they would be prepared to take representations from the Government of India on the matter. It was suggested that they might consider drafting laws 'more acceptable to the susceptibilities of the Indian people'.[58] A few months prior, the interim Government of India asked in December 1946 that the Canadian Government pressure the government of British Columbia 'to confer the franchise on the small Indian community in that province and thus rectify the present anomalous position which is a source of humiliation to Indians'.[59]

The stakes of the immigration matter and the possible agreement were put forward to the Canadians very early on. Girija Bajpai, as was relayed to Kearney, believed it would be impossible for India to remain part of the Commonwealth as a dominion. It would be possible, however, to remain as a Republic, but it was politically difficult, and, as Kearney cabled back to Ottawa:

> There are certain obstacles which if not removed, might make even this latter arrangement impossible, the chief of which is the immigration policy of some of the other Commonwealth nations, more particularly Australia and Canada.[60]

Bajpai went on to argue that it would be far easier for Nehru to argue for membership in the Commonwealth 'if Canada and Australia made an immigration concession such as was made

[57] Kirpalani, 'Political Report on Canada', p. 11.
[58] Leslie Chance, 'Letter to Department of Mines and Resources', September 2, 1947 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part 1, no. L-1-198, pp. 1-2.
[59] Government of India, cited in Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, p. 19.
[60] John D. Kearney, 'Dispatch to Ministry for External Affairs' May 27, 1948 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part 1, dispatch no 168.

some time ago by the United States'.[61] The suggestion here was essentially that Australia's and Canada's restrictive immigration policies make the Commonwealth a discriminatory body, and not one postcolonial India could be part of. Bajpai was willing to risk India's relationship with the Commonwealth in order to extract concessions from Canada over its immigration policy, suggesting very strongly that restrictive immigration policies deeply offended India. This is also very strong evidence for the argument made in Chapter Three, that the White Australia policy profoundly influenced the India-Australia relationship. St. Laurent later gave his external affairs minister Lester Pearson full authority to do whatever was necessary to keep India in the Commonwealth, suggesting it was a major priority for Canada.[62] By developing a flexible and multi-racial Commonwealth, Canada had managed to make deeper engagements with India possible, though, it must be said, this was by no means simple to achieve.

Given this pressure put on Canada and Australia, Canada had been handed important reasons to consider accepting some small concession to its immigration policy. Kearney closed his dispatch relying Bajpai's thoughts with some direct honesty:

> Frankly, I am a little jealous of the way the Government of the United States has handled the Indian immigration problem. It has succeeded in preventing large numbers going to the United States by a method which seems completely satisfactory and praiseworthy to India, and it is something which I think we might usefully keep in front of us.[63]

With this dispatch, the goal of the Canadians becomes clearer: to enable relations with India to grow, keep India in the Commonwealth without having any 'threat' to the Canadian way of life being 'disrupted' by large numbers of Indians. Canada, despite its belief in its own post-racial liberal internationalism, still held an identity tethered to its perception of self as a white dominion.

Resisting the Agreement

Given how easily negotiations on the position of people of Indian origin in British Columbia and the immigration agreement had proceeded, the Canadians were not expecting any further trouble on this front. Despite India's willingness to accept a token, the matter was

[61] Kearney, 'Dispatch to Ministry for External Affairs'.
[62] John English and Ryan Touhey, 'Canadian-Indian Relations: A Historical Appreciation', in Raj and Nafey, *Canada's Global Engagements*, p. 255.
[63] John D. Kearney, 'to Ministry of External Affairs', October 26, 1948, p. 4.

not closed, and was not necessarily a happy one for India-Canada relations. The provision allowing for the wives and families to immigrate to Canada explicitly excluded any immigrants of an 'Asiatic race'. The Canadian immigration agreement allowed various benefits to family members and to people entering Canada in order to marry a legal resident of Canada. However, these immigrants had to be included as part of the quota, and could not enter outside of it. Saksena enquired 'informally' as to whether or not this proviso might be changed, to allow more Indians into Canada. He argued that the number of Indians in Canada had actually dropped from 5,000 to 1,200 since 1908, and that under his plan, it would still take several years for the number to rise back to such a level.[64] In this sense, the argument that Indians might disrupt Canadian life was somewhat absurd. Saksena continued:

> The grievance of Canadian East-Indians that in this regard they were being discriminated against on grounds of race, has not been removed wholly or even partly. My submission to the Minister was that he might now feel disposed to grant Canadian East-Indians the same rights as were enjoyed by other Canadian nationals. I had also pointed out that the grant of this privilege would not have any far-reaching effect as the numbers involved were, on the whole, small.[65]

Saksena argued further that Indians in British Colombia had assimilated, and 'acted Canadian', suggesting that:

> …the fear that new entrants from India will remain isolated and conspicuous as their compatriots of an elder generation is, therefore, in my view, entirely wrong and is based on an unreasoning prejudice which unfortunately still exists.[66]

Saksena concluded that '…from whatever point of view you may look at the position the maintenance of discrimination in regard to admission of relatives against this small minority is undesirable, injurious and without justification'.[67]

Fortier of the immigration department relayed his concerns to Dana Wilgress in the MEA, as he felt these matters might affect India-Canada relations. He complained that 'Mr Saksena does not seem to know that the Canada-India agreement on Immigration was suggested by his government.'[68] Fortier continued, wondering what right Saksena had to advocate for Canadian citizens of Indian descent.[69] Saksena may have overstepped his

[64] Ramji R. Saksena to Harris February 2, 1953, pp. 1-5.
[65] Ramji R. Saksena to Laval Fortier, July 6, 1953 at LAC, RG26-A-1-c, vol. 127, part. 2 no. 152-HC/53, p. 2.
[66] Saksena to Fortier, July 6, 1953, p. 2.
[67] Saksena to Fortier, July 6, 1953, p. 2.
[68] Laval Fortier to Dana Wilgress, July 15, 1953, p. 2.
[69] Fortier to Wilgress, July 15, 1953, p. 2.

bounds with the MEA, as thought by the Canadians. He had done so only a few months previously, when forcefully attacking the US decision to sell arms to Pakistan.[70] According to Escott Reid, Saksena was:

> one of those Indians who combines a love of the kind of life he can lead in North America with the most violent criticism of the United States. He could have had the post of head of the Colombo Plan directorate in New Delhi but he pleaded an ancient lung condition as a reason for not returning to 'the tropics'. He is a favorite of R. K. Nehru's and Mrs. Pandit's whom he flatters.[71]

Saksena is depicted here as irrational and problematic. Importantly, though, even when there was frustration with India, the use of obvious colonial stereotypes is not nearly as apparent in Canadian discourse on India when compared to that of Australia. There was a considerable split within the Indian MEA. While some Indian diplomats were determined to resist colonial legacies wherever they found them, others were more pragmatic. Pillai, as will be seen further below, spoke frequently and kindly to Escott Reid, and was responsible for Reid's belief that Saksena would sometimes overstep his boundaries with the MEA.

From the pragmatic Malik and Kirpalani, to the fierier Saksena, we can see the response of India's diplomats to the racialized nature of Canada's liberal identity. Occasionally, the Indians pragmatically pursued concessions over immigration, sometimes successfully, while accepting what compromises were possible. Saksena, however, perhaps overstepping his direction from the MEA though supported by R. K. Nehru, frustrated the Canadians as they found him more difficult to deal with. It was clear to all involved that a quota of 150 was a token, but it was a relatively effective one. The Canadians were well aware that 150 people per year would not change the makeup of Canada's population. They were similarly careful to make sure that these people would assimilate into Canadian life, and not form Indian ghettos. This is still a hierarchical and racial vision of Canadian identity. And yet, even this very slight flexibility in Canada's racialized identity made relations with India easier. This made cooperation possible in the same way that Australia's immigration policy prevented cooperation. Despite this, the tokenistic nature of the compromise and the ongoing discrimination against Indians which Saksena was unwilling to accept revealed the fragility of the relationship. Ultimately, this means that an Indian could become a Canadian, albeit with some difficulty, when a person of Indian origin could not become an Australian. This

[70] Escott Reid, 'Interview with Sir Raghavan Pillai', January 6, 1954 at LAC, MG31-E46, vol. 8, file. 20, No. Jan 6/54, p. 2.
[71] Reid 'Interview with Sir Raghavan Pillai', p. 2.

reveals the differences in Australia's and Canada's perception of self and the English-speaking world, and how this shaped their relationship with India.

A 'Special Relationship'?: Escott Reid and India

Escott Reid arrived at the apex of India-Canada relations. In 1952, Lester Pearson had thrown Canada's full weight behind an Indian compromise at the UN, which would prevent escalation of the Korean War.[72] This angered the US, but ultimately succeeded, representing a successful intervention on behalf of Canada and India at the UN. As discussed earlier, attacking Reid's assertion that India and Canada shared a special relationship has become quite common in scholarship on this period. Donaghy and Roussel argue that Reid has been seen as a 'liberal idealist in a hard-power world'.[73] For them, Reid has been to some extent typecast as grandiose and prone to fits of unreasoned idealism, which irritated some of his more pragmatic superiors. There is even some suggestion that Reid edited his papers before donating them to Canada's national archives. Still, if we are to look at the attempt of post-racial internationalism to engage India, then it is well worth examining closely Reid's efforts. Reid's unwavering belief in a post-racial liberal internationalism, particularly identified through the Commonwealth led him to see India favourably as a stable democratic power in an unstable region. He saw Nehru and Gandhi unreservedly as heroic in their efforts to liberate India, and considered India to be the most important place in the world, as it would prove crucial in determining the outcome of the Cold War and the maintenance of world peace.[74]

Under the guidance of St. Laurent, and particularly during the term of deeply idealistic diplomat Escott Reid, Canada tried to tie India closer to the west by translating India to the west, particularly to the US. In Reid's mind, India held a hybridity: a stable democracy that might share the values of the West, but needed to be interpreted clearly, particularly to the US. In doing so, Reid believed India to be the most important place in the world, in which its relationship with Canada was pivotal. Reid saw India as having western systems of government, firm democracy, and as a growing power that was geopolitically central to the Cold War. He saw both India and Canada as possible 'bridges' between 'East'

[72] On this matter see Thakur, 'India's Diplomatic Entrepreneurism'.
[73] Stéphane Roussel and Greg Donaghy, 'Introduction', in Donaghy and Roussel *Escott Reid*, pp. 3-10.
[74] Reid has a reputation for embellishing his own importance, and in this context, India adds to Reid's importance. Though in this context, his grandiose vision of India as the centre of the world ties into his own perceptions of India.

and 'West', meaning for him, that India-Canada relations were essential. Likewise, Lester Pearson argued in India under Reid's tenure that he hoped that the Commonwealth might 'act as a bridge between Asia and the West, at a time when there are all too few bridges of this kind'.[75] Canada's liberal international citizenship facilitated this kind of bridge building project, but still relied on a colonial hierarchy, because it meant convincing India to behave in the way desired by the West, controlling India's behaviour by other means.

Reid tried to make India a far higher priority for Canada and took it upon himself to bring India closer to the West: an immensely ambitious campaign that he hoped would be a triumph personally and for Canada.[76] In Donaghy's view, this was only a limited success, with resistance from Ottawa, particularly though the more 'realist', pragmatic thinkers, led by Lester Pearson.[77] Reid makes his central argument in *Envoy to Nehru* that it was possible for Canada to play a crucial 'bridging' role in interpreting India to the rest of the western world.[78] His minister, however, Lester Pearson, was more sceptical and generally speaking unwilling to emphasize India to the extent Reid would have liked. Furthermore, Donaghy argues that there was some considerable anti-Indian feeling in the MEA at the end of Reid's tenure, due to the consistent disagreement between the two states over the war in Indo-China.[79]

Reid struggled to convince the more sceptical Pearson of the value of his plans. Pearson was less enthusiastic towards Nehru than Reid and St. Laurent, who described Nehru in his memoirs as:

> one of the most subtle and difficult men to understand whom I had ever met, an extraordinary combination of a Hindu mystic, who had become almost a Hindu god, and an Eton-Oxbridge kind of Englishman.[80]

Pearson had elsewhere stated that he found that the Pakistanis to be 'more like ourselves' and therefore easier to deal with.[81]

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[75] Lester B. Pearson, 'Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs', November 4, 1955 at LAC, MG31-E46, vol. 8, file 22, no. 55, pp. 9-11.
[76] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*.
[77] Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel Donaghy, 'Escott Reid in India: 1952-57', in Donaghy and Roussel *Escott Reid*, pp. 67-84.
[78] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*.
[79] Donaghy, 'Escott Reid in India: 1952-57', pp. 67-84.
[80] Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
[81] Quoted in Touhey, 'Canada and India at 60'.

Reid and his wife's depictions of Indian villages differ greatly from those of Walter Crocker in his report on India's communist tendencies. He instead wrote upon leaving the villages that 'we fell in love with the Indian countryside we visited… My memories of it are full of colour, of fragrance and of music'.[82] An Indian journalist mocked the trip, claiming that Reid had to leave Delhi to see 'real India' because Nehru was so Anglicized.[83] Reid was wise enough to note that he did not 'understand real India as a result of one village tour in one part of India'.[84]

Differences of perception on the basis of postcolonial identity ultimately dashed Reid's hopes for India and Canada to 'bridge' East and West. Differences became well established over India's and Canada's shared roles of peacekeeping in Vietnam.[85] India's opposition to race discrimination also caused some significant issues with its relationship to Canada. The US decision to sell arms to Pakistan also drew considerable ire and infuriated India. This put Canada in a difficult position, risking Reid's efforts to tie India to the West. Here it is important to consider the divisions in the Indian MEA. Krishna Menon and Ratan K. Nehru (who, it will be remembered from Chapter Three, Crocker considered a fanatic) were far more strongly anti-US. Reid did, however, have a positive relationship with Pillai.[86] The Canadians had dealt easily with Malik and Kirpalani, but found Saksena difficult, as he was aligned with this grouping, as opposed to Nehru and Pillai. The strength of India's anti-imperialist identity here needs to be seen as revealing the difficulties in India-Canada relations. This made it more difficult for the Canadians to engage with India, as assumptions about India under Nehru as acting similarly to a western-liberal power had been constructed through interactions with previous diplomats as well as their vision of 'Anglophile' Nehru. Reid wrote of Sardar Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, '[he] is violently anti-colonial and views increasing U.S. influence in South East Asia a resurgence of western dominance of the region.'[87] Pillai, however, would confide in Reid, stating that he was concerned about the 'dangerous amount of anti-American feeling in the Ministry, a feeling which was directed not

[82] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, p. 42.
[83] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, p. 42.
[84] Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, p. 42.
[85] Ramesh Thakur, 'Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy: Canada, India and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-1972', *British Journal of International Studies*, 6, 2 (1980), pp. 125-153.
[86] Menon was called by Alex Clutterbuck, who met with Reid frequently in Delhi, 'Nehru's evil genius'. Sunil Khilnani, Nehru's '"Evil Genius"', (2007) at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?234157, accessed March 21, 2014.
[87] Escott Reid, 'India and Indo-China', May 8, 1954 at LAC, MG31-E46, File 8 vol. 20, no. 156, pp. 1-2.

only against United States foreign policy but also against individual Americans'.[88] Canada found India's anti-colonialism in Indochina particularly difficult, as these two states had to work together, but, as shown by Ramesh Thakur, fundamentally perceived the conflict in opposite ways.[89]

Reid had tried desperately to convince both a reluctant Lester Pearson and the Indians to follow his prescriptions for world peace. Despite this, disagreements over the USSR invasion of Hungary, the Suez Crisis and the Vietnam War nagged at the relationship. Essentially, different postcolonial worldviews over what looked to India like neocolonial misadventures undermined the relationship. By the time Reid left India, Canada and India's 'special relationship' was looking somewhat shaky. For Donaghy, Reid mishandled the crucial moment of his time in India: the time of the USSR invading Hungary and the Suez crisis. Reid's actions were 'unrestrained and emotional', damaging his reputation in Ottawa. He feared also that his constant dispatches had painted him as too emotional to be relied upon in a crisis.[90] Nehru did eventually condemn the USSR's actions in Hungary, but not before he compared this event with the actions of the UK in the Suez Crisis.[91] Reid was anxious to maintain the relationship between India and Canada, despite these differences.

Reid made a heartfelt farewell speech to India, returning once again to his bridge metaphor:

> perhaps the reason both our countries try to be bridges of understanding is that both our countries are big countries with many different regions, different language groups and different religious groups, and we have both had to learn that on important matters in which there is strong domestic controversy, no policy is a wise policy unless it is a compromise.[92]

As Reid pointed out in his farewell speech to India, the trouble with bridges is that they 'are meant to be walked on',[93] and India's relationship with both Canada and the Anglosphere was about to be thoroughly trampled by India's perplexing 'peaceful nuclear device'. Reid's unpublished musings on India, however, are not quite so idealistic. Several years after his

[88] Escott Reid, 'Discussion with Sir R. Pillai', May 13, 1954 at LAC, MG31-E46, File 8 vol. 20, no May/14/54, p. 3.
[89] Thakur, 'Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy', pp. 125-153.
[90] Escott M. Reid Lester B. Pearson, November 19, 1956 at LAC, MG31-E46, file 9, vol. 26, no. 1.
[91] Donaghy, 'Escott Reid in India', pp. 79-80. Manu Bhagavan shows compellingly that Nehru was appalled by Krishna Menon's conduct at the UN in stating that the Soviet invasion of Hungary was an 'internal matter'. See Bhagavan, *The Peacemakers*, pp. 123-124.
[92] Escott M. Reid, 'After Dinner Speech by Mr. Escott Reid' at LAC, MG26-L, file 185, no. I-17-2, pp. 1-4.
[93] Reid, 'After Dinner Speech'.

time in India, Reid contributed to a Canadian panel on third world development, and emphasized his time in India as guiding his thoughts and later forwarded his report directly to Nehru:

> The pitiless tropical sun which most of India suffers from for all or much of the year induces lassitude even in healthy people. The Hindus who constitute two thirds of the people have scruples against doing such economically sensible things as destroying the fifty million useless cattle of India and the fifty million destructive monkeys, and eating certain types of easily available food.[94]

Reid's liberal internationalism was focused on someone like Nehru, whom he saw as both the archetypal 'great man' of history, but exhibiting 'western' and 'eastern' influences. Still, in his depictions of the broader Indian population, a sense of irrationality and stereotypes of the third world emerge. This shows Reid's belief in colonial hierarchy, seeing Indian society as tiered, as he commented that Nehru and India's leaders were well aware of the need to fix these problems.[95] Reid's belief in a 'special relationship', then, was tied closely to a colonial mission, in which Canada could help drag India to modernity and keeping it tied with Anglosphere-style engagements.

The fall of a 'Special Relationship'

Following Reid's departure, the India-Canada relationship continued to weaken, albeit gradually. In particular, differences over peacekeeping in Vietnam, Canadian insecurities over Indian nuclear proliferation and differences over the NPT proved deeply detrimental to the relationship. Still, some attempts were made to address the relationship's decline. Each of these issues reveals different perceptions of hierarchy as limiting the relationship. Though the period in which Canada's initial attempt to engage India though its liberal internationalism was largely over, we see its afterlives over this period, alongside the inexorable decline of India-Canada relations. Over this period, the relationship became far less active, and India and Canada found themselves on opposite sides of many key issues. As will be seen also, the apparent high-water mark for India-Canada relations, Canada's supply of nuclear reactors to India, was a source of conflict as well as cooperation, with Canada generally anxious to ensure India did not use their material to produce weaponized uranium.

[94] Escott M. Reid, 'Economic Aid to India', May 13, 1960 at NAI, 'Note from Mr. Escott Reid, formerly high commissioner for Canada in India to the P.M. on the Subject of Economic aid to India', Nos. 48(6)-AMS, 1961.
[95] Reid, 'Economic Aid to India'.

By the time of Escott Reid's departure, for Donaghy at least, the India-Canada 'special relationship', to the extent that it ever existed, was already broken. St. Laurent and Reid had attempted to engage India in this relationship on the basis of Canada's liberal internationalism. Throughout much of the period in question, India and Canada were involved together in UN peacekeeping operations in Vietnam, alongside Poland. This commitment to peacekeeping formed a part of the basis of the apparent 'special relationship' between the two states – as it fulfilled both Canada's liberal internationalism and India's vision of 'one world'. Thakur has provided a useful analysis of the role of peacekeeping, finding that initially shared roles in peacekeeping assisted India and Canada's relationship. As Thakur argues, by 1972 these differences of opinion over the conflict contributed significantly to the ending of their 'special relationship'.[96] India and Canada always perceived their peacekeeping mission differently, as Nehru considered Ho Chi Minh to be fighting 'European colonialism', whilst Lester Pearson believed the French to be fighting the 'communist menace'.[97]

Another shift in the relationship came when the Canada's Liberal Party lost power to the Conservative John Diefenbaker in 1957. The fall of St. Laurent was disappointing to Nehru personally, and he wrote to his chief ministers: 'I am sorry, for personal reasons apart from public, for the defeat of Mr St Laurent, who is a fine, upright and conscientious man, who took to politics late in life and is therefore unlike the average politician.'[98] Nehru continued that that 'St. Laurent had played a wise and soothing part not only in the Commonwealth but also in world affairs'[99] and that 'the new Government in Canada is likely to be a conservative one and possibly the role of Canada in future may be less liberal than it has been.'[100]

Diefenbaker visited India in 1958, as part of a much larger world tour. Diefenbaker's account of this visit is entirely unremarkable. Indeed, it is largely mundane, as is Nehru's.[101] Nehru's welcoming speech to Diefenbaker focused on the 'friendship between India and

[96] Ramesh Thakur, 'Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy: Canada, India and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-1972', *British Journal of International Studies,* 6, 2 (1980), pp. 125-153.
[97] Thakur, 'Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy', p. 139.
[98] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Letters to Chief Ministers: I', date not given, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru,* vol. 38, second series, p. 787.
[99] Nehru, 'Letters to Chief Ministers: I'.
[100] Nehru, 'Letters to Chief Ministers: I'.
[101] Nehru, 'Settling the Kashmir Issue', p. 341. See also, John G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honorable John. G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p. 106.

Canada'.[102] Nehru, did state, however, that India's relationship with Canada had grown since St. Laurent's previous visit. Most of the examples offered by Nehru in this speech focused on past achievements: most notably, Canada's assistance with India remaining in the Commonwealth.[103] Diefenbaker continued, to some extent, to exhibit particular forms of liberal internationalism that impressed Indian observers. For example, Nehru was impressed by Diefenbaker's sharp rebuke of apartheid in South Africa, which he made from India.[104] As Diefenbaker was so repulsed by South Africa's racial policies, he was the only Anglosphere member of the Commonwealth to side against South Africa's membership in the Commonwealth at a conference in India in March 1961.[105]

Diefenbaker, taking a different approach to Lester Pearson's emphasis on Nehru's 'Hindu mysticism', suggested in his memoirs that he would:

> always think of Pandit Nehru as a transplanted Englishman, who, while living in something of a metaphysical world, nevertheless was one of the great realists, capable of achieving his objectives with courage and determination, a Harrovian to the end.[106]

Diefenbaker's comments are particularly interesting, emphasizing Nehru's Englishness, in spite of his apparent mysticism. Both Diefenbaker and Pearson ultimately saw Nehru as part English, part Indian, though Diefenbaker saw more of an old Harrovian, while Pearson saw more of a mystic. Despite much history to the contrary, Canadian elites continued to see Nehru as essentially English and therefore understandable. Here, the assumption that an Englishman might assist Canada in India is replaced by Diefenbaker's terming of Nehru as a 'realist'. The term realist suggests that Nehru will single-minded in pursuing his chosen goal. Here, Englishness does not imply a liberalism that a Canadian could understand, but rationality. Diefenbaker had not idealized his vision of India in the manner of Reid, but instead emphasized Nehru as on different side of Britishness and anti-racist liberalism.

The Stresses of Nuclear engagement

As will be examined in more detail in Chapter Six, India's position in global nuclear hierarchies has long defined its relationship with the Anglosphere. The Anglosphere states

[102] Nehru, 'Civic Reception at Diwan-i-Khas', pp. 724-730.
[103] Nehru, 'Civic Reception at Diwan-i-Khas', pp. 724-730.
[104] Nehru, 'Settling the Kashmir Issue', p. 106.
[105] Nehru, 'Speech at the Civic Reception', pp. 724-730.
[106] Diefenbaker, *One Canada*, p. 106.

have long been at the forefront of deciding who can be 'trusted' with nuclear materials. These decisions have generally been tied to perceptions of which states are 'civilized' or 'uncivilized', reliant on an implicit racial hierarchy.[107] Canada's liberal internationalism led it to see India as a risk, but one it was willing to take. Canada, however, was always reluctant to do this, and had serious doubts about India's intentions. After India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, nuclear materials went on to be a major hindrance to India-Anglosphere relations that has only begun to change in the mid-2000s. Frequently cited as the bedrock of the India-Canada relationship was Canada's willingness to provide India with nuclear technologies under the Colombo scheme.[108] Touhey has written a strong historical account of the breakdown of this relationship from 1947-1976.[109] In his estimation, the engagement was 'troubled from the beginning', with signs that it would fall apart well before 1974. Touhey suggests that this was due in part to Canada's unrealistic expectations about how India would act in the international system due to its colonial legacy.[110] The primary stumbling block to this cooperation was over safeguards regarding the use of nuclear technologies aimed at ensuring they were not used for military purposes.

In 1959, Dr Homi Bhabha was reported to have told a parliamentary committee that 'India could manufacture an atomic bomb… if we mean to', which deepened Canada's concerns.[111] Similar rumours circulated once again in 1960.[112] Canada found itself in a relatively weak position: blocking sales and ending cooperation would likely just force India elsewhere and end what was left of the relationship:

> The most disturbing feature of these recent developments is the apparent general acceptance that if agreement is reached the safeguards will apply only to the first CANDU reactor. By receiving the drawings and designs, India could build other reactors without safeguards and, possibly, without Canadian material.[113]

[107] See Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*.
[108] For a very thorough analysis of Canadian economic aid to India, see Campbell-Miller, 'The Mind of Modernity'.
[109] Ryan Touhey, 'Troubled from the Beginning: Canada's Nuclear Relations with India during the 1960s' in Karthika Sasikumar and Wade. L. Huntley (eds), *Canadian Policy on Nuclear Co-operation with India: Confronting New Dilemmas* (Vancouver: Lulu.com, 2007), pp. 11-33.
[110] Ryan Touhey, Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946-76 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015).
[111] Anon, 'Telegram to External Affairs', November 26, 1960 at LAC, MG 25, vol. 5629, part 3
[112] Anon, 'Telegram to External Affairs'.
[113] Albert. E. Ritchie, 'Recent Developments Regarding Indian CANDU Reactor', May 23, 1963 at LAC, RG25, vol. 5692, part 6, no. 00/4000-1-15, pp. 1-2.

Given this concern, it made sense to continue with the engagement so as to maintain some kind of check over India's nuclear program, watered-down or otherwise. Ultimately, it was the Canadians who agreed to build an atomic power station in Rajasthan in 1963 and to continue with the provision of such technologies despite their concerns.[114]

In 1968, India declared that it would not sign the NPT, deepening Canada's fears over the risk that India might develop their technologies for less peaceful means. Finally, the detonation of India's peaceful device in 1974, for some at least, meant the failure of Canada's effort to help India's peaceful nuclear program.[115] The international reaction to India's nuclear test was immediately one of condemnation. Canada had perhaps the strongest response, as they ended their cooperation with India over nuclear science. This put a freeze on India-Canada relations that is only now being overcome.[116] US and Canadian materials may have been used in the process of creating the nuclear device tested in 1974. Canada wanted India to conform to norms of liberal behaviour, which were influenced by Canada's liberal internationalist identity in this period. Using Canadian nuclear fuel in a nuclear test, even an apparently peaceful one, certainly did not fit Canada's expectation of Indian behaviour. Canada's relationship with India hinged in this period to some extent on its willingness to engage with India's desires for nuclear power. Canada's expectations of India in the 1950s led to its nuclear engagement, but these idealized liberal internationalist expectations of India had, if anything, only led to a weaker post-1974 relationship due to the sense of betrayal felt by Canada.

The international reaction was largely angry: condemning India's decision to test a nuclear weapon. India, however, approached the event in a manner perplexing to outside observers, and was not treated with a nuanced understanding of India's position on nuclear weapons. At the time, Bruce Grant, Australian high commissioner to India, found the event difficult to comprehend. In describing the sense amongst his colleagues in Delhi (including those from US, the UK and Canada) he lamented privately to Canberra that:

[114] See: NAI, 'Agreement between the Govts., India and Canada relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station' at LAC, file no. 106(73)-L, 1963.
[115] See Greg Donaghy, 'Nehru's Reactor: The Origins of Indo-Canadian Nuclear Cooperation, 1955-1959', Raj and Nafey, *Canada's Global*, pp. 267-278.
[116] This point is generally agreed in the literature. See particularly, Touhey, 'India and Canada at 60' and Delvoie, 'Canada and India: A New Beginning', p. 61.

> Not untypically for India, what she has done does not fit in to generally accepted categories. There is a feeling of annoyance with India for being so tiresome. 'Why doesn't she simply say she's built a bomb?!' [117]

Grant perceived India as behaving 'irrationally', and outside the norm, with regard to its 'peaceful' nuclear explosion.[118] He reveals here frustration with India for the way it had acted. Again in 1974, orientalist stereotypes appeared in Australian descriptions of India. India does not fit 'accepted categories', which suggests that India again behaves abnormally. By conducting a nuclear explosion and labelling it as 'peaceful', India shattered the belief that it might act according to the liberal norms of behaviour expected between the Anglosphere states.

Conclusions: The Limits of Liberal Internationalism

By 1974, the weakness of the ideational basis for the India-Canada 'special relationship' had been proved, and the causes of this terminology being applied - nuclear cooperation, peacekeeping duties, the immigration agreement and a shared history and identity through the Commonwealth - had all at best caused controversy, and at worst, been totally undermined. Canada's initial assumptions about India were formed on the basis of its liberal internationalist identity and experience with Nehru, who was assumed to be 'English', 'Harrovian' and Anglophile, and the Indian diplomats like Kirpalani and Malik. And yet, Indian behaviour repeatedly failed to live up to Canada's expectations of an apparently 'liberal' world power. Ultimately, liberal internationalism, post-racial or otherwise, was conceived through its colonial history and still holds forms of colonial power within its genealogy. Canada and India's worldviews, though there was some overlap that played out in the initial construction of a close relationship, could not tie India and Canada together. By the end of Nehru's tenure, the only way that the India-Canada looked 'special' was to compare it to Australia's stagnant, fractured relationship with India. This relationship was based on the hollow token of 150 Indians being allowed into Canada per year, nuclear engagements which Canada was always anxious about, and assumptions about Indian foreign policy behaviour which were ultimately inaccurate. Ultimately, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the internationalism of the settler-colonial power was unable to underpin its relationship to the

[117] Bruce Grant, 'Indian Nuclear Test' (1974) at NAA: A1838: 919/13/9 Part 4, 'United Nations - Nuclear Weapons - Testing - India'.
[118] Grant, 'Indian Nuclear Test'.

colonized. Both states had fundamentally different perceptions of international order and hierarchy throughout the period, which undermined their relationship.

Canada's liberal internationalism – despites its idealist overtones – was a product of its colonial construction. It reproduced the India problem in a new form. The idea that Canada and India had a fantastic relationship over this period largely originates with Canadian diplomats, with the exception of Nehru's very kind words for Pearson and St. Laurent. Post-racial liberal narratives of the Anglosphere, as opposed to conservative, racialized Anglosphere narratives in Australia, were able to engage India to only a limited extent. At the very least, it did not prove to be a negative in the relationship in the early period. In this context, a pluralist, multi-racial approach was far more likely to engage postcolonial India, but still ultimately failed to produce and maintain a US-UK-like 'special relationship'. Even in this form, Canada's understanding of India was based on its form of the India problem.

The differences of perception between India and Canada reveal that India under Nehru fell within ideas of liberal internationalism very differently to those of Canada. Whereas Canada tended to oppose Communism in the way of the other western-Anglosphere states, India's postcolonial internationalism and non-alignment led it in a different direction. India's ideational relationship with Australia reveals to us that it was most certainly outside the Churchillian, racialized narrative of the English-speaking world. Indeed, Indian foreign policy was set thoroughly in opposition to such language and Australia's racist identity prevented engagement. The story is rather more complicated with regards to Canada. India was higher in Canada's vision of international hierarchy than Australia's, but Canada's perception of the world was nonetheless hierarchical and racialized. Indian and Canadian identities had some overlap, and led to some shared expectations of behaviour, yet due to the differences in their histories, these expectations were frequently not met. Canada's liberal internationalism did not match India's postcolonial internationalism. Key to shedding light on the identity issues is the debate over Indian immigration to Australia and Canada. It is telling that an Indian could hope to become Canadian, but could not become Australian during this period. The tokenistic fashion in which this quota was applied led to further discord between the two states, revealing some of the differences in their ideational perceptions.

Chapter Five: Hindu Nationalism and the 'War on Terror'

Introduction: India and an Anglosphere against its Others

After India's 1974 nuclear test, engagement between India and the Anglosphere states stalled. With the end of the Cold War and India's economic liberalisation, however, a new discourse on the English-speaking world and India became possible. The idea of the Anglosphere arose in global discourse around this time and came to particular prominence around the time the western-Anglosphere states sought to create a new relationship with India over both the 'war on terror' and through trade in nuclear materials and technologies. The approaches to India in this period represent a new approach to solving the India problem: to see India as knowable, teachable and 'just like us'. As I showed in Chapter Two, this discourse on the Anglosphere responded directly to the post-Cold War global order, particularly the idea of the 'Asian century' in world politics as well as political Islam.

Having considered the ways in which India resisted both the racialized and the pluralist narratives of the Anglosphere after its independence, I move in the next two chapters to consider how India has responded to the renewed discourse of the Anglosphere and the idea that India is 'just like us' in the mid-2000s. The western-Anglosphere states developed a new understanding of India, most notably as 'the world's largest democracy' with which they have 'shared values'. India, has, to an extent, constructed a shared identity with the Anglosphere states in this period. This, however, is limited by India's postcolonial identity, which shapes India's different understanding of international hierarchy. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, the idea of the Anglosphere arose at a time when India's relationships with the western-Anglosphere states all began to deepen. In this chapter, I examine the successes and failures of US-UK narration of the war on terror, and the ways in which India under the Hindu Nationalist BJP responded to it and how this shaped India's relationships with the US and the UK. I argue that the different understandings of the 'war on terror' arose from different understanding of the 'Anglosphere' in the post 9/11 world. This is largely in part to the colonial genealogy of Hindutva, which leads it to distrust the two imperial humiliations of India (Islamic and British) but it places India on the side of the US and the UK in the context of aggressive political Islam.

As an Anglosphere narrative, the war on terror was not about defending the rule of law and democracy, but about a defence of ideas of cultural and civilizational superiority.

The neoconservative leadership in the US and the UK crafted a new vision of the Anglosphere as united against political Islam. This hierarchical narrative had affinities with the BJP, but was interpreted differently. Whereas the Anglosphere powers saw themselves as responding to the threat of terrorism everywhere, they emphasized invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. For many in India, however, including much of the BJP leadership, Pakistan was the seen as the prime target for such intervention. Although this led to the construction of a shared identity between India and the Anglosphere, it reproduced the India problem, as India saw the idea of a 'war on terror' as encompassing very different actions and goals than the US and the UK.

Hindu Nationalism and the War on Terror

The idea of a 'war on terror' grew out of the US response to the attack by al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001. While both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be thought of as wars in their own right, they were both narrated as being part of a more transcendent struggle between 'free peoples' and 'terrorists'. I consider here, as Adam Hodges and Jack Holland have before, the 'war on terror' not as a specific conflict, but as a narrative communicated by the English-speaking world as a means of gathering support from potentially friendly nations to support its struggle with radical Islam.[1] The primary supporters of this concept were the US and UK, led by George W. Bush and Tony Blair respectively. It was also a particularly 'Anglosphere' narrative which divided the world into those 'with us' or 'against us', 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' and did so on the basis of democracy, freedom and values. I argue here that the war on terror narrative was an Anglosphere narrative, which divided people into 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' categories, even as it claimed to be based on liberal values as opposed to race. As Holland has argued, however, the US, the UK and Australia were the key proponents of this narrative to international politics, and were further instrumental to the narrative being 'translated' to the 2003 invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq.[2] Canada supported the idea of a 'war on terror' initially, but refused to join the 'coalition of the willing'. Vucetic has seen this as showing to us the limits of the Anglosphere in shaping the foreign policy of these states.[3] In this sense, the US and the UK promoted a particular neoliberal and hierarchal world order within the context of their own identities. The

[1] Adam Hodges, *The "War on Terror" Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Jack Holland, *Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11* (Florence: Routledge, 2012).
[2] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, pp. 135-169.
[3] Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, pp. 101-127. See also, Srdjan Vucetic, 'Why Did Canada Sit out the Iraq War: one Constructivist Analysis', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 13, 1 (2006), pp. 133-153.

discourse on the Anglosphere that arose at this time was the renewed articulation of the notion of the 'West' particularly in terms of its superior 'liberal values'. This conflation of culture, values and identity replays the older notions of Anglosphere, but emphasizing cultural superiority as opposed to racial superiority.

Here, I consider India's response to the Anglosphere's narrative of the 'war on terrorism' and its meanings, the actions (particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan) it both justified and caused, and the ways in which the Indian understanding of the term differed from that of the US and the UK. As will be seen, this narrative was able to animate certain kinds of cooperation between India and the US/UK, but failed to create the cooperation hoped for by the Anglosphere, particularly with regard to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I also consider the relationship between India's Hindutva identity and the Anglosphere. Hindutva, several authors have argued, is a racialized and gendered identity as it seeks to end the 'emasculation of state power' by its Gandhian and Nehruvian influences, as well as the subjugation of Hindus by Islamic and British invaders.[4] In this sense, Hindutva also accepts civilizational and racial hierarchies in world order, but perceives them differently from the western-Anglosphere powers.

Crucial to this story is the rise of Hindu Nationalist BJP which came to power in India in 1998, ending INC's domination of Indian politics. The BJP's position of power was reconfirmed in 1999, along with 12 coalition partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and remained in power until 2004, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when it was surprisingly defeated by the INC led United Progressives Alliance (UPA). In this chapter, I first consider the colonial genealogy of Hindutva, in the historical context with older writings of Indian nationalists who presented a Hindu-centred vision of India, as opposed to the secular, pluralist vision of Nehru. Following this, I consider the ways in which the war on terror was an Anglosphere narrative, primarily constructed by the US and the UK. Finally, I consider what these ideational politics reveals to us of India's relationship with the idea of the Anglosphere. I argue throughout that, although Hindutva places India on top of its own civilizational hierarchy, it still aligns India with the Anglosphere in particular contexts due to Hindutva's colonial origins. Hindutva, the pluralist Anglosphere narrative and the war on

[4] Several other authors have pointed to this discourse. See, for example: Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*; Varadarajan, 'Neoliberal (In)Security' and Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid"'.

terror narrative resonate with one another, and have led to an ambivalent recasting of India's relationships with the US and the UK.

The language used by Manmohan Singh, discussed in Chapter Two, explicitly links India to the 'English-speaking World'. This was used just following the fall of the Vajpayee government. This language is notably absent in BJP discourse. Importantly, though, Vajpayee did emphasize in 2000 'democracy, rule of law, pluralism and accommodation of the other points of view' as Indian traits shared with the US.[5] While Singh's narrative linked India positively to the US and the UK due to India's colonization, the Hindutva narrative asserts Indian cultural superiority over that of the British colonizer, and therefore places India outside of the Anglosphere. Despite this, in the context of an Islamist other, Hindutva aligns India with the Anglosphere powers. Here, I argue that the BJP aligned India with the US/UK and the war on terror and that there are some important shared spaces between contemporary Anglosphere identity and Hindutva narratives, which were animated through the war on terror narrative. Islamophobia unites the war on terror narrative, Hindu nationalism and the Anglosphere. Bennett's depiction of the Anglosphere is rooted partially in a belief in the 'protestant work ethic' and Christian values.[6] Hindu nationalism is animated by its own Islamophobia, in which Muslim Indians are perceived as 'less Indian' than their Hindu neighbours.[7] This civilizational narrative allowed Hindutva to claim affinities with the Anglosphere while maintaining a sense of difference. In order to understand the contemporary relationship, however, we first need to consider the colonial origins of Hindutva.

The Colonial Origins of Hindu Nationalism

Here, I consider the historical and colonial construction of the Hindutva narrative of Indian identity. I argue here that, although Hindu nationalism in its original formulation might be seen as hostile to the Anglosphere, this has shifted due to its emphasis on racialized civilizational hierarchies, ambivalences within the original discourse and electoral imperatives and domestic constraints. This has led the BJP to argue that Hindu civilization

[5] Atal B. Vajpayee, 'Beginning of a Vibrant Indo-US Relationship', in Government of India, 'Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Selected Speeches: Vol.-II' (New Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 2000), p. 280.
[6] Bennett, *The Anglosphere*. 71-72. On Islamophobia and the war on terror, see Arun Kundnani, *The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror* (New York: Verso Books, 2014), Deepa Kumar, *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012).
[7] Kundnani, *The Muslims Are Coming!* and Kumar, *Islamophobia*.

shares 'common values' with the West and to claim an affinity with the kinds of neoconservative policy discourse of the US administration.

For Romila Thapar, the idea of India as a specifically Hindu civilization originates from British colonial constructions of the period.[8] Colonial historians looked for Indian histories, but found nothing that suited their assumptions as to what history should be. The original orientalist scholars sought to categorize and define the Indian people, finding Muslims to be invaders and India as a Hindu and Sanskritic civilization, partly because Hinduism was so different from the monotheistic nature of European religions and with no single sacred text.[9] On this basis, the orientalist scholars rejected the various chronicles by Persian, Turkish, Afghan and Mughal writers of India's history as ahistorical. Indian society was often similarly seen as static and ahistorical itself.[10] European Romanticists found the orientalist vision of India appealing, which spread the conception of Indian values as 'spiritual', and European values as 'material'. German Romantic authors saw fantasies of the Orient as a way of escaping the rise of rationalism and industrialization.[11] India was then assumed by the Romantics to be the pristine, untouched past of Europe, appropriating the oriental Other to the European Self.[12] These original orientalist scholars also sought to categorize and define the Indian people.[13] Census-taking hardened religious identities and was used to further advance British divide and rule strategies.[14] The British began to see India as a Hindu civilization, which had been invaded by Islam. Islam was therefore seen as unIndian and unHindu. For Ashis Nandy, the orientalist scholars had helped form Hindu nationalism, leading him to argue that Hindutva is '…Western imperialism's last frenzied kick at Hinduism'.[15]

[8] Romila Thapar, *Early India: from the origins to AD 1300* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 1-6.
[9] Thapar, *Early India*, p. 3.
[10] Thapar, *Early India*, p. 2.
[11] Susan Bayly, 'Imagining "Greater India": French and Indian Visions of Colonialism in the Indic Mode', *Modern Asian Studies*, 38, 3 (2004), pp. 703-744.
[12] On this matter, see Ronald B. Inden, *Imagining India* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 66-68.
[13] For an influential example of categorization, see Herbert. H. Risley, *The People of India* (London: W. Thacker & co., 1915).
[14] For a useful discussion of communal violence in pre-colonial India, see Ian Copland *et. al*, *A History of the State and Religion in India* (London, 2012).
[15] Ashis Nandy, 'Hinduism Versus Hindutva: The Inevitability of a Confrontation', (1991) at https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/Socissues/hindutva.html accessed June 2, 2014.

The specifics of British colonial definitions of India's people had a profound effect in shaping India's postcolonial identity. The idea of India as a specifically Hindu civilization became an important stream of nationalist thought – in which Britain was thought of as the obvious ally of India against the Islamic invaders. Hindu nationalism railed against two, as opposed to just one, colonial oppressors: the British and Islam.[16] Susan Bayly has convincingly shown that Hindu nationalist thinkers on 'Greater India' were inspired by orientalist thinkers from France and Germany who appropriated India's history to the European Self, believing India to embody the unspoiled past of Europe.[17] As a result, Hindutva has a peculiar relationship with British colonialism and the English-speaking world, both historically and in contemporary narratives. While the Hindutva narrative emphasizes the superiority of Hindu culture, thus refusing to identify India with an English-speaking world, it simultaneously is able to align India with the English-speaking world, and particularly did so in context to an Islamic Other. The overlap between India and the Anglosphere, as seen in Manmohan Singh's commentary in 2005 and during the India-Anglosphere nuclear deals is, however, largely absent. And yet, due to its colonial origins and desire to enhance India's state power, and become a more 'masculine', 'realist' state, Hindutva has sought to mimic the US and the UK's supposed rationality and realism.

Hindu nationalism also grew as a response to British colonial narrations of India and its peoples.[18] In India, certain cultural groups were classified as 'teachable' or 'unteachable', 'civilized' or 'uncivilized'. These categorizations shifted with events, most notably in India after the Indian Rebellion. The British made such distinctions through gendered discourse of 'martial' races, with tropes of the 'effeminate', scholarly Bengali and the 'warlike', masculine Sikh.[19] The Hindutva response to colonial narratives of British hyper-masculinity, and its counterpoint of Indian effeminacy, was largely to assert military might and rationality. These tropes can be seen in the BJP's foreign policy discourse. Chacko has pointed in particular to the gendered discourse in depicting India's nuclear test, with Jaswant Singh claiming that Nehru's moralistic vision of world affairs has 'emasculated' India's military power.[20] Within this discourse, India needs to act like the rational, masculine Western powers in order to protect itself. As Ogden argues with regard to the BJP's 1998 nuclear test, 'realist-

[16] Sinderpal Singh, *India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 87.
[17] Bayly, 'Imagining 'Greater India', pp. 703-744.
[18] See, for example, Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1994).
[19] Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity* and Streets, *Martial Races*.
[20] Chacko, 'Search for a Scientific Temper'.

driven rationales' were an element, but were combined with a desire to show India as resurgent and rising on the world stage.[21] Chacko finds, however, that the BJP still cannot escape the Nehruvian project to create an ethical foreign policy, as a founding narrative of Indian foreign policy. She argues that, rather than ending Nehruvian postcolonial ambivalence, BJP foreign policy in this period rested 'not a wariness of Western modernity, but on a desire to appropriate Western modernity and at the same time retain a distinctive identity which is shaped in opposition to Islam and Muslims'.[22] The BJP have incorporated some elements of the Nehruvian discourse on Indian identity, as it is the founding discourse of Indian foreign policy, while reshaping particular elements of it. Similarly, Sinderpal Singh argued that the BJP's vision of Pakistan and Bangladesh led them to regard the actions of these states as the 'perennial Muslim menace that strove constantly to subjugate and humiliate Hindu India'.[23]

As with the colonial project, categorization is central to the various attempts to define the Anglosphere. The effort to define which states and which peoples fit within this supposedly superior space, reveal the colonial nature of this discourse. Bennett's vision, for example, of business-minded, English-speaking Indians fitting within the Anglosphere, but poor, non-English-speaking Indians on the outside defines a particular part of Indian society as being civilized. Anglospherist discourse has begun to identify India not as unknowable or unteachable, but as being understandable and manageable and has appropriated it on this basis. Similarly, the external narration of India by the Anglosphere powers, though, has shifted from untrustworthy and unteachable to a civilization that can be expected to act in a desired, sensible manner. This will be revisited in Chapter Six, as the US attempts to identify who can and cannot be trusted with nuclear materials often related to 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' nations.

The Hindu nationalist approach to the English language in India reveals this stream of thought's resistance to Anglo-Saxon claims to superiority and its sense of colonial humiliation. Hindu nationalists have often been at the forefront of efforts to remove the English as an official language in India, and to use Hindi as both a national and an official language. It is difficult to imagine, then, a Hindu nationalist leader citing the importance of

[21] Christopher Ogden, *Hindu Nationalism and the Evolution of Contemporary Indian Security: Portents of Power* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 128.
[22] Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy*, p. 66.
[23] Singh, *India in South Asia*, p. 113.

the English language as tying together India and the English-speaking world, in the manner of Manmohan Singh. Adeney and Lall find the BJP's domestic policies to be out of step with their international priorities, suggesting that the emphasis on India as single Hindu 'nation' had been undermined by the BJP's 2003 acceptance of extra languages, such as Dogri, in the Indian constitution.[24] Certainly, though, the ideological and ideational impulses of Hindu nationalist politicians are tempered to suit electoral politics and the maintenance of good international relationships. Although Hindu nationalism rejected the Anglo-Saxon superiority over India, it did not reject the idea of civilizational hierarchies or civilizational identities. It is because of this that Hindu nationalism can align India with the Anglosphere in particular contexts.

Returning to the origins of Hindutva similarly reveals the influence of British colonial perceptions of India and Indian history on Hindutva. Savarkar, in *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu*, argued that the Muslims, as opposed to the British, were the threat to India, a conclusion he reached during his 27 years imprisoned by the British.[25] Hindutva was published anonymously whilst he was still imprisoned. Savarkar wrote of the expansion of Islam:

> nations and civilizations fell in heaps before the sword of Islam of Peace!!... It was not a race, a nation of people India had to struggle with. It was nearly all Asia, quickly to be followed by nearly all Europe.[26]

Within his narrative of Indian history, Savarkar positions India as allied with Europe against Islamic invaders. Similarly, thinkers such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, and Aurobindo came to think of Britain as the ally of Hindu India against Muslims. Chatterjee's novel *Anandamath* called for a rise in Hindu nationalism to uproot Islamic rule in Bengal, and proposed the East India Company as a replacement, until Hindus were ready for Swaraj.[27] For these Bengali renaissance thinkers, it was the Muslim invasions, rather than the conquest of India by the British, which had led to the fall of a flowering Hindu civilization.[28] In this sense, Hindutva should be seen as a recycled imperial vision of India, as opposed to its endpoint. While supporting the US-UK led 'war on terror', Hindu nationalism has its own ambivalences with India's colonial history and with it, the Anglosphere. As I

[24] Adeney and Lall, '"National" Identity in India', p. 272.
[25] Christophé Jaffrelot (ed.), *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader* (Princeton, 2007), p. 85.
[26] Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalism*, p. 92.
[27] Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, *Anandamath, or the Sacred Brotherhood* (2005 [1882]: Oxford University Press, New York).
[28] See David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization 1773-1835* (Berkeley, 1969).

show below, in some ways, Savarkar's narrative of a Hindu nationalist India allied with Europe against Islam repeated itself under Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh. Following its 1998 nuclear tests, India was able to negotiate the worst of the international ramifications. By 2002, the Bush administration had begun to identify India as a teachable and understandable partner. The BJP government began to identify the US and the UK as a 'natural' partner even prior to the September 11 attacks. As a result of these racialized fears of Islam, something foundational to the Hindutva narrative of Indian identity, India under the Hindu nationalist BJP became more closely aligned with the Anglosphere.

Hindu Nationalism and Indian Foreign Policy

The extent to which Hindutva has an influence on foreign policy has been a matter of scholarly debate. For some, the BJP's identity discourse does not strongly shape foreign policy, with its identity impulses being kept in check by material concerns. Many scholars have attempted to consider Nehruvian and Hindutva identities as different discourses, or strands of thought in Indian foreign policy. Cohen identifies 'Hindu revitalism' as an influence of Indian foreign policy and domestic politics that is checked by domestic political necessities.[29] Rahul Sagar considers Hindu nationalism to be one element of India's foreign policy thought, though one that has not been particularly strong.[30] For Smith, writing in 2012, the Hindu nationalist discourse has been dominated by the liberal discourse in recent times, which she believes will continue for the short-to-medium term.[31] For Sinderpal Singh, however, the BJP's renegotiation of India's anti-imperialist identity led to shifts in policy regarding Pakistan and Bangladesh.[32]

In terms of foreign policy, there is an important critique of Nehruvian nationalism at the core of Hindu nationalism. This comes from the idea that Jain, Buddhist, and later Gandhian notions of non-violence left India more open to invasion and subjugation from Islam and later the British. This strand promotes a more 'muscular', 'masculine',[33] vision of Indian foreign policy, in which India is the defender of not just the state of India, but also the entirety of Hindu civilization. This has manifested itself in a stronger desire of BJP

[29]Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, pp. 118-126.
[30] Rahul Sagar, 'State: of Mind: What Kind of Power will India become?' *International Affairs*, 85, 4 (2009), pp. 801-816.
[31] Karen Smith, 'India's Identity and its Global Aspirations' *Global Society* 10, 24 (2012), p. 374.
[32] Singh, *India in South Asia*, pp. 85-113.
[33] For a discussion of the gender codings in Indian foreign policy, see Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy.*

governments to entangle the Indian diaspora as part of Indian foreign policy.[34] There is a tendency, certainly, towards a more aggressive tone of rhetoric within policy decisions and to embrace 'realist' discourse than has been seen under Nehru in Chapters Three and Four. Hindu nationalists have tied this gendered, masculine discourse to both acting more rationally in international politics and the pursuit of nuclear weapons.[35] Jaswant Singh also ties this to the need to act rationally so as to properly engage with the US, as this is how 'they' make foreign policy. In this sense, there is a degree of mimicry in BJP's foreign policy discourse.

One element in which this is clear is nuclear policy. In 1964, following the India-China war, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), a precursor to the contemporary BJP, criticized the INC's failure to develop a nuclear deterrent, stating that India's 'independence and integrity should not be limited by any pseudo-pacifist inhibitions'.[36] With regards to the nuclear tests in 1998, while the INC supported the decision to test nuclear weapons, and the nuclear program itself was bipartisan, the BJP were willing almost immediately upon gaining power to detonate five devices and frame the explosions as weapons, rather than as 'peaceful'. Exactly why then has the BJP been willing to align itself with the US and the UK, when their deep cultural chauvinism might obviously seek to rebel against Western forms of modernity? The answer has often been that India has accepted the necessity to behave in a self-interested manner.[37] I argue, however, that the Hindutva form of Indian identity ties India into a closer, albeit still ambivalent, relationship with the Anglosphere and that this can be seen in the 'war on terror' narrative which circulated after September 11, 2001.

The US/UK 'War on Terror' Narrative

Following the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, the concept of a threatening Islamic Other became far more prominent in Anglosphere foreign policies. This led to minor secretive operations such as frequent drone attacks (notably in Pakistan) and full-scale invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. As Adam Hodges has compellingly argued, the 'war on terror' is best perceived as a narrative, or a Foucauldian 'regime of truth'.[38] Within this

[34] Sanjay Chaturvedi, 'Diaspora's in India's Geopolitical Visions: Linkages, Categories, and Contestations', *Asian Affairs*, 32, 3 (2005), pp. 141-168.
[35] See Chacko, 'Search for a Scientific Temper'.
[36] Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 'Nuclear Deterrent Necessary', in Bharatiya Jana Sangh, *Party Document: Defense and External Affairs*, vol. 3 (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 2005), p. 22.
[37] For examples of this see, narrative, see: J. Mohan Malik, 'India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Cost, and Implications', *Contemporary South Asia*, 20, 2 (1998), pp. 191-215; Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*.
[38] Hodges, *The "War on Terror" Narrative*.

narrative, the US and the UK appealed to the global audience to join with it in punishing those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In framing this narrative, a call was made particularly to democratic, liberal, 'freedom-loving' countries to support military action against those responsible, alongside justifications for smaller, limited actions against particular terrorist cells anywhere in the world. This narrative was translated also to individual invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were framed as part of a broader struggle waged by peace-loving, liberal, democratic states against radical Islamists who threatened the way of life of the US and its allies. This was presented as a direct binary: as George W. Bush famously argued, '[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists'.[39] The connection between Iraq and al Qaeda was made discursively within this narrative regardless of whether Saddam Hussein was involved or not.[40] I seek to understand the ways in which this narrative has shaped India's relationship with the US and UK. This narrative, I argue, was a distinctly 'Anglosphere' narrative. Its main proponents were the US and the UK, it appealed to elements of the 'way of life' associated with the Anglosphere: 'democracy', 'freedom', 'free trade', 'free peoples' were all discursive signifiers used by Bush and Blair in arguing for their concept. Australia and Canada were supportive, though Canada, for various reasons, dissented from the invasion of Iraq.[41] As such, this narrative provides a rich opportunity to consider India's positioning within this Anglosphere narrative, in the context of a Hindu nationalist government fighting an Islamic Other.

In considering the 'war on terror' as a narrative, I draw on the work of Hodges and Jack Holland, who have examined the war on terror not as a specific war, but as a narrative which both linked and legitimated the various military incursions by the US, the UK and their coalition. Hodges' literary analysis examines George W. Bush's presidential speeches from 2001 until March 2008, and follows this with analysis of media coverage, which recontextualized, reshaped and resisted Bush's narration.[42] Hodges primarily considers the 'war on terror' as a matter of US foreign and domestic policy, as he puts it: 'to speak about America's repose to terrorism after 9/11 is to speak of the "war on terror" and to speak within the "war on terror" discourse… even as social actors resist the discourse they must

[39] George W. Bush, 'Declaring a War on Terrorism' in John W. Dietrich (ed.), *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary* (Armonk: Routledge, 2005), p. 53.
[40] Bush, 'Declaring a War on Terrorism', pp. 64-83.
[41] On this point, see Vucetic, 'Why Canada Sat out the Iraq War' and Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, pp. 101-127.
[42] Hodges, *War on Terror Narrative*, pp. 3-18.

appropriate its language to be listened to and understood'.[43] Hodges' work is limited in the sense that it only aims to examine the internal US response to the narrative, by examining media discourse and politically active students. He examines narrative and counter-narrative in the domestic context.[44] This narrative, though, as Holland shows, was communicated and 'sold' to the world. An understanding of what the Bush administration meant in their narration of a war on terror is central to understanding what India heard when Bush and Blair spoke.[45]

Holland examines the effort of the US to initiate a 'war on terror', and how the UK and Australia joined the US.[46] Holland emphasized foreign policy as a culturally embedded discourse, and does not consider it as a narrative.[47] Still, this work fills in some important gaps left by Hodges. He examines the 'void' left by 9/11, in which the US struggled to comprehend the events it had experienced, and how the following crisis caused it to launch a global war on terror.[48] For Holland, September 11, 2001 became '9/11' as a marker of 'crisis' that limited the possibilities for critical reflection. Holland shows also that both Bush and Blair justified the war in Iraq on the basis of 9/11 having created a 'brave new world' in which pre-emptive action is necessary to prevent threats. Blair in particular emphasized also British culture and history, as he struggled to win parliamentary approval and public support, suggesting that Britain had learned that pre-emption was necessary, as it had failed to prevent Hitler from taking Czechoslovakia.[49] Both Hodges and Holland examine the ways in which Iraq became connected discursively with 9/11. Blair, Howard and Bush, though, most notably all emphasized the nightmare scenario of terrorists with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), in order to tie the words 'terror' and 'Iraq' together.[50] Bush argued that 'Iraq has… provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training' and was 'harbouring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner' which 'runs a poison and explosives training centre in northeastern Iraq'.[51]

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[43] Hodges, *War on Terror Narrative*, p. 153.
[44] Hodges, *War on Terror Narrative*, pp. 11-15. Note that Hodges does interview one 'South Asian' in his college focus group sample.
[45] Hodges, *War on Terror Narrative*, pp. 63-84.
[46] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, pp. 1-3.
[47] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, pp. 1-5.
[48] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, p. 76.
[49] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, p. 76.
[50] Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, p. 143.
[51] George W. Bush, quoted in 'Threats and Responses; In Bush's and Cheney's Words', (2004) at 'http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/17/world/threats-and-responses-in-bush-s-and-cheney-s-words.html, accessed July 17, 2015.

The war on terror narrative was an Anglosphere narrative, not simply a western one. It was spoken primarily by the US and the UK and called explicitly for all 'civilized' nations to join with them. It was not just a 'western' narrative either. This can be seen with regards to the invasion of Iraq, whereas the US, the UK and Australia, saw the attack on Iraq as necessary, European powers questioned its legality. Or, as Jürgen Habermas argued the European view of the Americans, 'They think of themselves, so the explanation goes, as the real defenders of universalist ideals... only the Anglo-Saxons are committed to defending the universal values of freedom and democracy against an "evil" that is now embodied in 'rogue' states'.[52]

Narrating the War on Terror

The narrative of the war on terror appealed particularly to the Hindutva narrative of Indian identity. The US and the UK defined their invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq as linked to the war on terror and as part of this transcendent struggle between good and evil. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush and Blair began pressing for an invasion of Iraq. As action in Afghanistan was widely accepted as justified, I will focus primarily on the invasion of Iraq, the way that this was linked to the 'war on terror' narrative, and the way that India responded.

George W. Bush declared the 'war on terror' on September 20, 2001. Tony Blair joined him. Bush began by calling for assistance, listing the deaths of those from countries other than the US and the UK, including Pakistan, India and Israel. He argued that 'America has no greater friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause – so honoured the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America'.[53] Tony Blair made a very similar argument to Bush for intervention stated in January 2003, that 'it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together, and I regard them as two sides of the same coin'.[54]

[52] Jürgen Habermas, 'Letter to America', (2002) at http://www.thenation.com/article/letter-america-0?page=0,1, accessed July 17, 2015.
[53] Bush, 'Declaring a War on Terror', p. 50.
[54] Tony Blair, 'Full text: Tony Blair's speech', (2003) at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq, accessed June 27, 2014.

Bush begun making the case for invasion in Iraq shortly after the 9/11 attacks. He stated in 2002 that 'Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both'.[55] Bush further pointed out that some al Qaeda members had fled to Iraq and that the Iraqi regime had celebrated 9/11. He also addressed those questioning the timing, arguing that 'we've experienced the horror of September the 11th'.[56] Following this justification for the attack on Iraq, as based on liberal values and democracy through the war on terror, Bush argued that America's values mandated the invasion of Iraq. He stated that: 'America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer freedom to slavery; prosperity to squalor; self-government to the rule of terror and torture'.[57] This was further tied to America's history, as 'Like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending human liberty against violence and aggression'.[58]

Another crucial strand in this discourse is the idea that civilization itself had been attacked. As Bush's editor pointed out, Bush was 'careful to argue that the attacks of 9/11 threated all civilized countries'.[59] Bush stated at the UN following 9/11 that 'Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization: we will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence'.[60] This was further evident in a speech after the invasion, with Bush looking to broaden his coalition. He argued that:

> Terrorists in Iraq have attacked representatives of the civilized world, and opposing them must be the cause of the civilized world. Members of the United Nations now have an opportunity – and the responsibly to assume a broader role in assuring that Iraq becomes a free and democratic nation.[61]

The war on terror, and with it the invasion of Iraq, was framed as a battle between civilized and uncivilized states. It also formed a call for democratic, liberal powers to join with the US and the UK in providing military support for the actions believed to be necessary in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

[55] George W. Bush, 'Bush outlines the Iraqi Threat', October 7, 2002 in Dietrich, *Bush Foreign Policy Reader*, p. 94.
[56] Bush, 'The Iraqi Threat', p. 94.
[57] Bush, 'The Iraqi Threat', p. 94.
[58] Bush, 'The Iraqi Threat', p. 94.
[59] Bush, 'The Iraqi Threat', p. 43.
[60] Bush, 'President Bush Speaks to the UN', in Dietrich, *Bush Foreign Policy Reader*, p. 55.
[61] Bush, 'Future of Iraq', in Dietrich, *Bush Foreign Policy Reader*, p. 100.

The BJP and the War on Terror

A year before September 11, 2001, Vajpayee addressed the US Congress, and touched upon themes that would later become central to India's response to the war on terror narrative. He argued: 'Many of you here in the Congress have in recent hearings recognized a stark fact - no region is a greater source of terrorism than our neighbourhood.' He went on to position Pakistan as the source of this problem: 'Indeed, in our neighbourhood - in this, the 21st Century - religious war has not just been fashioned into, it has been proclaimed to be, an instrument of State policy.' He continues:

> Distance offers no insulation. It should not cause complacence… You know, and I know - such evil cannot succeed. But even in failing it could inflict untold suffering. That is why the United States and India have begun to deepen their cooperation for combating terrorism. We must redouble these efforts.[62]

The framing here suggests that it was India which began to see the US in a different light following the election of the BJP, which was animated by fears of Islamic terrorism. This suggests that the BJP's framing of the India-US relationship predated the US reappraisal of India as a partner against terrorism. These themes became far more important after 2001, but reveal here an important precursor to 9/11, with the Vajpayee utilizing the term even prior to al Qaeda's attack on the US. Retrospectively, this speech took on even more importance, with Vajpayee quoting it himself in an address on Indian television three days after the 9/11 attacks.[63]

The conception of a struggle against good and evil, civilization and barbarism, order and chaos as justifying an invasion certainly had some colonial overtones, particularly the vision of civilized nations defined against the uncivilized. Indeed, for some, but certainly not all, in India, the idea of such an invasion reeked of neo-colonialism. Of course, the Indian response to 9/11 was unquestionably one of shock and outrage. The language used, though, was telling. Vajpayee addressed the nation on September 14, stating that: 'terrorists have struck yet another blow - at the United States of America, at humanity, at the civilized way of life. But I have not the slightest doubt about the eventual outcome. Democracies, open, free and plural societies shall prevail'.[64] Here, he emphasized very similar language to that used by

[62] Atal B. Vajpayee, 'Vast Potential in Indo-US Relations', in Government of India, 'Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Selected Speeches: Vol.-III' (New Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 2002), p. 274.
[63] Atal B. Vajpayee, 'Address to Nation', (2001) at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/5929/Prime+Minister+Shri+Atal+Bihari+Vajpayee+Address+To+The+Nation, accessed June 29, 2014.
[64] Vajpayee, 'Address to Nation'.

Bush and Blair a few days later. In terming it an attack on 'the civilized way of life' he positioned India as equal to the US, and sharing the same problem with terrorism. Furthermore, this attack made India appreciate the US more, and caused the US to feel greater sympathy for India's situation, having been a target of terrorism for so long. Vajpayee effectively aligned India as having a shared identity with the US as 'civilized democracies'. Here, India has aligned itself with the US as a civilizational equal atop a global hierarchy. He further argued on September 14, that '[e]very Indian has to be a part of this global war on terrorism. We must, and we will, stamp out this evil from our land, and from the world'.[65] Here, Vajpayee had immediately taken up the language of a 'war on terror'. The ways in which this term was interpreted, though, had subtle differences, which reveal important causes of India's approach to the invasion of Afghanistan and its unwillingness to support the translation of this narrative to Iraq.

It is important to note the speed with which the Vajpayee took up the language of the war on terror and supported the US action in Afghanistan. There are some important shared spaces here, in which the Hindutva identity narrative and the pluralist Anglosphere narrative overlapped. Indeed, as the US Secretary of State wrote in a private cable. 'India has a long history with Afghanistan as well as key interests that need to be taken into account… India's cooperation is vital and welcomed'.[66] The BJP very quickly identified with the rhetoric put forward by the US in defining the war on terror, taking it up just as quickly as the US and the UK following these events.

Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh

Before I go on to examine the events of the war on terror narrative as linked to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is useful to consider the efforts of US deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and India's foreign minister Jaswant Singh following India's nuclear tests in 1998. These two began meeting in 1998 and carried on negotiations until the end of the Clinton administration. Talbott was eventually convinced that India should be a US strategic partner in Asia, but also concluded that India and the US might never be allies in the manner of the US-UK relationship.[67] Both Talbott and Singh have published extensive memoirs on their

[65] Vajpayee, 'Address to Nation'.
[66] Anon, 'Afghanistan's Political Future', (2001) at http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=01STATE176819&q=afghanistan%20india, accessed June 18, 2014.
[67] See Priya Chacko, 'A New "Special Relationship"?: Power Transitions, Ontological Security, and India–US

discussions. Interestingly, both have characterized their memories of their negotiations in the context of the war on terror, even though Talbott was not part of the Bush administration and the term had not yet come to prominence of the time of their meetings. The terminology and the events of the war on terror clouded both authors' recollections of their discussions and they were written well after the war on terror began. The ideologies and ideas that these discussions were centred on which underpinned India-US relations and India's response to the war on terror, however, had existed for decades. Talbott summarized Singh's vision of India-US relations and the position of Islam as his vision of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations'. He believed Singh to think that 'the Judeo-Christian West, secular India and moderate Islamic states' should make a common cause against Pakistan and groups like al Qaeda.[68] Singh often argued often that Pakistan needed to be the focus of the war on terror. As he stated at a press conference in May 2002:

> Let the world recognize that today the epicentre of international terrorism is located in Pakistan. Terrorists targeting not just India but other countries too, receive support from state structures within Pakistan. The current war against terrorism will not be won decisively until their base camps inside Pakistan are closed permanently.[69]

Clearly for India, terrorists from Pakistan represent the most urgent threat within the 'war on terrorism' framework. He does, however, include 'state structures' of Pakistan within his analysis. Singh does go as far as to suggest that Pakistan should be the primary target of the war on terrorism. Clearly, the war on terror narrative had different meanings for India and its BJP government than the US and the UK.

For Singh, the US was 'the natural ally' for India, and yet, despite this, the relationship was proving particularly difficult under his tenure. Much of his role was to smooth over the results of the 1998 nuclear tests. Still, believing India and the US and the UK to be natural allies against Pakistan is a very similar proposition to that put forward by Savarkar regarding the British. Here, we need to consider the ways in which Singh understood India's colonial history as shaping its foreign policy. Singh argued that the US and India needed to get over their 'hang-ups of history' in order to engage one another. For Singh, this meant the colonial experience caused a 'psychological selectivity' that led to:

Relations?', *International Studies Perspectives*, 15, 3 (2014), pp. 329-346.

[68] Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 119.

[69] Jaswant Singh, 'Transcript of Press Conference by Shri Jaswant Singh', (2002) at www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/020612pcforeignpressconference.doc, accessed August 2, 2014.

> that difficult-to-erase imprint of so many past humiliations of Western imperialism, of the agony of servitude… of subjugation... The psychological scars of imperial servitude are so all-pervasive that they often impede rational negotiators and take offence where none is meant.[70]

For Singh, India needs to 'get over' its postcolonial identity in order to behave 'rationally' and in its own national interest. Singh argued that Indian foreign policy had been held down by this postcolonial ambivalence, writing that India had been defined by:

> its many humiliations, the weight of so many centuries of servitude has imparted to India such an acute sense of hearing that quite often it hears insults where none exist, or are even implied… India has tended to carry many chips on its shoulder, almost always moralistic, needlessly arrogant, argumentative, mistaking such attitude as being an assertion of national pride. India did not then, and still does not, accept that for the many injustices of history there simply is no compensation.[71]

Here, we can see that Singh's affinity with the neoconservative Anglosphere relied on a claim of civilizational difference. This may represent an effort to ensure that India no longer saw itself as postcolonial. However, this narrative has its own ambivalences with colonial history. Singh went on to criticize the Nehruvian approach to foreign policy, which he saw as marked by 'anglicized condescension'.[72] For Singh, Nehru's apparent 'Anglo-ness' led him to condescend to the Anglosphere powers. He saw this as 'needlessly arrogant' and as leading to a 'continuing policy prejudice' against the United States, which was 'almost always to India's detriment'.[73] Within this narrative, Nehru's postcolonial project of reshaping foreign policy along new ethical lines was preventing rational behaviour. Here, Nehru's Anglicized tendencies are seen as a negative in engaging the Anglosphere, because they were marked by a perceived irrationality. This irrationality places India further away from its 'natural allies' of the US and the UK because rationality is an assumed element of both foreign policy and international politics in general *and* particularly as practised by the US. Within Singh's narrative of Indian identity, India has a deeply ambivalent relationship with the English-speaking world, ambivalence markedly different from that of Nehru's understanding of himself being the 'last Englishman to rule India'. Importantly, this text was written in the broader context of his efforts to engage the US. In this method, Singh accounts for the US as being India's natural ally, but still finds the relationship has been held back by India's irrationality. Though Singh is noted for being a moderate of the Hindutva movement, his

[70] Jaswant Singh, *A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India* (Delhi, 2006), p. 278.
[71] Singh, *A Call to Honour*, pp. 276-277.
[72] Singh, *A Call to Honour.*
[73] Singh, *A Call to Honour*, p. 227.

words here still tie into the narrative of India needing to become a rationalist, military power to properly engage with the US against an Islamic Other.

The differences between India and the US arise of out of different understanding of the 'Anglosphere' in the post 9/11 world. The defence of cultural and civilizational superiority in the war on terror narrative had affinities with the BJP, but led to different interpretations. In this sense, seeing India as simply aligning with the US/UK over the war on terror reproduces the India problem. The US/UK narration of the 'war on terror' in engaging India clearly places India closer to an Anglosphere against its Others. This was not, however, accepted uncritically, as there were clear differences in the Indian perception of what the war on terror meant, and how it should proceed. For Talbott, there was a key difference of perception. Talbott believed Jaswant Singh saw the main stumbling block for India-US relations as 'America's refusal to recognize that the United States and India were on the same side in the war on terror – which meant we should be allies against Pakistan'.[74] For Singh, the US and UK actually had not gone *far enough* in engaging India over the war on terror, as they had not fully chosen India as their ally instead of Pakistan. Within this framing, Pakistan should be the target of the war on terror, as opposed to an ally of the US. It is this matter which renders India's ideational position within any Anglosphere in doubt: there is an important difference of perception over the war on terror narrative, which can be seen when it first justified the attack on Afghanistan, and later when it was expanded and translated to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

India and the Invasion of Afghanistan

India's initial commitments to the war on terror narrative began with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Pant describes India's commitment to Afghanistan as 'soft', because India has provided aid and logistical support to Afghanistan but was unwilling to commit military forces.[75] India was supportive of the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and, following the invasion, became the largest regional provider of aid to the

[74] Singh, *A Call to Honour,* p. 119.
[75] Harsh V. Pant 'India in Afghanistan: A Trajectory in Motion', *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 17, 1 (2013), pp. 103-127.

new government in Afghanistan.[76] It did not, however, provide any military support for the initiative and has continually refused to do so.[77]

Bush commented when announcing the attack on Afghanistan that 'Today we focus on Afghanistan. But the battle is broader… If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves'.[78] Jaswant Singh welcomed this, stating that the US had finally come into line with India's position on state-sponsored terrorism.[79]

Singh's hopes that the US had begun to see South Asia as he did, however, were quickly dashed. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan began, Colin Powell came to India and, as Jaswant Singh put it, 'said what he would not say previously': that India and the US were 'united against terrorism and that includes terrorism directed at India as well'.[80] Here, the 'war on terror' narrative in the South Asian context proved divisive. Bush's assertion that any government that sponsors terrorism should be targeted implied to India that it may receive more support in combating terrorist groups in Kashmir. And yet, the US sought Pakistan's support for its attack on Afghanistan. For many Indians, the chief sponsor of terrorism in South Asia was not Afghanistan but Pakistan.[81] India and the Anglosphere had fundamentally different perceptions of terrorism at this point: for the US it was just about 9/11, and for India it was about Pakistan.

Just prior to his visit to India, Powell spoke from Islamabad stating that Kashmir was 'a central issue' between India and Pakistan.[82] This was seized upon in India as evidence of the US not following through on its commitment to fight terrorism everywhere, but unnecessarily focusing on Afghanistan. This was critiqued by Indian MEA spokesman Nirupama Rao stating that 'There should be no confusion between cause and effect. The

[76] Jayshree Bajoria, 'India's Northern Exposure', (2007) at http://www.cfr.org/india/indias-northern-exposure/p14969, accessed 20 May, 2015.
[77] Sandra Destradi, 'India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan', *The Washington Quarterly*, 37, 2, (2014), pp. 103-117.
[78] George W. Bush, 'A Nation Challenged', (2001) at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/08/us/a-nation-challenged-bush-s-remarks-on-us-military-strikes-in-afghanistan.html.
[79] Singh, *A Call to Honour*, p. 336.
[80] Colin Powell, quoted in Singh, *A Call to Honour*, p. 336.
[81] For example, see Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, 'India's response to terrorism after 13 December 2001', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 3, 2 (2003), pp. 277-285
[82] BBC News, 'Powell gets Indian backing', (2001) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1603743.stm, accessed July 17, 2015.

present situation in Jammu and Kashmir is a consequence of state-sponsored terrorism, and not its cause'.[83] The conflict, however, has caused considerable confusion in New Delhi, as the US has been vocal about seeking India's support, yet has relied throughout the conflict on Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence to negotiate with the Taliban rather than engage India over the issue.[84] In the case of Afghanistan, the India and the US/UK alliance have seen the conflict in very different terms, which reveals the different understandings of the Anglosphere's war on terror narrative.

India and the invasion of Iraq

India under the BJP in 2001 largely took up the narrative of the war on terror, but interpreted it differently. This may have tied India closer to the Anglosphere in the process, but the response to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was very different. This action was certainly framed as a part of this same struggle against terrorism.[85] In arguing for the invasion, Blair evoked 9/11 as evidence that:

> it is better to take action and to analyse and look carefully at problems before they erupt… Because there are these weapons of mass destruction… you may go on for several years as a world and one of these dictatorships won't use those weapons, but then you may wake up on day and find that they do.[86]

In June 2002, Bush supported Blair's argument, stating that:

> We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best… If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long… the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.[87]

The day before the invasion, March 19, 2003, Blair argued in the House of Commons that the attack on Iraq and the war on terror were linked: 'The threat is chaos. And there are two begetters of chaos. Tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam'.[88] He continued, framing Saddam's Iraq in the same light as al-Qaeda: '…these two threats have different motives and different origins but they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the

[83] Nirupama Rao, quoted in BBC News, (2001) 'Powell gets Indian backing'.
[84] Pant, 'India in Afghanistan', p. 103.
[85] On the ways in which narrative of the 'War on Terrorism' was translated to the War in Iraq by the US, UK and Australia, see: Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, pp. 135-169.
[86] Cited in Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, p. 137.
[87] George W. Bush, cited in Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, p. 137.
[88] Blair, 'Tony Blair's Speech'.

hallmarks of our way of life'.[89] Here, the war on terror is not just with terrorists, but dangerous regimes with weapons of mass destruction. This is an expansion of the narrative away from just terrorist cells and states that support them, but to any undemocratic regime that seeks WMD. Though the speech was given to the House of Commons, it still contained a call to India, arguing that: '[Terrorism] now poisons the chances of political progress: in the Middle East; in Kashmir; in Chechnya; in Africa'.[90]

> George W. Bush made a similar closing argument for war. On March 17th, he stated:
>
> The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harboured terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda… The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.[91]

Later in 2003 Bush argued that 'Iraq is now the central front in the War on Terror. [The] [e]nemies of freedom are making a desperate stand there.'[92] In the build up to the war, the Indian position, however, was to call for restraint and to argue for a UN backed, peaceful approach to disarming Iraq. The initial response of India was to condemn the war in very certain terms, with an official spokesman stating that it is 'with the deepest anguish that we have seen reports of the commencement of military action in Iraq.'[93]

The speeches made in the Lok Sabha condemning the invasion during 'debate' on the unanimously passed measure is particularly telling, as it shows India's response to the invasion and comprised many different sides of the varied Indian political spectrum. CPI representative Ajoy Chakraborty condemned the 'barbarous acts of George W. Bush and Tony Blair'.[94] Trinamool Congress representative Krishna Bose compared the attack on Iraq to India's colonization, stating that:

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[89] Blair, 'Tony Blair's Speech'.
[90] Blair, 'Tony Blair's Speech'.
[91] George W. Bush, 'Full Text: Bush's Speech', (2003) at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq, accessed May 22, 2014.
[92] George W. Bush, 'Global Message', (2003) at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030909.html, accessed May 21, 2014.
[93] Anon, 'Statement by Official Spokesperson on the commencement of military action in Iraq', (2003) at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/4322/Statement+by+Official+Spokesperson+on+the+commencement+of+military+action+in+Iraq accessed May 16, 2014.
[94] Ajoy Chakraborty, at 'Discussion on and the Unanimous Resolution relating to the war in Iraq, Lok Sabha, India's Lower House of Parliament, New Delhi, April 8', (2003) at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm, accessed May 22, 2014.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm accessed May 22, 2014.

> We have lived in colonial times. We know the humiliation of that. So, remembering that we must not do anything which will bring back colonial rule to any of our neighbouring countries. By bringing this Resolution, we have proved our allegiance to the bond of common humanity.[95]

INC member Jaipal Reddy suggested that 'India, as a nation, needs to be on guard against the implications of the unilaterist toxin that America is propounding'.[96] President of the Republican Party of India, an NDA affiliate, Ramdas Athawale suggested that there was no cause for attacking Iraq and that, 'If America sincerely wants to root out terrorism then Bush should have targeted Pakistan'.[97] At the close of this discussion, Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha was far more moderate than his colleagues. While he praised the unanimous passage of the resolution of condemnation, he concluded that 'India also has very friendly relationship with the U.S. and despite our differences on this particular issue, we would like our relationship with the U.S. to develop'.[98]

Despite this unanimous condemnation of the invasion, the US made a major request of India for troops to be sent to Iraq. The BJP considered a US request to send a sizable commitment of Indian troops to Iraqi Kurdistan, which would have made Indians the second largest troop commitment to the war at that point. The Indian military were reportedly 'excited by the possibilities' of serving in Iraq. Retired General Satish Nimbiar argued that India '[would] get a chance to become a global player' if it sent forces to Iraq and that the opportunity should be taken despite 'our deep resentment at US dominance and arrogance, and our discomfort with its unilateralism'.[99] Raja Menon argued that this was a 'chance of being accepted as a regional power and it would be timid of Delhi if the opportunity is wasted'.[100] For Chaudhuri, the highest levels of Indian government strongly considered the request, as a means of making Indian foreign policy more assertive. The major stumbling

[95] Shrimati Krishna Bose, at 'Discussion on and the Unanimous Resolution relating to the war in Iraq, Lok Sabha, India's Lower House of Parliament, New Delhi, April 8', (2003) at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm, accessed May 22, 2014.
[96] Jaipal Reddy, at 'Discussion on and the Unanimous Resolution relating to the war in Iraq, Lok Sabha, India's Lower House of Parliament, New Delhi, April 8', (2003) at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm, accessed May 22, 2014.
[97] Ramdas Athawale, at 'Discussion on and the Unanimous Resolution relating to the war in Iraq, Lok Sabha, India's Lower House of Parliament, New Delhi, April 8', (2003) at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm, accessed May 22, 2014.
[98] Yashwant Sinha 'Discussion on and the Unanimous Resolution relating to the war in Iraq, Lok Sabha, India's Lower House of Parliament, New Delhi, April 8', (2003) at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/exclusive/iraq/resolution.htm, accessed May 22, 2014.
[99] Satish Namiar, 'Why We Should Say Yes', at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/why-we-should-say-yes/220646, accessed June 26, 2015.
[100] Raja Menon, 'To send or not to send? Not a question' (2003) at http://archive.indianexpress.com/oldStory/25958/, accessed June 26, 2015

blocks were the uncertainty over whether or not the intervention was legal, the concern that India could not be seen to be fighting under the American flag and the domestic political constraints.[101] Rajeev Bhargava, while expressing his relief that sanity had prevailed, suggested 'That so much thought was even given to such a demand points to a huge shift in Indian foreign policy'.[102] A domestic check on the BJP's ideational impulses is important in this case, as the need to maintain favour with their affiliates made choosing to side with the US over the invasion of Iraq impossible. In 2003 at least, the BJP was not strong enough in the Lok Sabha to push through such a motion. Here, the BJP's ideational impulses are limited by the domestic context of India's political system.

Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani reported calmly on his travels through the US and the UK that 'I expressed to Prime Minister Blair that India had desired certain clarifications in this regard'.[103] That this was even under consideration was unusual in India. The suggestion of Indian involvement met considerable resistance in India, with some expressing outrage that India was even entertaining the idea of providing considerable troop commitments. In a dissenting opinion, author Amitav Ghosh warned that the invasion of Iraq was led not by the 'American Empire' but by the 'Anglophone Empire', and compared the attack on Iraq to British actions during the Indian Rebellion in asking whether or not invasion and intervention could ever be successful in reshaping other societies for the better.[104]

It was finally decided not to provide support at a meeting including Vajpayee, Sinha, Advani, the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, and Jaswant Singh. Following this, it was announced by Sinha that while they had closely considered the need to maintain friendly relations with the US, they could not take on the engagement. Furthermore:

> India remains ready to respond to the urgent needs of the Iraqi people for stability, security, political progress and economic reconstruction. Were there to be an explicit U.N. mandate for the purpose, the Government of India could consider the deployment of troops in Iraq.[105]

[101] Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 200.
[102] Rajeev. Bhargava, 'The Indian Refusal', (2003) at http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_1389.jsp, accessed May 19, 2014.
[103] L. K. Advani, 'Press Statement by the Hon'ble Deputy Prime Minister Shri L. K. Advani', (2003) at https://www.hcilondon.in/press_27.html, accessed May 20, 2014.
[104] Amitav Ghosh, 'The Anglophone Empire', (2003) at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/04/07/030407fa_fact2, accessed August 12, 2014.
[105] Amit Barua, 'No troops for Iraq without explicit U.N. mandate: India', (2003) at http://hindu.com/thehindu/2003/07/15/stories/2003071505870100.htm, accessed May 20, 2014.

In response to the decision, the US embassy in Delhi commented that, while they may have hoped for a different outcome, 'the transformation of U.S.-India relations will continue as before. India remains an important strategic partner for the U.S.'[106] Though India had ultimately backed away from strong support for this phase of the war on terror, it had not prevented India from being seen in a positive light.

Religious identities, Islamophobia and the Anglosphere

The Hindutva narrative of Indian identity has affinities with the neoconservative version of the Anglosphere that arose through the war on terror. Islamophobia animates elements of this identity. It is telling first of all that Pakistan and Bangladesh, states that had in some ways the same colonial experience as India, have not been taken into this Anglosphere context.[107] In an emotional speech, outgoing US ambassador to India Robert Blackwell revealed much about the relationship between India and the US as tied together by the war on terror narrative in deeply Islamophobic terms:

> No respectable religion could excuse these merciless acts. No moral framework could sanction these abominations. No political cause could justify these murders of innocents… these terrorist outrages against my country and against yours will not continue indefinitely. We know this from the Ramayana, and many other holy books… We will win the war on terrorism, and the United States and India will win it together - because we represent good, and terrorists are evil incarnate. God will make it so.[108]

Here, India and the US are tied together through a discourse of good over evil, as both are threatened by terrorism. The Ramayana and the Bible are compared, in the context of a form of Islam that justifies aggression against innocents. India's peaceful, pluralist Hinduism is appropriated to the Anglosphere Self. India had become teachable, seen as both civilized and able to be further civilized. The events of September 11, 2001 had placed Islam into a more dangerous category, and simultaneously shifted the Anglosphere perception of India into an overwhelmingly positive space. Thus, the Anglosphere has sought to appropriate it. This has led to the repeated emphasis on India as the 'world's largest democracy' and on 'shared values' and 'shared history', which is now the overwhelming way in which India is seen.

[106] Barua, 'No Troops for Iraq'.
[107] Of course, patterns of colonialism were different in contemporary Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. For a useful description of Pakistan in comparison with India and Bangladesh see: Niaz Murtaza, 'Over-Burdened Society, Over-Politicized State: Understanding Pakistan's Struggles with Governance', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 40, 3 (2012), pp. 321-341. It should also be noted here that these two states have had deeper struggles with democracy than India.
[108] Robert Blackwell, 'What India Means to me', (2003) at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/What-India-Means-To-Me/220923 accessed June 22, 2014.

The BJP, however, had already begun this transition, with Jaswant Singh sent to engage with the US immediately after India's nuclear tests in 1998 and Vajpayee speaking in the US Congress about shared terrorist threats in 2000. When Jaswant Singh argued that India and the US are 'natural allies', he placed them on par with one another. Hindutva narratives of Indian history place Hinduism at the top of its own civilizational hierarchy and, thus, outside the Anglosphere. However, this hierarchy's genealogy lies in British colonialism, as does the Anglosphere's hierarchy. In the context of the war on terror narrative, the BJP took the opportunity to strengthen India's relationship with Anglosphere powers on this basis of linking India with the US and the UK, so as to engage with these powers as equals. This narrative also caused the US and the UK to see India further up on their on their own vision of civilizational hierarchy, and caused India to be seen as joining an Anglosphere against its Others.

Conclusion: Hindu Nationalism and the Anglosphere

While a sense of shared fears of Islamic extremism might identify India more closely to the Anglosphere, there are important limits to this identity. Although the war on terror narrative undoubtedly made India look like an attractive partner for the US and the UK, this did not lead to unreserved support for all that the war on terror entailed. Most noticeably, it did not animate support for aggressive military endeavours such as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan or 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, it is fair to say in this context that the Hindutva movement in India, in the context of shared threats of Islam, has caused postcolonial India to move closer towards the Anglosphere. Jaswant Singh's assertion that the US and India were natural allies, and Vajpayee's speech to the US Congress reveal Hindu nationalism's ambivalences towards the colonial order of the Anglosphere. While this discourse undoubtedly rages against the West's tendency to proclaim its own superiority, it does so by asserting its own. Similarly, through its emphasis on rationality and masculinity, it aims to mimic its perception of the West, and in doing so, seeks to align India with the Anglosphere. This occurred particularly through its alignment with the US and UK over the war on terror. While the BJP's ideational impulse is to assert India's cultural and civilizational superiority and to challenge the use of the English language in Indian bureaucracy, a shared Islamophobia and anxieties temper this desire. The colonial origins of Hindutva are crucial here, as, even though it distrusts the twin imperial humiliations of Hindu

India (Islamic and British) it places a Hindu India on the side of the US and the UK in the context of an aggressive political Islam.

The outrage of the INC and the Indian parliament, and the strength of discourse opposing the Iraq war, suggest that there was a domestic political and ideational check on the BJP's instincts. When the BJP considered the US request for troops in Iraqi Kurdistan, it was their own parliamentary allies who ultimately prevented the decision. With the 'war on terror' the BJP's ideational instinct to assert their offence at the humiliation of India's colonization, clashed with its belief of threat from Islamic extremism. I should also consider here the role played by domestic political concerns. The response in India to the BJP's consideration of a US request to assist in stabilizing Kurdistan was extremely negative. Ultimately, this discourse was successful in engaging India in allying against Islamic extremists, but was still limited by India's domestic politics and its continued reliance on its postcolonial identity. In this case, Hindutva discourse aligned India with the US and the UK and perhaps even in some forms aligning with the Anglosphere. This was the case despite it seeing India as its own, separate civilization to the Anglosphere. Importantly, it does so not in the ways in which Anglospherists and policy makers in the US and the UK argue for, because it asserts its own cultural superiority. It does, however, emphasize an Anglosphere against its Others: specifically Pakistan and radical Islam.

Conceptions of India's colonial history remain central to the ways in which India has behaved in its relations with its former colonial masters. The Islamic world, following 9/11 and the war on terror, is the primary Other which animates the Hindutva form of Anglosphere discourse. Under Vajpayee, India was prepared to argue that the US was India's rational choice for a 'natural ally', and constructed a shared identity with the US and the UK. A major aspect of the translation of the war on terror narrative to Iraq is the connection made between terrorism and nuclear weapons and other 'WMDs'. This analysis will be continued in the following chapter on the India-US nuclear deal in 2005 and the following India-Anglosphere nuclear deals which further placed India in a trusted position. The INC and Manmohan Singh managed this, rather than the BJP. As will be seen, India's identity was narrated in a very different way and produced different, but still ambivalent, forms of engagement. After the defeat of the Vajpayee government, the India-Anglosphere *rapprochement* was continued by Congress, which furthered this cause by emphasizing India's links to the English-speaking world, in the context of nuclear deals, as will be investigated more thoroughly in Chapter Six.

Chapter Six: India and Nuclear Hierarchies: The India-US Nuclear deal

Introduction

As I identified in Chapter Two, recent discourse on the Anglosphere has been underpinned not just by the war on terror but also by the idea of the 'Asian Century' and particularly the rise of China. Given the limited successes of engaging India through the war on terror narrative identified in Chapter Five, it becomes imperative to consider the strengths of the India-Anglosphere nuclear deals and how India has identified itself in this context. In this chapter I consider the identity politics of the India-US relationship, primarily through discourse on nuclear materials and technologies. The India-US nuclear deal was hailed as a breakthrough in this relationship, and led to similar deals with the UK, Canada and Australia. This is a shift over an issue that has long divided India-Anglosphere relations: their different perceptions of the hierarchical structure of the global nuclear order. Importantly, the various India-Anglosphere nuclear deals were accompanied and underpinned by a distinct change in the western-Anglosphere states' discourse on India. Commentators and policy-makers alike started to cite various forms of shared colonial heritage and shared liberal values as underpinning these relationships, including a shared language.[1]

Aside from the Anglosphere perception of India, India under the INC and Manmohan Singh began to argue that India and the US had much in common with one another, and that they needed to ally with a 'common lexicon'.[2] This is an attempt at constructing a shared identity, but also an attempt to reshape the ideational hierarchy of the English-speaking world. Singh, as was discussed in Chapter Two, had been far more emphatic on positioning India within the English-speaking world, most notably at Oxford in 2005 where he termed people of Indian origin as its 'largest single component'. In terms of political issues, it is through the trade in nuclear materials and technologies that India has most identified itself with the English-speaking world. Clearly, India began defining its identity differently in this context. As I argued in Chapter Two, however, even Manmohan's assertion that India was part of the English-speaking world came with a significant reimagining of the concept's hierarchy: as India and its diaspora was seen as its largest single component.

[1] Davis, 'Problematizing India as Part of the Anglosphere'. For an analysis of the Australian media's framing of the India-Australia nuclear deal, see Alexander. E. Davis and Stephanie Brookes 'Australian foreign policy and news media: National identity and the sale of uranium to India and China', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming 2016.
[2] Singh, 'Exchange Toasts'.

In this case, the US and its Anglosphere allies have continued to manage the India problem by narrating India as knowable, understandable and 'just like us'. This has shifted away from viewing India as irrational and unreliable, and unable to be trusted within the global nuclear hierarchy. India has gradually become seen as more understandable, more 'normal'. This shift still reflects the English-speaking world's India problem. This is certainly a more palatable narration of India. However, as will be seen, as with the inclusion of India in the Anglosphere, it remains burdened by the India problem. In this context, the US and the rest of the English-speaking world have seen India as having a shared identity based on language and liberalism. This reproduces the India problem as it fails to interpret India's resistance to international hierarchy and its position in the hierarchical global nuclear order. As I argued in Chapter Two, commentary on India's newfound economic dynamism has led to an appropriation of India in which what is seen as positive in Indian society – free trade, English language, democracy and the rule of law – is seen as 'western' and its problems seen as particularly 'Indian'. This is important in discourse on the nuclear deals beginning in 2005. Here, I argue that India has identified itself with the English-speaking world in these uranium deals, but has only done so in the international context. This has, to an extent, deepened relations between India and the US. In this sense, the pluralist narrative of the Anglosphere has had some success in engaging India, and this can be seen in discourse on the nuclear deals. There are, however, important caveats to this that have largely been missed in Anglocentric IR discourse, which suggest India's very different understanding of the various India-Anglosphere nuclear deals.

The nuclear deal has been interpreted in India not just as improving the relationship, but also as ending years of unfair discrimination. Similarly, India still has no intention of joining with well-established non-proliferation regimes and cannot join the NPT as currently structured without disarming. India's resistance to the global nuclear hierarchy comes through in domestic discourse on the nuclear deal, where India maintained its nonalignment, emphasized its desire for a multipolar world order and continued to define the NPT and CTBT as discriminatory. This is a distinctly different vision of a hierarchical, liberal US-led world order desired by the Anglosphere states. Importantly, the India-Anglosphere nuclear deals accepted India as a civilian nuclear power, but not as a military one and thus still did not recognise India as a 'legitimate' nuclear state. India and the US came together on the basis of a certain discourse of the 'shared identity' and 'shared values' and while this was a

different notion of the Anglosphere, it remained in tension with Indian constructions of its identity.

In this chapter, I look first at the ways the India-US nuclear deal has been interpreted in IR discourse. I argue that the deal has often been seen as evidence for 'values based' engagement by policy makers and some scholars, suggesting it was performed on the basis of shared liberal identity. A second stream of thought proposes that it has been caused by a new confluence of interests. Following this, I consider the ways in which different perceptions of the global nuclear hierarchy have long kept India and the Anglosphere apart, as this context is crucial to understanding the India-US nuclear deal. Following this, I look in detail at the discourse surrounding the announcement of the 2005 nuclear deal, both internationally and then in India's domestic context, so as to examine the attempt to create shared identity. As will be seen, India still seeks to challenge the global nuclear hierarchy, because it refuses to sign the NPT and it remains marginalized in global non-proliferation structures.

Understanding of the India-US nuclear deal

There are two broad streams of thought in accounting for the US-India nuclear deal: one inflected by realist approaches to IR and another by liberalism. The first accepts a common theme of foreign policy discourse on the relationship that democracy and 'shared values' underpins the India US nuclear deal. This is typified by the suggestion that growth in the relationship is 'natural'. Indeed, as will be seen below, when the relationship was announced, shared values and shared democracy were consistently emphasized. The second, most commonly pushed by scholars of a broadly realist orientation, dismisses the idea that shared values led to the nuclear deal, and instead emphasizes that shared interests, most notably over the rise of China, underpinned the deal. Within both approaches, the nuclear deal has been seen as an important step forwards in the bilateral relationship, and perhaps even the end of India's non-alignment.[3]

A common account of US-Indian relations and the India-US nuclear deal over this period has been to argue that 'shared values' and a desire to increase the trade relationship

[3] Another major theme was the fear that the deal might threaten nuclear non-proliferation structures. For an overview, see Mario E. Carranza 'From Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation: Explaining the US–India Nuclear Deal', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28, 3 (2007), pp. 464-493.

have underpinned the resurgence. Twining and Fontaine have argued that 'values-based' engagement between the US and India is possible. They point out that India's foreign policy discourse has shifted considerably from 'non-aligned, post-colonial and non-interventionist' to frequently emphasizing the force of democratic norms and the strength of pluralist democracy.[4] Twining and Fontaine argue further that the US needs to treat India as an ideational actor, to avoid 'minimizing the qualitative differences between India and China.'[5] India is frequently considered as a possible 'democratic counterweight'[6] to China, though it must be said that policy makers generally attempt to distance themselves from such analysis.[7] India is now generally praised in this context as having a shared identity with the US: a democratic state, with liberal values or as a 'responsible stakeholder'.[8]

India's nuclear program and its nuclear deal with the US have led to many commentators emphasizing that India has become a more 'normal', knowable power in international politics. C. Raja Mohan in particular thinks of India and the US as 'natural allies', with India's non-alignment and refusal to engage the US as a foreign policy failure.[9] He has argued that India's nuclear deal with the US has been a shift from following a Nehruvian 'idealist' foreign policy to pursuing a more pragmatic, foreign policy.[10] There have been suggestions that the relationship is 'natural', akin to Mohan's commentary on US-India relations.[11] However, contemporary Indian and US strategic thinkers have both used the term 'natural allies' to describe the relationship. The term has not escaped criticism. Amit Gupta argues that, while India and the US are not quite 'natural allies' due to their differing worldviews, they have plenty of scope for mutually beneficial strategic partnership.[12] Raja-Mohan argues that while there are obstacles, 'India will have more in common with the Unites States than with the other great power for the foreseeable future'.[13]

[4] Twining and Fontaine, 'The Ties that Bind', pp. 193-205.
[5] Twining and Fontaine, 'The Ties that Bind', p. 197.
[6] This terminology is common. See, for an example, Arabinda Acharya, 'India and Southeast Asia in the Age of Terror: Building Partnerships for Peace', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 28, 2 (2006), pp. 297-321.
[7] This statement is based on my own brief interactions with US diplomats.
[8] Xenia Dormandy, 'Is India, or will it be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?', *The Washington Quarterly*, 30, 3 (2007), pp. 117-130.
[9] Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, pp. 83-115.
[10] Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon.*
[11] Medcalf, 'It's a Natural Alliance'.
[12] Amit Gupta, 'The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests', (2005) at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430809 accessed September 14, 2013.
[13] C. Raja Mohan, 'India and the Balance of Power', (2006) at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power, accessed August 2, 2015.

These scholars are right to note a new attempt between India and the US to emphasize what they have in common. Repeated emphasis has been placed on the relationship on the two states both being pluralist democracies. Although I do not question that India's foreign policy discourse has shifted over this period, this is more complicated than a simple shift away from a Nehruvian form of idealism to an ideational alignment with the US. Scholars with a liberal reading of identity or strategic focus have argued that the relationships are weaker than they 'should' be, or have been 'neglected', without offering an account of why this has been the case.[14] India has long had democratic values, and as has been seen in previous chapters, this had not previously led towards the cooperation expected today. This emphasis on values does not account for why the US has been so hostile to India's nuclear program in the past. Thus, the arguments seen by policy-makers below asserting that India's relationship with Anglosphere states are underpinned by shared heritage or shared values, miss that these factors have failed historically in creating a strong relationship. In this context, the repeated emphasis on India's Anglosphere identity needs deeper, more critical analysis.

The second strain of thought has emphasised the role of national interest and the structure of the international system as reshaping the relationship and creating the nuclear deals. Sumit Ganguly has argued that Indian foreign policy was beginning to 'grow up' in the new millennium and its 1998 nuclear test was a crucial landmark for India finally becoming a rational, adult actor.[15] Ganguly and Kapur have argued that the Cold War and disagreement over India's nuclear program held back the relationship, and see the India-US nuclear deal as a very positive step forward for the relationship and reflecting mutual interests. They account for the deal with an emphasis on the rise of China as well as a greater economic convergence and the role of Bush and Singh's leadership.[16]

Varun Sahni, however, is rather more circumspect about India-US relations, seeing the language of shared values and shared identity as being out of step with the 'strategic

[14] Similar arguments of 'neglect' or 'disappointment' are echoed frequently in discussion of India-US relations. See, for example, Anja Manuel, 'A Rising Brand: India's Rising Power, implications for South Asia and U.S Policy', in Nicholas Burns and Jonathan Price, *American Interests in South Asia: Building a Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India* (Washington: The Aspen Institute, 2011), pp. 159-178 and Rubinoff, 'Incompatible Objectives and Shortsighted Policies', pp. 38-60.
[15] Ganguly, 'Indian Foreign Policy Grows Up'.
[16] S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, 'The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future' *Asian Survey*, 47, 4 (2007), pp. 642-656.

reality'.[17] Harsh Pant sees the India-US deal as caused by the flux of the global balance of power, with both states looking for a mutually beneficial partnership which may assist in dealing with this uncertainty.[18] Pant argues that the US sees India 'not only as a potential counterweight to China and militant Islam but also as a responsible rising power'.[19] Pant has later suggested that the India-US and India-Australia nuclear deals mean 'the end of non-alignment' and the rise of a new, pragmatic 'Modi doctrine'.[20] This relies on a reimagining of the India problem: in which India's strategic *rapprochement* with the US that means India has finally become more 'realist' and ended its non-alignment.

Each position reflects, to some extent, the English-speaking world's and IR's India problem. As I outlined in Chapter One, the narratives of Indian foreign policy presented by both these theoretical approaches are burdened by the India problem. Within each account of the nuclear deal, inflected with realism or liberalism, India has gradually become seen as more understandable, more 'normal'. Given that this argument has been made in context of the India-US relationship, the implication is that India now shares the values of the US, be this self-interested realist behaviour or liberalism. In this sense, the new emphasis on what India has in common with the US and on India's having liberal values and acting within acceptable categories is tied to its engagement with India. In foreign policy discourse, India is now seen as a liberal power, as opposed to an untrustworthy, unknowable one.

These accounts also miss crucial details of the way that India's nuclear program has disrupted India's relationship with the US, which have been problematized by postcolonial scholars. The claims of shared democracy as underpinning the US-nuclear deal are misleading. As Chacko has pointed out, India has had shared a belief in democracy akin to the US since 1947, but this failed to create a fruitful relationship throughout the Cold War.[21] Similarly, India's nuclear deal with the US does not mean the end of 'non-alignment' or the end of India's postcolonial identity, because the deal has been interpreted domestically as assisting to remove unfair discrimination. In order to understand India's nuclear deal with the US, and the extent to which it has recast the relationship, we need to understand India and the Anglosphere's very different interpretations of the global nuclear hierarchy.

[17] Sahni, 'Limited cooperation between limited allies', pp. 173-192.
[18] Harsh V. Pant, 'The US–India nuclear deal: the beginning of a beautiful relationship?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20 (2007), pp. 455-472.
[19] Pant, 'US-India Nuclear Deal', p. 471.
[20] Pant, 'In with a Modi doctrine'.
[21] Chacko, 'A New "Special Relationship"?'.

India, Nuclear Hierarchies and 'Nuclear Apartheid'

Here, I argue that India has a long history of resisting nuclear hierarchies, and that this needs to be taken into consideration in understanding the identity politics of the India-US nuclear deal. The Anglosphere states were central to the establishment of the regulatory regimes based on the NPT and the CTBT. The US and the UK are both founding members of regimes identified by India with nuclear apartheid and within the original five nuclear weapons states and Australia and Canada are key uranium producers. As Shampa Biswas has argued, the nuclear governance system is a set of cultural exclusions, which reflects the perceived 'irrationality' of the Third World.[22]

For Biswas, the label nuclear apartheid, though signifying the world's nuclear order as colonial and hierarchical, is used selectively by states seeking to undermine this hierarchy.[23] India, having long fought this colonial order, has, through the US nuclear agreement, joined what Biswas has termed a nuclear order 'dominated by powerful states and capitalist interests'.[24] There are, of course, issues with simply terming the global nuclear order as 'racialized', or with the Anglosphere itself, given the privileged position of China and Russia within it, though it is most certainly hierarchical.[25] Despite this, the Anglosphere states have been deeply implicated in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation structures, and have now begun to remove India from its list of exclusions. Shane Maddock has argued that US nuclear policy following its attack on Japan, rather than representing a belief that such weapons needed to be subjected to international control, sought to bring about a nuclear world order which would prevent proliferation outside of its own. He concludes that the NPT was '… an empty pledge not to sin, enforced by sinners'.[26] The US approach was informed by a belief in cultural and racial hierarchy, in which some states were viewed as trustworthy and others were dismissed. Indeed, control of nuclear proliferation has long been wrapped in discourses of 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' states. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated early in the 1950s that 'higher civilizations have always maintained their place against lower civilizations by devising more effective weapons'.[27]

[22] Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid"', pp. 485-521.
[23] Shampa Biswas, *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), pp. 102-104.
[24] Biswas, *Nuclear Desire*, pp. 102-104.
[25] Biswas, *Nuclear Desire*, p. 103.
[26] Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, p. 298.
[27] John F. Dulles, quoted in Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, p. 1.

Bill Clinton echoed this after India's nuclear test in 1998, when he argued that 'civilized nations' needed to devise protections from nuclear weapons so as to prevent attacks from 'irresponsible' nations allied with 'terrorist and other groups'.[28] This discourse reflects a hierarchical global order in which the US sees itself as able to both draw and enforce this distinction. India moved away from being seen as uncivilized and untrustworthy. In terms of the global nuclear hierarchy, this places the collective US/UK/Canada/Australia on the top, with the ability to bestow legitimacy on particular 'chosen peoples' and India on the bottom, holding nuclear weapons outside of regulatory regimes. Even after the India-Anglosphere nuclear deals, India has only been accepted as a civilian nuclear power, and not a military one, meaning that India's positioning within this hierarchy has shifted from being seen as completely illegitimate, to an ambivalent middle ground.

Aside from the US and the UK, two of the original five nuclear weapons states, Australia and Canada are both massive uranium producers and exporters, though both are extremely careful about their exports. Canada was the world's leading uranium producer until 2009, when it was overtaken by Kazakhstan. In 2013, Canada produced 22 per cent of the world's uranium, a total of 11,007 tonnes.[29] In the same year, Australia produced 7,488 tonnes of uranium, making it the world's third-ranking producer.[30] The US, UK, Canada and Australia have all now sought to allow India's entry into the NSG. Despite their reserves, Canada and Australia have not developed nuclear weapons. Rather they have sought protection under the US/UK 'nuclear umbrella'.[31] India's nuclear agreements with these states are not just a policy shift, but an ideational shift. While some scholars have previously considered India's nuclear program as an element of its postcolonial identity, none have done so in the context of India's recent partial acceptance into the global nuclear order.[32] Nuclear deals between India and the Anglosphere states have all occurred within a few years of one another, all animated by India's 'Anglosphere' characteristics. I hope here, to understand the ways in which India has been accepted into the nuclear order through the India-US nuclear

[28] Bill Clinton, quoted in Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, p. 1.
[29] Anon, 'Canada', (2015) at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Canada--Uranium/ accessed August 2, 2015.
[30] Anon, 'Australia', (2015) at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Australia/ accessed August 2, 2015.
[31] Michael Cohen and Andrew O'Neil, 'Doubts Down Under: American Extended Deterrence, Australia and the 1999 East Timor Crisis', *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, 15, 1 (2014), pp. 27-52.
[32] See: Abraham, *The Indian Atomic Bomb*, Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid"', pp. 485-521, Himadeep Muppidi, *The Politics of the Global* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), Varadarajan, 'Neoliberal (in)Security' and Chacko, 'Search for a Scientific Temper', pp. 185-208.

deal, the extent to which it remains excluded, and to critically examine the identities that enable these inclusions/exclusions.

As I discussed briefly in Chapter Four, India's nuclear test in 1974 was deeply confusing and frustrating to the western-Anglosphere states. Unlike in 1974, however, the BJP followed their nuclear test in 1998 by emphasizing India's strength and masculinity, alongside its independence, in suggesting India had brought down nuclear apartheid.[33] Given the many nuclear deals done with India, one might be forgiven for considering India's transition into a legitimate nuclear power was complete, and that its resistance to nuclear apartheid was therefore over. And yet, India's postcolonial identity has long defined its relationship to nuclear regimes, which I argue here has not yet changed. Indeed, resistance to international hierarchy has defined India's nuclear deals with the western-Anglosphere states. Himadeep Muppidi has considered India's 1998 decision to test nuclear weapons as an 'apt manifestation of a postcolonial state's deep ambivalence towards a colonial order of governance'.[34] The Indian state was originally one of the first to argue for a CTBT. This was aimed at the eradication of the world's nuclear weapons, and India initially argued that this needed to be combined with a program of the first five nuclear states to agree to gradually eliminate their existing nuclear arsenals. The NPT, however, legitimated these states' possession of nuclear weapons, and so India refused to sign it. Muppidi further argues that India hoped for an equal world in which no one had exclusive rights to nuclear weapons. Instead, the CTBT and the NPT legitimated the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council to allow for a 'colonial nuclear order' which was structured around the rights of the US, UK, France, Russia and China to hold nuclear weapons, while instituting treaties which prevented further proliferation.[35]

Abraham, Chacko, Biswas and Varadarajan have all previously considered the connection between India's nuclear program and its postcolonial identity.[36] The tests were also considered as defiant towards the US, as the US had been involved in preventing such tests under the leadership of the INC in the years leading up to Pokharan II. The performance of the test can be read in defiance of the US and the international norms of nuclear

[33] Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid'.
[34] Muppidi, 'Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance', p. 286.
[35] Muppidi, 'Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance', p. 286.
[36] Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*; Varadarajan, 'Neoliberal (In)security; Chacko, 'Search for a Scientific Temper' and Biswas, '"Nuclear Apartheid"'.

proliferation advanced by the NPT, which were most certainly chaperoned by the western-Anglosphere. Abraham argues that the postcolonial state has treated atomic energy as 'the privileged instrument of development'.[37] Following the 1974 nuclear test, he argues, India's security thinkers began to believe their own performance, and 'accepted fully the anarchic norms of the international system'.[38] Likewise, Chacko has examined the racial and gender coding in India's identity discourse to understand the ambivalences of India's nuclear policy: India has long argued for the unfairness of the NPT and for disarmament, while simultaneously engaging in proliferation. The 1998 nuclear tests received a 90 per cent approval rating, and the strong backing of Congress leader Sonia Gandhi.[39] Though conducted by the recently elected BJP government, they would not have been possible without India's covert nuclear program, which was continued by successive Indian governments, and so the term bipartisan could comfortably be applied. For Varadarajan, these tests were performed in the context of India's liberalized economy, as the process of liberalization had created a discourse of 'lost self-esteem'.[40] This also rendered impossible its emphasis on state planning and economic independence, a key plank of its postcolonial identity. Given the strength of postcolonial approaches to considering India's ambivalence towards nuclear weapons, we cannot simply abandon the approach given India has now begun to engage the Anglosphere states over nuclear materials. Rather, we need to consider the ways in which these nuclear deals have changed India's relationship with the Anglosphere so as to test India's positioning within the global nuclear order.

The western-Anglosphere states' defence of a hierarchical nuclear order can be seen in their response to India's 1998 nuclear test. One of the best known responses to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests is that of Bill Clinton, who following a presidential visit through South Asia, stated that '[t]he most dangerous place in the world today, I think you could argue, is the Indian subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir'.[41] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described India's nuclearization as 'a uniquely serious and dangerous situation' because while there 'were thousands of miles of ocean between the US and the USSR', whereas India and Pakistan are 'cheek by jowl'.[42] Albright continued, stating that

[37] Abraham, *The Indian Atomic Bomb*, p. 157.
[38] Abraham, *The Indian Atomic Bomb*, p. 166.
[39] Abraham, *The Indian Atomic Bomb*, p. 166.
[40] Varadarajan, 'Neoliberal (In)security, p. 337.
[41] Bill Clinton, quoted in Jonathan Marcus, (1998) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/687021.stm accessed, July 1, 2013.
[42] Madeleine K. Albright, 'Press remarks on India and Pakistan'at

India and Pakistan 'have had difficulty accepting each other's birth' and were involved in a 'long-standing conflict over Kashmir.'[43] This conception is problematic given that it constructs India and Pakistan as having a greater propensity towards nuclear war than the US-USSR relationship, and constructs India and Pakistan as less rational actors than the US and the USSR, and falls back on stereotypes of the 'irrational' third world. The suggestion that nuclear deterrence works for the US, but not for India constructs India as an 'irrational' actor, willing to destroy itself for a cause (Kashmir).[44] From 1998 to 2005, India's position in the global nuclear hierarchy shifted rapidly.

Australia's response to the 1998 test has been regarded as particularly savage, with Manmohini Kaul describing it as 'the most abrasive of all',[45] with all defence ties immediately suspended and Indian defence removed personnel from training sessions at Australian defence colleges.[46] Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's press release on the matter likewise did not hold back, announcing more sanctions on India due to 'the outrageous acts perpetrated by India', so as to show 'the [Australian] Government's condemnation of the wilful disregard for international opinion'.[47] The same statement called on India's neighbours, though not specifically Pakistan, to show restraint in the face of such provocation.[48] Downer later stated in Manila that, '[t]his is the act of a government that has the utmost disregard for accepted international norms of behaviour'.[49] In the context of these statements, it is obvious that the neighbours referred to were Pakistan and China. The evocation of 'norms' is common in scholarly discourse, but less common in official statements from policy-makers. In this sense, Downer's comment reflects a belief about how states are 'supposed' to act, with India transgressing. This again assumes India to be dangerous, irrational and threatening. It mirrors discourse on India's 1974 nuclear tests, which was seen as 'tiresome' and outside of 'accepted categories'.[50] Within condemnations

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http://19972001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980603.html accessed July 3, 2013.
[43] Albright, 'Press Remarks'.
[44] A similar argument was made by former BJP external affairs minister Jaswant Singh. See Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', *Foreign Affairs*, 77, 5 (1998), pp. 41-52.
[45] Manmohini Kaul, 'Australia-India Relations: Post-Pokhran II Phase', *International Studies*, 35 (2000), p. 365.
[46] Janaki B. Kremmer, 'There's No Wizard in Oz', at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?205982 accessed July 2, 2013.
[47] Alexander Downer, 'Media Release: Australian Response to Indian Nuclear Tests', at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1998/fa059_98.html, accessed July 3, 2013.
[48] Downer, 'Media Release'.
[49] Alexander Downer, quoted in Kremmer 'There's no Wizard in Oz'.
[50] Grant, 'Indian Nuclear Test'.

of India's action, South Asia is clearly regarded as a volatile and dangerous place, with India another object of instability, engaging in dangerous nuclear brinkmanship.

The India-US Nuclear Deal

As discussed above, a common approach to the language used to account for India's engagement with the US, UK, Australia, Canada has been to dismiss it, on the grounds that it is out of step with 'strategic reality'. With regard to these agreements, the most work has been done on the India-US deal (partly due to the timing of these deals, the India-US deal was certainly the first of its kind, but also in all likelihood the most important). This is illustrated well by the subtitle given to an edited collection on India-US cooperation: 'more than words'.[51] Sahni has argued within this collection, taking these statements 'at face value', might lead us to think that India and the US was the strongest relationship in the world today.[52] While it is accurate to say that India-US relations are not as strong as the discourse analysed here might suggest, I argue that this discursive emphasis needs to be considered in more depth, rather than simply be written off. As was seen in Chapter Two, depictions by Anglospherist authors of India were consistently tinged with colonial orientalist stereotypes. In that case, politicians arguing for engagement with India use very similar discursive markers to those used by Bennett *et al.* when defining the idea of 'Anglosphere', a definition which mirrors the colonial hierarchy and assumes cultural superiority. In particular, I will consider here the extent to which this political discourse from policy elites can be seen in discussions of India's nuclear program, and the shape and form it takes.

Seven years after the remarkably strong condemnations in 1998, the US and India began the process to allow engagement on nuclear technology. This deal was finalized in 2008. Following the US, the western-Anglosphere states have all accepted India into the global nuclear hierarchy under the same framing.[53] In 2007, under John Howard, Australia agreed to sell uranium to India, but this was reversed under Kevin Rudd later that year. Under

[51] Sumit Ganguly, *et al., US-Indian Strategic Cooperation*.
[52] Varun Sahni, 'Limited Cooperation between Limited Allies: India's Strategic Programs and India-US Strategic Trade', in Ganguly *et al.* (eds), pp. 173-192.
[53] David Cameron, 'Speech at Unilever offices in Mumbai, (2013) at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-speech-at-unilever-offices-in-mumbai, accessed September 25, 2013. See also, Government of Canada and Government of India 'Joint Statement between Canada-India', November 6, 2012 at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=5149, accessed September 24, 2013.

Julia Gillard, however, it was made official Labor Party policy to sell uranium to India in 2011, meaning the sale now has bipartisan support. In 2010, David Cameron lifted a UK ban on the export of nuclear technology to India, against official recommendations.[54] Shortly after this, Canada resumed the sale of nuclear technology to India after 36 years, with Stephen Harper and Manmohan Singh finalizing terms late in November 2012.[55] Tony Abbott argued that the India-Australia nuclear deal was 'anchored in shared values as liberal democracies' along with as well as common interests and opportunities in the Asian Century and 'in a stable and outward looking Indian-Pacific region.'[56] Manmohan Singh and Stephen Harper arguing that India-Canada relations in the context of the nuclear deal were underpinned by 'long-standing people-to-people ties and mutually-cherished values of democracy, tolerance, human rights, pluralism, freedom of religion and the rule of law.'[57] These statements reflect that the same attempt at shared identity construction between India and the western-Anglosphere states.

The acceptance of India to the 'nuclear club' by the US and other Anglosphere states, then, requires further consideration, particularly given how quickly it occurred after such brutal denunciations of India, and over a period in which India's domestic and international politics had not fundamentally changed. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 revealed a dramatic reversal of discourse on India, despite the 1999 war with Pakistan over Kargil and the apparent stability-instability paradox between these two now-nuclear armed states:[58]

> The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India… We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean.

[54] Rosa Prince, 'David Cameron agrees nuclear deal with India against official advice', (2010) at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/7913835/David-Cameron-agrees-nuclear-deal-with-India-against-official-advice.html, accessed March 26, 2013.
[55] BBC News, 'India and Canada finalise conditions of nuclear deal', (2012) at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20231759, accessed March 26, 2013.
[56] Julia Gillard and Manmohan Singh, 'Joint Press Statement on the State Visit of Prime Minister of Australia to India', (2012) http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/20713/Joint+Press+Statement+on+the+State+Visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Australia+to+India, accessed 2 August, 2015.
[57] Stephen Harper and Manmohan Singh, 'Joint Statement between Canada-India', (2012) at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/11/06/joint-statement-between-canada-india#sthash.qJmK0NBa.dpuf accessed November 12, 2013.
[58] On this conception of nuclear weapons in South Asia, see: Micheal Krepon and Chris Gagné, 'The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia', (2001) at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/NRRMTitleEtc.pdf, accessed July 27, 2013.

> Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.[59]

In 2002, this commentary may have seemed hollow, and the emphasis on a call for closer cooperation that one might generally find in any generic bilateral statement between two democracies. However, the near-obsessive rhetorical emphasis on India as a democratic, free-trading, anti-terrorist and status quo power in South Asia has since been repeated in so many statements from across the 'Anglosphere' that it requires further analysis.

When announcing the US-India civil nuclear deal in 2005, Manmohan Singh defined the US in exceptionally kind terms:

> We share a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, pluralism and rule of law. We face common challenges that threaten our way of life and values that both our countries hold dear.[60]

The emphasis on what India and the US have in common occurs here when likewise emphasizing challenges to 'our way of life'. In the context of post-9/11 America, the threat of Islamic terrorism is perhaps the most obvious of these challenges. George W. Bush echoed these sentiments, stating that: 'Our people share the bonds of friendship and a commitment to prosperity, peace and regional stability. Our nations believe in freedom. And our nations are confronting global terrorism'.[61] Bush defines India as a partner in regional stability rather than a destabilizing actor, a remarkable shift from 1998.

During this same visit, Manmohan Singh toasted India-US friendship, stating that the two had once been 'divided by a common language', but urged an end to this, stating that,

> I believe, Mr. President, that our two countries must try to ally with a common lexicon and a shared framework of reference in looking at the rest of the world, for I sincerely believe there is truly very much that we have in common.[62]

Here, India and the US need to see the world in the same way through the same language (English). Throughout this discourse, Singh emphasizes India's common links with the US to

[59] US National Security Strategy, (2002) at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf, accessed July 17, 2015.
[60] Manmohan Singh, 'President Welcomes Prime Minister Singh of India in Arrival Ceremony', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2005/49744.htm, accessed July 3, 2013.
[61] My emphasis, George W. Bush, 'President Welcomes Prime Minister Singh of India in Arrival Ceremony', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2005/49744.htm, accessed July 3, 2013.
[62] Bush and Singh, 'Exchange Toasts'.

account for the nuclear deal, suggesting India's connection with the Anglosphere and the English-speaking world. In the previous toast, George W. Bush had suggested that:

> Our trading partnership has grown dramatically in recent years… America and India also understand the danger of global terrorism, which has brought grief to our nations, and united us in our desire to bring peace and security to the world.[63]

The desire to 'bring peace and security' suggests a shared interventionism. This was not the case in the events discussed in Chapter Five. This led Bush to define the relationship again as based in:

> common values… As two strong, diverse democracies, we share a commitment to the success of multi-ethnic democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. And we believe that by spreading the blessings of democracy and freedom, we will ensure lasting peace for our own citizens and for the world.[64]

Bush emphasized that both states are diverse democracies, with various 'shared values', committed to liberty and the rule of law, all of which are also a part of discourse on the Anglosphere. Thus, both leaders emphasized India's Anglosphere identity as part of justifying the decision and thus sought to construct a shared identity.

There are notable exclusions in the discourse, which must be considered as well because they suggest the ambivalence of India and the US of the attempt to create a shared identity.[65] There is an important silence within discourse, which is particularly stark when compared with constructions of South Asia in 1998. The terms 'Kashmir' and 'Pakistan', so common in 1998, do not appear unless specifically brought up by members of the press.[66] Even when this occurred, the response of Undersecretary of Defence Nicholas Burns during a press conference was instructive. Burns was asked to discuss the geopolitics of the decision, whether or not Pakistan or China was implicated in the discussion. He responded: '[the decision] stands on its own. Here, you have the world's largest democracy of a billion people,

[63] George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh, 'President, Indian Prime Minister Singh Exchange Toasts', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2005/49766.htm, accessed July 3 2013.
[64] Bush and Singh 'Exchange Toasts'.
[65] For the full list of documents examined here, see: US State Department Archive, 'U.S. - India Relations: Visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/49765.htm/ accessed, July 3, 2013.
[66] George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh, 'Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm, accessed July 3, 2013.

a country that is interested in promoting democracy worldwide.'[67] These silences indicate the continuing resonance of notions of hierarchy and race.

Similar issues were raised following the Australian Labor Party's decision to allow uranium sales to India. The Pakistani high commissioner to Australia, Abdul Malik Abdullah, suggested that 'If Australia is going to lift the ban on a country which has not signed NPT it is much hoped that will also apply to Pakistan the same way.'[68] No serious consideration was given to Pakistan in either case. Refusing to discuss the geopolitics of US-India nuclear agreement reveals the context in which India was regarded. This reflects a deeper change in the perception of India as an ideational actor rather than a threatening geopolitical one: an ideational source of hope, which reflects the US and Anglosphere sense of Self.

Bush's visit to India, 2006

One year later, Bush visited India. In the joint statement that accompanied the visit the framing of the partnership was even stronger:

> Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The successful transformation of the U.S.-India relationship will have a decisive and positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in this new century.

India's nuclear weapons, then, are no longer seen as 'weapons of mass destruction'. In this statement the civil nuclear agreement was framed not as geopolitics, but as a move towards 'energy security and a clean environment'.[69] Similarly, the preamble to the act of the US Congress in 2006 that approved the India-US nuclear deal stated that 'Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and means to deliver them are critical objectives for the United States foreign policy'.[70]

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[67] Nicholas Burns, 'Briefing on the Signing of the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India', (2005) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm, accessed July 2, 2013.
[68] Brendan Nicholson, 'India nuclear negotiations start next year, but Pakistan sales not on cards', *The Australian*, December 6, 2011, p. 4.
[69] George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh, 'US-India Joint Statement', (2001) at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2006/62418.htm, accessed January 15, 2015.
[70] Preamble to the Henry J. Hyde the United States - India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (H.R. 5682), at MEA India, 'Documents on Foreign Policy, 2006' available at http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/main_2006.pdf, p. 10, accessed July 17, 2015.

The US very clearly no longer sees India's nuclear weapons as a threat or likely to spark further proliferation.

For a very different perspective on the nuclear deal, however, I will now consider how the India-US nuclear deal was discussed in India's domestic context. This is particularly clear in the Lok Sabha debates on the issue. In order to consider the ways in which India can be represented in the domestic context, I will consider public speeches made by key policy elites on foreign policy for domestic consumption. Upon his return to India following the successful 2005 visit to Washington, Manmohan Singh gave a somewhat more sober account the nuclear agreement. In this speech, 'shared values' are only mentioned once, with democracy only mentioned in a different context.[71] He argued that the main objective of his visit was not a new alignment with the US, but to 'sensitise the US Government about the full extent of the changes that have taken place in India since 1991'.[72]

In a *Suo Motu* statement to the Lok Sabha, Singh argued that India's nuclear program was 'truly unique'.[73] He continued to emphasize, as Abraham and Chacko have identified with regard to the nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, the role that India's scientists play in their nuclear program. Singh stated that 'Our scientists have done excellent work and we are progressing well on this programme as per the original vision outlined by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Homi Bhabha. We will build on this precious heritage'.[74] By mentioning Nehru, Singh drew on the heritage of the INC, but also on Nehru's vision of peaceful nuclear development. This was done partly due to the attacks by the INC's allies over the closer alignment with the US.

During the state visits in 2005 and 2006 to the US, India's primary goal in India-US nuclear agreement appeared to be a deeper bilateral relationship. Manmohan Singh's comments a year later to India's parliament reveal a very different ambition. He argued to the Lok Sabha in August 2006 that:

[71] Manmohan Singh, 'Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in Parliament on his Visit to the United States', (2005) at http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2601/, accessed September 14, 2013.
[72] Manmohan Singh, 'Speech to Lok Sabha', quoted in MEA, 'Documents on Indian Foreign policy: 2006', (2006) at http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/main_2006.pdf, p. 14, accessed February 14, 2015.
[73] Manmohan Singh, 'Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in Parliament on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States', (2006) at http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/main_2006.pdf, p. 416, accessed February 22, 2015.
[74] Singh, 'Speech to Lok Sabha August 18 2006'.

> the central imperative in our discussions with the United States on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation is to ensure the complete and irreversible removal of existing restrictions imposed on India through iniquitous restrictive trading regimes over the years.[75]

The India-US nuclear deal no doubt improved the relationship between India and the US. But this was secondary for India when compared with removing the restrictions placed by the NSG on India's ability to purchase nuclear technologies and materials. Singh continued:

> We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy – ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing spent fuel, i.e. all aspects of a complete nuclear fuel cycle.[76]

In the US, the nuclear agreement has been seen primarily as a small price to pay for a close relationship with India, which is now seen as a 'beacon' of democracy in an unstable region. In India, however, it has generally been seen as a means of further dismantling the discriminatory world order created by the NPT and CTBT.

The US-India civil nuclear agreement was deeply controversial in India. Manmohan Singh was accused of damaging Nehru's anti-nuclear heritage and India's non-alignment, particularly by the INC's leftist allies, by getting too close to the United States. Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma said 'we reject completely any insinuation that there is a sellout. It is a Congress-led UPA Government, inheritor of a very rich and proud legacy'.[77] Echoing this sentiment, Shyam Saran, India's foreign secretary, argued at a speech to the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs that India under the INC had been true to its Nehruvian heritage. As outline above, much thought in IR has placed the India-US nuclear deal in the context of the rise of China. Yet Saran's speech argued that 'global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament continues to be an important plank of our nuclear policy, which is characterized by restraint, responsibility, transparency, predictability and a defensive orientation'.[78] He similarly emphasized that India 'consciously promoted

[75] Manmohan Singh, 'Speech to Lok Sabha'.
[76] Manmohan Singh, 'Speech to Lok Sabha'.
[77] Anand Sharma, 'Interview of Minister of State Anand Sharma to the Weekly India Today and TV Channel Headlines Today', (2006) at http://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/main_2006.pdf, pp. 125-133, accessed July 17, 2015.
[78] Shyam Saran, '001. Address by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies: "Present Dimensions of the Indian Foreign Policy", Shanghai, January 11, 2006', (2006) at //www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?2078/Present+Dimensions+of+the+Indian+Foreign+Policy++Address+by+Foreign+Secretary+Mr+Shyam+Saran+at+Shanghai+Institute+of+International+Studies+Shanghai, p. 96, accessed February 22, 2015.

multipolarity in international relations'[79] and renewed calls for Panchsheel and non-alignment.

After suggesting that the US-India relationship was underpinned by 'common values' and 'common interests' he argued also for the strength of the India-Russia relationship and then for a multipolar world order summarizing that 'India remains committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy that best serves her national interests'. He continued on: 'This policy seeks to promote multipolarity in international relations and to strengthen forces of multilateralism that help protect the interests of the developing countries and reinforce geo-strategic stability'.[80] Here, the goal of India's nuclear deal with the US becomes clearer, removing blocks on its nuclear program through closer relations with the US assists India in creating a multipolar world order. This position is underpinned by India's continued reliance on its postcolonial identity in the context of global nuclear hierarchies. Without an understanding of this identity, then, the English-speaking world remains trapped in the India problem.

Manmohan Singh emphasized India's independence and nonalignment, a narrative established by Nehru, in further debate in India's parliament. In a speech to the Lok Sabha in 2007 announcing the success of negotiations over the 123 Agreement, in which he presciently stated that he was not 'given to exaggeration',[81] Singh carefully outlined the benefits to India of the agreement. In this context he emphasized a non-aligned, postcolonial narrative of Indian history and identity, frequently arguing that India's independence was not undermined by the agreement as 'Our right to use… our independent and indigenously developed nuclear facilities has been fully preserved'.[82] He continued later to rebut charges that this made India's relationship too close to the US, arguing that:

> I had specially underlined that the pursuit of a foreign policy that is independent in its judgement is a legacy of our founding fathers and an abiding commitment of my Government. India is too large and too important a country to have the independence of its foreign policy taken away by any power… There is independence in our thought and independence in our actions.[83]

[79] Saran, 'Address by Foreign Secretary', p. 96.
[80] Saran, 'Address by Foreign Secretary', p. 102.
[81] Manmohan Singh, 'PM's statement in the Lok Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States', August 13, 2007, at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2601 accessed September 15, 2013.
[82] Singh, 'PM's statement in the Lok Sabha'.
[83] Singh, 'PM's statement in the Lok Sabha'.

The emphasis on India's independence and its indigenous technology for a domestic audience suggests the ambivalence of India's Anglosphere identity in the domestic context. Here, the India-US civil nuclear agreement is described in very different terms and justified by different narratives of Indian identity. This is starkly different, however, from his call in 2005 for the US and India to see the world in the same way. Here, perhaps most tellingly of all, however, the terms 'democracy' and 'values' do not appear once in this speech, showing that India's sense of nonalignment still remained central to accounting for foreign policy decisions in the domestic context.

What we see here is India's ambivalence towards the Anglosphere and the way it is articulated through the language of shared identity. As with authors writing for an Anglosphere audience, India has become able to define itself as inside and outside of the space. India's postcolonial identity can be moulded to different international contexts. In this case, India has, to an extent, sought closer alliances with the US by accepting what the two states have in common. Despite India's new deals with the US and the broader English-speaking world, it has continued to resist the NPT. Shortly before India's nuclear deal with Australia, it took part in a UN vote on the NPT. Following this vote, the Indian government provided an oft-repeated reasoning for India's continued refusal to sign the NPT:

> India's position on the NPT is well-known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.[84]

Almost identical language was used under Manmohan Singh in 2009.[85] Another example came when the President of India's Atomic Energy Commission R. K. Sinha was asked about India signing the NPT due to its deal with Australia. He argued that:

> We cannot sign the NPT… having been a strong supporter of the non-discriminatory regime. We will be bound by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in respect of facilities in which equipment, material or fuel will be used if they are coming through the international cooperation but not beyond that.[86]

[84] Government of India, quoted in Anon, 'India votes against UN draft resolutions on NPT', (2014) at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-votes-against-un-draft-resolutions-on-npt/article6551447.ece', accessed December 27, 2014.
[85] Government of India, quoted in A. Vinod Kumar, *India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: The Perennial Outlier* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[86] Ratan Kumar Sinha, 'India for Nondiscriminatory Nuclear Regime' (2014) at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-for-nondiscriminatory-nuclear-regime-says-atomic-energy-commission-chairman-rk-sinha/article6388804.ece?ref=relatedNews, accessed December 21, 2014.

Despite the strength of the discourse on India's engagements with the US nuclear deal, on this matter, there has been absolutely no movement.

The appropriation of India into the global nuclear order reveals not the end of a hierarchical world order defined by the western-Anglosphere, but a shift in it. The nature of 'nuclear apartheid' has been directed away from India, and towards Pakistan and Iran. This can be seen not only by the refusal to allow Pakistan the access granted to India within the NSG, but the absolute derision at suggestions that the India-Anglosphere deals might lead to deals with Pakistan.[87] This shift was started in the context of the war on terror by the BJP, but has been continued by the INC, which has furthered this cause by emphasizing India's links to the English-speaking world. The fear of India's geopolitics as seen in Chapter Three in particular, has dissipated and been replaced by obsessive emphasis on what India and the Anglosphere have in common.

Conclusion: From the 'most dangerous place in the world' to the 'world's largest democracy'

In the case of the US, the foreign policy elites' perception of India has shifted from a fearful object of unstable geopolitics, to source of ideational hope. Indian foreign policy makers have similarly begun to construct a shared identity with the US. Essentially, what has occurred in the nuclear context is a shift from Anglosphere states perceiving India as an actor solely in its geopolitically dangerous 'South Asian' context, viewed primarily as having a large population and dangerous border disputes with its also nuclear-armed and densely-populated neighbours, to a discourse emphasizing India as liberal-democratic, a trading partner which can be trusted with nuclear technologies without consideration of its geopolitical danger. The emphasis on India and the US's 'common values', 'rule of law' and 'multi-ethnic democracy', 'freedom' and 'free trade' in the US are particularly important as these are the same discursive strands that are identified with scholars and politicians arguing for the continued supremacy of the Anglosphere. Thus, rather than a dangerous actor, now, India is hoped to be the Anglosphere's 'democratic counterweight' to China. This is particularly telling given that India's border conflicts with Pakistan and China have not been resolved, and its nuclear program continued. This newfound appreciation of India in ideational constructions from Anglosphere actors is a crucial part of the shift of India

[87] Burns, 'Global Partnership Agreement'.

towards India's connections with the Anglosphere identity. India-US, as well as the broader India-Anglosphere, cooperation is animated and made possible by precisely this discursive shift. This shared identity, though, is ambivalent because it has challenged India's established postcolonial identity discourse. India, under Manmohan Singh in this period was prepared to emphasize its connection to the Anglosphere and this has assisted it in moving itself up the nuclear hierarchy it has long deemed discriminatory. Partly allying with an Anglosphere against its Others has assisted India not just in removing discrimination against its nuclear program, but has assisted in furthering its goal of creating a multipolar world order. It has been able to do this even as India remains outside of the NPT and other non-proliferation structures. It is on this basis that nonaligned India has become a part of a nuclear order it so long dismissed as colonial.

Moreover, the embrace of India from the western-Anglosphere states is still reliant on the India problem. This is despite the attempt to (re)define the Anglosphere as pluralist and postcolonial. India has become seen as knowable, trustable and 'just like us'. This approach to solving the India problem, though, is similarly burdened by the past. While India may have transcended its geopolitics of South Asia and the Indian Ocean in the eyes of Anglosphere, the embrace is severely limited by the ambivalence of India's postcolonial identity and the Anglosphere's inherent egocentrism. Despite the reshaping of India-Anglosphere relations in the context of nuclear materials and technologies, however, India still sought to distance itself from the US relationship. In the domestic setting it emphasized that it remains outside of the NPT, and sees this order as discriminatory. It has also reiterated its desire for a multi-polar or polycentric world order, and that it has no intention of changing these policies. By seeking a polycentric world order, India still resists the US-led hierarchical liberal world order. By seeking to move up the nuclear hierarchy it termed colonial, India has still resisted it in the same way that joining the Commonwealth made the organization less hierarchical. India's 'semi-legitimate' position in the global nuclear order has made that order less discriminatory. This is far from purely resistance to hierarchy. India's Anglosphere turn has been animated partly by the same Islamophobic discourse that animates the Hindutva connection with the Anglosphere and the rise of China. From India's perspective, however, the deals assist in creating a non-hierarchical, multipolar world in which India is able to compete equally with the US. This is fundamentally not the liberal-hierarchical world order envisioned by the US and its Anglosphere allies.

Conclusion: Race, Hierarchy and the Anglosphere

This thesis has considered the idea of English-speaking unity in international relations and the ways in which India has been located inside and outside it. It has shown the ways in which colonial histories and imaginaries continue to shape contemporary international politics and considered how this racialized world order has defined India's place in the world. Ideas of the English-speaking world have shifted historically, but there has been much continuity. Despite scientific racist discourse being replaced with 'culture' and 'values', there has been a considerable level of continuity with regards to ideas: racialized identities have continued to shape international politics. India has resisted the racialized nature of world politics and the hierarchy attached to it. These racialized categories have continued to shape India's relationship with the English-speaking world despite the demise of biological racial terms.

The case studies presented have further demonstrated the centrality of this ideational issue to constructing India-Anglosphere relations. Throughout these examples, we can see the ways in which colonial/postcolonial identities of colonizer and colonized have shaped and continued to shape international relations between India and the Anglosphere. Despite the immense enthusiasm for India across the English-speaking world, India has not behaved in the manner suggested it might by Eurocentric IR theory or in the manner expected by the western-Anglosphere states that have become so eager to engage it. This is the crux of the English-speaking world's contemporary India problem, in which India is seen as having a shared identity with the Anglosphere. This is only possible on the basis of the excision of race and decolonization from IR theory and international politics. This neglects, however, India's continued reliance on its postcolonial identity and the ways in which this has continued to limit its engagements with the Anglosphere. Despite India's ambivalence with the Anglosphere, India understands the US-led liberal hierarchical order in a fundamentally different way from the Anglosphere states. This has led to repeated confusion over India's foreign policy, seeing it as irrational and unnecessarily concerned with colonialism, and now as erroneously seeing India as 'just like us', a part of the Anglosphere.

Within IR theory, the vision of states acting according to interests determined by the system, be they realist or liberal, reinforces the India problem within the discipline. The Eurocentric origins of these theories leave mainstream IR continually perplexed by Indian

foreign policy. As numerous scholars have pointed out, IR's origins as an imperial discipline and the Eurocentric nature of this theory leave limitations on its ability to interpret international politics.[1] This has left IR largely blind to the postcolonial hierarchy at play in contemporary international politics and limited its understanding of Indian foreign policy. As has been demonstrated here, India's response to this racialized hierarchy has been to resist it and its avatars, leading India to challenge patterns of hierarchy, such as colonialism, racial discrimination and the NPT.

To conclude my discussion of India's ambivalence with the Anglosphere, I reiterate the key themes of this thesis through a final consideration of what India tells us about the idea of English-speaking unity in world politics and, following this, what taking an Anglosphere perspective can tell us about Indian foreign policy. I follow this by considering the future of India-Anglosphere relations and future prospects for research. I close with a final consideration of what future the idea of the Anglosphere might have in IR.

The Anglosphere from an Indian perspective

This thesis has added a postcolonial dimension to the study of the Anglosphere as a racialized identity, as begun by Vucetic. Although Anglo-Saxonism defines the close relationships between the Anglosphere states, this identity also limits relationships with other states, particularly those that have been shaped by the Anglosphere's imperialist adventures. Viewing the Anglosphere as more than a collection of states connected by a racialized identity, but as a broader ideational narrative which relates to particular others, and becomes more prominent at times of international anxiety, allows us to conceptualize the idea further and subject it to postcolonial critique. This enables us to consider the relationship between colonizers and colonized and the different perceptions of world order, particularly when the western-Anglosphere states reach out to connect with former colonies. Placing India in this context adds a new understanding of the Anglosphere. This highlights not only the exclusionary nature of the racialized identity more clearly, but also the pluralism within the idea of the Anglosphere. There have always been exceptions to the racialized identity of Anglo-Saxonism identified and discussed so effectively by Vucetic. The racialized hierarchy within the idea of the Anglosphere, though, and where non-white peoples might sit on it, as

[1] See, for example: Krishna, 'Race, Amnesia' and Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture'.

examined in Chapter Two, reveals the centrality of the colonial hierarchy to contemporary debates on the Anglosphere.

This thesis has mapped out the India problem and showed the forms in takes IR theory, the Anglosphere states' foreign policy discourse and, most clearly, the idea of English-speaking unity. Chapters One and Two identified two interrelated narratives on India's position in the English-speaking world, showing that they have always co-existed and continue to do so. Both have incorporated racial ideas, although the most recent wave of discourse has sought to proclaim its anti-racist postcolonial nature. The analysis of where India sits within the 'Anglosphere', however, reveals how central colonial discourses remain to the contemporary concept and further shows that colonial impulses and identities still exist in contemporary world politics. The racialized identity of the Anglosphere states led them often to view India as irrational and unteachable after Indian independence, as not acting inside accepted categories. In the post-Cold War world order, these states have sought to appropriate India into the Anglosphere, elevating it within the international hierarchy on the basis of new, similarly racialized, anxieties. India has become seen as civilized and teachable. While seeing India this way, however, the western-Anglosphere states have consistently misinterpreted India in its efforts to see it as 'just like them' and sharing its 'values'.

The hierarchy within the idea of English-speaking unity can first be seen in the idea of Greater Britain. Imperialists who were anxious over the future of the empire considered various forms of imperial federation, but were unsure of what to do with their largest and most powerful imperial possession. When imagining the future of world order, the British imperialists considered imperial federation but were ultimately unwilling to give up India. Some saw India as needing to remain with an imperial federation, but needing to be subjugated within it. Others rejected the idea that India could ever be a part of Greater Britain, as the idea had to be racially exclusive. Looking at Greater Britain through India's engagement with the concept, particularly that of the Indian liberal streams of thought that partially accept the idea, reveals to us very clearly the difficulties within the concept of English-speaking unity. The Indian liberals were prepared to accept this concept if it meant the removal of racial discriminations against India. They were left on the outside; however, as it became clear that the British could not imagine Indians as being on par with them. The INC, on the other hand, rejected the idea outright in favour of full independence.

A new idea of the English-speaking peoples arose after WWII led by Winston Churchill, which was accompanied by debate on what form the Commonwealth should take. These same narratives of the English-speaking world arose once more, with some calling for a multiracial Commonwealth and others concerned that such an organization would lack cohesion. Churchill hinted at an overlap between the 'English-speaking peoples' and the colonies, but ultimately emphasized the US and the UK in his own vision of the English-speaking peoples. Nehru, however, once India was independent, instead joined the Commonwealth, thus preventing it from being an all-white organization. As was seen in Chapters Three and Four, India went on to use this organization to oppose racial discrimination in Australia, Canada and South Africa.

The English-speaking world originally constructed the 'global colour line', and has continued to see itself as the defender of world order. These ideas have continued to shape contestations over international political issues and global governance. This has been continuous, despite the change in the nature of the discourse away from explicit biological racism. As Tony Abbott stated in a speech for US Independence Day: 'Almost from the beginning, the destinies of our two countries have been intertwined. They were intertwined in the 1770s when the English government sought a new penal colony because America was no longer available'.[2] He went on to argue that: 'We are natural partners because America's values – democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom and opportunity – are Australia's values, too… America was, is, and will be the indispensable nation – the one reliable bulwark against a world where might is right'.[3] Here, the construction of shared identity is linked both to settler-colonialism and the ongoing defence of US-led hierarchy.

One matter of great continuity throughout each wave of discourse is the way in which Indians have resisted the racialized hierarchy of the Anglosphere. Even when Madhav das Nalapat identified India with the Anglosphere, he did so when arguing that it was the force of ideas and not the 'blood of the body' that made it so. He was arguing against the racialized form, but also against the hierarchy within the pluralist vision of the concept. When Manmohan Singh argued that India was central to the English-speaking world, he argued that Indians were the 'largest single component', thus making India more central to the idea than

[2] Tony Abbott, 'Address to the USA Independence Day Reception, US Embassy, Canberra', (2015) at 'http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-06-30/address-usa-independence-day-reception-us-embassy-canberra, accessed July 17, 2015.
[3] Abbott, 'Address to the USA'.

any Anglo-Saxon identity. This takes a very different form when practised by Hindu nationalists rather than those politically aligned with the INC. When Jaswant Singh identified the US as India's 'natural ally', he did so when framing the two as equals in the war on terror and in world order generally. When India identifies itself with the English-speaking world, it does so with the aim of levelling the hierarchy within the concept that has consistently dominated western-Anglosphere perspectives. This is common between both the foreign policy measures taken by India (joining the Commonwealth, resisting racial discrimination, joining the war on terror, signing the many India-Anglosphere nuclear agreements) and Indian discourse on the concepts of 'Greater Britain', the 'English-speaking peoples' and the Anglosphere.

This, however, is very much not the case when the idea of the Anglosphere has been used by its proponents and included India.[4] The same is true of the politicians associated with the term. Anglospherist thinkers all reinforce the colonial hierarchy of the concept obvious within its genealogy. Tony Abbott's usage was clearly belittling India because he identified India's positive elements as British, and its negatives as Indian.[5] When Gordon Brown wanted to 'enlarge the Anglosphere' he wanted to expand US-UK cooperation.[6] When India is discussed within this space, its colonial history is seen as positive, revealing to us the excision of colonial violence from the contemporary idea of the Anglosphere.

Even within the contemporary idea of an Anglosphere, some authors, such as Andrew Roberts, exclude India and simply define the English-speaking world through its original racialized core.[7] Others, such as Howard, suggested that they were surprised to think India might fit within the idea, but have seemingly warmed to the idea.[8] Those arguing for a contemporary Anglosphere discussed in Chapter Two, such as Bennett, Kimball and Hannan have sought to place India within this space. First, simply including India in an Anglosphere narrative does not take into account the history of resistance discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. This certainly does not take into account the more subtle forms of contemporary resistance to hierarchy discussed in Chapters Five and Six. India, despite the shared identity constructed with the US and the UK in certain contexts, still has important

[4] Bennett, *The Anglosphere*.
[5] Abbott, *Battlelines*.
[6] Brown, 'Enlarging the Anglosphere'.
[7] Roberts, *History of the English Speaking Peoples*.
[8] Howard, 'The Anglosphere and the advance of freedom'.

differences over the perception of world order. As I suggested earlier, the impossibility of positioning India within this idea, combined with India's ambivalence towards it strongly suggests, however, that the idea of an Anglosphere remains tethered to its colonial origins. This appears to be its permanent condition.

India from an Anglosphere perspective

What, then, can an Anglosphere perspective tell us about Indian foreign policy? The case studies of this thesis have considered India-Anglosphere relations through detailed case studies of the postcolonial identity politics between India and the western-Anglosphere states. Looking at India through an Anglosphere perspective gives us a new framework for understanding India's foreign policy and a new way to consider Indian identity. India has, for the most part, had very similar relationships with all four of the western-Anglosphere states, suggesting very strongly that these states see India the same way and that India has tended to treat them as a single entity.

Chapter Three of this thesis showed just how thoroughly India rejected Australia's racialized identity. Australia's perception of India as irrational and unknowable is the clearest and worst iteration of the India problem. Australia's racialized identity and assumptions about India led it to look down on Indian foreign policy as frustratingly irrational. This mirrors the ways in which the racialized narrative of the English-speaking world has relied on racialized and orientalist stereotypes of India. After India's independence, Australia's explicitly racialized identity severely limited its ability to engage with India, inhibiting the development of a productive postcolonial relationship.

India resisted the creation of a racialized Commonwealth in the 1940s and 1950s, and went to considerable effort to resist racial discrimination in Australia and Canada, often to the detriment of its relationships with these states. India's postcolonial identity led it to resist assertions of Anglo-Saxon superiority once it was freed from Britain's colonial rule. In this early period of Indian independence, its international behaviour reveals its resistance to acting in the manner that the Anglosphere states hoped it might. Despite this resistance, Nehru did keep India within the Commonwealth, and Canada was able to build briefly a constructive relationship with India. India's position within this discourse reflects the deep ambivalence of a postcolonial state within the hierarchical world order. In the case of

Australia under Robert Menzies, when the identity was explicitly racist, India has shown outright resistance to the expectations of a Commonwealth/Anglosphere state. This tells us about the way Indian identity continues to shape its foreign policy in the contemporary world and reveals to us the ways in which India continues to resist global hierarchies.

At the same time, Canada's liberal internationalist identity was more successful in engaging India, but ultimately failed to construct a 'special relationship'. This, coupled with India's resistance to a racialized Commonwealth reveals this colonial hierarchy to be something resisted by India. Postcolonial India was unable to align itself with this space, largely due to racial discrimination. That racist discourse on India was most prominent in the case of Australia, suggests that India, due to Australia's own anxieties over its place in the world, was one of the others on which Australia's racialized identity was constructed.

Canada was immensely enthusiastic about India, seeing it as reflecting its liberal internationalism. This confidence however, was misplaced. Canada's liberal internationalism led it to see India as a possible partner in a 'special relationship'. Although it professed its opposition to racism, Canada's vision of itself was still dependent upon settler-colonial narratives. Although India successfully urged Canada to allow a token number of Indians, even this caused tension between the two countries. Indeed, Canada's immigration policy was an excellent example of the pluralist narrative of the English-speaking peoples for although it was not racially exclusively, the limited size of the quota and the insistence on 'assimilation' into Canadian life suggested strongly that Canada was determined to maintain its whiteness.

In these two cases, an emphasis on Indian sources adds an important new perspective on these relationships. This has been a major failing in advancing our understanding of India-Australia relations: the inability to overcome the difficultly of accessing Indian sources so as to bring more Indian voices to the understanding of the relationship. Recent historical work by Gurry has emphasized the role of postcolonial issues in shaping India-Australia relations after Indian independence, but this work can only be made stronger by further emphasis on the Indian sources.[9] While historians like Christopher Waters, Gwenda Tavan and David Walker have performed important work on the ways in which Australia perceived Asia, this

[9] Gurry, *Mapping the Journey*.

has work has left important gaps.[10] Much less has been done on the Asian states' perspectives on Australia and how these perceptions might shape bilateral relationships. For IR, an emphasis on identity becomes central: Indian material cannot match the detail of those found at western archives, yet the study of Indian identity and its diplomatic practices can advance a postcolonial understanding of Indian diplomatic history. Purely empirical diplomatic history, then, struggles to take into account non-western perspectives when studying cross-cultural diplomacy. This is in part due to archival practices in India, which have been shaped by the NAI's history as a secretive British institution, and are in this sense part of the cause of the India problem.[11] I will return to this theme as a future research agenda below.

In the post-Cold War world order, discourse on English-speaking unity has animated similarly ambivalent relationships with India. The US-UK narration of the war on terror was able to engage with the BJP government on the basis of shared threats and fears of Islam. This shows us that India has a connection to the Anglosphere that can be animated in the context of shared others. Even when this occurs, its postcolonial ambivalence still limits the advance of these relationships. The colonial construction of the Hindu nationalism leads it to its own ambivalences with India's colonial history and the Anglosphere. This has allowed for some alignment between the US and the UK and the Hindutva movement. Hindu nationalism rejects the Anglosphere not so much due to opposition to hierarchy, but so as to assert India's place atop a different civilizational and racialized hierarchy, alongside, but different from, the English-speaking world. While the Hindu nationalist narrative avoids the discourse used by Nehru and Manmohan Singh, that explicitly placed India as part of the 'English-speaking world', a shared Islamophobia still animated a particular Hindutva form of Anglosphere identity. Within Hindu nationalist foreign policy discourse, India is a natural partner for the US and the UK. This reveals also that Islam is an Other which animates the idea of the Anglosphere and enables the inclusion of India.

[10] Waters, *After Decolonization*; Tavan, *Long Slow Death of White Australia* and David Walker, *Anxious Nation*.
[11] Dinyar Patel, India's Archives: how did things get so bad?, (2012) at http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/indias-archives-how-did-things-get-this-bad/?_r=0, accessed 9 January, 2015. For my own more elaborate analysis of this issue, see Alexander E. Davis, 'An Archival Turn for International Relations: Interrogating India's Diplomatic History from the (Post)colonial Archive', paper presented at ISA Global South Caucus Conference, Singapore, January 2015.

Chapter Six showed the ambivalence of India's recent nuclear engagements with the Anglosphere via the India-US nuclear deal. This deal has partially ended India's explicit resistance to 'nuclear apartheid' and reveals a partial, ambivalent alignment between India and the pluralist narrative of the Anglosphere. Even in this case though, India's postcolonial identity simultaneously limited its alignment with the Anglosphere. Although these deals have undoubtedly improved India's relationship with the Anglosphere, these two states still had very different perceptions as to what this deal meant. Similarly, the INC mounted a defence of their Nehruvian foreign policy and fitted the policy within that narrative. Even as further deals were done with the other Anglosphere states, India continued to emphasize its opposition to the NPT. India's willingness to identify itself with the English-speaking world in this context, however, reveals that India is connected to this space, but has reimagined its hierarchy. The shared identity constructed between India and the Anglosphere over the war on terror and the trade in nuclear materials is made ambivalent by these clashes.

We can say comprehensively from these examples that India has not and still does not behave the way the western-Anglosphere states expect it to. It has repeatedly been shown in each of the case studies considered here. It was clearest, though, in the confusion surrounding the Indian 1974 nuclear test, as seen in Bruce Grant's summation of the western-Anglosphere states' response, in which India was seen as acting outside of 'accepted categories'.[12] This continues to be the case in the India-US nuclear deal, and was similarly the case over cooperation in the war on terror. The repeated emphasis on India as a power with which the Anglosphere states could share a special relationship is revealing and consistent. And yet, the western-Anglosphere states have been continually disappointed and perplexed by India's foreign policy choices. Although there is limited overlap of identities that has animated some forms of cooperation, India and the Anglosphere see the world from different positions of global hierarchy. It remains true that India does not act within the ideological parameters of the space. Such expectations of India's behaviour, have been continually dashed, and yet continue to reappear. The India problem remains.

The future of India-Anglosphere relations

As I argued in Chapter One, much scholarship on India's bilateral relationship with the western-Anglosphere states presents a progressive narrative of India-Anglosphere

[12] Grant, 'Indian Nuclear Test'.

relations as finally emerging out of Cold War-induced torpor. This silences India's resistance to colonialism and racial discrimination and dismisses Nehruvian foreign policy as the growing pains of a new state. Most assessments of the future of these relationships today are rosy, expecting deeper alignments to be formed as India continues its 'rise' in world politics, seeing an alignment of both values and interests. My research calls into question the assertion that India and the Anglosphere share an identity, and with it, interests and values. Whereas the Anglosphere states are allied together in support of the US-led liberal hierarchy, India seeks a 'polycentric' or multipolar world order. This leads India and the Anglosphere to be on opposite sides of numerous global issues. India is friendly to Russia, joins with anti-Western coalitions in the WTO, seeks solidarity with the 'Global South' through BRICS, and will not join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.[13] Even on issues where India and the Anglosphere have broadly agreed, these two states have perceived these matters differently.

The rise of Narendra Modi to power in 2014 has created even more interest in India across the English-speaking world. Modi has visited Australia, Canada and the US as part of a broader effort to energize India's foreign policy. As Vajpayee did in his first term of office, Modi has emphasized links with the Indian diaspora, continuing to see India more as a defender of a broader Hindu civilization. Modi has avoided identifying within the 'English-speaking world' as Manmohan did when announcing the India-US nuclear deal, but has been prepared to identify India as sharing 'values' and 'history' with the Anglosphere states.[14] The BJP have sought to further liberalize India's economy, through its 'make in India' campaign, which seeks Foreign direct investment in Indian manufacturing and will continue to entice the Anglosphere powers towards a similar discourse on India.

This has not, however, been without its ambivalences. Although India and Australia have aimed to strengthen their partnership since Modi's election, and have had some successes in doing so, the different readings of colonial histories and their meaning were very clearly on display during Modi's visit to Australia in November 2014. Modi was introduced by Tony Abbott, who argued that that 'Australians admired the way India won independence – not by rejecting the values learned from Britain, but by appealing to them; not by fighting

[13] Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis, 'The Natural-Neglected Relationship: Liberalism, Identity and India-Australia Relations', *The Pacific Review*, published online: 27 Oct 2015.
[14] Governments of India and Government of the US, 'U.S.-India Joint Statement', (2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all, accessed June 5, 2015.

the colonisers, but by working on their conscience'.[15] Modi suggested also that India is linked to Australia 'by the great Indian Ocean; by our connected history and our many shared inheritances - and, even more by our deeply interlinked destinies.'[16] Modi's choice of example tying India and Australia together through colonial history, though, was telling:

> More than 150 years ago, an Australian novelist and lawyer John Lang fought the legal battle for a brave Indian freedom fighter, the Queen of Jhansi, Rani Laxmi Bai against the British East India Company in India's first War of Independence.[17]

Where Abbott had cited various battles to protect British colonial interests such as Gallipoli, Tobruk, Singapore and El Alamein,[18] Modi cited a lone Australian lawyer defending a 'freedom fighter' after India's 'First War of Independence'. Even though India and Australia are seeking to draw on shared history in an effort to construct a shared identity, they drew very different lessons from this history. Modi's choice of 'shared history' similarly made Abbott's assertion that India did not fight its colonizers but won them over with their own British values appear absurd. It is insufficient for India and the Anglosphere to simply express a deeper desire to engage one another if they continue to see international hierarchy and international politics so differently. This shared identity is still deeply ambivalent. As long as the western-Anglosphere states maintain their close links to one another in support of US hegemony over world order, they will not be able to engage postcolonial India in deeper relationships. Changing this aspect of India-Anglosphere relations requires more than just the political will and enthusiasm that was displayed by Narendra Modi and Tony Abbott. Rather, the relationship requires a shift in the ways in which India and the Anglosphere imagine themselves and world politics. Without this, India and the Anglosphere will continue to misunderstand one another regardless of how much desire there is to engage.

Future research opportunities

Given the pessimistic vision of the future of India-Anglosphere relations presented here, which is at odds with much contemporary political discourse, the arguments advanced in this thesis suggest a number of opportunities for further research. This research opens up

[15] Tony Abbott, 'Address to Parliament, House of Representatives', (2014) at http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2014/11/18/prime-minister-address-parliament-house-representatives-parliament-house, accessed February 12, 2015.
[16] Narendra Modi, 'Address to Australian Parliament', (2014) at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/narendra-modi-first-indian-prime-minister-to-address-joint-session-of-australian-parliament/article6518365.ece, accessed February 12, 2015.
[17] Modi, 'Address to Australian Parliament'.
[18] Abbott, 'Address to Parliament'.

avenues for further study of the contemporary world order, as well as for our understanding of historical development of international politics and the ways in which decolonization shaped world order. This thesis has advanced our understanding of India's ambivalent ideational relationship with the Anglosphere in a way that had not previously been considered. There are, however, some issues raised by this thesis that present opportunities for new research and opportunities to advance a broader postcolonial constructivist approach to IR.

The India problem can be solved in IR theory through an approach that takes into account identity and is at least sympathetic to postcolonial issues. By seeing India's postcolonial identity as playing a constitutive role in foreign policy, we can escape seeing India as being an irrational actor that has finally become more knowable or more 'normal'. The postcolonial research agenda here is most compatible with a critical constructivist approach which does not see the state as a blank slate prior to entering the international system, with an identity developed through interaction. The Wendtian approach limits IR's ability to consider colonial histories as constituting states' identities, as it sees state identities formed through interstate interactions.[19] Future scholarship needs to take a more critical look at India's foreign policy, rather than continue to rehash old answers to the 'India problem' that have broadly failed to understand the nuances of India's international behaviour. This means considering colonial histories and the ways in which race and racialized identity have shaped IR. If constructivist IR is to take in a postcolonial approach, then, it needs to consider more carefully and more explicitly the role colonialism played in constructing state identities across the colonial and settler-colonial world.

There are some limitations to the scope of this project, which can also form part of a future research agenda. First, I have identified throughout free trade as an element of Anglosphere identity. The emphasis on India as part of the Anglosphere arose as India liberalized its markets not just after the end of the Cold War, but with the beginning of the war on terror. As I have argued elsewhere, this can be seen as a form of geoeconomic discourse.[20] India's emphasis on state planning after independence was likely an element of its limited engagement with the Anglosphere states. An international political economy approach which takes into account states as ideational constructs grounded in the global

[19] Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', pp. 384-396.
[20] Davis, 'Problematizing India as Part of the Anglosphere', pp. 81-96.

economy would more explicitly examine the ways in which trade flows and economic policy shape India-Anglosphere relations.

There is a greater diversity of opinion in India than just the Nehruvian and Hindutva ideologies of the two major parties. Various strains of Communism are prominent across India and rely on different forms of Indian identity from the Nehruvian and Hindu nationalist forms. Regional political groups such as the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu are also influential in the Lok Sabha and play a role in parliamentary alliance formation that has not been considered in detail here. These minor parties played an important role as placing a check on the BJP's ability to ally India with the US and the UK, as discussed in Chapter Five. A more detailed consideration of the domestic context in which India foreign policy is made and the constraints this places on policy-makers would add to a more nuanced to our understanding of India's identification with the English-speaking world.

Another way in which this can be advanced is sharpening our understanding of how identity shapes India and the Anglosphere's perceptions of important contemporary events and issues.[21] India and the Anglosphere have very different perceptions of global hierarchy. But we need to consider how this manifests over certain international issues. This can be seen here in India's position within the global nuclear order. I have identified the rise of China as an important Other that drives the discourse on the English-speaking world and argued that this has changed the way India is seen by the Anglosphere. However, India has a distinctly different worldview from the Anglosphere states, as has been demonstrated here. Although both India and the Anglosphere feel a certain degree of anxiety over the rise of China, we need to consider the extent to which India and the Anglosphere really face the same 'China threat'.[22] Where the Anglosphere states fear China may threaten its liberal hegemony over world order, India's rise has been accompanied by a desire for a polycentric world order. As was seen in Shyam Saran's speech in Shanghai on the global nuclear order, India sees China as another pole in its desired multipolar world order. He went on to argue that India has 'a solemn commitment to pursue an independent foreign policy, promote multi-polarity in world

[21] For an example which investigates India and Australia's differing perceptions of Russian aggression on the Crimea, see: Chacko and Davis, 'The Natural-Neglected Relationship?'.
[22] Chengxin Pan, *Western Representations of China's Rise*.

relations and oppose unilateralism'.[23] India's border disputes with China, however, complicate this matter, but on the findings of this thesis, it is questionable if India and the Anglosphere states see China's rise in the same way. The extent to which China shares India's desire for a multipolar world order is unclear. India still sees China as a pole in its multipolar/polycentric world order, whereas the Anglosphere states seek to control and constrain the rise of China so as to prevent it from causing the demise of its hierarchical world order.

There is also scope for more historical research within a postcolonial-constructivist research agenda. The construction of the Commonwealth as a multi-racial institution rather than an all-white old boys club, which appeared likely when Jan Smuts first raised the idea, presents an excellent opportunity to consider in detail how the racial question shifted through decolonization. A historical study of how British imperial racial ideas in defining Greater Britain led to the idea of imperial federation and finally diffused over the clash as to what the Commonwealth should be would add to our understanding of decolonization of the world order. After India, the inclusion of Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, along with states in the Caribbean and South East Asia further expanded this body. This was only touched upon here in Chapters Three and Four. However, further work could look at the ways in which colonial racial discourses were challenged and reshaped by decolonization. The position of South Africa, where discourses of racial classifications hardened into apartheid, presents as a particularly important area of study. Further research can be done on this period using this approach, particularly on the basis of the material available at the under-resourced and under-utilized National Archives of India and other non-western archives. Despite the difficulty in accessing such material, a postcolonial research agenda must be more creative in dealing with limitations on archival material so as to ensure non-western voices are not ignored in diplomatic history, as has been the case particularly in India-Australia relations.

The future of the Anglosphere as a postcolonial resource, however, is rather murkier. A continued research agenda on the Anglosphere as a concept should also take in perspectives from other states marginalized within the narratives presented here. This thesis has only begun this task by examining the position of India in the Anglosphere, as India has

[23] Shyam Saran, 'Present Dimensions of the Indian Foreign Policy' at //www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?2078/Present+Dimensions+of+the+Indian+Foreign+Policy++Address+by+Foreign+Secretary+Mr+Shyam+Saran+at+Shanghai+Institute+of+International+Studies+Shanghai, accessed July 17, 2015.

become its largest and most talked about postcolonial member. Still, other states and peoples are similarly ambivalent within its definition. Recalling Bennett's generalization that 'parts of Africa' were part of the Anglosphere, new perspectives on the concept could come from English-speaking Africa such as Kenya and South Africa. The same is true of other states in Asia such as Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh who each narrate their colonial history and connections to Britain in different ways. The colonial nature of the concept has been revealed and critiqued here in detail, but the concept can yet be viewed from many different perspectives. Were it to be more thoroughly decolonized and viewed from more non-Western and non-Anglo perspectives, we could better understand how different histories of imperialism have created different state identities. The extent to which an Anglosphere perspective has a broader future in IR, however, is another matter.

Given the centrality of the racialized identity to the pluralist narrative of the Anglosphere, however, a decolonized narrative of the Anglosphere may be a contradiction in terms. The contemporary Anglosphere, constructed through ideals and free trade and against China and the Islamic World, have moved India, if only slightly, towards its historically constituted 'Anglosphere' identity. This shift does not represent India's foreign policy becoming more 'values-based' or more 'realist', rather it represents India's contemporary geopolitical anxieties clashing with its historical colonial experiences. And so, the identity remains deeply ambivalent.

Given the impossibility of placing India on the inside or outside of the Anglosphere, the English-speaking world, or a future iteration of the concept, this idea will always be an expression of colonial power and superiority. Vucetic has already shown how its close relationships are the product of colonial, racialized identities. We can further decolonize the concept through analysis of its so-called peripheries, to expose and undermine its continuation of colonial hierarchy. In this case, an Anglosphere perspective can indeed assist us to view the patterns and hierarchy of the current racialized world order. Given the persistence of the close relationships at the core of the Anglosphere, an approach to IR that takes in concepts of race and racialized identity is necessary. To fully decolonize the Anglosphere would be to disassemble it entirely, and move towards embracing more plural visions of modernity, necessitating the end the Anglo-western pretence to cultural and moral superiority that is at play in both international politics and IR as a discipline. We can use constructivist methods, including genealogy, to consider how such identities and ideas shape

international politics, and underpin close relationships between white, English-speaking states. Ultimately, though, postcolonial IR needs to unpick and critique the concept, and, as a normative stance, dispute the claim to superiority inherent in the Anglosphere. Without the claim to superiority, though, little would be left of the Anglosphere.

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